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Abstract 
Horticultural Marketing Channels in Kenya: Structure and Development 
PhD thesis by Tjalling Dijkstra 
This study analyses the structure and development of horticultural marketing channels in 
Kenya. It is based primarily on a farm survey among some 500 farmers in Nyandarua, Kisii 
and Taita Taveta Districts and a trade survey of about 750 horticultural traders in 18 different 
market places. The surveys were carried out between 1990 and 1992 as part of the Food and 
Nutrition Studies Programme. 
The book first describes the producers that bring horticultural commodities into the 
channels and then the actors and institutions that operate in those channels. Traders selling in 
the domestic market, agents, facilitating intermediaries, export traders, marketing 
cooperatives and processors are all reviewed. There is a particular focus on collecting 
wholesalers. It is shown that they increase the efficiency in the marketing channel to the 
benefit of both farmers and distributing wholesalers. The development of rural assembly 
markets, in which the collecting wholesalers sometimes operate, is also examined. It is 
concluded that such markets evolve in production areas with relatively poor farm 
accessibility and low supply concentration, because they reduce the transport and/or 
information costs of suppliers and buyers. 
The central research question of the study is what factors determine vertical 
differentiation in Kenyan horticultural marketing channels. A model is developed which 
seeks to explain this process. The first two explanatory factors found significant are the 
population of the market centre where the surveyed market place is located and population 
density of the rural hinterland. These are indicators of the consumer population served by the 
marketing channel. Other factors are transport time of the commodity from producer to 
consumer, keeping qualities of the commodity, and turnover of the traders. 
The analysis shows that marketing channel theory can be of relevance to the 
developing world. The vertical differentiation model proposed here can aid in predicting 
future changes in horticultural marketing systems in emerging African economies. The 
findings suggest that gravity models may also contribute to a better understanding of the 
structure of marketing channels in developing countries. 
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1.1. Exploration of the problem 
At the World Food Summit of November 1996, which was organized by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, food marketing in developing countries was 
one of the central themes. In a document prepared for the summit, the reason for this focus 
was made clear: the road to food security is impeded by malfunctioning marketing systems 
(FAO, 1995). This is certainly true for Africa. The demand for food is rising because an 
increasing number of people are unable to produce their own food. Population growth, 
rural-urban migration, land pressure and land degradation are among the factors behind this 
process. While the demand for food is rising, the supply is hampered by inefficiencies in 
production, collection, processing and distribution. Scarcity of inputs, poor infrastructure, 
lack of financial intermediaries and unstable political environments are some of the 
explanatory factors. 
African governments in the 1960s and 1970s tried to solve food marketing 
inefficiencies, particularly for storables such as grains. They replaced private-sector 
collection and distribution systems by state-controlled ones. In so doing they threw away the 
good with the bad. The cure also proved worse than the disease. In the 1980s, governments 
began putting their faith again in the hands of the free market, the same free market that had 
all along been shaping private trade systems for perishables such as vegetables, fruits and 
tubers. 
Present African governments are trying to keep pace with new developments in 
private food trade. They generally believe that state interventions should be avoided. At the 
same time, they understand that allowing resources to be allocated by the market may not 
always yield the desired results. Government regulations may be necessary, but will only be 
effective when based on a profound knowledge of the structure of private trade systems and 
of the factors that determine their long-term development. The present book contributes to 
this knowledge for the trade of vegetables, fruits and tubers (so-called horticultural 
commodities). 
1 
2 
Kenya as a case study 
Kenya is taken here as a case study. Horticultural commodities are produced by millions of 
Kenyan smallholders and are consumed by large sections of the rural and urban population. 
Marketing structures have developed without any significant government involvement, and 
within a relatively stable political environment Marketing channels are comprised of a wide 
variety of intermediaries. Small petty traders carry vegetables, fruits and tubers on their 
heads to the nearest market while large wholesalers hire transporters to carry horticultural 
commodities by truck from one side of the country to the other. Export traders charter whole 
cargo planes to fly produce to other parts of the world. 
Knowledge about the Kenyan horticultural sector is limited. Government studies of 
food marketing have dealt largely with grains. There are two reasons for this. First grain is 
a strategic commodity in the struggle for national food self-sufficiency. Second, the 
marketing system for grains, which until recently was monopolized by a marketing board, 
has been exhibiting politically unacceptable inefficiencies. Both these factors justify the 
attention paid to grains, but they do not warrant the knowledge gap that exists when it comes 
to vegetables, fruits and tubers.1 Besides being sources of indispensable nutrients, these 
commodities bring income, employment and foreign exchange to the Kenyan population. 
The horticultural marketing system in Kenya is more highly developed than those in 
many other African countries, and the present situation may give an indication of future 
developments in these countries. At the same time the Kenyan system is far from perfect 
Various constraints reduce its efficiency and effectiveness. Most of them are typical for 
many other African countries as well as Kenya. Analysing them could therefore contribute to 
a better understanding of horticultural marketing constraints in various parts of Africa, and 
eventually to better performance in horticultural marketing systems. 
The marketing channel approach 
Horticultural marketing in Kenya will be studied here by means of a marketing channel 
approach, meaning that all successive actors and institutions involved in getting produce 
from the farms to the consumers will be taken into account The analysis examines not only 
transactions in market places, but also those elsewhere, such as at the farm gate. That creates 
a clearer picture of the entire channel. Constraints on the exchange process at each marketing 
level can be investigated. The findings can be of use in improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the channels. 
Many commodities change hands in more than one market place before reaching the 
consumer. The marketing channel concept enables us to clarify the function of each market 
place, and to explain under which circumstances a market place will develop which kind of 
functions. This knowledge can be useful in planning new market places or upgrading 
existing ones. 
For a particular commodity, different types of marketing channels can exist 
Together these channels form a marketing structure. Some channels in the structure can be 
Not only policy studies by the government but also scholarly studies by local universities have rarely 
dealt with the marketing of horticultural commodities during the past few decades. This contrasts with 
the late 1960s and 1970s, when researchers at the University of Nairobi carried out a number of studies 
on the subject (Wilson, 1969, 1973; Maritim, 1976; Mbogho, 1977; Ngeno, 1978; Durr & Lorenzl, 
1980). 
3 
vertically differentiated to a greater extent than others. The degree of differentiation in 
marketing channels is influenced by specific factors in the marketing environment The 
challenge in the present study is to relate the degree of vertical differentiation to these 
explanatory factors. The findings can lead to a better understanding of the current marketing 
structures in developing countries, and can help to predict structural changes ensuing from 
expected changes in the marketing environment 
1.2. Research objective and questions 
The horticultural sector is of major importance to Kenya, and improved knowledge of the 
marketing system can help enhance the performance of the sector. The present study seeks to 
expand this knowledge. The objective is to analyse the structure and development of 
horticultural marketing channels in Kenya. 
Kenyan farmers that produce horticultural commodities for the market will be 
described first. They are the raison d'Stre of the marketing channels. Knowing them will 
increase understanding of the marketing system. 
The subsequent focus will be on the marketing channels themselves. The first 
research question is: What actors and institutions operate in the channels and what are their 
characteristics? Traders, agents and facilitating intermediaries will be examined. Specific 
focus is on collecting wholesalers. In Kenya, as in many other developing countries, they 
operate in the most problematic and least understood part of the channel. Special attention 
will be devoted to their efficiency. The development of rural assembly markets, in which 
collecting wholesalers operate, will also be investigated. Special reference is made to 
transport and information costs. 
What factors determine the degree of vertical differentiation in Kenyan horticultural 
marketing channels? This is the second and central research question. The most important 
factors to be investigated are the size of the consumer population and transport times from 
farms to consumer centres. A historical analysis of food trade in Sub-Saharan Africa helps to 
identify them. 
1.3. Research methodology 
The analyses in the present study are based primarily on primary data. Surveys were carried 
out as part of a research project on horticultural production and marketing in Kenya. This 
project was part of the Food and Nutrition Studies Programme (FNSP), a joint effort of the 
Ministry of Planning and National Development in Nairobi, and the African Studies Centre 
in Leiden.2 
The surveys were carried out by enumerators of the Central Bureau of Statistics and 
students from Egerton University, under supervision of one researcher from Egerton 
For a review of research results and published reports during the 1985-1992 period, see Hoorweg (1993). 
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University and one from the African Studies Centre. The project results were published as 
FNSP reports (Dijkstra & Magori, 1991,1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b, 1995b). 
The farm survey 
A farm survey was carried out in Nyandarua, Taita Taveta and Kisii Districts. These were 
selected because they were known for their horticultural output, and because their location 
would provide information on different parts of Kenya. Nyandarua is located in the central 
highlands, Kisii in western Kenya, and Taita Taveta halfway between the central highlands 
and the coast Map 1 shows their location. The map depicts the situation at the time of the 
survey. Kisii District is smaller today than shown on the map due to a redrawing of district 
boundaries. 
In each of the three selected districts, the rural areas suitable for horticulture were 
identified. In Taita Taveta two areas with greatly divergent agro-ecological conditions were 
encountered, each with its own kind of horticulture (rainfed or irrigated). Taita Taveta was 
therefore divided into two separate research areas, the Taita Hills and Taveta Division. Four 
research areas were thus distinguished: Nyandarua, Kisii, Taita and Taveta. 
In each research area, horticultural farmers were sampled in a multi-stage sampling 
procedure. First clusters were sampled randomly in the areas suitable for horticulture, using 
a list of existing CBS clusters. Maps 2 to 4 show the locations of the clusters within each 
district The next step differed from one district to another. In Nyandarua a relatively recent 
listing existed of all households located in the clusters. The large majority of the households 
were presumed to sell horticultural commodities. A systematic sample of 240 households 
was taken from the list and all of them were interviewed. The six households that turned out 
not to sell horticultural commodities were removed from the sample when the characteristics 
of commercial horticultural farmers were analysed. 
In Kisii, Taita and Taveta, existing listings were relatively old and the involvement of 
households in commercial horticulture was expected to be lower than in Nyandarua. 
Therefore, new household listings were compiled in the sampled clusters. During the listing, 
households were asked whether they had sold horticultural commodities in the year under 
consideration. After the listing was finalized, a systematic sample was drawn from the listed 
households which had been found to be involved in commercial horticulture.3 Table 1.1 
shows the number of listed, households, and listed and sampled households with 
horticultural sales. 
For the purpose of the survey, households were defined in accordance with the 
definition of the Kenyan CBS: a household is a group of people who live together in the 
same dwelling unit or homestead, and eat together (share the same cooking pot) (CBS, 
1994b). Normally these people are related by blood or marriage, but this is not necessarily 
the case. All members are answerable to the same head. Horticultural commodities were 
defined as all vegetables, fruits and tubers which were traded fresh (and were therefore 
perishable). Beans were not regarded as horticulture, with the exception of those eaten fresh 
In all four research areas substitution was applied. In the event of nonexistent households or repeated no 
response, these households were replaced by other ones. Less than 5 per cent of the sampled households 
had to be substituted. 
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Map 2. Nyandarua District and part of Nakuru District 
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Table 1.1. Listed and sampled households in the farm survey per district 
District (Province) all listed 
households 
listed hh's -with 
horticultural sales 
sampled hh's with 
horticultural sales 
Nyandarua (Central) [240] [234] 234 
Kisii (Nyanza) 1 3 9 1,016 144 
TaitaTaveta (Coast) 
-Taita Hills 563 351 87 
- Taveta Division 544 182 38 
(e.g. French beans). Cut flowers are also part of horticulture, but none of the fanners in the 
survey areas cultivated them. 
The farm survey was carried out between August 1990 and March 1992. Farmers 
were visited once, and asked about farm and off-farm activities in the current or previous 
year. The enumerators used standardized questionnaires. 
The trade survey 
Parallel to the farm survey, a trade survey was carried out in 18 market places, located in 15 
population centres in five Kenyan districts. Some of the centres were located in the 
horticultural production areas of the same districts examined in the farm survey. Others were 
located outside such production areas in the same or other districts. The market places and 
their locations are listed in Table 1.2, and shown in Maps 2 to 4. 
The survey was carried out during harvesting periods, when the bulk of the 
horticultural commodities entered the market. Market places in large urban centres were 
operational six days a week, while the others had two official market days a week. Outside 
these two days trade was limited. Each market place was surveyed once, on an official 
market day. 
In each market place, horticultural traders were selected by systematic sampling, and 
were interviewed by means of a standardized questionnaire.4 It is important to note that the 
trade area of the market place was usually bigger than the demarcated selling area. The 
fenced area was often too small, or there was no fence at all, and selling in front of the 
market was not uncommon. Market masters adapted to this situation and also collected 
market fees from traders who displayed their commodities on the ground outside the official 
selling area. In our survey, everyone who had paid market fees was considered to be part of 
the market place. 
Each enumerator began in a different part of the market and interviewed, for example, every fifth trader 
(depending on the total number of traders selling in the market place and the targeted number of 
interviews). If a trader refused to cooperate or was busy dealing with a customer, the next trader was 
approached. In small markets, the aim was to interview at least 20 traders. In the Kongowea wholesale 
market in Mombasa, only horticultural traders who sold commodities from Taita Taveta were included in 
the sampling (such in accordance with the aims of the FNSP project at the time). In the other markets 
all horticultural traders selling produce were included. 
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Map 3 . Kisii District 
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Table 1.2. Location, total trader population and sample size of surveyed market places 
District (Province) market centre market place trader population* sample size 
Nyandarua (Central) Nyahururu Nyahururu 50 21 
Engineer Engineer 25 21 
Magumu Magumu 75 30 
Nakuru (Rift Valley) Nakuru wholesale market 803 96 
retail market 90 24 
Njoro Njoro 160 31 
Dundori Dundori 45 19 
TaitaTaveta (Coast) Voi Voi 184 57 
Taveta Taveta 452 95 
Wundanyi Wundanyi 199 56 
Kisii (Nyanza) Kisii Municipal market 137 39 
Daraja Mbili 286 41 
Nyakoe Nyakoe 225 27 
Riochanda Riochanda 307 37 
Kebirigo Kebirigo 74 38 
Keroka Keroka 127 35 
Mombasa (Coast) Mombasa Kongowea wholesale market 343 40 
Majengo retail market 106 59 
* The size of the trader population is the number of farmer-traders and professional traders selling produce in the 
market place on the day of the survey. 
Table 1.2 shows the number of traders questioned per market place and the total 
horticultural trader population in the market on the day of the survey. The figures refer to 
traders who offered produce for sale. Traders who came from elsewhere to buy 
commodities were neither counted nor sampled. 
In addition to the general trade survey, some smaller surveys were carried out One 
of them focused on collecting wholesalers operating in Nyandarua District Another was 
carried out by an MA student from Wageningen Agricultural University, who gathered 
detailed information in the Nakuru and Njoro markets (Van den Berg, 1994). A third survey 
collected background information on traders in three market places in Taita Taveta District 
(Voi, Wundanyi and Mgambonyi). 
1.4. Scope of the study 
The present study examines horticultural farmers and horticultural marketing intermediaries. 
Their behaviour is analysed from an economic point of view. It is realized, however, that 
social, psychological, political and religious motives may play a role, too. Consumers are 
regarded as willing buyers of produce, because we are dealing with a sellers market. 
Horticultural commodities normally sell as long as they reach a retail oudet Marketing 
constraints are found mainly in earlier parts of the channel. 
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The analyses focus on marketing channels for fresh produce. By far the largest part 
of the Kenyan horticultural commodities are marketed fresh, and only relatively small 
quantities are processed. Horticultural processors will be examined in brief. 
When we deal with horticultural farmers, our unit of analysis is the household. 
Households decide to sell part of their horticultural produce in some certain way. It is 
realized that the decision processes are subject to certain intra-household mechanisms. When 
we deal with horticultural marketing intermediaries, the unit of analysis is the actor or the 
institution. 
The farm and trade surveys were cross-sectional. Most of the questions dealt with 
the situation on the day of the interview. Some questions related to the past (with a 
maximum recall period of one year). Market places were surveyed during the main 
harvesting period in that region. As a consequence, markets in different regions were 
surveyed in different parts of the year, or in successive years (August 1990 - March 1992). 
The years under consideration experienced normal horticultural harvests. The value of the 
Kenyan shilling declined during the research period, but it was generally observed that this 
did not affect prices for horticultural commodities. 
Farmers and traders were willing to cooperate, and did not find it a problem to 
discuss their businesses. This was, at least in part, thanks to the enumerators. Local CBS 
personnel carried out the farm survey. They knew the farmers and spoke the local language. 
Farmers knew from experience that their answers would not be used for tax purposes. 
Egerton students carried out the trade survey. In most cases they came from the survey area 
and spoke the local language. The fact that they were 'just' students reassured the traders. 
1.5. Outline of the book 
Figure 1.1 visualizes the structure of the book. Chapters 2 and 3 are introductory chapters, 
and provide information needed for the analyses later on. Chapter 4 discusses relevant 
aspects of marketing channel theory, and Chapters 5 to 8 contain the actual analysis of the 
structure and development of horticultural marketing channels in Kenya. Here follows a 
summary of contents of each chapter in brief. 
Chapter 2 gives a short history of food trade in Sub-Saharan Africa, covering the 
pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence period. This furnishes a historical framework 
for the analysis of horticultural marketing that follows. It shows that urbanization, transport 
developments and government policies have to be taken into account when explaining the 
development of food marketing channels in Africa. 
Chapter 3 provides an introduction to the horticultural sector in Kenya in general and 
in the research areas in particular. After a brief explanation of the national situation, the focus 
is on Nyandarua, Kisii, Taita and Taveta. The history of commercial horticulture in the 
research areas is discussed, and its present importance in terms of income is shown. The 
sustainability of the horticultural enterprise is shown to be threatened by production 
problems. 
Chapter 4 looks at aspects of marketing channel analysis relevant to the present 
study. In the first part, definitions are given of a marketing channel, channel structure and 
Figure 1.1. Structure of the book 
Introductory 
chapters 
Ch2: 
- introduction to the history of food trade in SS A 
Ch3: 
- introduction to the Kenyan horticultural sector 
Relevant aspects 
of marketing 
channel theory 
Ch4: 
- marketing institutions 
- marketing functions 
- efficiency, effectiveness, equity 
First part of the research objective: 
Structure of the channels 
Analysis of Ch5: 
horticultural - traders domestic market 
marketing - marketing cooperatives 
channels in - export traders 
Kenya -processors 
Ch 6, first part 
- collecting wholesalers 
Second part of the research objective: 
Development of the channels 
Ch 6, second pare 
- development of rural assembly markets 
Ch7: 
- a vertical differentiation model for horticultural marketing 
channels in an emerging economy 
Ch8: 
- testing the vertical differentiation model for Kenya 
Note: Arrows indicate that aspects of one chapter are used as input to another chapter. 
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channel environment It is explained how a marketing channel can be described. Reference is 
made to horticultural marketing channels in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the second part of the 
chapter, efficiency, effectiveness and equity are introduced as concepts for understanding 
vertical differentiation and integration processes in marketing channels. Relevant concepts 
such as functional spin-off, entry barriers, place, time and form convenience, and power are 
explained. Again, reference is made to horticultural marketing on the African continent 
Chapter 5 is the first of four chapters to analyse horticultural marketing channels in 
Kenya. The various actors and institutions are introduced here. The chapter begins with 
traders, agents and facilitating intermediaries. Then horticultural marketing cooperatives are 
examined, analysing the difference between success and failure. Horticultural export traders 
are observed and their business strategies are explained. Horticultural processors are briefly 
looked at with a focus on their problems in producing for the world market The chapter 
ends with some comments on the structure, conduct and performance of the horticultural 
marketing system 
Chapter 6 focuses on one specific stage of the marketing channels, the collection of 
produce in the production areas and transport to wholesale markets in urban centres. The 
first part of the chapter shows the importance of collecting wholesalers, and the efficiency of 
their mediation, which benefits both distributing wholesalers and farmers. The second part 
of the chapter analyses the development of rural assembly markets, showing how they 
reduce transport and information costs at the collection stage. 
Chapter 7 is the first of two chapters that deal with vertical differentiation in Kenyan 
horticultural marketing channels. A model is developed with five explanatory factors: 
number of inhabitants of the market centre served by the channel, population density of the 
rural hinterland of this centre, transport time of the commodity, keeping qualities of the 
commodity, and turnover of the trader involved. Hypotheses about the impact of each factor 
are proposed. The unit of analysis, sample size and composition are discussed, and variables 
are specified. 
In Chapter 8 the vertical differentiation model proposed in Chapter 7 is tested. First 
a brief introduction is given to the types of analyses used (binomial and multinomial logistic 
regression), and the analytic procedure is explained. The model is tested twice: once 
analysing trade flows with known terminal markets, and once analysing all trade flows but 
excluding rural assembly markets. Conclusions are drawn at the end of the chapter. The final 
chapter provides a summary and general conclusions. 
2 
F o o d T rade i n S u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a : 
f r o m the P re -Co lon i a l Past to the 
Structural Ad ju s tment E r a 1 
This chapter deals with food trade in pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence Sub-
Saharan Africa. It provides a broad historical framework for the present study. As will be 
shown, the development of food trade is closely related to urbanization and urban growth. 
Other factors are also at work, however. They will be identified, to be examined later when 
the development of horticultural marketing channels is traced. 
2.1. The pre-colonial period 
In the beginning 
The first forms of exchange between African communities probably go back as far as the 
Early Stone Age. Food items were already part of the deal: The exchange of bright or useful 
stones and honey for meat, and occasionally even womenfolk, probably marked the 
gatherings of foraging peoples' (Mokhtar, 1990, 386). With the beginning of agriculture at 
the start of the Neolithic era (the New Stone Age), such exchanges became more regular. 
Although much of the trade was probably still on a relatively restricted scale and local in 
scope, it included a wide range of commodities including 'salt, certain types of stone and 
later iron tools, beads, shells, possibly plants for medicinal or ritual use, meat for arable 
communities, and grains and root crops for pastoral groups, specialized utensils or 
substances like poisons for fishing or hunting, dried fish and all sorts of objects with a 
scarcity value such as strange seeds, animal claws, teeth, curious stones, bones, etc. which 
might have a magical significance' (Mokhtar, 1990,387). 
An earlier version of this chapter was published by the author as an ASC Working Paper (vol 22/1995) 
entitled "Food Trade and Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa. From the Early Stone Age to the Structural 
Adjustment Era'. 
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As Hopkins (1973) explains for West Africa, and Gray & Birmingham (1970) for 
the eastern and central part of the continent, exchange took place even while production was 
primarily intended for subsistence. It resulted from households' production strategies, and 
from variations in the natural and human rrricro-environment: 
The basic aim of most households was to secure the products needed to maintain 
their customary standards of living. In order to reach this target each household 
tried to plant the amount of crops needed for survival in what, from experience, 
was known to be a poor year. In planning for disaster, there would be more crops 
available in an average year than the household could consume. Sometimes these 
crops were stored for future use, but this was not always possible with perishable 
varieties. Sometimes they were consumed in harvest 'festivals', but there were 
limitations to the amount of food which one community could eat in a short 
period of time. Sometimes, if neighbouring villages lacked foodstuffs, local 
produce was traded (Hopkins, 1973, 54). 
In some cases, households planned their production of foodstuffs and crafts with a 
certain amount of exchange in mind. Trade of this kind was made possible by the presence 
of complementary needs within regions: 'Variations in natural resources did not have to be 
profound for local trade to develop, though marketing activity was especially intense on the 
borders of ecological zones' (Hopkins, 1973, 54). Those borders existed at the edges of 
savannah and forest, but also along the banks of major rivers. In the central Zaire basin, for 
instance, a brisk trade in river fish for inland agricultural products existed.2 
Agriculture led to the rise of urban settlements. The oldest ruin in western Africa 
(Dar Tichitt) is thought to be 'a stalled early form of proto-urban settlement occurring at the 
time of the Neolithic Revolution on the southern Sahara border' (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991, 
22). It dates back from 3800 to 2300 years. 
The presence of urban settlements led to the rise of a class of merchants who 
organized the supply of food. However, some of the townspeople had residential bases in 
the countryside, and lived only intermittently in the urban centres, thus reducing the urban 
demand for agricultural commodities. Moreover, elites (and armies, for that matter) relied at 
least partly on non-market provision of food. They were supported in kind by slave 
cultivators, clients and requisitions from the subordinate population (Guyer, 1987).3 
Long-distance trade 
Not all food came from within the direct sphere of influence of the elites. Long-distance 
trade developed all over Africa. In West Africa, the Saharan salt mines and Sahelian 
commercial towns, which existed already before the Christian era, were almost entirely 
dependent on savannah agriculture (Tarver & Miller, 1993; Meillassoux, 1971). 4 
'Although inland people fished in small streams, their catches did not satisfy their needs. Conversely, the 
fishing societies of the central Zaire basin grew crops, but the conflicting demands of fishing and 
fanning prevented them from growing adequate supplies' (Harms, 1981,20). 
Non-market provision was not only common among urban elites, as in parts of West Africa, but also 
among rural elites, such as the royalty who lived in mobile villages in some of the central parts of the 
African continent (Guyer, 1987). 
Meillassoux gives an example of this dependency that dates back to the 14th century (the Teghaza salt 
mines receiving dates from Morocco and millet from Sudan). Hopkins (1973) gives an example dating 
from the 12th century (Timbuktu 'imported' grain, vegetables and livestock) and one from the 15th 
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Commodities passed through the hands of several merchants before arriving at their 
destination. This was related to the limited capacity of carriers to travel across different 
ecological zones: camels were used in the Sahara but stopped at the Niger, donkeys moved 
from the Sahel to the edges of the forest, and men were mainly used south of the savannah. 
The merchants tended to sell their goods at the relay points.5 Livestock, dairy produce and 
salt were traded at the Sahara-savannah border in exchange for millet and cloth. In return, 
livestock, salt, dried fish, potash and cloth were traded at the savannah-forest border in 
exchange for slaves, ivory, ironware, cloth and kola nuts.6 Finally, various foodstuffs and 
manufactures were traded in for fish and sea salt at the coastal settlements (Hopkins, 1973). 
A relay point could form the beginning of urbanization (Meillassoux, 1971). Even if 
it became a prime trading city, however, it remained only a small-sized settlement where the 
major part of the population went on cultivating (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991). 
In addition to relay points, rest places developed along caravan routes. They were 
mainly centres of trade for sellers of cooked food. Rest places could evolve into major 
market centres if they were on an important route. On the other hand, they could become 
inconsequential because of diversion of trade routes or destruction by war (Falola, 1991). 
Everywhere in West Africa, long-distance trade suffered considerably from civil, intertribal 
and interstate warfare on caravan routes (McGowan, 1990). 
Markets and urban centres were not common in East Africa, except among the 
coastal Swahili settlements. But this does not mean that long-distance trade was absent 
Trade was not conducted through regular markets, 'but in ad hoc gatherings at a caravan 
halt or by visiting a particular place of commercial interest such as a centre of salt or iron 
production' (Roberts, 1970, 64) . 7 As articles of intertribal trade, salt and iron were 
especially important in the Northern interlacustrine region (now Uganda), along with bark-
cloth and wild coffee beans (Tosh, 1970). In western Tanzania, salt and iron were traded 
along with pottery, dried fish, forest products and catde.8 According to Roberts (1970,47) 
the trade may well have involved exchanges over 'considerable distances'. According to 
Wagner (1993, 159) trade linkages were prominently based on 'economic and utilitarian 
goals'. 
An important exception to the basically marketless interior of East Africa were 
periodic markets at interethnic boundaries. Transactions could be safely carried out at these 
markets, even during tribal warfare. In western Kenya, for instance, 'a truce would be 
organized to enable the women folk to go to the market the opposing warriors remaining at 
a distance at either side of the market There would be mainly a bartering of foodstuffs and 
also there would be exchange of cattle in the payment of bride price. The elders controlled 
century (long distance trade in millet rice and livestock within the empire of Mali). Evidence from 
earlier periods does not seem to be available. 
Relays did not only mark ecological boundaries but could also mark ethnic boundaries, as in the 
particular case of southern Ivory Coast (Meillassoux, 1971). 
Kola nuts are important commodities in West Africa. Their bitter-sweet liquid acts as a stimulant and an 
antidote against thirst They are also used for social functions as well as rituals (Adebayo, 1991). The 
kola trade already existed well before the 16th century (Lovejoy, 1980). 
Not only the present hinterlands of Kenya and Tanzania lacked well-established markets, but also Uganda 
(Middleton, 1962). 
Nearer to the Tanzanian coast tobacco was probably the most widely traded agricultural product (Iliffe, 
1979). 
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the market and extracted dues' (Fearn, 1955, 29, as quoted by Obudho & Waller, 1976, 
10). 9 Exchanges often had a regional and interzonal character, as cattle from the lowlands 
was exchanged for grain and root crops grown upland (Cohen, 1983). The periodic markets 
remained weakly organized compared to the caravan towns that would arise later on 
(Obudho & Waller, 1976). 
Well-established markets did exist in the coastal Swahili settlements of East Africa. 
They were supplied with inland products by specific groups such as the 'Nyika'. 1 0 The 
latter sent their caravans from the coastal area to the north and northwest to trade with the 
Kamba, bringing back a variety of items including ivory, gum copal, honey, beeswax, 
grain, food stuffs, timber for building dhows, a special kind of beer, game meat, saliferous 
sand, tobacco and bark bags. In exchange they obtained salt, beads, cloth, iron hoes, and 
other coastal goods (Lamphear, 1970). 
Long-distance trade not only developed in West and East Africa but also in central 
Africa, for instance in the Zaire basin. The Bobangi, in particular, mounted long distance 
expeditions by canoe. During those ventures they came into contact with other river peoples 
and acted as long distance commercial carriers' (Birmingham, 1981, 141). As in West 
Africa, commodities passed through the hands of several merchants before arriving at their 
destination. The Tonga in southern Central Africa (now Zambia), for instance, had valuable 
supplies of salt with which they could purchase goods of external origin. Items like shells, 
beads, and cloth came 'from farther afield and reached the Tonga after multiple exchanges 
had taken place among neighbours who were trading in fish, grain, game, ochre, building 
materials and specialized food items' (Birmingham, 1981, 127). Both in Zambia and 
Malawi, salt, iron, and copper were part of 'complex inter-regional bartering networks, 
which were based on a comparatively steady, but informally structured demand for raw 
materials' (Fagan, 1970, 25) . 1 1 Permanent markets and urban centres, however, were not 
characteristic for the region before the arrival of the Europeans (Rotweg, 1962; Birmingham, 
1981). 
Although local trade in Sub-Saharan Africa had its own rationale, it was connected to 
long-distance trading through the sale of supplies to passing caravans and, to a lesser extent, 
through the distribution of goods that caravans delivered. People along the caravan routes 
found it profitable to produce crops for sale, and when commercial contacts increased it 
became easier to make up for local deficiencies through trade (Gray & Birmingham, 1970; 
Hopkins, 1973). 
Both in East Africa and elsewhere, local traders were predorninandy women because of their immunity 
during wars. In Yorubaland (Nigeria), 'even during the earliest tribal wars, the mutual need to hold 
markets seems normally to have been recognised sufficiently to allow transactions to be safely carried 
out on neutral territory: the women would go to the market, the opposing warriors remaining at a 
distance on either side' (Hodder, 1969,24). Women were also immune among the Lugbara of Uganda, 
trading commodities like fish with other ethnic groups. The women 'were able to travel freely, even 
moving between groups which were fighting one another.' Men were also involved in trade, especially of 
iron and poisons. They moved, however, 'along lines of kinship from one tribe to another' (Middleton, 
1962, 563). 
The semi-arid wasteland which runs just inland parallel to much of the Kenyan Coast was called the 
'nyika'. Arab and Swahili residents from the coastal towns referred to Giriyama and other ethnic groups 
who lived in this area and traded with them as the Nyika (Lamphear, 1970). 
Long-distance trade of iron and salt was absent in the central Zaire basin, because the resources were 
distributed rather evenly throughout the region (Harms, 1981). 
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In addition to local trade, two other types of trade were connected to the regionally 
determined long-distance trade networks. The first was specific for West Africa and 
concerned trans-Saharan trade. The internal system of long-distance trade in West Africa 
made the development of trans-Saharan trade possible (Mokhtar, 1990). Dating back as far 
as 1000 BC, it included a large range of items, but few of them were food. Gold, slaves, 
expensive cloth, pepper, ivory, kola nuts, leather goods, and in the 19th century ostrich 
feathers, were carried to the north, while textiles, copper, preserved foodstuffs, glassware, 
beads and miscellaneous 'fancy goods' went south (Hopkins, 1973). 
The second type of trade that made use of existing regional networks was the 
overseas trade. Both the trade with the Arab Mediterranean world and the Adantic trade 
inserted themselves into existing regional and even local networks (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 
1991). 
Overseas trade 
The Portuguese were the first to open up trans-Adantic trade routes from West Africa in 
the late 15th century, followed by the French, Danish, Dutch and British in the 17th century 
(Gugler & Flanagan, 1978). 1 2 Until the 19th century the main exports from West Africa 
were slaves, gold, ivory, timber, dyewoods, beeswax, gum, leather, indigo and pepper 
(Meillassoux, 1971; Northrup, 1978, Hopkins, 1973). Slave trade became the prime focus 
in the 18th century, causing local warfare, disorder and even the rise of an entirely new state 
on the Slave Coast (Dahomey). 1 3 According to Hopkins (1973), however, the trade of 
commodities such as gold, camwood, beeswax and gum continued, not only to supplement 
the trade of slaves but also as viable exports in their own right 
Overseas and local trade were interrelated. Searing (1993) studied the 18th century 
slave trade concluding that the demand for food by the slave caravans not only stimulated 
local grain trade, but that grain supplies even determined the geographical origins of slaves 
sold to Adantic merchants. When a region experienced a grain shortage due to a famine or 
high regional demand, the area exported fewer slaves. 1 4 
The overseas slave trade was abolished in the course of the 19th century. 1 5 In 
consequence, the West African product mix shifted to palm oil, rubber, groundnuts, wood, 
hides and rice (Meillassoux, 1971; Mark, 1986). 
The overseas trade stimulated urban growth. Multicentred urban networks came up 
or expanded in Yorubaland, Hausaland, Ashanti, Dahomey, in the Volta and Niger 
hinterland and in the Wolof kingdoms (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991). Food trade flourished in 
The early trade of the Portuguese consisted of two kinds of activities. They carried bulk goods from one 
part of the coast to the other, converting their profits into gold, ivory, and pepper for remittance to 
Lisbon. In addition, they carried Mediterranean manufactures, especially North African textiles, to Africa. 
In West Africa this cut into existing markets accustomed to trans-Saharan trade (Birmingham, 1981). 
Law (1991) has shown that the rise of Dahomey in the 17th century was linked to the growth of the 
European slave trade, and that Dahoman military organization was clearly geared to gathering slaves. 
Slaves were used for gum extraction in the desert region. They had to be fed with savannah grain. An 
increase in gum production reduced the grain available for slave caravans that travelled through the 
savannah area. Grain was cultivated not only by peasants but also by slave labour on large-scale farms. 
Hence, grain production and gum extraction cut into the available supply of slaves for export (Searing, 
1993; Roberts, 1980). 
In 1807, the British were the first to make slave trade illegal. It took until the end of the 1860s before 
the Atlantic slave trade was entirely suppressed (Hopkins, 1973). 
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these networks. According to Guyer (1987), however, not the urban dwellers but the 
caravans participating in the export trade were the prime initiators of the rise in food demand. 
The porters that carried crops to the coast for export were the most rapidly expanding 
consumer group. There were enormous numbers of them, and 'unlike the retainers and 
clients of earlier periods, porterage crews had no authority behind them to ensure free 
support from village populations. They had to be fed along the line of march, through some 
kind of commercial transaction' (Guyer, 1987,27). 1 6 
As well as urban residents and porters, the crews of docking ships and the slaves 
that were put to work on local plantations had to be fed by bought food. The latter were a 
significant group. Plantation production was pushed by an increasing demand for export 
commodities. In Senegambia, groundnuts were cultivated on a large scale in the Adantic 
coastal region and the Senegal River Valley (Searing, 1993). Elsewhere in West Africa, 
large-scale production of palm oil emerged alongside peasant production of the 
commodity. 1 7 The slaves that could no longer be sold to the Europeans because of the 
abolition of the slave trade were put to work on oil palm plantations, producing and 
transporting the oil (Meillassoux, 1971). The rise in palm oil production led to shortages of 
food in the oil palm belt, which in turn stimulated regional food trade in yams, cattle, fruit 
and grain (Northrup, 1978). 
Market places were the centre of most food transactions. They exhibited a high level 
of competition, and operated within efficient distribution systems (Hopkins, 1973). Gold 
dust, cowries, strips of cloth, and copper and iron rods functioned as general-purpose 
currencies (Arhin, 1990; Hopkins, 1973). Prices were subject to short-term fluctuations 
reflecting the balance of supply and demand, but overall they tended to rise.18 In the large 
towns, continuous markets were found, while elsewhere markets were usually held at 
intervals of between two and eight days (Hopkins, 1973). Some African states played an 
active role in market development In Asante on the Gold Coast for instance, an elaborate 
system of border markets, customs duties, state-sponsored traders, and state loans for 
trading existed (Wilks, 1975).1* 
Overseas trade in East Africa dates back as far as the first millennium BC, when 
colonies of Greeks, Egyptians, Arabs, and possibly Indians existed on the Ethiopian coast 
(Abir, 1970). Aksum, the oldest still-existing city of Sub-Saharan Africa, was a major 
Guyer (1987) observes that wage levels and food prices were already in place by the time colonial 
governments became major employers of porters in the late 19th century. She quotes Daaku (1971), who 
recorded wage payment and food purchase in cowries in Ashanti (West Africa) in the 17th century, and 
Iliffe (1979) who describes 19th-century trading caravans in East Africa as internally differentiated 
organizations with guards, personal servants, cooks, guides, porters, and slaves, each with their own 
mode of remuneration. 
Large- and small-scale entrepreneurs were involved in the production and trading of palm oil in 
Dahomey, Yorubaland, Lagos and Igboland, among other places (Law, 1995). 
The expansion of European trade between the mid-17th and mid-18th centuries had led to an uncontrolled 
importation of cowry shells that caused inflation of prices both in European trade and in the domestic 
markets. In the second half of the 19th century the situation repeated itself, leading to the so-called Great 
Inflation (Law, 1992). 
The king of Asante was also a large slave trader. According to Spaulding and Kapteijns (1987,5), he 
practised 'a royally administered export commerce in slaves'. The same was true for the kings of 
Dahomey, Kazembe and late Keira Dar Fur. 
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Blocks of salt and coined money were already used as currencies. The use of salt as currency was a 
common phenomenon in Africa and can be explained by a general scarcity of salt.... The coastal salt 
plains of northern Ethiopia were therefore probably an important asset to the people of Axum and helped 
to foster their commercial activity and sponsor caravan trade' (Abir, 1970,119). 
Around 1500 AD, coastal Muslim settlements in East Africa were Mogadishu, Marka and Brava (in the 
present Somalia), Lamu, Malindi and Mombasa (in the present Kenya), Zanzibar, Kilwa (in the present 
Tanzania), and Sofala (in the present Mozambique) (Hrbek, 1992). 
"By the tenth century India and China were the most important markets for East African ivory' (Mokhtar, 
1990, 312). The trading of slaves by the Indians possibly followed the expansion of Islam into the 
Indian subcontinent after the 14th century (Mangat 1969). 
In 1832, Zanzibar town became the capital of the Omani empire instead of Mombasa (Berg, 1968). 
The Nyamwezi, who had accumulated their capital in the internal trade of western Tanzania, were 
important long-distance traders of iron, salt hoes, cloth, food, and other local staples (Birmingham, 
1981). Their caravans travelled all the way from eastern Zaire to the coast from the early 19th century 
onwards OBerg, 1968). 
In West Kenya these towns appeared in the second half of the 18th century. Mumias was the most 
important one, being one of the five major interior caravan towns that still exist in today's Kenya. The 
other four were Taveta, Dagoretti, Machakos and Tsavo (Obudho & Waller, 1976). 
trading town in Eritrea at that time (Hance, 1970). 2 0 From the end of the first millennium 
AD, Muslim trading towns began to develop on the western coast of the Red Sea, in the 
Gulf of Aden, and further down the East African coast (Abir, 1970; Hrbek, 1992). 2 1 Arab 
and Persian settlers became involved in exporting slaves and ivory from the hinterland, and 
locally produced skins, hides, precious gums, ghee and ostrich feathers (Lewis, 1962). 
Indian merchants were the principle suppliers of cotton, cloth, beads and sundry 
manufactured articles, and buyers of ivory, gold, iron, gum copal, ambergris, incense, and, 
later on, slaves (Mangat, 1969). 2 2 
In the late 16th century, Portugal conquered various independent Swahili states on 
the East African coast The Portuguese, however, were not so much interested in inland 
trade as in a secure port of call for vessels sailing between Goa and East Africa (Berg, 
1968). Towards the end of the 17th century they were expelled from East Africa by the 
Sultan of Oman, who ruled the coast until the arrival of the British.2 3 
Meanwhile, the Arabian, Persian and Indian traders continued their business. 
Initially, local groups like the 'Nyika' and Kamba in Kenya and the Nyamwezi in Tanzania 
supplied them with export commodities and food. 2 4 Much of the long-distance trade was 
cut off in the latter half of the 19th century due to raiding by tribes such as the Maasai, 
Shambala and Galla. As far as the coastal cities were concerned, it was at this time that direct 
Arab trading caravans became necessary to obtain the trade goods formerly supplied by local 
ethnic groups, and permanent caravan towns arose where caravan traders could procure 
fresh supplies of water and food and take a rest (Obudho, 1983; Obudho & Waller, 1976). 2 5 
The caravans did not end at the shores of Lake Tanganyika, but penetrated further into the 
central part of the continent 
Apart from ports and caravan towns, 19th-century urbanization was not as common 
in East Africa as in West Africa. Some ethnic groups had capital cities (e.g. the Lunda and 
the Kuba), others had military camps, but according to Coquery-Vidrovitch (1991, 31), the 
rest of the people 'probably scattered in the bush in precarious settlements as to escape slave 
raiders and pillage or were decimated by the spread of rising epidemic diseases (such as 
sleeping sickness) all along the Rift encouraged by the progress of penetration.' 
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Similarly to 19th-century West Africa, export crop plantations developed in East 
Africa. They were, however, not situated on the mainland but on islands in the Indian 
Ocean. Arab settlers in Zanzibar and Pemba went into plantation-wise production of cloves. 
Earlier on, in the second half of the 18th century, sugar plantations had been established on 
the islands of Mauritius and Reunion. 2 6 All these plantations made use of slaves brought in 
from the East and Southeast African mainland (Alpers, 1968). 2 7 The demand for slaves 
became one of the main reasons for the growing importance of caravan trade, boosting the 
development of caravan towns along the routes as places for resting and procuring fresh 
food supplies (Obudho, 1983). Thus, plantation production did not stimulate food trade on 
the mainland because slaves had to be fed while working, as was the case in West Africa, 
but because they had to be fed on their way to the plantations on the islands. 
The Portuguese were the first Europeans to arrive in central Africa. They landed 
on the coast of Angola towards the end of the 15th century, and started to export slaves and 
ivory from the central Zaire basin in the second half of the 16th century (Birmingham, 1970; 
Harms, 1981). Their arrival in central Zaire changed political entities such as the large 
Kongo kingdom, which until that time did not have an established market network. After a 
century of overseas contact, 'a relatively high level of craft specialisation had developed 
among potters, weavers, salt-makers, fishermen, blacksmiths and coppersmiths, all of 
whom traded part of their output, either by the traditional flow of goods through the tribute 
network, or by the increasing use of regular marketplaces' (Birmingham, 1981, 29). 
Tragically, these changes were bound to the increasing wealth of the ruling elite and the 
trading class involved in the slave trade. 
The Portuguese were also the first Europeans to land on the shores of Mozambique 
in the early years of the 16th century, subsequently penetrating the hinterland by river.28 
They continued as far as Zumbo along the Zambezi, at the border with the present Zambia, 
where they started to trade with African ethnic groups like the Yao and the Bisa (John, 
1970). 2 9 Later, in the second half of the 18th century, Scottish, Dutch and Indian traders 
travelled up the Zambezi in the direction of Lake Malawi, both to look for ivory and to 
purchase commodities such as sesame seeds in exchange for cloth, hoes, and other foreign 
goods (Mandala, 1990). 3 0 
In the 19th century, commerce and Christianity travelled hand in hand. Missionaries 
in areas such as southern Malawi and Namibia encouraged the local people to grow tobacco, 
thus boosting market development Mission stations developed into market centres with 
schools, hospitals and trading companies. Examples are Windhoek in Namibia, which was 
The Dutch introduced sugar cane to Mauritius in the 17th century. The French created the first sugar 
factory and sugar estate on the island in 1740. The sugar production was limited: 3,000 tonnes in 1803. 
After the British took over in 1810, production rapidly increased to 34,000 tonnes in 1830 (North-
Coombes, 1993). 
In addition to the mainland, Madagascar supplied slaves, together with rice and cattle that was needed to 
feed the slaves on the plantations of the other islands (Campbell, 1993). 
Vasco da Gama anchored off Kilwa in 1498, making it one of Portugal's strongholds until Malindi and 
Mombasa became more important (Berg, 1968). 
At the limit of the foreigners' trading frontier, 'the vital trading initiative seems to have come from the 
Africans', just as in the case of the Kamba and Nyamwezi East Africa (Sutherland-Harris, 1970,231). 
Indians acted as itinerant traders, as well purchasing foodstuffs for their own consumption and for resale 
on the lower Zambezi and the coast (Mandala, 1990). 
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established by missionaries as early as the 1850s, and Blantyre in Malawi, established in the 
1870s (Gibson, 1962; Van Dijk, 1992). 
While overseas trade was generally connected to regional trade, such was not the 
case at the Cape of South Africa. Here, Dutch settlers arrived as early as the 1650s with the 
initial aim of growing wheat for the ships of the Dutch East India Company (Omer-Cooper, 
1978). Later on, in the 18th century, they began exporting surplus wool and wine to Europe 
(Ross, 1986). The commodities were produced on the settlers' farms with the help of slave 
labour instead of being purchased from local ethnic groups.3 1 
2.2. The colonial period 
The European conquest of Africa took place largely between 1874 and 1905. "Frontiers of 
trade and belief, of white settlement, and the linked scourges of famine and epidemic 
disease' moved on in the process of 'the scramble for Africa' (Lonsdale, 1985, 682). 'In 
1879 more than 90 per cent of the continent was ruled by Africans. By 1900 all but a tiny 
fraction of it was being governed by European powers' (Oliver & Atmore, 1967,103). 
Under colonial rule the process of urbanization and market development continued. 
According to Coquery-Vidrovitch (1991,35-36) 'colonisers tried to use and adapt previous 
settlements, towns, villages, or clusters of villages (such as Swahili harbours, Yoruba 
towns, or marketplaces and villages close to the river, for instance Kinshasa and Brazzaville) 
just because their needs were more or less the same as before.' When existing facilities were 
found unsuitable, new colonial towns might be established to serve as administrative or 
commercial centres. 
Settler farmers and mining economies 
Colonial rule meant a pronounced difference in the case of settler farmers and mining 
economies. Non-African farmers settled in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) and Kenya. In the central highland regions of Kenya, urbanization and market 
development can be directly attributed to the settlers. The newly established urban centres 
were regarded as bases for administrative and commercial activities rather than as centres for 
permanent African settlement They were, however, encircled by settlements of African 
migrants (Obudho, 1983) . 3 2 The centres had marketing functions with regard to the 
collection of local produce for export, the distribution of imported goods and the trade of 
local food. African and non-African traders were officially segregated. Non-African food 
and non-food traders were allowed to establish themselves only in the urban areas, 
townships and trading centres, while African traders could establish themselves 'anywhere 
in the bush' (Rimmer, 1983, quoting a report of the East African Royal Commission). 
The British colonial administration in Nairobi imposed a hut tax and later a poll tax to 
get local Africans to work on settler farms as wage labourers (Low, 1965; Wrigley, 
One commodity that was initially purchased from local Africans, especially the Khoi, was meat It was 
not exported, however (Omer-Cooper, 1978). 
In contrast, 'Africans in the indigenous West African cities during the colonial period purchased urban 
property, erected city dwellings, and moved freely between rural and urban areas' (Chandler & Tarver, 
1993, 253). 
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1965). 3 3 In fertile regions away from the settler areas, it thought to generate taxes and bring 
economic development by promoting cash crops among Africans. 3 4 Coffee and cotton 
appeared suitable for peasant production and were successfully pushed. 3 5 The peasant crop 
was carried by rail to Mombasa together with the settler output Only the collection stage 
called for additional efforts. The challenge was taken up by Indians and Arabs, who 
collected the cash crops at periodic markets in the production areas (Obudho & Waller, 
1976). According to Ehrlich (1965), who studied Uganda, the Indians played a crucial role 
because they were both willing purchasers of export products and sellers of trade goods, 
thus creating new incentives for further production.3 6 However, the administration also 
played its part It encouraged the establishment of additional periodic markets and trading 
centres by improving roads (Obudho & Waller, 1976). The new markets and centres 
streamlined export trade, stimulated sales of import goods and facilitated local trade in food. 
Trading centres emerge not only as a result of improved roads but also of new laws. 
In 1936, the colonial authorities in Nairobi declared that from then on 'all townships 
belonged to the central government, the trading centres belonged to the local government 
and the periodic markets were left to the Locational Authority' (Obudho & Waller, 1967, 
44). In the years that followed, many local governments established new trading centres. At 
the same time, new periodic markets sprang up around newly introduced mills for grinding 
maize. 
Mining had at least as much impact on African urbanization and food trade as the 
arrival of non-African settlers. The biggest mining industries developed in South Africa, 
Rhodesia, Angola and Belgian Congo. 3 7 In South Africa the discovery of diamonds and 
gold in the 1860s and 1870s changed an economy that was basically agricultural and pastoral 
in nature into one based on mining and industry (Omer-Cooper, 1987). The greatly 
increased demand for African labour could not be met from within the areas of white 
The poll tax was introduced to catch the youths who did not qualify as householders (Wrigley, 1965). A 
similar tax was introduced by the British-administered territories in Southern Africa (Wild, 1992). 
According to Rimmer (1983, 146) the colonial administrators went for taxes to 'discharge their 
responsibilities without dependence on grudgingly given metropolitan subventions'. 
Coffee production was promoted among African smallholders on the western shores of Lake Victoria, 
but discouraged in the central highlands of Kenya and around Mount Kilimanjaro to protect the white 
settlers (Wrigley, 1965; Brett, 1973). Although technically speaking there were no legislative sanctions 
against African coffee cultivation in the settler areas, custom and bureaucratic obstruction excluded it 
(Talbott, 1990). 
In the Uganda protectorate cotton became the most important smallholder cash crop (Ehrlich, 1965). 
Gold, diamonds, coal and iron ore were mined in South Africa, copper, zinc, and lead in Northern 
Rhodesia (presently Zambia), and iron ore, gold, asbestos and chrome in Southern Rhodesia (presendy 
Zimbabwe). In the Belgian Congo, copper, cobalt and zinc were mined, together with gold and 
diamonds, which were also found in Angola (Katzenellenbogen, 1975; Pedler, 1975). Mining activities 
also took place in West Africa. Tin and coal were found in Nigeria, diamonds and iron in Sierra Leone, 
diamonds and bauxite in Ghana, and bauxite in various parts of French West Africa. According to 
Katzenellenbogen (1975), however, mining never had as much impact on the West African economies 
during the colonial period as it did in the Southern African economies. In addition to Southern and West 
Africa, some relatively small gold mining activities were developed in East Africa, especially in the 
Lake Victoria regions of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (Qiffe, 1979; Pedler, 1975). In all parts of 
Africa colonial governments relied on private enterprise for the development of the mineral resources. 
The only major exception was the coal mine that was an enterprise of the Nigerian railway (Pedler, 
1975). 
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occupation and control alone. 3 8 Migrant labourers settled in camps near the mines, that 
rapidly developed into towns and eventually cities (Chandler & Tarver, 1993). The 
expanding consumer populations created new markets for food, providing new opportunities 
not only for white commercial farmers but also for African peasants, who greatly expanded 
their commercial production (Omer-Cooper, 1987). Wild (1992), who discusses Southern 
Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe), explains that market gardening was quite common among 
African farmers living near urban settlements. The market gardeners hawked their 
pumpkins, grains, fowls, eggs and so forth in the European residential and business areas. 
Food-supply policies of the colonial administrations 
British colonial administrations became directly involved in the marketing of food when they 
allowed African farmers to pay their taxes in rice, beans and maize as an alternative to cash. 
In addition, the administrations bought surpluses for distribution to prisons, marine, army 
and police, and for sale to civil servants in urban centres (Kalinga, 1990). 3 9 
Both public institutions and private employers provided their workers with food. The 
bulk purchases by public and private employers stimulated large-scale production and 
wholesale trade. In Kenya, for instance, where a large African labour force worked on 
European coffee plantations, some settlers concentrated on maize production. Although 
some maize was exported, most was directed to plantation and other labourers in the 
domestic market (Wrigley, 1965). 
Taxation in kind was applied not only by the authorities in the British administered 
territories but also in parts of the French, Belgian and Portuguese empires, particularly in the 
low-density areas of central Africa. A 'requisition regime', with local chiefs as 
intermediaries, was introduced because of the lack of an indigenous market system that 
could be expanded, the limited means of transport, and the non-existence of commercial 
farmers. The chiefs were ordered to regularly supply specified kinds and quantities of food 
to cities, worksites, porterage crews and administrative headquarters (Guyer, 1987, 32). 
In West Africa, the supply of food to wage labourers was left to the existing 
indigenous marketing systems. As a consequence, the process of institutional market 
development gained further momentum in this region. Colonialism tended to favour the 
growth of daily food markets and their transformation into permanent retail trading places. 
At the same time, buying points for the collection of cash crops multiplied (Meillassoux, 
1971) 4° xhe spacing of markets became more uniform, whereby, according to Hogendorn 
(1975), the location and periodicity of a market was related to the density of the population, 
allowing for anomalies due to the absence of exchanges, the interference of past economic 
phenomena, or social and political factors. 
The labourers had to be drawn to a large extent from African-occupied areas and still independent African 
states within South Africa, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia (Omer-Cooper, 1987). 
Both the food buying and the payment of workers in food were part of a policy to control newly 
introduced European currencies (which were in denominations too large for everyday food purchases), and 
simultaneously to maintain low food prices. Low food prices were especially important when consumer 
populations were big, as in the mining and settler economies (Guyer, 1987). 
The most important African-produced export crops during this period were palm oil (in various countries 
bordering on the Atlantic Ocean), groundnuts (Senegal and the Gambia), cocoa (the Gold Coast and 
western Nigeria) and cotton (northern Nigeria) (Hogendorn, 1975). 
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Hogendorn does not mention the purchasing power of a population. In colonial 
Gambia, however, purchasing power was at least as important as population density 
(Barrett, 1988). Purchasing power was associated with groundnut cultivation. The 
commercial production of groundnuts led to a lack of food self-sufficiency among the farm 
households involved, and consequentiy food had to be purchased in market places. In areas 
with high groundnut production, market places flourished, whereas they were absent in 
areas without commercial groundnut production. 
In addition to supplies from the African continent, some of the colonial territories 
depended on food imports, such as rice from the Orient (Kalinga, 1989). Imported food fed 
a large proportion of the mining workers during the mineral boom in Southern Africa. In 
Senegal and the Gambia, rice imports from Indochina were needed to feed the urban 
population because farmers had specialized in peanut production (Guyer, 1987). Rice was 
imported in smaller quantities in a self-sufficient country such as Malawi, where Europeans 
and Indians preferred Burmese and Thai rice to the locally produced variety (Kalinga, 1990). 
New boundaries and transport networks 
The introduction of new, artificial boundaries between colonial territories affected the 
development of market centres and trade networks. While freighting became easier, faster 
and relatively cheaper within territories, trade across international boundaries became more 
difficult in some cases. 
Within colonies, internal security allowed traders to go further away from home. 
Among the notable large-scale movements in West Africa were those of Ibo traders who 
travelled from their homelands east of the Niger to the north of Nigeria, and Hausa butchers 
from the north who went to markets throughout the south. Many traders from Lagos had 
stalls in the markets of Ashanti, and the Kwahus from the highlands near Nkawkaw were 
well represented in the Accra markets. There were fewer of these kinds of movements in 
East Africa, but there were some. Luos from western Kenya, for instance, were a major 
trading group in Mombasa, and Somali traders from Somalia and northeastern Kenya 
travelled about the countryside far from their homes (Pedler, 1975). 
Trade across colonial borders could become more difficult In West Africa, the long-
distance trade of salt and kola nuts that cut across French to British territories declined 
(Adebayo, 1991). A combination of new borders and the increasing importance of overseas 
export trade caused the decline of many of the old towns in the Saharan region. A famous 
town like Timbuktu in today's landlocked Mali 'succumbed entirely to a second economic 
desiccation' (Gugler & Flanagan, 1978,27). 
The development of coastal market centres was determined by their accessibility from 
the sea and by the productivity of their hinterlands (Gugler & Flanagan, 1978). The fate of 
market centres between the coast and the production areas was in the hands of the colonial 
authorities, which had to decide on the improvement of local transportation networks. The 
trajectory of a new railway line or the improvement of a road governed the rise of certain 
centres and the decline of others.4 1 River ports and smaller seaports were usually among the 
Newly built railways in colonial Africa had three purposes: (!) to connect an administrative centre on the 
seacoast with an interior area for political and military control; (ii) to reach areas of mineral exploitation; 
and (iii) to reach areas of potential agricultural production (Salau, 1979). The British built railways in 
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losers. They were robbed of their hinterlands 'as spreading networks of railroads and 
roadways swept up and funnelled export commodities to those few larger coastal ports 
destined to become the focal points of national economies' (Gugler & Flanagan, 1978, 
28)42 
From depression to growth 
In the 1930s the world economy was struck by a depression that affected African economies 
through the falling prices of their export commodities. In West Africa, some of the peasant 
farmers reacted by retreating into subsistence, e.g. growing millet instead of groundnuts. 
Farmers with tree crops such as cocoa and coffee planted fewer new trees, and at particularly 
critical times they withheld supplies in the hope of forcing buyers to offer higher prices 
(Hopkins, 1973). The lower purchasing power of the rural population and retreat into 
subsistence production reduced food trade in the periodic markets. 
In the settler communities, white farmers were at least partly sheltered from falling 
commodity prices by increased market regulation, including preferential access to markets, 
credit, and government services (Adedeji, 1984). The prices of export commodities of local 
African farmers (sesame, beans, hides, skins and ghee) fell more drastically than those of 
European cash crops. In addition, tens of thousands of Africans lost their jobs on settler 
farms. Despite the ensuing reduction in household incomes, the colonial administration did 
not adjust the tax obligations of the Africans (Kanogo, 1989). As in West Africa, domestic 
food trade followed the depression in export trade. 
Food market controls cumulated in the settler economies during the Second World 
War. New committees and so-called commodity control boards were formed in the first two 
years of the war, controlling the whole economy including the production and marketing of 
maize. The authorities introduced a guaranteed price for settler-produced maize, bought the 
commodity in bulk, and introduced compulsory African labour to guarantee production on 
the settler farms (Bennett, 1965; Zeleza, 1989). 4 3 
After the war and the recovery in the international economy, the world demand for 
African commodities and minerals rose rapidly (Adedeji, 1984). At the same time, colonial 
administrations began to explore indirect interventions rather than direct controls. In French 
Africa, any hitherto existing direct controls on population movements were abolished 
South Africa, Bechuanaland (Botswana), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe, Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi), Kenya and 
Uganda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and the Gold Coast (Ghana). The French built them in French 
Sudan (Senegal, Mali), French Guinea, Dahomey (Benin), Ivory Coast and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), 
French Equatorial Africa (Congo, Central African Republic), and on three Islands in the Indian Ocean 
(Madagascar, Reunion, Mauritius). The Italians built railways in Ethiopia, Eritrea and to a lesser extent 
Somaliland; the Germans in Southwest Africa (Namibia), Tanganyika, Kamerun (Cameroon) and 
Togoland; the Belgians in the Belgian Congo; the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique (Durrant et 
al., 1981; Wiener, 1931). The railways were usually built by the state, but sometimes a private 
company took the initiative. An example of a private initiative was the railway line that was built by a 
German company in Kamerun (now Anglophone Cameroon), going inland from the port of Bonaberi to 
a distance of about 160 km. It provided the company with transport through the difficult forest zone to 
the savannah belt (Gann, 1975). 
River ports played a major role during the early days of transoceanic trade (Noah, 1989). 
Maize produced by African peasants was also bought at a guaranteed price, but it was approximately half 
the price setders received (Zeleza, 1989). 
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(Guyer, 1987). This stimulated urban growth. 4 4 Farmers increased their production of food 
commodities to meet the growing needs of the urban population. Rural periodic markets 
functioned as collection points for food commodities destined for urban daily markets. In 
addition they served a rural population that was experiencing increasing purchasing power 
due to the rising prices for export crops such as groundnuts, coffee and cotton. 4 5 
In East Africa, British colonial administrations continued to use their powers to 
control population movements and determine the establishment and location of markets. 
They concentrated on the development of periodic markets 'since it was discovered that they 
would help more in the economic development of the district than would gazetted towns' 
(Obudho & Waller, 1976,55). 4 6 In the export trade, Marketing Boards took over the role of 
the commodity control boards (Bennett, 1965). 
In the East and Southern African settler economies, the activities of African traders 
remained largely restricted to the 'reserves'. Wild (1992) showed for Zimbabwe that African 
traders did very well in these rural areas. Towards the end of the 1950s they had firmly 
established their hold on rural trading at the expense of European businessmen. In the urban 
areas, segregation politics hampered the development of African enterprises. However, here 
the Asians eroded European control on domestic trade, taking over most of the general stores 
in the traditional European enclaves (Jones-Dube, 1991). 4 7 
2.3. The post-independence period 
In 1960, 16 African states became independent, followed by many others in quick 
succession during the following years. 4 8 The new independent nations were confronted with 
The rate of urbanization had remained modest in Sub-Saharan Africa prior to World War H. In 1920, 
only two to three per cent of the African population lived in towns, and forty per cent of these were 
Nigerians who had lived in towns for more than a hundred years (Vennetier, 1972). After World War II 
the rate of urbanization accelerated, reaching its peak during the post-independence period (Elkan & Van 
Zwanenberg, 1975). 
Prices in the rural market places were not always lower than in the urban market places. Collecting 
traders came to periodic markets from distant places to buy large quantities of one product but did not 
generally bring produce from other areas. The latter produce was brought to the market by a few local 
traders. As a consequence, periodic markets had a limited range of foodstuffs from other parts of the 
country for sale at high prices, in contrast with daily markets in urban centres that offered a wider range 
at more competitive prices (Lawson, 1971). Market places were not always the linchpin of the food 
trade. So-called landlord systems also existed, whereby buyers and sellers of commodities like kola, fish, 
cattle, sheep and goats, onions and natron were received in the houses of powerful landlords (HilL 1971; 
Hodder, 1971). 
The most active markets were also made auction centres where cattle could be exchanged in addition to 
produce. In some parts of western Kenya, new periodic markets were established as part of a plan to 
redistribute the population (Obudho & Waller, 1976). 
Indian and European 'general trading stores', which could be wholesale- or retail-oriented, had already 
been in competition since the pre-war period, not only in settler economies but also in other British 
colonies such as Malawi (Power, 1993). The British had brought the Indians to East Africa to work on 
the railways at the end of the 18th century. 
In 1960 Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Leopoldville (now 
Congo), Dahomey (now Benin), Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, 
Togo and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). In 1961 Sierra Leone and Tanganyika (now Tanzania). In 
1962 Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. In 1963 Kenya In 1964 Nyasaland (now Malawi), and Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia). In 1965 the Gambia. In 1966 Bechuanaland (now Botswana) and Basutoland 
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a steady population growth and increasing urbanization. The region was not highly 
urbanized by global standards, but the urbanization process gathered momentum very 
rapidly.4 9 Six major factors have influenced the urbanization process in post-independence 
Africa. The first two are endogenous — population growth and rural exodus (Appendix 2.1 
summarizes the causes of the rural exodus). 5 0 The other four are exogenous (White, 1989). 
One of them is drought, as in 1983/84. The others are related to the global economy. There 
were price increases of petrol in the 1970s, which were followed in the first half of the 
1980s by an appreciation of the US dollar in which oil is priced. There was also the 
slowdown of the global economy, and the adverse trend in the terms of trade for exporters 
of primary goods. These international factors led to a concentration of industries and a 
decline in per capita agricultural production, aggravated by the urban bias in governments' 
policies. 5 1 
Government interventions in food production and marketing 
The growth of urban centres and the relatively high purchasing power of the urban 
population boosted the flow of food from the countryside to the cities. 5 2 Many African 
governments believed that these flows should be regulated by the state in order to control 
inflation and replace traditional and private-sector distribution systems that were thought to 
be inefficient (Manu, 1992). Marketing boards were established in Anglophone Africa, 
Offices de Commercialisation and Caisses de Stabilisation in Francophone Africa, and 
Empresas de Ctomercalizacao Agrfcola in Portuguese-speaking countries, to deal with the 
collection, storage and distribution of selected food commodities. Most organizations 
focused on durable crops such as millet, sorghum, rice, and maize, leaving aside perishable 
crops. 5 3 In the first half of the 1980s, as many as 29 African countries south of the Sahara 
(now Lesotho) (Dudley, 1984). Prior to 1960, Ghana was the first and only colony in Sub-Saharan 
Africa to become independent, in 1957 (Due, 1971). 
Today the rate of growth of the urban population in Africa is the highest in the world (UN, 1989). 
Interregional differences are considerable, however, with higher levels of urban population prevailing in 
Southern Africa (Kosinski & Clarke, 1982). In 1989, South Africa had the highest urban population as 
a percentage of the total population (59%), followed by Zambia, the Central African Republic, Liberia, 
and Mauritania (45% to 50%) (World Bank, 1991). Burundi and Rwanda were the least urbanized (5% to 
10%). Cross-country comparisons should, however, be made with caution, because the figures are based 
on divergent national definitions of what is urban. Between 1980 and 1989, the average annual growth 
rates of the urban population were the highest in Mozambique, Tanzania and Botswana (10% to 11%) 
and the lowest in Mali and Sudan (3% to 4%) (World Bank, 1991). 
A third endogenous factor involves changing classifications of urban areas, but the contribution of this 
factor is minimal (UN, 1989). 
The international factors also caused increasing national debts, negative balances of payment, and the 
reliance of many African countries on food aid and concessionary capital (White, 1989). The human 
crush that resulted from the rural-urban migration 'often added to the frantic political scene in which one-
party states were emerging, and where politicians who had lost out in the zero-sum game of African 
politics, plotted how to compromise with the ruling cliques or overthrow them' (Skinner, 1986,194). 
Purchasing power is most important in the cases of meat, vegetables and fruits, as the general urban 
trend towards a higher consumption of these commodities is basically conditioned by a rising level of 
income. This does not mean that urban dwellers are always better off. Nutritional deprivation among the 
urban poor can be greater than in rural areas due to the closer link between food consumption and 
purchasing power (Delisle, 1991). 
The grain marketing boards succeeded the raw material marketing boards that had already been established 
under colonial rule in the 1940s and 1950s to deal with commodities like cocoa, coffee, cotton, and oil 
seeds for export (Dijkstra & Van der Laan, 1990) (see also Section 2.2). 
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(60%) had one or more marketing boards that were actively involved in the cereal trade 
(FAO, 1985). In six cases, grain marketing boards had an official monopoly in the domestic 
market 5 4 
Many African countries tried to tackle the increasing need for food not only through 
market intervention, but also by intervening at the production stage. In the former settler 
areas of Kenya, many of the large-scale farms were subdivided to parcel out land to small-
scale producers.55 The number of large-scale farms dropped from 4000 in 1960 to less than 
400 in 1982 (Odingo, 1971; CBS, 1984).5° 
Africans not only settled on former European farms but also in areas that had hitherto 
sporadically been used for agriculture. These setflement schemes, which became quite 
common all over Sub-Saharan Africa, were not merely aimed at increasing commercial food 
production and the food self-sufficiency of rural households, but also at tackling the 
problems of (1) displaced persons, landless families and squatters in the rural areas, and (2) 
unemployment and the rise of a lumpenproletariat in the urban centres (Hill, 1977; Hoorweg 
et al., 1991). The farmers in the schemes were subject to scheduled production and 
mandatory marketing arrangements, or were treated like any other small-scale producer.57 
In some countries, government interventions at the production stage were more 
drastic. In Tanzania, a forced villagization programme was carried out to increase both yields 
and the total marketed output (Bryceson, 1993). Between 1973 and 1977, approximately 60 
per cent of the rural population was moved into villages. On the marketing side, all cereal 
trade was monopolized by the National Milling Cooperation, but later cooperative unions 
were reinstated in an attempt to remedy rising urban food shortages caused by marketing 
inefficiencies.58 
Villagization and cooperative production were also forced upon peasant farmers in 
Mozambique and Ethiopia. In 1976, the FRELTMO government nationalized all land, and in 
the subsequent five years it relocated one million Mozambicans to communal villages 
(Davison, 1986). The Marxist government in Ethiopia instituted sweeping land reforms in 
1975 which dissolved all existing tenancy and abolished private ownership (Krishnan, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia (FAO, 1985). Some of these 
countries had socialist regimes, others had not The monopoly of the board usually referred to 
interdistrict and interregional trade, excluding local retail trade, which remained the domain of private 
traders. The boards were not only responsible for trade, but also for the maintenance of strategic reserves, 
and in some cases for the actual running of market places. The ADMARC in Malawi, for instance, had 
an extensive countrywide network of some 1,139 markets (Kaluwa & Chilowa, 1991). 
The first settlement schemes were already initiated two years prior to independence 'to facilitate an 
orderly transfer of land from European to African ownership with little or no drop in productivity' 
(Odingo, 1971,188). 
The remaining large-scale farms included individually owned farms (many of them absently owned), 
group-owned farms (including partnership, company and cooperative farms), and farms of the 
Agricultural Development Corporation (a Kenyan parastatal responsible for the purchase of farms from 
Europeans and reselling to Africans) (Foeken & Verstrate, 1992; Foeken & Tellegen, 1994). 
Four basic types of settlement schemes can be distinguished: schemes with individual holdings, 
compulsory marketing schemes, schemes with scheduled production, and schemes in which production is 
collectively organized (Chambers, 1969). In Kenya, the first two are most common (Hoorweg et al., 
1991). 
The National Milling Cooperation was accorded a monopoly in 1975, after which existing cooperatives 
were abolished in 1976. In 1983 urban food shortages became so acute that the government had to 
introduce a party-supervised rationing system in Dar es Salaam. In 1984, cooperative unions were re-
established (Bryceson, 1993). 
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1994). Peasant Associations, Service Cooperatives and Producer Cooperatives were 
established, and villagization, resettlement, and forced quota deliveries of cereals to the 
Agricultural Marketing Cooperation were introduced (Habtu, 1994). 5 9 
Communist and socialist regimes were also in favour of large-scale production on 
state farms. Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, sought to make the country a showpiece 
of African development through mechanized agriculture (Due, 1971). Over 200 state farms 
were established, which focused on export crops like cacao and food crops like rice. In 
Benin, the Marxist regime established state farms in the 1970s that produced export crops 
like French beans and groundnuts, and food crops like maize and rice (Godin, 1986). Large 
farms were also run by the state in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Angola (Krishnan, 1994; 
Davison, 1986; Azam et al., 1994). The governments in the latter two countries nationalized 
plantations that were neglected or abandoned by the Portuguese to form state plantations.60 
Negative intervention results 
The results of government interventions in food production and trade were negative in most 
cases. In Tanzania, the reinstated cooperatives did nothing to improve the finances or 
operations of the country's grain marketing. Marketing inefficiency caused huge financial 
losses among the cooperative unions, which the state eventually paid for through explicit 
subsidies or enormous bank overdrafts with inflationary consequences (Bryceson, 1993). 
The main effect was a massive transfer of resources away from peasant farmers (Ellis, 1983, 
as quoted by Fleming & Antony, 1991). 
In Ethiopia, explicit and implicit taxes discouraged farm production (Krishnan, 
1994). The system of compulsory deliveries of grains induced farm households to switch 
towards production of goods that were not covered by the quota system (Aredo, 1994). 6 1 
The inability of the Agricultural Marketing Corporation to carry out the necessary 
interregional stock movements disadvantaged both consumers in the deficit areas and 
producers in the surplus areas. 6 2 Moreover, the subsequent disinvestment in land had 
disastrous environmental effects (Habtu, 1994). Small-scale production was also hampered 
by the government's favouritism to state farms. While these farms covered only 4 per cent of 
the arable land, they received 75 per cent of the available fertilizer and 88 per cent of the 
improved seeds (Krishnan, 1994). Despite their relatively high input levels, they used the 
land less efficiently than small-scale producers (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1990). 
State farms were also a manifest failure in Ghana, Angola, Benin, and Mozambique. 
The contribution of Ghanaian state farms to the food supplies of the local peasants was 
Private ownership of land was also abolished in Angola in 1975. In contrast with Ethiopia and 
Mozambique, the Angolan government did not relocate peasant farmers or force them into cooperatives. 
Smallholders could rent land from the state for 90 years (Azam et aL, 1994). 
Under capitalist regimes private plantations were more common. Like most of the state farms, they 
focused either on traditional export crops like rubber (e.g. Firestone in Liberia), tea and coffee (e.g. 
Brooke Bond in Kenya), or on food crops for export like palm oil (e.g. Unilever in Cameroon and Zaire), 
pineapples (e.g. Del Monte in Kenya), and bananas (e.g. United Brands in Ivory Coast and Cameroon) 
(Dinham & Hines, 1983). 
The farmers also dumped inferior-quality produce onto the Agricultural Marketing Corporation, which 
was responsible for the compulsory purchases of farm products (Fleming & Antony, 1991). 
The consumers had to pay more while the producers received less (Fleming & Antony, 1991). 
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negligible (Konings, 1986). Most of the farms were phased out by as early as 1970. 6 3 In 
Angola, much of the land of the state farms had been appropriated for individual household 
farming by the early 1980s, and almost all cattle had been absorbed into smallholder herds. 
The remaining state farms were dependent on state subsidies to cover sizeable deficits, and 
basically supplied the military forces (Azam et al., 1994). In Benin, the production of the 
state farms was reduced to practically zero at the beginning of the 1980s, because of 
mismanagement and lack of spare parts and capital (Godin, 1986). In Mozambique, the bulk 
of the total agricultural output still came from peasant production, although the FRELIMO 
government placed priority on state-farm production to the neglect of peasants. 6 4 Peasant 
collectivization was not an overwhelming success under the Marxist regime either. Although 
one million Mozambicans had been relocated to communal villages by 1981, only 70,000 
were involved in agricultural cooperatives (Davison, 1986). 
Not only state farms and cooperatives failed to achieve their objectives in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the same was true of grain marketing boards. In the 1970s it became 
increasingly clear that statutory food marketing authorities (including the grain marketing 
boards) were acting according to a hidden agenda that aimed to keep prices low in order to 
pacify urban populations (Hesp & Van der Laan, 1985, Fleming & Antony, 1991). They 
were rather effective at transferring producers' surpluses both to the state and the urban 
consumers. 6 5 The outcome was, however, achieved at a tremendous cost, notably a 
reduction in the rate of agricultural and rural development (Fleming & Antony, 1991). 6 6 In 
Ghana the results were widespread shortages of food, smuggling, hoarding and corruption. 
Interventions created a class of newly rich people who had preferential access to government 
officials (Manu, 1992). In Zimbabwe, incomes among poor rural consumers were 
effectively reduced by as much as 30 per cent because 100,000 tonnes of expensive 
commercial maize meal were brought into rural areas annually, at the same time that local 
grain was being carried out through the state marketing channel (Jayne & Chisvo, 1991). 6 7 
The same circuitous movement of grain was common, for instance, in Malawi, where grain 
was moved by ADMARC from regions in the north to the strategic grain silos in Lilongwe to 
be stored, and then moved back in the hungry season for distribution. The operation caused 
large financial deficits to the parastatal (Kaluwa & Chilowa, 1991). 
In the aftermath of the first Ghanaian coup, many of Nkrumah's programmes were dismantled as quickly 
as possible. The state farms were no exception. By June 1968 the number of state farms had been halved 
and the labour force had been reduced by three quarters (Hill, 1977). By mid-1970 only 38 farms had 
survived, including three rice farms (Due, 1971). 
In 1985, state farms were responsible for 28% of the total agricultural output (largely cash crops for 
export) in the central region of Mozambique, while 12% came from cooperatives and 60% from peasants 
(Davison, 1986). 
Schiff & Valdes (1992), who studied Ivory Coast, Ghana and Zambia, calculated that as a result of the 
combined effect of direct and indirect price interventions, there was a huge transfer of income from 
agriculture towards the government and the rest of the non-agricultural economy in these countries, 
representing a staggering 96% of their agricultural GDP between 1960 and 1984. 
Schiff & Valdes (1992) associated high taxation of agriculture through direct and indirect price 
interventions statistically with lower agricultural and overall growth rates. 
The system was very costly in terms of transport and storage, especially because the price system failed 
to synchronize supply and demand for grains. Unit handling costs increased because of a vast depot 
network that was dictated mainly by social and political considerations. Weak accountability processes 
and the bureaucratic nature of the marketing board further contributed to the high marketing margins 
(Jiriyengwa, 1993; Takavaraha, 1993). 
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Many grain marketing boards had to face a financial crisis sooner or later. The 
NCPB of Kenya had billions of shillings of outstanding debts in 1987. Farmers were 
complaining about excessive payment delays, while commercial banks were unwilling to 
extend any further credit to the board. The financial problems resulted not only from 
allocative and operational inefficiencies, but also from the Treasury's reluctance to finance 
the exceptional losses made by the board in carrying out its price stabilization and food 
security objectives (Smith, 1992). 6 8 The wide trade margin which the board had to set to 
accommodate its high costs further encouraged informal sector markets and private sector 
trading, reducing the board's ability to achieve its food security objectives (Smith, 1992). 6 9 
In Mali the monopoly of the grain marketing board was likewise more fictional than 
real. The OPAM handled only 20 to 40 per cent of the total grain market in the country 
(Staatz et al., 1989). Meanwhile, the repression of private trade, while not sufficient to 
eliminate it, did increase transaction costs. OPAM's official monopoly and its system of 
official prices also acted as major disincentives to domestic grain production.70 
Structural adjustment 
All in all, the involvement of the state in primary agricultural marketing placed an enormous 
burden on the African economies. 7 1 This did not remain unnoticed, all the more because it 
appeared to be part of a general problem of inefficiency and ineffectiveness of public sector 
activities. The situation was seriously questioned for the first time in the mid-1970s, when 
agricultural stagnation, a hostile external economic environment, and an internal debt crisis 
was impairing the macroeconomic performance of most African countries. The fact that 
many such countries were unable to recover from the 1974 oil crisis was blamed at least 
partly on their large public sectors, which, it was argued, robbed these economies of the 
flexibility they needed to achieve the necessary adjustments (Najib & Nindi, 1988). 
Although changes were generally thought necessary, they took off very slowly in the 
following years. 7 2 They gained momentum, however, after the second oil crisis in 1979. 
Governments had to look desperately for foreign financiers, who set their conditions (Najib 
The allocative inefficiencies stemmed from the various types of administrative controls in operation, 
while the operational inefficiencies stemmed predominantly from the board's monopoly position, which 
encouraged managerial slackness and rent-seeking activities. The board's costs were also inflated by the 
expansion of the depot and buying centre network, a threefold increase in the number of employees 
between 1980 and 1987, and the need to finance the strategic reserve of maize fJBates, 1989; Smith, 
1992). 
The policy of stringent movement regulations aggravated an already substantial regional and seasonal 
food price variation in rural Kenya, simultaneously raising the profitability of private trade and placing 
restrictions on it (Meilink, 1987). 
Other similarities with boards in other countries were mismanagement and accumulating deficits (Staatz 
etal., 1989). 
African farmers, for instance, received a significantly smaller part of the final consumer price than Asian 
farmers, even taking into account the higher transport and related marketing costs on the African 
continent (Ahmed, 1988). 
The slow implementation of reforms was related to a number of widely observed factors: vested interests 
and political factors, an unwillingness to give up direct patronage benefits; the beliefs prevalent in many 
countries that markets would not work, that peasants would be exploited, etc.; the fact that short-term 
gains might be small; that some ethnic groups or foreigners would be the prime beneficiaries; that 
piecemeal reform was difficult since complex systems were often at stake; that reformers often did a poor 
job; and that donor assistance could sometimes allow governments to avoid hard choices (Berg, 1985). 
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& Nindi, 1988). Structural adjustment was recommended, grain marketing liberalization 
being one of the central components (Shepherd, 1989). 
Senegal's parastatal for cereals (ONCAD) was liquidated as early as 1980, 7 3 while 
grain marketing in Mali was gradually deregulated from 1981 onwards. 7 4 Many countries 
followed in subsequent years. Deregulation took place in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Somalia, and Ethiopia, while grain marketing boards were 
phased out in Nigeria, Zambia, Zaire, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone (Antony & Fleming, 
1991; Reusse, 1987). 7 5 In some countries the process went very gradually, as in Tanzania, 
where grain trade deregulation started in 1984, only to be completed in 1990. The buying 
monopoly of the Tanzanian cooperative unions was phased out by gradually allowing private 
traders to handle larger quantities of grain, and eventually permitting them to purchase 
directly from the farmers instead of dealing with farmers' societies (Coulter & Golob, 
1992). In other countries the road of adjustment was more circuitous. The Zambian 
government dissolved the poorly performing NAMBOARD in 1989, transferring its 
marketing functions to cooperative unions (as in Tanzania five years earlier). The unions, 
however, were unable to operate efficiently under a pricing structure based on huge 
subsidies to maize meal consumers. Eventually, all consumer subsidies were abolished in 
1991, and the remaining restrictions on maize marketing were removed (Jones & Beynon, 
1992). 
The first results of the deregulation of the African grain trade have been encouraging. 
To mention but a few, in Tanzania liberalization improved the efficiency of resource 
allocation, stimulated private enterprise and contributed towards production surpluses 
(Coulter & Golob, 1992); in Mali, liberalization stimulated entry into grain marketing, led to 
an increase in specialization and scale of operations, and reduced premiums demanded by 
merchants (Staatz et al., 1989); in Madagascar, liberalization led to growing competitiveness 
and effectiveness, which significantly diminished rice price differences between surplus and 
deficit areas (Berg, 1989). 
Nevertheless, the deregulation process has also exposed the weaknesses of African 
economies. Due to the long period of suppression in Tanzania, the system which has 
emerged from liberalization exhibits many inefficiencies: 
Wholesale traders characteristically have little capital, handle small volumes (not 
more than a truckload at a time), and do not invest in vehicles or interseasonal 
storage of grains. Their operation is hampered by the poor state of the roads, a 
shortage of vehicles, a lack of market infrastructure, and above all the absence of 
any source of formal credit for private trading operations. There is limited 
integration of the country's different markets, with restricted spatial flows reflected 
The core activity of the Senegalese ONCAD was groundnut marketing, while millet marketing and 
supplying inputs were additional activities. ONCAD's dissolution brought greater participation by 
private enterprise in the millet market, but not in the groundnut market, where cooperatives and other 
parastatals filled the gap (Hoogervorst et al., 1988; Van der Laan & Van Haarcn, 1990). 
In exchange for the Malian government's agreement to abolish the state's legal monopoly on grain trade 
and to encourage private sector marketing, international agencies and donors pledged long-term 
shipments of food aid to supply the urban areas with grain during the transition period (Staatz et al., 
1989). 
In Madagascar the deregulated commodity was rice, and in Zimbabwe it was wheat In other countries 
more than one type of grain was involved. The phased-out marketing boards in Ivory Coast and Sierra 
Leone dealt with rice, and in Zaire with maize. The others dealt with more than one type of grain. 
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by high regional price fluctuations. Lack of market information and systems of 
communication between markets have increased the risk of trading (Coulter & 
Golob, 1992, 421). 
In Mali, similar and other constraints hamper most wholesalers in responding fully to 
the opportunities created by the grain trade liberalization; notably these are a shortage of 
working capital, lack of political connections, and the riskiness of the trade. 7 6 The latter 
derives from demand and supply instability, regulatory uncertainty, and the unenforceable 
nature of contracts.7 7 In Madagascar, deregulation of the rice market has been impeded by 
ambiguous regulations, continuing limits on free entry, attempts at cartelization, and 
tenacious resistance of existing stakeholders and institutions. Additional structural 
constraints are poor roads, weak extension services, and inadequate credit systems and input 
supply arrangements (Berg, 1989). In Malawi the liberalization of food trade has affected 
food supplies to households in remote areas. These areas have experienced the closure of 
uneconomic ADMARC buying-and-selling points, while private traders have been reluctant 
to penetrate them. 7 8 Even where such traders do operate, they typically purchase for sale in 
other areas, leaving food-deficit households with access to fewer alternative sources of food 
(Kaluwa & Chilowa, 1991; Kandoole, 1991). 7 9 
On the basis of these and other experiences, it is now generally agreed that simply 
eliminating government controls and allowing resources to be allocated by the market may 
not yield the desired results. African governments have to play a role in creating the 
institutional framework within which efficient and effective grain markets can emerge. 
Primary factors in accelerating the development of private trading are (1) the development of 
market places, storage structures and rural financial markets, (2) long-term infrastructural 
policies to reduce transport costs, and (3) investment in market support systems, marketing 
research, and quality grades and standards.80 
Other food commodities 
Prior to structural adjustment, marketing boards dealt with grain trade in over half of the 
African countries south of the Sahara. At the same time, other, less strategic food 
commodities were hardly handled by parastatals. A few exceptions did exist 
Political connections were important in the beginning because sales contracts with the OPAM were 
initially awarded not by an open bidding process but through personal contacts. Obtaining a contract to 
supply OPAM was very lucrative, because OPAM was buying grain at an official producer price that 
was considerably higher than the open market price (Staatz et aL, 1989). 
Regulatory uncertainty exists when officials do not apply formal regulations, e.g. negotiating tax 
payments for the benefit of official and trader, or harassing traders that respect all regulations. 
Traders have not replaced ADMARC in areas that were abandoned as a result of the rationalization of 
economic activities. Both ADMARC and private traders are competing in accessible areas. This has had 
adverse effects in most remote areas in terms of access to inputs and markets (Mtawali, 1993). 
Apart from alternative food crops, these households presently have to rely on other farmers who are able 
to buy or grow and store excess maize. These surplus farmers realize high margins by trading maize for 
labour when the labour supply is high (the hungry season) and maize is short in supply. "By neglecting 
their own farms, short-term food deficit farmers can find themselves in chronic deficit situations' 
(Kaluwa & Chilowa, 1991,116). 
For a discussion on these factors see Santorum & Tibaijika (1992), Dias et al. (1991), Kaluwa & 
Chilowa (1991), Takavarasha (1993), Shawa (1993), Von Braun & Paulino (1990), Coulter & Golob 
(1992), Beynon et al. (1992). 
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Trade in sugar was monopolized by the state in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia (FAO, 1985). Importation of foreign sugar was usually more 
important than the collection of local production. Domestic production was insufficient either 
because of unfavourable agro-ecological conditions, or, as in the case of Tanzania and 
Kenya, because of poor performance of the government-controlled sugar industry.81 The 
sugar sectors have been reformed or are being reformed now. 8 2 
Trade of processed fluid milk was monopolized in Kenya by a national cooperative 
and in Zambia and Swaziland by a dairy board (FAO, 1985). The Kenya Cooperative 
Creamery (KCC) had a monopoly on milk sales in urban centres by virtue of a law that 
forbade trade of raw milk in cities. The milk market was liberalized in 1992 after the milk 
collection and marketing system of the KCC had broken down (Jaffee, 1995). 8 3 Private 
traders responded to the new situation by capturing a major share of the urban market 8 4 
Kenyan and Zambian parastatals at one time monopolized commercial slaughtering of 
beef cattle (FAO, 1985). The Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) had a legal monopoly over 
commercial slaughter in the 1960s, but lost it in the 1970s. From then on, the KMC was 
supposed to concentrate on slaughter for export and export trade, while private firms took 
care of the domestic market It did not become a very successful exporter, however 
(Evangelou, 1984; Rutten, 1992). 8 5 
Trade in vegetables, fruits and tubers was not monopolized in any African country 
during the post-independence period. The commodities were left to the free market As a 
consequence, demographic, physical, and sociocultural circumstances determined the trade 
process, rather than political or legal ones. We will look into these circumstances (marketing 
channel environments) in various chapters of the present work. A few short remarks will do 
here. The sociocultural environment affects producers' sales decisions, traders' trading 
practices, and consumers' eating habits (see Section 4.1). As for the demographic 
environment most transactions are concentrated in market places. The spatial organization of 
The main causes of the disappointing performance of the Tanzanian sugar industry were (1) a shortage of 
foreign exchange (in combination with a high foreign exchange component in both operating and 
replacement costs), (2) an unfavourable pricing policy, and (3) deficiencies in management (NDC, 1992). 
In Kenya the reasons were more or less similar: (1) rising input costs, (2) a poor policy environment 
that provided disincentives to farmers, and (3) inefficient state-run sugar factories (Chalon, 1994). The 
processing capacity of Kenya's sugar factories potentially could meet domestic demand (PAM, 1995). 
The Tanzanian reforms, which took off in 1986, included liberalization of prices, foreign exchange 
measures, and institutional reforms (NDC, 1992). The Kenyan reforms were announced in 1992. All 
sugar factories were listed for privatization (Chalon, 1994). Prices were decontrolled in 1993. 
In early 1992 the Kenya Cooperative Creamery (KCC) was no longer able to meet urban demand because 
of a drought in the production areas, a liquidity crisis which led to payment delays of 3 to 4 months, and 
the inability to reconstitute large quantities of imported powered milk due to a lack of butter oil. As a 
consequence, the government was forced to relax controls on private milk distribution, including those 
on raw milk sales in cities (Jaffee, 1995). 
In Nairobi the KCC's sales of fluid milk (pasteurized and sterilized [UHT]) fell from 400,000 litres/day 
in early 1982 to 230,000 litres/day in early 1993 (Jaffee, 1995). 
The KMC had to receive its supplies from the Livestock Marketing Division (LMD), another parastatal 
responsible for the purchase of stock in pastoralist areas. However, the LMD was unable to compete 
with private traders who offered higher prices and direct payment (Evangelou, 1984; Rutten, 1992). The 
KMC has failed where the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), which has a monopoly on beef exports 
from Botswana, has succeeded. According to Abbott (1987), the success of the BMC has been in its 
relationship with the Botswana government: it has received strong backing, without being pressured to 
take decisions that are politically desirable but economically costly. 
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these market places tends to follow population distributions (Section 4.5). Population 
distributions change with urbanization. In West Africa, urbanization and urban growth have 
moulded the trade of food (including horticultural commodities), as well as the location of 
market places, since pre-colonial days (Section 2.1). In most other parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the urbanization process started during the colonial period, as did its effect on 
indigenous food systems. The settler economies were the only exception: urbanization and 
urban growth did occur, but segregation policies of colonial governments curtailed the 
possibilities of indigenous food traders to respond to increasing urban demands (Section 
2.2). Here, a direct relation between urbanization and the trade in food (including 
horticultural commodities) could only develop after independence. 
In addition to the demographic environment, the physical environment has played a 
major role in the development of post-independence horticultural trade (Section 5.6 and 
Chapter 6). That relation dates back to the pre-colonial period, when the structure of long-
distance food trade was determined by transport conditions in various agro-ecological zones, 
and by the presence of things like navigable rivers (Section 2.1). In the colonial period the 
building of railways and the improvement of roads determined the emergence of new trade 
routes and market places for both export crops and food crops (Section 2.2). 
Up to the 1970s, the purchasing power of consumers also played an important role 
in the development of food trade. This factor dates back to the long-distance caravans that 
traversed pre-colonial Africa. The traders were in need of large amounts of food and had 
considerable purchasing power, thus generating local food trade (Section 2.1). During the 
colonial period the introduction of cash crops increased the purchasing power of African 
farmers, further stimulating local trade in food (Section 2.2). Purchasing power lost 
importance as stimulating factor after the first oil crisis in 1974. The reason is that, on the 
whole, the purchasing power of the African population has not improved since that time. 
Between 1975 and 1993, per capita private consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa decreased on 
average 0.8 per cent per year (at current prices) (World Bank, 1995). Differences between 
countries do exist, but most had to cope with a decline, and none showed the kind of growth 
figures that were common for developing countries in East Asia (in Section 7.1 we will look 
in more detail at purchasing-power indicators for Kenya). 8 6 
2.4. Concluding remarks on food trade in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The previous sections have traced the development of food trade in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Various factors have influenced this development The first is urbanization. From the very 
beginning of agriculture in the New Stone Age, a relationship has existed between 
urbanization and market development Agriculture made urban settlements possible, which 
in turn led to the rise of a class of merchants who began trading food with the townspeople. 
Thus, urbanization gave rise to marketing channels. However, initially the non-market 
During the same period the average annual growth in per capita private consumption for East Asia and 
the Pacific was 5.3 per cent (World Bank, 1995). According to the World Bank, the highest average 
annual growth rate in the East was found in China: 6.6 per cent The top of the class of Sub-Saharan 
Africa was Chad: 1.9 per cent 
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provision of food remained common. Moreover, food trade also developed in regions of 
Africa without urban centres. Factors of importance in those areas were agro-ecological 
differences, interethnic boundaries, and a demand for specific raw materials like salt and iron 
ore which were traded in exchange for food and other commodities. 
Once established, the development of local and regional food marketing networks 
was stimulated by the growth of trans-Saharan trade with the Mediterranean countries and of 
overseas trade with the Middle and Far East Later still, Europe and the Americas came to be 
the most important export destinations and European traders the leading intermediaries. The 
trans-Atlantic trade led to a rapid growth of urban centres and a further intensification of 
regional and local food trade. 
During the colonial period, the same process of export-led town and market 
development continued, with two exceptions. In the setder economies, new centres of food 
trade arose due to segregation policies. In the mining economies, urban centres inhabited by 
a new class of consumers sprang up around the mines. Elsewhere, food production and 
trade were stimulated by taxation in kind and by the rising purchasing power of farmers 
involved in cash crop production. Trade flows and the locations of market centres were 
affected by the improvement of local transportation networks. 
After independence, urbanization and urban growth resumed their role as a catalyst 
of market development as prior to the rise of the trans-Atlantic trade. However, the actual 
structure of food production and marketing systems was often governed by government 
policies. In many countries, cooperatives, state farms and marketing boards were used to 
stimulate, regulate or monopolize production and trade, especially of grains. Perishables 
were thoughtless strategic, and the trade in these commodities was seen as too risky for 
successful government intervention. Grain trade was again deregulated in most countries in 
the 1980s and 1990s, after two decades of disastrous experiments. Policymakers started to 
put their faith in the free market reinventing the importance of private trade. 
All in all, the development of food trade in Sub-Saharan Africa has varied in relation 
to population distributions (urbanization and urban growth), transport, purchasing power 
and government policies. Purchasing power was important in the late pre-colonial period and 
the colonial period, but has declined in significance during the post-independence period 
(especially in the 1970s and 1980s) due to stagnating per capita incomes. Government 
policies have affected grains in particular, while being of lesser consequence for vegetables, 
fruits, tubers and other perishables. 
Hort icu l ture i n K e n y a , w i th Spec i a l 
Reference to the Re sea r ch A r e a s 1 
3 
The present chapter will discuss the production of horticultural commodities in Kenya. In the 
first two sections Kenya will be introduced, and the national horticultural picture will be 
drawn. In subsequent sections the research areas will be presented, and some aspects of the 
horticultural enterprise in these areas will be analysed. 
3.1. Kenya 
Kenya belongs to the middle-income countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1992, it had a per 
capita GNP of $310. Mozambique had the lowest per capita GNP of Sub-Saharan Africa ($ 
60) and Botswana the highest ($ 2,790) (World Bank, 1994). Kenya has one of the fastest 
growing populations of the continent, having witnessed a 40 per cent population increase in 
ten years' time. The annual growth rate was 3.4 per cent between 1979 and 1989 (CBS, 
1981, 1994b). 2 Only Ivory Coast had a higher population growth rate during that period 
(3.8 per cent) (World Bank, 1994). Overall, Kenya's average population density is not 
particularly high compared to other African countries. In 1989, the average population 
density for the whole country was 36 persons per square kilometre (CBS, 1994b). Countries 
such as Nigeria, Burundi, Uganda and Gambia had densities over twice as high (UN, 
1993). However, by far the largest part of Kenya consists of sparsely populated dry 
lowlands, and 18 per cent of the land accommodates 80 per cent of the population: in 1989, 
17.1 million people lived on 103,150 sq km of land, while the remaining 4.3 million lived 
on 478,630 sq km (CBS, 1994b). Population concentrations can be found in the highland 
areas of central and western Kenya and along the shores of Lake Victoria and the Indian 
Ocean. 
An earlier version of this chapter has been published by the author in the Scandinavian Journal of 
Development Alternatives and Area Studies, Vol. 16. no. 1,1997, pp. 49-74: 'Commercial Horticulture 
by African Smallholders: A Success Story from the Highlands of Kenya.' 
The two most recent population censuses were carried out in 1979 and 1989. 
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Over 80 per cent of the people live in rural areas (CBS, 1994c). Agriculture is their 
main activity and source of cash income. Traditional export crops for smallholder production 
are coffee, tea, pyrethrum and cotton. Many farmers have turned away from those crops, 
though, because of low producer prices and excessive delays in payment by the marketing 
boards that monopolize the trade.3 Horticulture has become a popular alternative because it 
brings fair prices and immediate returns. The market prospects for vegetables, fruits and 
tubers are favourable as a result of ongoing urban growth. The share of the Kenyan 
population classified as urban increased from 15 per cent in 1979 to 18 per cent ten years 
later. In 1989,3.9 million people lived in urban centres in Kenya, compared to 2.3 million in 
1979 (CBS, 1994c). 
3.2. Horticulture: the national picture 
The Kenyan climates and soils are suitable for growing a large variety of vegetables, fruits 
and flowers (Table 3.1). The commodities are used as staple food (potatoes, bananas), are 
served as a supplement with ugali (tomatoes, onions, kale), or are grown for export 
Table 3.1. Major horticultural commodities in Kenya 
Vegetables Artichokes Cauliflower Lettuce 
and tubers Asparagus Celery Okra 
Baby marrows Chillies Onions 
Beetroot Cucumbers Potatoes 
Brinjals Dudi Radishes 
Brussels sprouts 
Cabbages 
Galka Snake gourds 
Karela Spinach 
Capsicums Kohlrabi Turia 
Carrots Kale Turnips 
Fruits Avocados Limes Plums 
Apples Mangoes Pomelos 
Bananas Mulberries Strawberries 
Cape Gooseberries Oranges Sweet melons 
Figs Papayas Tangerines 
Grapes Passion fruit Tomatoes 
Guavas Pears Tree tomatoes 
Lemons Pineapples Watermelons 
Cut-flowers Alstroemerias Lilies Solidasters 
Ammi majus Moluccella Spray carnations 
Arabicum Orchids Standard carnations 
Chrysanthemums Ornithogalums Stance 
Delphiniums Roses Tuberoses 
Note: Appendix 3.1 provides an extended list of vegetables and fruits, including their common and botanical 
names. 
In the second half of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, payment delays for coffee and cotton became 
extreme. Payments to coffee farmers (by the Coffee Board of Kenya through the Kenya Planters' Co-
operative Union) and to cotton farmers (by the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board) would often take 
more than a year (Weekly Review, 1990; Dijkstra, 1990). 
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purposes (French beans, avocados, cut flowers). Many of them were known in Kenya 
before the colonial period, but others were introduced by European setders (potatoes, 
cabbages) or more recendy by Kenyan research institutes (apples, strawberries). 
Horticulture occupies eleven per cent of the total arable land, ranking third after maize 
cultivation,4 and dairy farming. By comparison, coffee and tea account for only three per 
cent and two per cent respectively of arable land (Nyamiaka, 1995). According to Nyamiaka 
(1995), approximately 210,000 hectares of land were under production for fruits, vegetables 
and cut flowers in 1991 (Table 3.2). 5 He does not mention the land under production of 
tubers. 
Almost all horticulture in Kenya is rain-fed and concentrated in the highland areas. 
The only exceptions are the small-scale production of citrus fruits and mangoes in the coastal 
Table 3.2. Production of vegetables, fruits and cut flowers in Kenya, 1991 
Crops Hectares Production in Tonnes 
Fruits: 
Bananas 75,714 1,026,276 
Citrus 1 9 3 7 190,875 
Mangoes 10,173 93,994 
Pineapples 8,322 378,705 
Avocados 1,562 18,710 
Passion fruit 1,463 16,256 
Papayas 4,400 44,593 
Apples 388 3,727 
Pears 521 8,059 
Plums 808 5,550 
Others 1,910 12,885 
Total 124,548 1,799,630 
Vegetables: 
Cabbages 23,049 363,861 
Tomatoes 9,292 118,414 
Kale 18,178 220,532 
Onions 7,086 73,140 
Carrots 5,255 63,030 
Brinjals 1343 13,985 
French beans 5,939 28,645 
Chillies 1,432 9,443 
Garden peas 6,752 31,643 
Asian vegetables 2,299 37,187 
Traditional vegetables 3,949 13342 
Others 1,961 19,492 
Total 86,535 992,714 
Cut flowers: 
Total 638 16,405 
Source: Nyamiaka, 1995. 
Part of the maize is intercropped with beans. The beans are normally intended for drying. They are not 
included in the area under horticulture. 
Appendix 3.2 specifies the hectarage under cut flowers (including cut foliage). 
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region, and some large-scale farms and settlement schemes with irrigated production near 
rivers and lakes in the dry lowlands.6 Table 3.3 lists all horticultural production areas and 
Map 5 shows the districts involved.7 
Most small-scale horticultural farmers focus on production for family consumption 
and for the domestic market The limited number of large-scale farms in the country 
concentrate mainly on production for export. Sometimes small-scale out-growers are 
contracted, for instance for French beans and so-called Asian vegetables (chilli peppers, 
okra, eggplants etc.), but they are relatively few in number. Horticultural exports make up 
approximately five per cent of the total volume of horticultural commodities marketed in the 
country (HCDA, 1990). 8 It can be concluded that commercial horticulture in Kenya is first 
and foremost rain-fed production for the domestic market by smallholders in the highland 
regions. 
3.3. Smallholder horticulture in Nyandarua, Kisii and Taita Taveta 
Three Districts were selected to study commercial horticulture among smallholders in more 
detail: Nyandarua, Kisii and Taita Taveta (see Section 1.3).9 Nyandarua was occupied by 
pastoralists (Masai) during pre-colonial days (Rutten, 1992). 1 0 Later it was brought under 
cultivation by non-African settlers and became part of the White Highlands. The settler farms 
were located on the Kinangop plateau, which covers the lower parts of the present 
Nyandarua District; they measured 400 to 800 hectares each. The farmers cultivated cereals 
and pyrethrum and kept dairy cattle and sheep (Odingo, 1971). 1 1 
After independence (in 1963) most settlers were bought out and most farms were 
subdivided by the government to be allocated to small-scale producers, mainly of Kikuyu 
ethnic origin. Later, additional settlement schemes were established in the forest reserves 
higher up the slopes of the Aberdare Range that borders the district to the east. The 
population density in the district remained relatively low compared to other parts of the 
Kenyan highlands. 
Horticulture has been of major importance to small-scale producers from the moment 
they settled in the district Coffee and tea cannot be cultivated at this high altitude (over 2400 
metres). By 1970 about half the total area under cultivation in the settlement schemes was 
being used to grow Irish potatoes, cabbages, green peas and other horticultural commodities. 
In the next two decades the relative importance of horticulture remained roughly the same, 
See Foeken et al. (1989), Hoorweg et aL (1991) and Hoorweg et al. (1995) on the coastal region, and 
Ruigu (1988) on large-scale irrigation schemes. 
The map shows district boundaries as they existed in 1990. 
The estimate dates back to 1990. More recent figures are not available, but the export percentage has 
increased one or two per cent at best since then. Large differences exist from one commodity to another 
by far the bulk of the marketed French beans and cut flowers are exported, while many other 
commodities are not exported at all (see Section 5.4 on horticultural exports). 
Appendix 3.3 provides some information on the altitude, rainfall, soil and population density in the 
research areas. 
Some parts of Nyandarua still bear Masai names (01 Kalou, 01 Joro Orok). 
Pyrethrum is a naturally occurring insecticide. Traditionally it was used widely in domestic, institutional 
and commercial applications. Nowadays its uses are more restricted as a consequence of historical supply 
problems and the availability of cheap synthetic alternatives (Robbins, 1984). 
Table 33 . Horticultural production areas in Kenya 
Production 
area 
Altitude Type of production 
(rainfall pja.) 
Major vegetables 
domestic market export market 
Minor vegetables Fruits 
A) Kiambu, 
Machakos, 
Nairobi 
800-2400 metres rain-fed 
(1500-2000 mm) 
Machakos: irrigated (1) 
(600-1000 mm) 
cabbage, carrot, 
Irish potato, kale, 
(spring) onion, 
tomato 
brinjal, capsicum, 
chilli, okra, 
French bean, 
karela 
broccoli, pea, 
Brussels sprout, 
cauliflower, 
courgette, lettuce, 
spinach, cucumber 
mango, citrus, 
papaya, banana, 
pineapple, 
passion fruit, 
avocado 
B) Baringo, 
Nyandarua, 
Nakuru 
2100-2800 metres 
Lake Naivasha: 
1900 metres 
Lake Baringo: 
1000 metres 
Molo, Nyandarua: 
rain-fed (1200-1800 mm) 
Lake Naivasha, Lake 
Baringo: irrigated 
(400-600 mm) 
cabbage, carrot, 
Irish potato, kale, 
(spring) onion, 
garden pea 
capsicum, chilli, 
courgette, 
French bean, 
cut flowers (2) 
broccoli, spinach, 
Brussels sprout, 
cauliflower, 
courgette, lettuce, 
cucumber (2) 
plum, apple, pear 
Q Embu, Mem 
Nyeri, Muranga, 
Kirinyaga 
800-2500 metres 1200-2500 m: rain-fed 
(1000-2000 mm) 
800-1200 m: irrigated (3) 
(400-800 mm) 
cabbage, carrot, 
Irish potato, kale, 
onion, tomato (4) 
brinjal, capsicum, 
French bean (5) 
banana, orange, 
papaya, pineapple 
D) Kisii, South 
Nyanza 
1100-2200 metres rain-fed 
(Kisii: 1200-2100 mm; 
S. Nyanza: 700-1800 mm) 
cabbage, kale, 
onion, tomato 
banana, pineapple, 
passion fruit 
E) Busia, Siaya, 
Kakamega, 
Bungoma, 
Kisumu 
Busia, Kisumu, Siaya: 
1100-1500 metres 
Bungoma, Kakamega: 
1200-2000 metres 
rain-fed 
(Bungoma, Busia, Kakamega: 
1100-2000 mm; Kisumu, 
Siaya: 700-1800 mm) 
cabbage, kale, 
(spring) onion, 
tomato 
French bean 
(tinned) 
mango, banana, 
passion fruit, 
orange 
Lake Victoria: irrigated 
Table 3.3, continued 
F) Trans Nzoia 1600-2200 metres rain-fed and irrigated (6) 
(900-1400 mm) 
citrus, apple, 
avocado 
G)Kilifi,Kwale 0-500 metres rain-fed and irrigated (7) 
(400-1400 mm) (8) 
brinjal, capsicum, 
onion, tomato 
mango, citrus, 
cashew nut 
H) Taita-Taveta 600-1000 metres 
Taita Hills: 
1200-1700 metres 
Taita Hills: rain-fed 
(800-1500 mm) 
Taveta, Voi: irrigated 
(400-600 mm) 
cabbage, carrot, 
kale, onion, 
tomato 
banana, mango, 
passion fruit 
I) Oloitokitok 1800-2000 metres irrigated 
(600-800 mm) 
onion, tomato 
J)Garissa 200-300 metres irrigated 
(250-500 mm) 
banana, citrus, 
melon 
Source MOA, 1989. 
Notes: 
(1) mainly along Athi-River/Yatta Funow 
(2) export and minor vegetables especially under irrigation at Lake Naivasha 
(3) including Kibirigwi irrigation scheme 
(4) English potatoes especially in Meru 
(5) export produce especially in Muranga 
(6) usually large-scale fanning 
(7) irrigated horticulture particularly in case of vegetables 
(8) high rainfall usually restricted to a narrow strip along the coast 
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Map 5. Horticultural production areas in Kenya 
E. Busia, Bungoma, Kakamega, Kisumu, Siaya 
E Trans Nzoia 
G.Kffifi,Kwale 
H.TaitaTaveta 
I. Oloitokitok 
J. Garissa 
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while the total area under cultivation increased by about one third. 1 2 The district had 
developed into one of the chief suppliers of potatoes and cabbages to the Nairobi market, a 
100 km to 140 km journey from the production area. 
Seventy per cent of the total area of Nyandarua District is suitable for horticulture. 
The remaining parts have to cope with frequent night frosts, unreliable rain and waterlogging 
(Jaetzold and Schmidt, 1983). The district's climate favours cultivation of temperate 
vegetables and fruits. The end of the long rains and the start of the short rains usually 
overlap, allowing two successful vegetable crops a year, and three with some luck. Maize is 
hardly grown in the areas suitable for horticulture because of its very long growth season of 
up to a year and its susceptibility to frost damage. Potatoes are the main staple food. In 
addition to horticulture, pyrethrum is grown as a cash crop, and graded cows (Frisian 
Holsteins) are kept to sell milk. 
Kisii District is inhabited by the Gusii, who were traditionally mixed agriculturists-
pastoralists. 1 3 They settled in the area in the 19th century, after being pushed out of the 
Kano plains and away from the shores of Lake Victoria, where they had arrived in the 16th 
century. During the colonial period, the area was part of the 'reserves'. The British 
administrators introduced coffee for smallholder production on an experimental basis in the 
1930s, and tea and pyrethrum in the 1950s (Carlsen, 1980). In the course of time, farm sizes 
shrank substantially due to population growth and the subdivision of holdings as part of the 
inheritance system. At present, Kisii is among the most densely populated rural areas of 
Kenya (average density 554 persons per sq km). 
Eighty per cent of the district is suitable for horticulture, with the remaining part 
lacking appropriate soils (Jaetzold and Schmidt, 1983). Although Kisii receives rain almost 
throughout the year (allowing three successive crops), two vegetable crop cycles per annum 
are most common. By far the most important horticultural commodity in the area are 
bananas, which are harvested more or less continuously. They are usually cultivated in 
monocultures, enriching the scenery with banana forests. 1 4 
The area under bananas more than quadrupled between 1970 and 1991, while the 
area under tea increased more gradually and the areas under coffee and pyrethrum declined 
during the same two decades. 1 5 Increasing scarcity of land and selling prices that were 
thought to be fair stimulated the cash crop production of bananas.1 6 The bunches find their 
way to urban centres in western Kenya, the Rift Valley and the central highlands close to 370 
In 1970, 21,500 ha out of 40,300 ha was being used for horticulture (MFP, 1971). In 1991, the total 
area under cultivation had increased to 55,800 ha, of which 23,600 ha was used for horticulture 
(OVPMPND, 1994c). 
Kisii District in today's Kenya is smaller than the area discussed in this book because of a redrawing of 
district boundaries. 
Two types of bananas are grown: cooking bananas (Musa paradisiana), which are cooked and mashed 
before being eaten, and sweet bananas (Musa sapientum), usually consumed fresh. The cooking type is 
more common in Kisii. 
The area under bananas increased from 5,400 ha in 1970 to 20,000 in 1985 and approx. 24,000 in 1991. 
The area under tea rose from 6,200 ha in 1970 to approx. 15,000 ha in 1991, while the area under coffee 
declined from 11,100 ha to less than 7,000 ha, and the area under pyrethrum from 5300 ha to approx. 
4,000 ha (MFP, 1971; MPND, 1989; OVPMPND, 1994a; OVPMPND, 1994b). 
In contrast with bananas, tea and coffee cannot be intercropped with food crops without drastically 
reducing their yields. 
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km down the road. Some even reach Mombasa after an 850 km journey. Notwithstanding 
the importance of bananas, maize is the Gusii's staple food. 
Taita Taveta is a district with two centres of agricultural production: the wet, foggy 
Taita Hills and the farmland around the Taveta springs in the otherwise dry lowlands. The 
Taita, who now occupy the Taita Hills, setded in the area in the 16th century after migrating 
southwards from Somalia together with other Bantu-speaking groups. They were 
agriculturists who in the 19th century started to sell surplus produce such as sugar cane, 
beans, dried cassava, sweet potatoes and gourds to passing caravans in exchange for cloth, 
metal objects and other items (Hollis, 1975). In the 1890s the missionaries introduced coffee 
(Nazzaro, 1974). 
The Taita became further drawn into the cash economy by working for colonial 
officers who had established an administrative centre in the hills at Wundanyi, and for 
private companies that had received large concessions at the foot of the hills, which they 
turned into sisal plantations.1 7 After independence, wage labour remained an important 
source of income to households in the region. The tourist industry along the coast and in the 
game parks that surround the Taita Hills developed into a new major employer.1 8 
In the early 1940s the Taita were already growing vegetables for the Mombasa 
market, 170 km away. Cabbage was the most important crop. In 1941, colonial officers 
established a cooperative which collected the produce to be transported by truck to Voi, 
where it was loaded onto trains to Mombasa (African World, 1954). 1 9 In 1965 the newly 
independent government finished bituminizing the Voi-Mombasa road, which made possible 
direct transport to the coast by road (GOK, 1964, 1966). Since then, the hills have 
developed into one of the chief suppliers of the Mombasa market, not only for cabbages but 
also for highly perishable commodities such as tomatoes and capsicums. Most farmers 
produce two horticultural crops a year, though the area under production is smaller during 
the short rains because maize has priority at that time.20 Some irrigated production takes 
place outside the rainy seasons with water diverted from small streams that run down the 
hills. As in Kisii, holdings have become quite small due to population pressure and because 
many slopes are too rocky and steep to cultivate. 
In Taveta, the initial community was formed by refugees and immigrants from a 
number of population groups in the Kilimanjaro area who entered the Taveta forest seeking 
security and economic subsistence in the 17th century. 2 1 They practised subsistence 
agriculture, growing bananas and yams under irrigation by means of water from a local river 
and springs. With the arrival of caravans in the early 19th century, the Taveta started to 
obtain cloth, beads, weapons and ammunition from traders in exchange for bananas, honey, 
yams, tomatoes, sugar cane, tobacco, legumes, mangoes, maize, sweet corn, millet, 
Concessions were in high demand because of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway line that passed through the 
area and had a station at Voi (Nazzaro, 1974). 
Since 1987 tourism generates more foreign exchange per year than traditional export crops such as coffee 
and tea (CBS 1988,1994a). 
African farmers who participated in the cooperative (the Taita Vegetable Growers' Cooperative Society) 
were exempted from military service (Wolf, 1985). The society was liquidated in 1959 (see Appendix 
5.4, case 3). 
Horticulture has priority during the long rains. Few farmers plant maize then because they believe it 
does not do well in that season. 
The pre-colonial and colonial history of Taveta is based on Frontera (1978). 
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pumpkins, and a number of edible vines. The cultivation of the last six items was introduced 
to the area by the traders. 
During the colonial period the Taveta area lost much of its importance as a centre of 
trade and agriculture. The Taveta started to grow cotton, introduced by the colonial 
authorities, but initially only enough to pay their taxes and make a few purchases of cloth 
and agricultural implements. The railroad line to Taveta, built before the First World War, 
prompted a substantial demand for hardwood, threatening the future of the forest The focus 
of European setders in the Taveta area on sisal production in the 1930s led to alienation of 
the greater part of the land of the Taveta, especially the grazing grounds outside the forest 
and to importation of large numbers of non-indigenous peoples to work on the plantations. 
After independence, Taveta remained a relatively isolated spot on the border with 
Tanzania, the nearest tarmac road ending 80 kilometres away at the foot of the Taita Hills. 
Nevertheless, the area developed into the chief supplier of bananas to the Mombasa market 
The fruits are cultivated in monocultures on large irrigated plots, to be harvested throughout 
the year and carried to the coast by means of heavy trucks. Tomatoes and onions are also 
grown under irrigation, while mango, lemon and orange trees grow on the higher parts. 
Some bananas and onions find their way to Nairobi by rail. 
The history of the three research areas shows that commercial horticulture did not 
develop overnight but evolved gradually over the past decades. Favourable agro-ecological 
circumstances and increasing land shortage in the production areas, in combination with 
growing urban demand and improvement of interregional road networks, have fostered the 
development process. The substantial purchasing power of consumer groups in large urban 
centres such as Nairobi and Mombasa allowed for long supply lines with transport distances 
of up to 850 km. In Nyandarua, commercial horticulture developed without much 
competition from other income-generating activities. In Kisii coffee and tea, and in Taveta 
cotton, competed for the same land, and in Taita employment opportunities competed for the 
same labour. Nevertheless, horticulture has developed into a major source of income to rural 
households in all four regions. 
3.4. Some aspects of horticultural farming in the research areas 
A core activity in terms of income 
Farm surveys were carried out in the areas suitable for horticulture in Nyandarua, Kisii, 
Taita and Taveta. In Nyandarua, over 95 per cent of the households interviewed were found 
to sell horticultural commodities, in Kisii 79 per cent, and in Taita 63 per cent (see Section 
1 .3) . 2 2 In Taveta 74 per cent of the households with access to irrigation water sold 
horticultural commodities.2 3 
In all four research areas, high participation in commercial horticulture was revealed 
not only in clusters near all-weather roads but also in those which were regularly cut off 
from the world by heavy showers. Impassable roads were a recurrent problem in such 
2 2 Almost all rural households in the research areas owned at least some land to farm on. Landless 
households were scarcely found. 
2 3 Horticultural production without irrigation was not possible in the area. Forty-five per cent of the listed 
households had access to irrigation water. 
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clusters, but this kept few rural households from embarking on the enterprise. Commercial 
horticulture was not just something for the rural elite on prime locations, but an income-
generating activity for the majority of the rural population in the surveyed areas. 
In each of the four regions, commercial horticulture was on average the most 
important source of farm cash revenues for the households involved (Appendix 3.4). A 
traditional cash crop like coffee, which was grown in Kisii and Taita, hardly generated 
income, due to low prices on the international market which caused farmers to neglect their 
coffee trees. 2 4 Cotton, which was traditionally grown in Taveta, did not generate much 
income either, partly because of low world market prices and partly because of 
mismanagement by the cotton marketing board (see Section 3.1). Most farmers no longer 
took the trouble to grow the crop. The only export crop of any income significance at the 
time of the survey was tea, which was grown in Kisii. 2 5 
As a percentage of total household cash income, commercial horticulture was of 
roughly the same importance for low-income, middle-income and high-income households 
in Nyandarua, while being of distinctly greater significance for low-income households with 
horticultural sales in Kisii, Taita and Taveta (Appendix 3.6). This confirms that the 
horticultural enterprise was a core activity for broad segments of the rural population, 
including poorer households. 
In the Nyandarua research area, commercial horticulture was even a source of income 
to the very poor. This was not the case in Kisii, Taita and Taveta. The poorest three to five 
per cent of the households in the latter regions did not sell horticultural commodities, nor 
were they involved in any other cash-generating activity. They used their land to grow crops 
for private consumption and did not have off-farm employment They were thus highly 
vulnerable, living in a cash economy without earning money. 2 6 
Specialization 
Although commercial horticulture was a successful income-generating activity in the research 
areas, it also faced serious problems. One severe problem at the production stage involved 
produce losses from pests and diseases. The latter spread because of specialization and lack 
It was forbidden by law at that time to uproot coffee trees. Farmers therefore neglected them, 
interplanting them with food crops like maize and bananas, or sometimes killing them with salt 
Besides horticultural commodities, livestock contributed substantially to the farm revenues, especially in 
Nyandarua, where graded cows were found in most compounds and the selling of milk to the national 
dairy cooperative (Kenya Cooperative Creameries) was common. Off-farm employment was a major 
contributor to household cash income in all four regions, but only in Taita did it exceed the importance 
of horticulture (Appendix 3.4). In absolute terms, Nyandarua farmers earned at least as much money 
through horticultural sales as horticultural farmers in Kisii, Taita and Taveta earned with all their 
activities put together. This is to a large extent due to the possibility of growing three vegetable Crops a 
year, as well as the larger size of the Nyandarua holdings (11.0 acres compared to 2.9 acres in Kisii, 3.4 
acres in Taita and 2.9 acres in Taveta). 
The percentages are based on the household listings and additional surveys in Kisii, Taita and Taveta 
among households without horticultural sales. The latter were sampled from the household listings. 
Owing to external circumstances, the sample sizes were relatively small (25 in Kisii, 22 in Taita and 16 
in Taveta). In Kisii 16%, in Taita 14% and in Taveta 6% of the households without horticultural sales 
did not have any cash income in 1991. They represented 3% (Kisii), 5% (Taita) and 3% (Taveta) of all 
listed households in the regions. All households without cash income owned at least some land, which 
means that landless poor were not yet a problem in the research areas. The limited number of households 
without land in the research areas usually came from elsewhere and had moved to the region because the 
household head was stationed there as a teacher, extension worker etc. 
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of crop rotation. The relative importance of crops in terms of value and acreage was not 
always the same, but the composition of the average horticultural cash income gives an 
indication of farmers' specialization (lack of diversification). At the time of the survey, about 
85 per cent of the average horticultural cash income in Nyandarua and Kisii came from two 
crops, namely potatoes and cabbages (Nyandarua), and bananas and kale (Kisii) (Table 
3.4). 2 7 In Taveta the situation was not much different, with three crops providing about 80 
per cent of the horticultural revenues. 2 8 Taita was the only area with a somewhat more 
diversified assortment: the two most important crops, tomatoes and cabbage, supplied less 
than 50 per cent of the average horticultural cash income, while 85 per cent of the revenues 
came from a total of nine different crops. The assortment of the Taita farmers even included 
fairly unknown vegetables such as baby marrow, cauliflower and lettuce, which were in 
demand from tourist hotels along the Kenyan coast (Table 3.4). 
Input problems 
Disease and pest problems were exacerbated by failing crop protection. Either farmers lacked 
knowledge, using the wrong chemicals or spraying too late, or they had the knowledge but 
not the money to buy the proper pesticides and fungicides. Credit to buy horticultural inputs 
was generally hard to obtain. Neither commercial banks, the Kenya Cooperative Bank nor 
the Agricultural Finance Corporation (a parastatal) were willing to issue loans to small-scale 
horticultural farmers, even when the latter possessed a title deed that could serve as security. 
While chemical and fertilizer use were already low in the 1980s, the situation 
worsened in the early 1990s. Input costs rose sharply at that time due to the depreciation of 
the Kenya shilling and decreasing subsidies on farm inputs as part of Structural Adjustment 
Pesticides, fungicides and fertilizers more or less doubled in price within two years' time. 
Farmers responded by cutting back on their use, leading to a further increase in pests and 
diseases. 
Many horticultural farmers shied away from buying certified seeds in the early 1990s 
because of recurrent quality problems. The germination rate of seeds produced by the Kenya 
Seed Company, which still possessed a monopoly at that time, had deteriorated. Farmers 
and retailers blamed the seed company for supplying poor quality, while the seed company 
blamed the retailers for improper storage and the farmers for "burying the seeds', that is, 
sowing them too deep. 
Quality problems also occurred in the case of chemicals. Farmers were offered fake 
pesticides and fungicides in some rural markets, causing them to lose faith in such inputs. 
Well known is the story about Royco soup which was once sold as a pesticide in one of the 
local market places of Kisii. The dried soup was sold in the chemical's original packaging 
material. Once sprayed with this solution, the crop smelled nice while the pests flourished 
away. 
Farmers had been cultivating these commodities on the same plots for years, and bacterial wilt hue 
blight and eelworms (in the case of potatoes) and banana weevil, nematodes and Panama disease (in the 
case of bananas) were a constant and ever-increasing threat 
Bananas had been cultivated under irrigation on the same plots for decades, and pests and diseases 
threatened to wipe out the entire crop. 
Table 3.4. Composition of the average horticultural cash income of households selling horticultural commodities, 
by survey area, 1991 
Nyandarua (n=229) 
crop % 
Kisii (n=144) 
crop % 
Taita (n=87) 
crop % 
Taveta(n=38) 
crop % 
Irish potatoes 73 bananas 75 tomatoes 29 bananas 48 
cabbages 14 kale 10 cabbage 20 tomatoes 19 
spring onions 8 local leafy vegetables* 5 kale 12 onions 12 
green peas 2 tomatoes 4 Irish potatoes 9 mangoes 5 
plums 1 pineapples 4 spinach 3 lemons 4 
pears 1 cabbage 1 avocados 3 oranges 3 
other 1 other 1 passion fruit 3 Asian vegetables** 3 
lettuce 3 kale 2 
carrots 3 papaya 2 
French beans 2 avocado 1 
sweet pepper 2 other 1 
baby marrow 2 
o DarjondS 
cucumber 1 
cauliflower 1 
other 5 
* The most important local leafy vegetables in Kisii were black nightshade, Amaranthus, spider flower, pumpkin leaves and cowpea leaves. 
** Asian vegetables grown in Taveta at the time of the survey were chillies, brinjals and okra. 
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Future perspectives 
Horticulture has brought rising incomes to broad sections of the rural population as well as 
diversification within the agricultural sector — two key aspects of rural development. 2 9 
Continued growth in Kenya's urban population will lead to a further rise in the demand for 
horticultural commodities (see Section 3.1). Therefore market prospects are good, and 
commercial horticulture is expected to be a key source of income for the surveyed 
households in the years to come. 
In Nyandarua there is no real alternative, because agro-ecological conditions do not 
permit cultivation of other cash crops, except pyrethrum. The demand for pyre thrum on the 
world market is declining in the wake of cheap synthetic alternatives. 
Horticulture offers a more reliable source of income than coffee in Kisii or cotton in 
Taveta. Both crops are plagued by fluctuating world market prices and red tape at the 
collection stage of the marketing system In Kisii, pressures on land make coffee and tea less 
attractive to smallholders. The crops are perennial, and intercropping with food crops such 
as maize and bananas reduces their yields drastically. In contrast, most horticultural crops 
can be grown in sequence with maize, and some even together with maize, without reducing 
yields. 
In Taita, the coastal tourist industry formerly offered an attractive alternative to farm 
work. Since the first half of the 1990s, however, the industry's image has been tarnished by 
ethnic clashes and insecurity in the country, and it is no longer the source of jobs it used to 
be. No one can predict how long Kenya will remain a fashionable tourist destination.30 The 
Kenyan government was formerly another major source of off-farm jobs, but in the 1990s it 
has been cutting expenditures as part of structural adjustment policies. Nowadays many 
college graduates wind up working on farms rather than sitting in government offices. 3 1 
The foregoing arguments demonstrate why commercial horticulture is expected to 
offer a more sustainable source of income in the research areas than export crops or (formal) 
off-farm employment. However, the sustainability of the horticultural enterprise can be 
threatened from within. The rise of commercial horticulture initially led to diversification in 
the agricultural sector. When it proved profitable, farmers started to forget other agricultural 
crops. This is not necessarily a problem, since horticultural crops are extremely varied in 
According to Sterkenburg (1987), rural development comprises growth of production and productivity, 
and diversification within the agricultural sector; expansion of rural industries; improvement of 
employment; increase in income for broad segments of the rural population; expansion and amelioration 
of agricultural and community services; and improvement of environmental conservation. Other authors 
have added more abstract notions like the improvement of health, human welfare, justice and equality, 
and the strengthening of local initiatives (Carr-Hill, 1990; Chole, 1991; Yimam, 1990). In the case of 
horticulture, in our study this labour-intensive enterprise had created not only income opportunities for 
farmers, but also new employment opportunities for local casual labourers at both the production stage 
(planting, weeding, harvesting) and the marketing stage (carrying produce to the road, loading trucks). 
Whether it had also improved health and human welfare cannot be judged with certainty, but the 
horticultural revenues the households earned had at least better prepared them for the potential 
misfortunes of human life. 
Countries such as South Africa and Gambia are becoming major competitors in the tourist market 
Other people try to make a living through employment or self-employment in small-scale enterprises in 
the informal sector. Small-scale enterprise employment in Kenya is, however, heavily concentrated in 
urban areas (Livingstone, 1991). It is less common among rural households, including those in the 
Taita Hills. For a discussion on rural employment in Sub-Saharan Africa see Bryceson & Van der Laan 
(1994) and Bryceson (1996). For a bibliography on the subject see Tellegen (1993). 
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nature. Nonetheless the research found that farmers tend to confine themselves to a few 
horticultural commodities (e.g. potatoes in Nyandarua and bananas in Kisii and Taveta), 
making their farming as poorly diversified and as vulnerable as before. 
4 
M a r k e t i n g Channe l A n a l y s i s : Re levant 
A spec t s for Hort icultural T rade i n 
S u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a 
The present chapter provides a theoretical framework for the analyses of horticultural 
marketing channels in the following chapters. In the first two sections, various concepts 
related to marketing channel analysis are introduced, and their relevance with regard to 
horticultural trade in Sub-Saharan Africa is analysed. In the subsequent four sections, 
relevant theories on the development of marketing channels are discussed. The theories use 
efficiency, effectiveness or equity as criteria. 
4.1. Defining marketing channel, structure and environment 
Stern et al. (1996, 1) view marketing channels (or channels of distribution) as 'sets of 
interdependent organizations involved inth^rocess of making aproduclpr service available 
for use or consumption.' Kohls & Uhl (1990, 529) define them as 'alternative routes of 
product flows from producers to consumers.' Kohls & Uhl focus on the marketing of 
agricultural products, as is the case in the present book. Their marketing channel starts at the 
farmer's gate and ends at the consumer's front door. Some of the products are processed on 
their way to the end users, while other products reach them without undergoing any form 1 i t -
changes. The latter is most commonly the case with horticultural commodities in Sub- ' 
Saharan Africa. 
For a particular commodity, various marketing channels form a marketing structure. 
The marketing structure is embedded in a marketing environment which consists of a 
number of subsystems. One such subsystem is the political and legal environment It 
encompasses not only government policies and national laws, but also regulatory agencies, 
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consumer advocacy organizations and trade associations which operate in so-called parallel 
political networks and represent the interests of consumer-citizens and specific constituency 
organizations.1 Other environmental subsystems are the demographic environment, the 
economic environment, the physical (or natural) environment, the technological 
environment, and the sociocultural environment (Koder, 1988,1997). 
The political and legal environment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Some components of the marketing environment have a larger impact than others on the 
horticultural marketing channels in Sub-Saharan Africa. The political and legal forces are 
generally weak. According to Van Tilburg et al. (1989), who looked into vegetable 
marketing in various developing countries, interventions in the horticultural subsector are 
generally avoided by national governments because of the risky nature of the operations. 
The perishability of the commodities requires a degree of flexibility more suited to private 
entrepreneurs than to parastatals. In addition, Abbott & Creupelandt (1966) have pointed out 
that off-season storage requires cold storage and processing facilities. These have been 
scarce so far. 
Intervention is also thought unnecessary because vegetables, fruits and tubers are not 
regarded as strategic commodities. In Kenya, for instance, both horticultural commodities 
and maize show large seasonal supply fluctuations. The national government, through one 
of its marketing boards, tries to equalize seasonal maize supplies in the country by 
maintaining a national reserve stock, while not considering such policies for potatoes, 
cabbages etc. 2 
If African governments refrain from intervention in horticultural trading, neither do 
they introduce incentives policies. Improvement of market places and access roads to 
production areas, for instance, have low priority. Programmes to support beginning 
horticultural entrepreneurs with credit or training are lacking. Research into subjects such as 
post-harvest handling and appropriate packaging materials is limited (see also Section 5.6). 
National laws which might try to regulate food marketing in Sub-Saharan countries 
usually have a limited impact on horticultural trade, because most of the fruit and vegetable 
traders operate in the so-called informal sector without being registered as entrepreneurs. 
Even the strong-arm method of law enforcement at roadblocks and in market places usually 
fails, because of the susceptibility of policemen to bribes. For that matter, law enforcement 
has also been a problem in the case of controlled commodities such as cereals (see Section 
2.3). 
The parallel political framework is not yet well developed when it comes to 
horticultural trade in developing countries. Specialized regulatory bodies that might, for 
instance, adjudicate conflicts among channel members are absent Consumer advocacy 
organizations are only found in a few African countries. Kenya has a consumers' 
Failure to achieve acceptable and favourable exchange arrangements with the actors in the parallel 
political networks can hamper channel members' ability to achieve their marketing objectives and reach 
their target segments of consumers (Hutt et al., 1986). See also Stern & Reve (1980), Achrol et al. 
(1983), Arndt (1983). 
For past policies of the Kenyan government on maize prices and stocks, see for example Hesselmark & 
Lorenzl (1976), Gsaenger & Schmidt (1977) and Meilink (1985,1987). For the performance of cereal 
marketing boards in Africa, see Section 2.3. 
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association, but its bureau is staffed by a director and his secretary who, when focusing on 
food, deal with complaints of contaminated milk, unsound maize meal and other types of 
processed food that have gone bad. Fresh horticultural commodities are normally outside 
their scope of interest. Trade unions of food traders are rare in Sub-Saharan Africa, because 
they are prohibited in some countries, and because the majority of the food traders are rural-
based and communication networks are underdeveloped. 
Under certain circumstances, the political environment does have a heavy impact on 
horticultural marketing in African countries, notably in the event of political unrest leading to 
national or regional insecurity. To give an example: tribal clashes in Kenya in the first half of 
the 1990s, which were largely politically inspired, caused the government to seal off Molo, 
one of the major supply areas of potatoes in the country. Those farmers who had not 
abandoned their homes were unable to sell their crop because nobody was allowed to enter 
the region, including the traders who otherwise came to buy the potatoes to carry them to 
Nairobi and elsewhere. 
The demographic and economic environments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Under normal circumstances, the demographic and economic environments have a much 
bigger impact on horticultural trade in Sub-Saharan Africa than the political and legal one. 
Population growth, changing population distributions, and the rising purchasing power of 
consumers have their effect This has already been shown in Chapter 2, and will be analysed 
further in Chapters 7 and 8. It therefore does not need further attention here. 
The physical and technological environments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The physical environment is also of major importance. In most African countries the state of 
the roads limits the distances perishables can be transported. Bumpy roads and muddy 
market places reduce quality, increase produce losses and raise transport costs, as will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
The technological environment is less important because most of the horticultural 
commodities are eaten fresh without prior processing. Fresh commodities are seldom 
cooled. The absence of cooling facilities is not only related to the technological environment 
but also to the economic one. Cooling would make horticultural commodities too expensive 
for large parts of the African population. 
In the case of horticultural commodities such as tomatoes and leafy vegetables, 
absence of cooling leads to large seasonal supply fluctuations, which in turn have their 
bearing on the marketing channels. In the case of tubers such as potatoes such fluctuations 
may be less extreme because of the possibility of storage in pits. 
The sociocultural environment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The sociocultural environment is of major importance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Social and 
cultural values determine people's relations to others, to instimtions, and to society. One 
may add ethnic values as a third component, because ethnic thinking influences people's 
everyday behaviour in Africa. 
The majority of the horticultural producers are peasant households that function both 
as a family and an enterprise, as a consumption and a production unit. Sales decisions may 
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be based on risk aversion, profit maximization or other considerations. The peasants may 
operate within so-called interlocked markets, which means that the terms of exchange in one 
market (e.g. selling of output) are contractually tied to those in other markets (e.g. supply of 
inputs and credit) (Ellis, 1993). 
In addition to most rural African households, some urban households produce their 
own food (practising so-called urban agriculture).3 Others have access to land in their native 
rural areas, although rural relatives usually farm it (Andrae, 1992). 4 When food prices 
increase and access to food is reduced, poor urban households in particular tend to fall back 
on their rural connections.5 In general, urban households try to stick to their traditional diet, 
which means that trade flows often follow migration patterns. 
Social and cultural values are important to horticultural traders as well as to food 
traders in general. In rural areas, retailing is a women's affair and food trading is a part-time 
activity. Studies in such places as Bungoma (Kenya) and Borno (Nigeria) have shown that 
full-time professional food traders are scarce (Lado, 1991; Porter, 1984; Porter 1986). 
Farming is the most common other income-generating activity of the traders. 
The reason why rural food retailers are females is determined by history and culture, 
as has been explained in Chapter 2 and will be discussed again in Chapter 5. The women 
tend to be involved part-time because of both farming activities and domestic obligations. 
Turrittin (1988) has shown that male traders in rural Mali have more time to go to the market 
than female ones, even when the women are beyond child-bearing age and have daughters-
in-law to assist them in household matters. 
The impact of the social environment on food trade in rural areas becomes clear once 
more when we look at rural market places. Larson (1991) describes rural periodic markets in 
northern Togo where young men flirt with young women who may one day be their wives, 
where people come from far and wide to meet old friends and relatives, where chiefs make 
their appearance to mingle with their people and frequently make important announcements, 
where minor court cases are tried by the chief and his council, and where government 
officials broadcast propaganda and information or sell tickets in the state lottery. The sphere 
that characterizes these market places determines the way buyers and sellers deal with each 
other. According to Seierup (1994), who looked at horticultural traders and small-scale 
entrepreneurs in Kenya in general, a fairly large number of the steady customers of these 
entrepreneurs are related to them through mutual or overlapping ties in the rural community. 
In urban African markets, full-time professional food traders are more common than 
in rural areas. This does not, however, make the social environment less important. Van 
Donge (1992), who studied Waluguru traders in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, found that 
marrying someone from another trading family was used to extend the economic network. 
Urban agriculture has been found to be of importance in Nairobi, for instance (Freeman, 1988), Kampala 
(Maxwell & Zziwa, 1992) and Lome (Schilter, 1991). 
Things are changing, however. In African countries with a high level of commercialization of farmland, 
like Kenya, families are not always prepared to share their rural sources with those who have left for 
work in the cities (Kongstad & Mikkelsen, 1983, as quoted by Andrae, 1992). In addition to land, urban 
households may own livestock which is managed by their rural kinsmen. This is common in Somalia, 
for instance (Little, 1992). 
•Exchanges often take place between urban and rural branches of extended families, with rural relatives 
bringing food for their urban kin in exchange for urban manufactured goods or services, such as a place 
to stay' (Von Braun et al., 1993,13-14). 
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In contrast with rural areas, both women and men are involved in the urban food 
trade.6 Various studies suggest that the female traders are of specific age groups or classes. 
Hansen (1989), for instance, showed that food-trading women in Lusaka, Zambia, tended to 
be either middle-aged married women who were beyond their childbearing age or single 
heads of households. Sandee & Weijland (1986) showed that horticultural trade in 
Swaziland was especially important among female-headed households. 
Seierup (1994, 16) characterized female horticultural traders and, more generally, 
female 'open air' entrepreneurs in Kenya as 'a unified group in the sense that the majority of 
them use business surpluses for daily basic consumption needs. It is the widow who wants 
to feed her children, the disabled person who might be unable to marry and has to make a 
living on his/her own, and it is the wife in the poor urban-based family trying to earn a little 
extra for survival.' 
4.2. Description of marketing channels 
Authors like Revzan (1967), Bucklin (1970) and Mallen (1977) have combined elements of 
the institutional and functional approach to describe marketing channels and structures by 
means of marketing intermediaries, marketing functions and flows, and channel length, 
breadth and multiplicity.7 
Marketing intermediaries 
Four groups of marketing intermediaries can be distinguished: merchants, agents, brokers 
and facilitating intermediaries. The merchants take title to the merchandise, the brokers and 
agents restrict themselves to the negotiation of tide, and the facilitating intermediaries assist 
the merchants in their marketing activities. Those dealing with horticultural trade in Africa 
usually refer to merchants as traders. 
Each group of marketing intermediaries can be divided into smaller subgroups. The 
distinction between wholesale traders and retail traders is well known: wholesaling includes 
all activities involved in selling goods to those who buy for resale or for business use 
(Kotler, 1997). In the analysis of horticultural trade in developing countries, wholesale 
traders are usually subdivided into rural assembling traders, collecting wholesalers and 
distributing wholesalers.8 Rural assembling traders accumulate produce in the production 
areas to sell to collecting wholesalers, who carry the commodities to large towns. On arrival, 
The women are involved to a lesser extent in wholesaling, but they dominate retailing. In the urban food 
markets of Tanzania, for instance, 'women traders generally dealt in the grain commodities produced in 
their hinterland and traded smaller quantities than the men' Qîryceson, 1993,120). In the peri-urban area 
of Maputo, Mozambique, over 95 per cent of the small-scale vegetable retailers are women (Little & De 
Coloane, 1992). In Kampala, Uganda, food-trading street hawkers are predominantly women, while male 
street hawkers focus on non-food items (Nyakaana, 1993). 
For a review of the evolution of marketing channel theory, see Meulenberg (1989,1997). 
See for instance Shechambo (1993) on Tanzania, Moustier (1992) on Congo-Brazzaville, Central African 
Republic and Madagascar, Van Tilburg (1981) on Indonesia, Bœkholt et al. (1983) on India, Torres & 
Lantican (1977) on the Philippines, and De Morrêe (1985) on Colombia. In some of the studies, 
collecting wholesalers are called interregional traders. Region, however, is a rather ambiguous term. 
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they sell them to distributing wholesalers, who in turn sell to retailers.9 The retailers may 
have a fixed base (either a stall, a shop or a place on the ground), or they may be hawkers 
carry their produce around (e.g. on a large platter on their head). 
In addition to traders, agents also operate in the marketing channel. In the case of 
horticultural commodities in Sub-Saharan Africa, purchasing agents are most common. 
They generally have a long-standing relationship with buyers and make purchases for them 
(Kotler, 1997). They operate in the horticultural production areas, where most of them buy 
on behalf of collecting wholesalers and some on behalf of processing industries. In addition 
to purchasing agents, commission agents may sometimes be found. Commission agents take 
physical possession of products and negotiate sales in a central market place on behalf of a 
producer (Kotler, 1997). The majority of the horticultural producers, however, are peasant 
farmers whose output is too low to attract this type of agents. 
Some brokers may be also found in large urban markets. In contrast with agents, 
who represent buyers or sellers on a rather permanent basis, brokers bring buyers and 
sellers together and assist in negotiations on a more ad hoc basis. They may, for instance, 
negotiate sales in a horticultural wholesale market on behalf of large distributing 
wholesalers. Some brokers may operate as auctioneers, auctioning produce on behalf of 
collecting wholesalers. 
Traders not only use agents but also facilitating intermediaries. Kotler (1988,1997) 
refers to three types of facilitators: first, physical distribution firms, including warehousing 
firms and transportation firms; second, marketing service companies, including marketing 
research firms, advertising agencies, media firms, and marketing consultancy firms; and 
third, financial intermediaries, including banks, credit companies, insurance companies, and 
other firms that help finance and/or insure risks associated with the buying and selling of 
goods. 
In horticultural marketing in Sub-Saharan Africa, transportation firms are the most 
common intermediaries. Warehousing firms are scarcely found because of the perishability 
of the commodities and relatively high costs of cold storage. Marketing service companies 
such as advertising agencies are insignificant, except in the case of a few processed 
horticultural commodities (e.g. tomato ketchup). 
Financial intermediaries such as commercial banks are present in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but they are not very eager to finance the activities of individual horticultural traders. 
They find the risks too high and ask for collaterals that most of the traders lack. 
Consequendy, horticultural traders have developed their own savings and credit associations 
(see Section 5.2). Business insurance is still far beyond the scope of horticultural traders 
and insurance companies in Africa. The insuring of trucks by transportation firms is the only 
exception. 
A wholesale institution that has been absent in African horticultural trade, while being a chief actor in 
many other food commodities, is the marketing board (see Sections 2.3 and 4.1). 
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Marketing functions and flows 
Channel members carry out marketing functions, or, put differently, participate in marketing 
flows. Kotler (1997) delineates nine functions/flows: 
1. Information collection and dissemination of market information 
2. Promotion development and dissemination of persuasive communications 
about offers 
3. Negotiation attempts to reach final agreement on price and other items of the 
offer 
4. Ordering backward communication of intentions to buy 
5. Financing acquisition and allocation of funds required to finance the 
carrying of inventory 
6. Risk taking assumption of risks in connection with carrying out channel work 
7. Physical possession successive storage and movement of physical products (product 
flow) 
8. Payment payment of bills 
9. Ownership actual transfer of title10 
When dealing with horticultural marketing channels in Sub-Saharan Africa, one can bring 
these nine functions back to six: information, negotiation/ordering, financing, risk taking, 
physical possession (transport and storage) and payment/ownership. Promotion is omitted 
because it is of minor importance (as explained earlier). Ordering is subordinate to 
negotiation. Both functions are performed by the same market intermediaries during the 
same meetings. Negotiation is the most important of the two because a successful 
negotiation process will almost inevitably lead to immediate placement of an order. 
Ownership is closely related to payment. Payments are carried out by traders without 
interference from banks. Titles change hands when payments are made, which means that 
the payment flow is the exact reverse of the title flow. In other words, in analysing the 
payment function we cover the ownership function, too. 
The payment function arises because of the exchange of ownership rights. The same 
is true of the information and negotiation functions. The costs generated by these functions 
are so-called transaction costs. 1 1 Eggertsson (1990) distinguishes six activities that give rise 
to transaction costs: (1) information search, (2) negotiation, (3) the making of contracts, (4) 
the monitoring of contractual partners, (5) the enforcement of contracts, and (6) the 
protection of property rights against third party encroachment (e.g. protection against pirates 
in the case of illegal trade). The third to fifth activities, which are all related to contracts, are 
relatively unimportant in African horticultural trade, because most of the transactions take 
place in a spot market, and traders demand cash on delivery. 1 2 The sixth, protection of 
Other authors distinguish three categories of functions: exchange functions (buying and selling), 
physical supply functions (transportation, storage) and facihtating functions (financing, risk taking, 
marketing information, standardization and grading) (Meulenberg, 1989). 
According to Eggertsson's (1990) definition, transaction costs are costs that arise when individuals 
exchange ownership rights to economic assets and enforce their exclusive rights. See also Carlton & 
Perloff (1994) on transaction costs in general, and De Janvry & Sadoulet (1994), Ensminger (1992), 
Nabli & Nugent (1989) and Shechambo (1993) on transaction costs in developing countries. 
The only exception is the export trade (see Section 5.4). 
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property rights, is also unimportant because all people are allowed to trade horticultural 
commodities, and traders do not have their own brands. 
Channel length, breadth and multiplicity 
A marketing channel can be characterized by its length and breadth, and a marketing 
structure by its multiplicity. Channel length refers to the number of channel levels, and 
channel breadth to the number of institutions at a given level in a given geographical area. 
Multiplicity concerns the number of marketing channels in a marketing structure. 
The length, breadth and multiplicity of horticultural marketing channels in Sub-
Saharan Africa varies considerably. A channel may have only one intermediate level (rural 
retailers who buy their produce from farmers), or as many as four (rural assembling traders, 
collecting wholesalers, distributing wholesalers, urban retailers). The breadth may vary from 
a couple of collecting wholesalers in isolated production areas, to dozens of retailers in rural 
markets and hundreds of retailers in urban centres. 
Multiplicity of channels is quite common. Farmers sell, for instance, to collecting 
wholesalers who then sell to distributing wholesalers. Within the same marketing structure, 
other farmers may bypass the collecting wholesalers to sell to distributing wholesalers, or 
direcdy to retailers. In the course of time, some channels disappear while others become 
more important. 
4.3. Differentiation and re-integration of marketing channels 
Marketing channels do not appear out of the blue but develop along certain lines. At the start 
only self-sufficient non-surplus producers are present, with no middlemen required. 
Marketing channels develop when a surplus in production occurs above a farmer's 
household requirements. Producers start to exchange commodities to other goods or money; 
a direct marketing channel is bom. The exchange gets concentrated in central market places 
because of so-called place and time utility. By using a central market place each seller has to 
make fewer trips to meet all his customers (place utility), and buyers and sellers meet when 
commodities are ready for exchange (time utility) (Alderson, 1967). 
At the next step, marketing intermediaries enter the chain and the direct marketing 
channels alter into indirect ones, causing vertical differentiation. Eventually, the vertical 
differentiation process comes to an end, and marketing channels start to re-integrate again. 
Vertical coordination occurs, including administered systems, based on informal 
collaboration on inclusive goals, or contractual systems, based on contractual agreements. In 
addition, channels may change into corporate systems, whereby members of different levels 
are owned and operated by one and the same organization.13 Vertical coordination and 
integration lead to so-called Vertical Marketing Systems (VMSs), in which open-market 
activities are limited. This contrasts with Conventional Marketing Channels (CMCs), in 
which channel coordination is achieved primarily through bargaining and negotiationamong 
actors. 
Stern et al. (1996) call corporate systems 'hard' vertical integration, and administered and contractual 
systems 'soft' vertical integration. 
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When looking at Sub-Saharan Africa, scores of small producers sell small quantities 
of horticultural commodities either direcdy to consumers or through professional traders. 
Marketing channels are still in a process of vertical differentiation; vertical re-integration is 
not yet a wide-spread phenomenon. According to Van Tilburg et al. (1989,1), the channels 
can best be characterized as Conventional Marketing Channels: the actors in the chain are 
'usually selling and buying together with many competitors, are separated by markets, and 
the allocation of resources is guided by "the invisible hand" of prices resulting from 
quantities supplied and demanded.' Elements of vertical coordination and integration may 
exist, however. Examples are contract farming (see Section 5.4), cooperative marketing by 
farmer groups (Section 5.3), and integrated production and wholesaling (Section 5.4). 
As noted, the development of horticultural marketing channels in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is primarily a process of vertical differentiation. The following three sections of the present 
chapter will look into efficiency, effectiveness and equity theories that may explain this 
process. 
4.4. Marketing channel development: efficiency 
Vertical differentiation of conventional marketing channels can be explained in terms of 
efficiency, meaning that structural changes are the result of cost-minimization policies by 
channel members. Professional traders start to mediate between producer and consumer 
because they are able to improve the efficiency of the marketing process. In addition to time 
and place utility (see previous section), they create possession utility because transactions 
can be carried out at lower costs by them than through direct exchange (Alderson, 1967). 
Their mediation decreases the total number of transactions in the system (minimum 
transaction criterion), and allows economies of scale. 1 4 
When the number of professional traders in the system increases, the number of 
transactions can be reduced further by vertical differentiation into wholesale and retail trade. 
Wholesale trade may arise because of economies of scale in accumulation, but also because 
of what Alderson (1967) calls discrepancy of assortments. At the collecting wholesale level 
commodities may, for instance, be assorted in relation to physical handling characteristics 
during transport, while at the retail level they are assorted in relation to consumer preferences 
of the target group. 
All in all, the role of wholesale traders is sorting out, accumulation, allocation and 
assorting, and that of retailers is allocation and assorting.15 The relative importance of each 
function differs from one situation to another. In Kenyan horticultural trade, for instance, the 
sorting functions are relatively unimportant, as will be shown in Section 5.2. 
When producers deal directly with consumers, the number of bits in any flow is small. When traders 
enter the system they can aggregate bits from various producers, thus transporting produce in quantities 
sufficient to exploit economies of scale (Bucklin, 1972). They may also obtain economies of scale with 
regard to other marketing functions such as storage, information and negotiation. 
Sorting out involves breaking down a heterogeneous supply into separate stocks that are relatively 
homogeneous, notably through the grading of produce. Allocation refers to the breaking down of 
supplies into smaller lots. Assorting involves the building up of an assortment of associated products 
for sale (wholesalers building assortments of goods for retailers, and retailers building up assortments for 
consumers) (Stem et aL, 1996). 
62 
The functional spin-off concept 
Stigler (1951) and Mallen (1973, 1977) developed a theory that predicts the rise of new 
market intermediaries on the basis of cost developments in their marketing functions. The 
fundamental premise is that given a specific level of demand, traders will try to maximize 
profits by designing or selecting a channel that will generate the lowest total average cost for 
them. 
The average costs of most marketing functions decrease with increasing volume, 
because of economies of scale. Decreasing average cost curves lead to a spinning off of 
functions by small entrepreneurs. The transport function is a good example. African 
horticultural producers are small-scale farmers (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4). If we assume that 
transporters face the same transport cost curve as these farmers, an individual farmer at his 
or her low volume will have higher average transport costs than a transporter who can 
combine the volumes of a number of producers and thus benefit from economies of scale. If 
the farmer in turn benefits from the lower average transport costs of the transporter, the 
farmer's total average cost will decline if the transport function is spun off. 
. A similar reasoning may also apply to other functions. It has to be noted, however, 
that the spinning off of certain functions may inevitably lead to the spinning off of other 
closely related ones. In Section 4.2 it was shown that in Sub-Saharan horticultural 
marketing the ordering and negotiation functions are interrelated, as are the payment and 
ownership functions. As a result six major marketing functions were distinguished: 
information, negotiation/ordering, financing, risk taking, physical possession (transport and 
storage) and payment/ownership. The last function is a crucial one to the extent that spinning 
off the payment/ownership function inevitably means spinning off all marketing functions. 
This happens, for instance, when a farmer does not take produce to the market but sells the 
commodities to a trader at the farm gate. The trader takes over all marketing functions from 
the farmer. The spinning off of all functions results in a more differentiated marketing 
channel. We will come back to this in Section 6.2 when we look at potato farmers in 
Nyandarua who sell their produce to collecting wholesalers instead of going to Nairobi 
themselves. 
Barriers to entry 
As said, the spin-off concept is based on the premise of cost minimization. Initially, it was 
believed that perfect competition was required to make market intermediaries minimize their 
costs (Bain, 1959). Later, Baumol et al. (1988) argued in their theory of contestable markets 
that imperfect competition was not a problem as long as entry and exit barriers were absent 
Potential competitors could then enter the marketing channel as soon as 'monopoly profits' 
were observed, and existing competitors could leave the channel whenever profits came 
under pressure. The only possible barrier to entry would be so-called sunk costs: 
investments such as research and infrastructure that lose their value when they leave the 
market 
Among horticultural traders in Sub-Saharan Africa, sunk costs are usually low. Exit 
barriers are generally absent but entry barriers may exist Porter (1980) distinguishes various 
sources of barriers to entry. Some are more relevant to us than others. Government policies, 
for instance, do not usually form entry barriers in horticultural trade (see Section 4.1, the 
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political and legal environment). In contrast, economies of scale can be an entry barrier, 
especially in interregional trade when established wholesalers use large trucks. If a potential 
wholesaler wants to enter the chain he will have to start with the same scale of operations, 
because the use of a smaller vehicle will entail higher transport costs per selling unit Lack of 
capital may also be an entry barrier in this respect, because hiring a truck and financing a 
truckload of produce require money. As pointed out earlier, commercial banks are not eager 
to issue loans to horticultural traders. 
Product differentiation is not a real entry barrier to horticultural trade. Consumers 
may favour certain varieties, but all traders can include those varieties in their assortment if 
the want In theory, traders can differentiate on the basis of services and quality. Services, 
however, are usually absent in horticultural trade. Most horticultural traders will not refund 
money when customers want to return bought produce, nor do they offer any kind of after-
sales service, if such would even be possible. Quality is a matter of careful buying, since 
traders do not process bought commodities. Therefore, accumulated buying experience 
might serve as an entry barrier. Highly perishable commodities such as tomatoes and 
bananas may look fine to a layman and still turn black within a few days. Packaging 
experience is also needed, given the rough roads and the recurrent scarcity of packaging 
materials. Finally, negotiation experience is required to get a good price and avoid being 
cheated by other traders. After all, selling units are not standardized and prices are 
determined transaction by transaction. 
Potential customers do not face major switching costs. Access to distribution 
channels may, however, be a problem, for instance because of existing customer relations 
between collecting wholesalers and distributing wholesalers or between farmers and 
collecting wholesalers. Many distributing wholesalers in urban centres attach importance to 
regular supplies, and may therefore cherish their existing suppliers who have shown to be 
reliable. Small-scale farmers are very suspicious when dealing with traders. They may not 
want to try their luck with a new unknown collecting wholesaler when customer relations 
with known wholesalers are satisfactory. Besides, the latter may be financing part of the 
farmers' crops, which ties the farmers' hands and makes switching to other traders 
difficult 1 6 
A potential entrant's trepidation about the reactions of existing competitors may be an 
entry barrier, especially in urban wholesale markets where horticultural traders are often 
thought to be unscrupulous and hostile to new entrants. In the production areas, negative 
expectations by farmers about the reactions of collecting wholesalers may deter any decision 
to go into trade themselves. Farmers may believe that the collecting wholesalers they dealt 
with will persuade distributing wholesalers to boycott them, thus leaving them with 
unsaleable produce on arrival in the urban centre. They may also be afraid that if the 
experiment fails, collecting wholesalers will give them the cold shoulder and leave them with 
unsaleable produce on the farm. 
In sum, entry barriers to horticultural trade in Sub-Saharan Africa may be related to 
economies of scale, capital requirements, cumulated experience, access to distribution 
channels and potential entrants' expectations. The chances of encountering entry barriers are 
especially real at the collecting wholesale level. 
See Section 4.1 on interlocked markets. 
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4.5. Marketing channel development: effectiveness 
The development of marketing channels can also be assessed by analysing their 
effectiveness. The price of a commodity being equal, consumers prefer to deal with a 
marketing channel that provides a higher level of spatial, time and/or form convenience. 
Thus, a marketing channel may develop because consumers demand more convenience—in 
other words, a higher service output (Stern et al., 1996). In the long run, an effective 
channel will stimulate latent demand. 
Spatial convenience: development of market places 
The spatial convenience factor of the service output of a marketing channel refers to the 
development of market places. According to gravity models used in marketing research, the 
attractiveness of a city's shopping area to consumers from elsewhere is somehow related to 
the population size of the city and the distance to the city. One of the first models was 
developed by Reilly in the 1930s. His goal was to explain the relative attractiveness of two 
different cities' shopping areas for those consumers who lived in a town in between them 
He proposed that the proportion of that trade that is attracted by city A relative to city B is 
equal to the population size of city A relative to city B, times the squared reciprocal of the 
distance from the intermediate town to city A relative to city B (Jteilly, 1931, as quoted by 
Sheth e t al., 1988). 
In the 1960s Huff (1964) developed a model predicting the probability of a consumer 
from a given point of origin travelling to a particular shopping centre. Size of the shopping 
centre (measured by the square foot of area devoted to the sale of a particular class of goods) 
and travel time were the two explanatory variables. Huff did not develop his model with an 
eye to Africa, but his use of travel time instead of distance is certainly appropriate when 
dealing with that continent. Two cities may be located at the same distance from an 
intermediate town, while due to divergent road conditions travelling to one of them takes 
twice as long as to the other. 1 7 
Population size and transport distance feature not only in gravity models used in 
marketing research but also in central place theory used in geographical research. The 
location of trading centres is said to be related to the minimum population required to bring 
about the offering of a certain good for sale, and the maximum distance over which people 
will travel to purchase a good offered at a central place. 1 8 Central place theory has been 
tested in Africa during the last few decades, and it was shown that we have to be careful in 
applying i t According to Obudho (1983) consumers are not supplied with goods and 
services from a central place, but central place functions are performed by mobile agents 
who move from place to place and thus give rise to periodic markets. Wambugu (1994) 
showed that in Nyeri District (Kenya), the spatial organization of such periodic market 
places follows the distribution of the population. Lado (1991), however, came to a different 
conclusion for Bungoma District (Kenya). Some of the markets in that district developed 
into assembly points of local farm produce destined for large urban centres outside the area. 
For a discussion of regional-spatial analysis in marketing, see also Revzan (1971), Grether (1983) and 
Timmermans (1993). 
Pioneers of the central place theory were Berry & Garrison (1958). 
65 
The so-called rural assembly markets show a closer relationship with the distribution of 
agricultural production in the district than with the distribution of the population. Akasaka 
(1992) and Hollier (1980) showed for southwest Mali and west Cameroon respectively that 
the location of rural assembly markets in surplus areas was related to the demands of 
collecting wholesalers: markets that they could easily access by vehicle and where they could 
collect large quantities of a commodity at a time developed as collection points. 1 9 The 
development of rural assembly markets for horticultural commodities in Kenya will be 
discussed in Sections 6.3 to 6.7. 
Time convenience: timing of market days 
In the rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, the periodic nature of markets affects the time 
convenience of consumers. Timing of periodic markets is to some extent related to their 
place in a so-called market ring, composed of markets that operate on successive days. The 
itineraries of the traders that operate in the ring are thought to be determined by the aim that 
no hamlet or other settlement is far away from a market for any more than a few days. 2 0 
Other factors are also at stake, however. In many regions one day is set aside for religious 
functions, but in some regions this day is generally chosen as market day because the market 
is located at the same site as the church or chapel (Lado, 1991). The assembly function of 
some rural markets also has its effects: their timing is at least partly related to the timing of 
market days in the urban centres served by these assembly markets. For instance, if Sunday 
is a day of rest in the urban centre, the assembly market will be more likely to operate on 
Friday than on Saturday. Generally, market places in cities operate six or seven days a 
week. The time convenience to the urban consumers is higher than to rural consumers: they 
can do their shopping almost whenever they want 
Form convenience: quality 
In Sub-Saharan Africa where horticultural commodities are not usually processed, nor 
treated or pre-packed for retailing, form convenience refers largely to quality. In the USA 
and Europe, poor-quality vegetables, fruits and tubers hardly enter the marketing chain, but 
in developing countries this stage has not been reached yet, and trader policies to raise 
minimum quality standards are still subject to debate. We will look at problems of quality 
deterioration and produce losses in the course of horticultural marketing processes in Section 
5.6. 
Near national boundaries, assembly markets develop in centres that are accessible by road or rail from 
both sides of the border. See Nkera & Schoepf (1991), Meagher (1990), and Fodouop (1988) for 
examples of cross-border trade of horticultural commodities and other foodstuffs. 
As a result successive markets would not normally be adjacent ones. Early research on this matter was 
carried out by Hodder (1969) in Yorubaland (Nigeria), Ukwu (1969) in Iboland (Nigeria) and Skinner 
(1964) in China. 
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4.6. Marketing channel development: equity 
As well as in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, the development of marketing channels 
can also be analysed by assessing equity. Equity refers to the division of power in the 
marketing channel and to the ways market segments are served. 
Power in the marketing channel 
In a marketing channel context, power typically is defined as a channel member's ability to 
influence the perceptions, behaviour and/or decision-making of another channel member 
(Anderson et. al., 1987). Changes in the division of power are related at least in part to 
members' perceptions about the present situation. French & Raven (1959) were the first to 
distinguish five types of perception-based power, reward power, coercive power, legitimate 
power and referent power. Each type may feature in horticultural marketing channels in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Reward power and coercive power may play a role in isolated production 
areas where few traders operate. The farmers regard themselves as price takers and the 
traders they deal with as price setters. According to the farmers' perceptions, the traders 
have the power to offer a better price, for instance, if the farmers are loyal to them. Whether 
the traders are indeed price setters is less important than the perception of the farmers. 
Farmers may also believe that traders have the power to punish them if they try to bypass 
them and take the produce to an urban centre themselves. This belief slows down possible 
trends of forward integration. 
Legitimate and reference power may play a role in horticultural trade as a 
consequence of social and ethnic constructs. Two examples: if a potential buyer lives in the 
same community as a seller, and the buyer has a higher social status than the seller (e.g. 
belongs to the family of the chief), this may give him legitimate power. Second, if a potential 
buyer belongs to the same ethnic group as a seller, while the majority of his competitors 
belong to another ethnic group, this may give him reference power. 
Expert power may also play a role, as when farmers expect traders to have more up-
to-date knowledge about demand and supply in the urban markets than they themselves 
have, or when traders assume that transporters have more knowledge about maintenance 
costs and related transport charges than they themselves. 
Porter (1980) gives an extensive list of circumstances that determine the power of 
buyers and sellers who deal with each other in the marketing channel. 2 1 Some of the 
circumstances he mentions are characteristic for the collecting wholesale of horticultural 
commodities in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Collecting wholesalers may be expected to be 
powerful when dealing with farmers because: they purchase large volumes relative to farmer 
According to Porter (1980) a buyer is more powerful if (1) he purchases large volumes relative to sellers' 
sales; (2) the products he purchases from the sellers represent a significant fraction of his costs or 
purchases (making him more price-sensitive and purchase-selective); (3) the products he purchases from 
the sellers are standard or undifferentiated (which makes it easier to switch to other sellers); (4) he faces 
few switching costs (which would lock him to the seller); (5) he earns low profits (high profits would 
make him less price-sensitive and might give him a longer view towards preserving the health of his 
sellers); (6) he poses a credible threat to backward integration (is in a position to demand bargaining 
concessions); (7) the quality of the produce supplied by the sellers is unimportant for the quality of the 
buyer's products (making the buyer less price-sensitive); (8) the buyer has full information (about 
demand, actual market prices and even suppliers' costs). 
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sales; the commodities they purchase from the farmers represent a significant fraction of then-
cost; they buy undifferentiated commodities; they face few switching costs; and they have 
full market information. 
Both French & Raven and Porter look at individual buyers and sellers. Actors who 
operate at the same level in the marketing chain may also cooperate to change the division of 
power in the channel. Farmers, for instance, could organize themselves into a horticultural 
marketing cooperative to increase sellers' sales relative to buyers' purchased quantities. 
Mutual cooperation increases their countervailing power. 2 2 Horticultural marketing 
cooperatives are, however, rare in Sub-Saharan Africa, as was explained in Section 2.3 and 
will be shown for Kenya in Section 5.3. 
Not only farmers but also traders may cooperate to increase their power. They may, 
for instance, agree on maximum prices paid to suppliers and/or minimum prices demanded 
from buyers (thus forming price cartels). The chances to successfully hold prices below or 
above the competitive level are greater when there is a high degree of market concentration 
and products are homogeneous (Scherer & Ross, 1990). In Sub-Saharan horticultural trade, 
a high degree of market concentration may especially occur at the collection stage. The 
chances for collecting traders to come up with a successful price cartel are greater when most 
farmers in a given area specialize in a few horticultural commodities, making the supply 
relatively homogeneous. In the Kenyan research areas this was indeed the case, as shown in 
Section 3.3. Nevertheless, price cartels were not found, as will be explained in Section 5.6. 
Equity in serving market segments 
When a country develops, the equity in serving market segments may change for the better 
or the worse. The growth of urban centres and the rising purchasing power of urban citizens 
may, for instance, drain supplies from the countryside. As a consequence, prices in the rural 
areas rise, and households which hitherto have bought some of their requirements may no 
longer be able to do so. 
The same may happen when developing countries start to export horticultural 
commodities. Fruits and vegetables previously destined for local consumption may rise in 
price when exportation becomes feasible. Whether such developments will indeed occur will 
be shown for Kenya in Section 5.4. 
Etgar (1976) defined the power of a channel member or of a group of members in a conventional 
marketing channel as a function of (1) his (their) power sources, (2) the degree of dependency of other 
channel members upon him (them), and (3) the countervailing power of those channel members whom 
he (they) wish(es) to influence. Heide & John (1988) defined dependency as the extent of the 
replaceability of the exchange partner. 
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5.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 4, the actors and institutions that operate in horticultural marketing channels in 
Sub-Saharan Africa were briefly introduced. In the present chapter the focus is on Kenyan 
channels. Actors and institutions will be looked at in some detail, with a focus on their 
characteristics and mode of operation. This will be preceded by a few examples of 
horticultural marketing channels which show the diversity in channels that exists. The 
examples are derived from the research areas. 
The shortest marketing channel, found in all production areas, consists of a farmer-
trader who goes to a small rural market on foot or by public minibus (matatu) to sell 
vegetables or fruits from her own farm to local consumers. The channel has a second level if 
the farmer does not sell her produce to consumers but to one or more retailers. She may do 
so in the market place itself or early in the morning at the gate of the market place. Instead of 
the farmer coming to the market gate, the retailer may also come to the farm gate. The retailer 
lives near the farmer, and before going to the market she passes by the farmer to purchase 
supplies. The retailer may carry additional supplies from her own farm. 
When additional trade levels are present, the diversity in channels becomes greater 
and more region-specific. In Nyandarua, purchasing agents may deliver bags with cabbages 
to a collecting wholesaler, who fills his 7-tonne truck and takes the commodities to 
Wakulima wholesale market in Nairobi to sell to wholesalers and retailers. Another 
collecting wholesaler may buy directly from the farmers, and, on arrival at Wakulima, sell 
the entire load to a collecting wholesaler from the coast, who transfers the produce to another 
truck and takes it to the Kongowea wholesale market in Mombasa. Here the cabbages may 
be sold either to a distributing wholesaler or directly to retailers from Mombasa and nearby 
towns. 
In Kisii, purchasing agents and small rural assembling traders without a store may 
bring banana bunches on foot to a bigger rural assembling trader with a store. The latter sells 
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the bananas on to a collecting wholesaler from Nairobi, who transports them by hired 7-
tonne truck to the capital. A colleague from the production area may employ agents herself 
and transport the produce straight from the farms to Nairobi, or even all the way to 
Mombasa. 
In Taveta, rural assembling traders may bring tomatoes by pick-up trucks to Taveta 
market to sell to a collecting wholesaler from Mombasa. The latter hires space in a 7-tonne 
truck after sorting the tomatoes according to ripeness and repackaging them in large wooden 
boxes. The truck is shared with other collecting wholesalers, each trader paying in 
accordance with the number of units transported. On arrival in Kongowea wholesale market, 
Mombasa, the boxes are sold to distributing wholesalers and retailers from Mombasa or 
other coastal towns like Kilifi. 
Another collecting wholesaler in Taveta may hire a pick-up truck to collect banana 
bunches near the farms, using purchasing agents to organize the harvesting and carry the 
produce to the collection point He brings the bunches to the railway station in Taveta to be 
loaded into a goods wagon. Kenya Railways charges the wholesaler per bunch. Produce 
from several wholesalers is put into one wagon after the bunches are marked with a different 
sign for each trader. On arrival in Nairobi, the bananas are sold to distributing wholesalers 
and retailers at the railway station or from a store in town. 
In another part of Taveta, there is an export trader who buys French beans from 
farmers three days a week at a specific collection point The beans are graded and packed 
before going on transport to Nairobi by truck. In Nairobi the beans are stored in a cold store 
before being brought to the airport and flown to retailers in London. 
In the Taita Hills, a local wholesaler may go to the farms to buy a large assortment of 
vegetables, including tomatoes, cabbages, baby marrows, sweet peppers, kale, leeks, 
carrots and Irish potatoes. She takes the produce in baskets to one of the main roads that 
traverse the hills and waits for a transporter, who comes by on certain days of the week. The 
transporter collects the produce of a large number of wholesalers, charging them an amount 
per kilogram after weighing the baskets with a scale. The wholesalers themselves travel to 
Mombasa by matatu. When the truck arrives in the Kongowea wholesale market at 
Mombasa, the baskets are weighed again to make sure no produce has disappeared on the 
way. 
In the same hills, a truck owned by the local horticultural marketing cooperative 
assembles various kinds of vegetables from member-farmers at collection points. The 
produce is brought to the compound of the cooperative, where the commodities are sorted, 
graded and repacked. They are then carried to the Kongowea wholesale market where the 
cooperative has a rented stall. Retailers, ship chandlers, hotels and other institutions come to 
buy the commodities. 
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5.2. Traders, agents and facilitating intermediaries in the domestic market 
Traders and market places 
Five types of horticultural market places can be distinguished in Kenya, each with its own 
mixture of trader types. The smallest horticultural markets are informal rural retail markets.1 
They are not registered and have no facilities at all. The market is periodic, with one or two 
market days a week. The number of traders is limited. Most are farmer-traders, selling 
produce cultivated on their own farms. 
Next in hierarchy are the registered rural retail markets. They are also periodic, but in 
the bigger ones some trade may also take place outside official market days. Farmer-traders 
and professional retailers are the main sellers, and consumers the main buyers. Often very 
few facilities are available to the traders there, with permanent stalls, toilets and a proper 
drainage system being absent. The market fees collected by the County Council are rarely 
used to improve the market place. Some rural retail markets develop into rural assembly 
markets, where farmer-traders and rural assembling traders sell to wholesalers from 
elsewhere. Whether such a development actually occurs depends on a combination of factors 
which will be discussed in Sections 6.3 to 6.7. 
While rural assembly markets have a collection function, urban wholesale markets 
have a distribution function. Retailers from urban retail markets in the same population 
centre as well as retailers from smaller population centres in the region come to buy produce 
from wholesalers based in the wholesale market Some of these wholesalers buy their 
produce from farmers and traders in the production area, thus combining collection and 
distribution activities. Others focus either on the collection or distribution side. Distributing 
wholesalers remain in the market place and buy from collecting wholesalers who sell to them 
from the back of their truck in or in front of the market place. 2 The market place is 
operational six days a week. 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Although in theory a clear distinction exists between urban wholesale and retail markets, the 
situation is more complicated in reality, because wholesale activities in urban markets attract 
retailers who try to set up business in the same compound. Even in classified wholesale 
markets like the Nakuru wholesale market or the Kongowea wholesale market in Mombasa 
not all traders are pure wholesalers. Although these market places were primarily intended 
for wholesale trade when built, they were soon invaded by retailers who began trading on 
the ground, blocking the passageways with their small heaps of vegetables and fruits. 
In Mombasa the authorities have tried to solve the problem by building a separate 
retail market adjacent to the wholesale market. The retailers were driven into this section and 
Sometimes these markets are also called roadside markets, but that is somewhat confusing. They are 
informal because they lack registration by the County Council, not because they are located on the side 
of a road. Both informal and registered rural markets may be located on the side of the road. 
In Kenya, traders who buy produce in the production area to sell in large towns are often called 
middlemen. This is confusing because these middlemen can be either collecting wholesalers (selling to 
distributing wholesalers), or wholesalers who combine collection and distribution activities (selling to 
retailers), or they can even be large retailers (selling to consumers). In the literature, the term middlemen 
usually refers to all traders operating in the marketing channel. 
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removed from the passageways by force. However, consumers keep on visiting the 
wholesale market and especially the smaller wholesale traders sell to them, although that is 
officially prohibited. It is very difficult for the market authorities to prevent this because of 
the lack of standardized wholesale units in horticultural trade.3 
The authorities in Nakuru have not tried to get the retailers out of the wholesale 
market Instead they have restricted the activities in the market place to the morning hours to 
deter competition with the retail market elsewhere in town. The retailers in the wholesale 
market are concentrated in the central open-air part, while the wholesalers have settled under 
the roofed part of the market place. Due to the presence of consumers, many of the 
wholesalers have also reverted to occasional retailing. Interestingly, some retailers in the 
central part of the market sell not only to consumers but also to traders. The traders they are 
dealing with come from poorer parts of town where they have small wooden kiosks 
alongside the road. The quantities they require per commodity are too small to buy from 
wholesalers.4 
The thin dividing line between wholesale and retail trade exists not only in 
horticultural wholesale markets but also in the bigger market places without a defined 
wholesale character, such as the municipal markets in Kisii and Nyahururu. The traders in 
these market places are characterized not as wholesalers and retailers but as larger and 
smaller traders. The larger ones sell primarily in bulk to retailers from within the market and 
to retailers from other parts of town. After doing that in the morning, they may sell their 
remaining supplies in smaller units to consumers in the afternoon. The smaller traders sell 
primarily to consumers. They may sell to retailers from outside the market when 
commodities are scarce and the larger traders run out of supplies. The visiting retailers then 
revert to buying small quantities from various smaller traders instead of buying in bulk from 
one bigger trader.5 
Allocation and sorting 
The discussion on the dividing line between wholesalers and retailers stems from the 
definition of the two types of traders: wholesalers allocate commodities to businesses such 
A wholesaler may sell tomatoes either by the 50kg or 5kg box. Pineapples are usually sold by the 
dozen but no one can keep a wholesaler from selling them by the piece. A small retailer or a consumer 
may ask for the same quantities of one commodity. Most likely a retailer will come to buy every day 
and the consumer only once or twice a week, but traders are not registered and no one can tell whether a 
customer is a trader or a consumer. 
The kiosk retailers may buy only three heaps of tomatoes, five bundles of kale and two heaps of onions 
from one or more retailers to sell at a higher price in their kiosk. The traders they buy from are not pure 
retailers, because they also sell to traders, but neither are they true wholesalers, because they sell mainly 
to consumers. 
Combined wholesale and retail trade in food is not unique to Kenya. It was also found by Bryceson 
(1994), for instance, who studied grain traders in urban market places in Tanzania. To distinguish 
wholesale traders from retail traders, Kibera & Warungi (1988, 256) decided to define African food 
wholesalers as traders selling 'primarily' through retailers. This definition is difficult to use, even if we 
assume that 'primarily' refers to 50 per cent or more of the physical turnover. What do we call a trader, 
for instance, who sells most of her tomatoes to retailers and most of her onions to consumers? 
Comparing apples and oranges should be avoided. An alternative solution is to look at flows rather than 
actors. Each trader may participate in different flows, e.g. buying from farmers to sell to retailers (flow 
1) or buying from farmers to sell to consumers (flow 2). In Chapters 7 and 8 below, flows instead of 
actors will be used to analyse vertical differentiation in horticultural marketing channels. 
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as retailers, and retailers allocate them to consumers. In Section 4.4, an additional criterion 
was mentioned to distinguish the two types of traders, namely their assortments. Wholesale 
assortments were defined in relation to physical handling characteristics during transport, 
and retail assortments in relation to consumer preferences. Thus, in theory a comparison of 
traders' assortments might define which traders are wholesaling and which are retailing. 
This approach does not work, however, for horticultural traders in Kenya. One reason for 
this is the differentiation into collecting and distributing wholesale trade that exists there. 
Distributing wholesalers do not transport commodities: both suppliers (collecting 
wholesalers) and buyers (retailers) come to them. A more important reason is the limited 
assortment of most collecting wholesalers, distributing wholesalers and retailers: the 
majority sell only one or a few commodities at a time (their allocation function is more 
important than their sorting function). As a consequence, the assortments of wholesalers and 
retailers who deal with each other are often quite similar, and a comparison of traders' 
assortments does not, in most cases, provide a clue to the type of trade (wholesale or retail) 
they are pursuing. 
Characteristics of the market places in the present sample 
Five types of Kenyan market places were introduced at the beginning of this section. Every 
market place can be characterized on the basis of its status (formal/informal), setting 
(rural/urban), frequency (periodic/daily) and main types of trade (wholesale/retail/ 
assembling). 
The market places that were included in our trade survey can all be characterized in 
this way. To begin with, all of them are formal. Informal rural retail markets were not 
included in the sample because it was expected that traders in such markets would hesitate to 
cooperate due to the more or less illegal character of their activities. 
Table 5.1 shows the further characteristics of the surveyed market places. Rural and 
urban, periodic and daily markets are included in the sample. The rural markets are all 
periodic ones, while the urban markets are either periodic or daily. The daily markets are 
found in the largest urban centres. The Kenyan CBS classifies population centres of 2,000 
inhabitants and upwards as urban, but they are more rural then urban in appearance, and the 
trade activities that take place there are more similar to those in rural centres than in large 
cities. Both in the rural and small urban centres the markets are periodic. In markets in the 
small urban centres, some trade activities do usually take place outside official market days, 
while this is rare in the markets of rural centres. 
Based on the CBS definition, two of the assembly markets in the sample are urban: 
Taveta and Kisii Daraja Mbili. This may seem strange because assembly markets have been 
characterized here as rural. Taveta is relatively large because it is a border town and it has a 
so-called second-level assembling function, as will be explained in Section 6.6. Daraja 
Mbili, the other urban assembly market, is officially part of Kisii town but it is located at the 
edge of town. It used to be located in the rural area but the expansion of Kisii town changed 
its setting. It retained its assembling function. 
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Table 5.1. Surveyed market places and then- characteristics 
District marketplace wall periodic! main types 
(Province) urban daily of trade 
Nyandania Nyahururu urban periodic* retail/wholesale 
(Central) Engineer rural periodic retail 
Magumu rural periodic assembling/retail 
Nakuru Nakuru wholesale market urban daily wholesale/retail 
(Rift Valley) Nakuru retail market urban daily retail 
Njoro urban periodic* retail 
Dundori rural periodic retail 
TaitaTaveta Voi urban periodic* retail 
(Coast) Taveta urban periodic* assembling/retail 
Wundanyi urban periodic* retail 
Kisii Kisii Municipal market urban daily retail/wholesale 
(Nyanza) Kisii Daraja Mbili urban periodic assembling/retail 
Nyakoe rural periodic assembling/retail 
Riochanda rural periodic assembling/retail 
Kebirigo rural periodic assembling/retail 
Keroka urban periodic* retail 
Mombasa Kongowea wholesale market urban daily wholesale/retail 
(Coast) Majengo retail market urban daily retail 
Most market activities take place on periodic market days, but some retailing continues throughout the week. 
Characteristics of the traders 
The characteristics of horticultural traders who operate in the domestic market are analysed in 
some detail in Appendix 5.1. The findings show that over 95 per cent of the traders who sell 
horticultural commodities in rural market places and in market places in small urban centres 
have at least one thing in common: they are women. Only in daily markets in large urban 
centres do male traders become more numerous. 
In terms of ethnic background, age and marital status, the composition of the 
horticultural trader population more or less coincides with that of the general population in 
the region where the traders operate. The majority of the traders are between 25 and 45 years 
of age. Many female traders are young women, single mothers, divorced women, widowed 
women, and women with absentee husbands. 
The majority of the farmer-traders and professional traders derive low to moderate 
daily and monthly incomes from their trading activities. Two small groups of actors have 
high incomes, namely the collecting wholesalers, and those distributing wholesalers who 
operate in large wholesale markets (such as the Kongowea wholesale market in Mombasa). 
Agents andfacilitators 
The most common horticultural agents in Kenya are purchasing agents. At the time of the 
trade survey, seven of them were interviewed in Kinangop Division, Nyandarua District.6 
6 The total number of horticultural purchasing agents operating in Kinangop at the time of the trade 
survey was not known. It was estimated that there were 20 of them at most 
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All but one of these dealt with potatoes, the most important horticultural crop in the area.7 
Four of the seven agents were also commercial horticultural farmers, and three were pure 
agents. All lived in the division where they carried out their agent activities. Their estimated 
buying radius was five to ten kilometres. They knew the farmers and the farmers knew 
them. This contrasted with the collecting wholesalers for whom they worked. These traders 
usually came from Nairobi or from other parts of the district. The agents' knowledge of the 
local situation gave them expert power.8 
A collecting wholesaler informed his purchasing agent about the day he would come 
to collect produce and the price he was willing to pay farmers. The agent then started to look 
for produce. He bargained with farmers about quantities and prices on behalf of the 
wholesaler. Once the deal was settled, he instructed the farmer when to deliver the produce. 
The agent organized the packing of the produce in bags, the topping up and twining of 
bags, 9 if necessary the carrying of bags to a road that could be reached by truck, and finally 
the loading of the truck. In this way, he minimized the time the wholesalers needed to collect 
the produce. Without the agent the collecting process would have taken some two days, and 
with the help of the agent only half a day. 
After loading the produce, the collecting wholesaler paid the agent, who in turn paid 
the farmers. Farmers always received cash. During periods of produce scarcity, all 
interviewed agents paid an advance to make sure that farmers did not sell their produce to 
another trader before the wholesaler arrived.1 0 The agents, in turn, received the money in 
advance from the wholesaler. A farmer who received an advance could be dishonest to an 
agent, but this might backfire on him if he needed the agent in future. In general, a farmer 
was more prepared to cheat an unknown wholesaler than a well-known local person, which 
was an important reason, particularly for wholesalers from outside the district, to call in an 
agent The agent might of course, also cheat the collecting wholesaler, but word would then 
spread to other wholesalers and the agent would lose his job and his standing in the local 
community. 
Five of the seven agents said they would deal with any reliable wholesaler that came 
along. The other two dealt with specific wholesalers only. The reason they gave was 
'security': if they worked for these wholesalers during periods of high demand and low 
supply, the traders would also come to them during periods of low demand and high supply. 
The latter occurred, for instance, after a heavy shower during harvesting peaks, when the 
production area was difficult to access and the harvested crops began to perish. 
Six of the interviewed agents dealt with potatoes. The seventh dealt with cabbages, the second most 
important crop in the area. Four of the six potato agents also handled cabbages. Agents handled one 
commodity at a time, because collecting wholesalers asked for either potatoes or cabbages. 
See Section 4.6 on types of power. 
Cabbages and potatoes were packed in the gunny bags also used for maize (containing 90 kgs of maize). 
After filling a bag with potatoes or cabbages a large heap of produce was put on top (the topping up). 
Then twine was used to make a kind of net that covered the heap and held it down to the bag. The 
extension of the bag could be one third to half the size of the bag itself. 
The agent made an advance payment either before the crop was harvested or thereafter. The first 
possibility was adopted when crops was still immature and produce was not yet available in the area. 
The agent then tried to persuade farmers to harvest their crop prematurely in exchange for a good price, 
and, in the course of the negotiations, offered an ample prepayment to ease cooperation. The second kind 
of advance payment was made when only part of the crop in the area was mature, or when the harvest 
was poor. 
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All interviewed agents received a cornrnission per collected bag which was agreed on 
in advance. The agents had to use part of the cornrnission to cover their own costs, notably 
the hired casual labour needed for packing, topping up and twining. 1 1 The cornrnission was 
not related to the negotiated buying price at the farm or the expected selling price in the 
Nairobi market 1 2 Agents increased their profit by negotiating a lower buying price than the 
one agreed on with the wholesaler. Of course this practice was known to the wholesalers, 
and was used in the negotiation process to keep the commission rate low. The system 
remained advantageous to the agents because commission rates were known within the 
community, while people could only guess at the additional profits generated by the 
difference between agreed and actual buying prices. 
Commission rates were negotiable, since wholesalers were not entirely dependent on 
their agent: agents were replaceable either by other agents or by direct buying from farmers. 
Engaging the services of agents was simply the result of weighing costs against benefits on 
the part of collecting wholesalers. The benefits included saved time, inside knowledge 
(expert power of the agent), and lower enforcement costs in cases of advance payments. 
Whereas collecting wholesalers may use purchasing agents, distributing wholesalers 
may use brokers . Brokers are, however, less common in horticultural trade than 
purchasing agents. In Kenya they can be found, for instance, at the Wakulima wholesale 
market in Nairobi. The brokers are usually young men who do not have enough capital to go 
into trade themselves. They try to make some money by selling produce on behalf of 
collecting wholesalers who sell in the market place from the back of their truck, and 
distributing wholesalers who sell in the market from a stall. The brokers position themselves 
near the entrance of the market place and ask people who pass them what they want to buy. 
If a person wants to buy potatoes, a broker takes him to a potato trader he knows. He may 
either carry out the price negotiations on behalf of the trader, or assist the trader in the 
process. If the deal is on and the customer has paid, the broker gets a small commission 
from the trader. 
In the Kongowea wholesale market in Mombasa an additional type of broker can be 
found, the auctioneer. They are the only horticultural brokers of their kind in Kenya. 1 3 They 
auction on behalf of collecting wholesalers, charging them a commission of 10 per cent of 
the selling price. Some fruits are auctioned throughout the year (e.g. bananas from Taveta), 
while others are only auctioned during peak periods of supply (e.g. a proportion of the 
oranges, mangoes and papayas from Kwale and Kilifi). The system guarantees quick selling 
at competitive prices. Buying, however, requires knowledge of the auction system and 
bidding skil ls . 1 4 This is beyond the scope of many retailers. Therefore, in addition to 
1 1 In two cases the agent also had to pay the hired labourers that loaded the bags into the trader's truck. 
Otherwise these costs, and any costs to carry the produce to an accessible road, were met by the 
wholesaler. In all cases the bags and string for twining were supplied by the wholesaler. 
1 2 The buying commission was either KSh 20 or Ksh 30 per bag, both for potatoes and cabbages. Since 
farm gate prices for potatoes were up to twice as high as those for cabbages, commissions were not in 
proportion to the value of the produce handled. Apparently agents were paid for their organizational 
efforts without regard to the value of the produce. 
1 3 In December 1991 nine auctioneers operated in the Kongowea wholesale market Like wholesalers with 
stalls they paid a fixed monthly fee to the market authorities. 
1 4 Oranges and mangoes are sold in lots of one or more bags or baskets, and bananas in lots of some five 
to a dozen bunches (depending on supply and demand in the market). The auctioneer starts with a low 
price per bag, basket or bunch, and increases the price as long as more than one buyer shows interest 
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retailers some distributing wholesalers have specialized in buying fruits at the auctions to sell 
to retailers.15 
The most common facilitators in the marketing channel are transporters (in the 
broadest sense of the word). Porters are usually for hire for short distances. They carry 
bags, baskets, boxes and bunches on their head or back, from the farm to the road or from 
the bus stop to the market place. In addition to porters, transporters with donkeys and 
tractors may be available for short-distance transport in rural areas, and transporters with 
handcarts in urban areas. 
For longer distances buses can be used. Minibuses (matatus) traverse production 
areas and urban centres, and run from one urban centre to another. They carry produce on 
their roofs. The driver is usually not the owner; one owner often having a whole fleet of 
matatus. Large coaches connect major cities. They carry produce in their cargo-hold and on 
their roofs. The bus companies to which they belong are owned by big businessmen. One 
parastatal used to run coaches (the so-called Nyayo buses), but halfway through the 1990s it 
was in the process of being sold off. 
Instead of using a bus, which has to be shared with others, a trader may hire a truck. 
Transport companies that hire out trucks are usually located in cities. Most truck owners 
who live in rural areas are not primarily transporters but traders: they only rent out their 
trucks when they do not have business themselves. They own one or a few trucks, whereas 
urban truck companies may own a whole fleet of vehicles. 
The most common trucks rented out to horticultural traders who want to collect 
produce in rural areas are 7- to 9-tonne trucks. Trucks of more than 10 tonnes are too heavy 
and too big. They easily get stuck on the narrow muddy roads in the rural areas. Pick-up 
trucks of 1 to 3 tonnes are economical only at short distances, that is, from farms to urban 
centres located in the production area. 
Transporters finance the purchase of new trucks or buses through a loan from a 
commercial bank, on credit from a truck dealer, or, less often, by means of their own 
capital. They can get credit or a loan only if they are known, are able to provide collateral, 
and have proven themselves to be successful businessmen. Alternatively, they must have the 
right political connections. 
Commercial banks are relatively unimportant as facilitators to horticultural traders. 
Lack of collateral and high trade risks make banks reluctant to issue loans to these traders. 
The limited working capital of the majority of the traders makes supplying credit 
unattractive. 
If traders need a loan, other traders and informal savings and credit groups are their 
main sources. According to a small survey in Njoro market, nine of the 26 interviewed 
professional traders (35%) lent money to fellow traders. By contrast, only two (8%) 
admitted to borrowing money from colleagues, which could reflect people's reluctance to 
The highest bidder does not have to take the entire lot but may also demand part of it. If this happens, 
the remaining bags, baskets or bunches are auctioned once more during the next round. 
A third, relatively small, category of buyers are agents who act on behalf of wholesalers from large 
urban centres up-country. They buy produce such as oranges, re-pack them, and put them on transport to 
Nairobi or Nakuru. The agents are relatively few in number, because most of the oranges and mangoes 
go directly from the coastal production areas to up-country markets without passing the Mombasa 
wholesale market 
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talk about their debts. In addition to other traders, farmers were an important source of 
credit: seven of the professional traders (27%) received commodities on credit from farmers. 
In turn, seven professional traders said they provided credit to consumers.1 6 
As many as 19 of the 26 professional traders (73%) participated in savings and 
credit associations. Nine of them belonged to two or more groups. The size of the 
association ranged from 6 to 33 traders, with 10 to 15 members being most common. The 
fixed weekly contribution could be as low as KSh 20 or as high as KSh 500 or more. Two 
systems existed, which were also found among traders in other parts of Kenya (e.g. Kisii 
District): members either borrowed money from an accumulating fund, or each member 
received the pool in turn.1 7 
5.3. Horticultural marketing cooperatives 
The Kenyan government has been promoting agricultural cooperatives since independence 
(Zeleza, 1990; GOK, 1997) . 1 8 All over the arable parts of the country, agricultural 
cooperative unions and societies deal with input supply and the assembling stage of the 
marketing process. Both such activities are important for coffee, cotton, sugarcane and dairy 
products (the main areas of cooperative involvement) but also for horticultural commodities. 
Horticultural societies, however, have been rare in Kenya. 1 9 There are two reasons for this: 
a general reluctance of farmers to participate in any kind of group marketing due to negative 
experiences with cooperative structures (Appendix 5.3) and the availability of alternative 
marketing channels for horticultural commodities. Like it or not, until recendy many non-
horticultural farmers had to deal with cooperatives because these institutions were their only 
alternative. In the case of horticultural commodities alternative market oudets have been there 
all along. Moreover, they are reasonably reliable. Private traders usually come whenever 
they promise, and are ready to pay cash on delivery. Most farmers prefer these 
intermediaries to the theoretical alternative of cooperative marketing, even though traders 
may pay a lower price. 
Most farmers do not believe that cooperative management is capable of successfully 
handling the marketing of horticultural commodities. By analysing the histories of the 
Horticultural Cooperative Union (HCU) and the Kinangop Agricultural Cooperative Society, 
one can show that this is not entirely unfounded. The HCU was at the centre of the 
cooperative approach of the Kenyan government towards the horticultural sector in the 
1970s. The Kinangop Agricultural Cooperative Society is an example of a local initiative 
As for the relatively small group of farmer-traders who operated in Njoro market: one of the five 
respondents lent money to another trader and none sold on credit to consumers. 
In contrast with professional traders, none of the five interviewed farmer-traders participated in a savings 
and credit group. 
According to Kohls & Uhl (1990) a cooperative is a business voluntarily owned and controlled by its 
member-patrons and operated for them on a non-profit or cost basis. 
Undl 1983, less than 12 societies focused on horticulture as their main activity, equalling less than five 
per cent of all registered societies in Kenya (Gyllstrom, 1991). Since then, the number of horticultural 
societies has most likely only decreased. They are not mentioned in recent statistics at all. So-called 
multi-produce societies may focus on horticulture in addition to, for instance, coffee, but such has been 
rare in the 1990s. 
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towards the cooperative marketing of horticultural commodities in the 1980s. Both failed, as 
explained in Appendix 5.4. In contrast to these two examples of failures, however, the Taita 
Horticultural Produce Cooperative Society is an example of an initiative that succeeded in the 
1990s (Appendix 5.4). 
A comparison of the three cooperative case studies can explain why the Taita 
initiative succeeded where the other two failed. This is of interest because the Kenyan 
government is still advocating agricultural marketing cooperatives, even though it recognizes 
that they must prove themselves in competition with private traders (GOK, 1997). One part 
of the explanation is immediately clean the HCU and the Kinangop society had to cope with 
mismanagement, a fate which the Taita HPC has been spared. Obviously, it is more difficult 
to succeed while being mismanaged. 
Another, less obvious, part of the explanation is found in marketing strategy. The 
HCU and the Kinangop society aspired to improve the equity in the marketing channel to the 
benefit of member-farmers. Their approach was to copy the buying activities of private 
traders. Both cooperatives failed because they proved to work less efficiently and to be more 
bureaucratic than the traders. 
Like the HCU and the Kinangop society, the Taita HPC has also tried to get a better 
price for its members, but not by copying the activities of private traders. The Taita 
management has been aware that a cooperative can never be as flexible as an individual 
trader. It will lose the battle unless it delivers something new. And so it has done: a more 
effective marketing channel (a constant supply of superior-quality produce). Whether a 
similar strategy would have worked for the HCU and the Kinangop society cannot be said 
with certainty, but it is clear that a better strategy is needed than simply copying the activities 
of private traders. 
5.4. Horticultural Export traders 2 0 
When produced for the world market, vegetables, fruits and cut flowers belong to the so-
called non-traditional export crops (Appendix 5.5). Kenya is very successful in this field. In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s it developed into the largest African supplier of fresh 
vegetables and cut flowers to the European market, and the biggest African exporter of air-
freighted fruits after South Africa (Appendix 5.6 shows Kenya's African competitors). In 
1993 it exported 62,128 tons of fresh produce worth KSh. 4.8 billion, and 90,000 tons of 
processed produce worth KSh. 3.3 billion (Nyamiaka, 1995). Horticulture was the third 
foreign exchange earner in the Kenyan agricultural sector, after tea and coffee. Horticultural 
exports accounted for 11 per cent of Kenya's total foreign exchange earnings (CBS, 1995). 
Kenya's chief export fruits are avocados, pineapples and mangoes, and the chief 
vegetables are French beans and the so-called Asian vegetables. The latter term refers to 
commodities such as chillies, okra, eggplants as well as more exotic species like karella, 
turia, tindori, dudhi, valore and guar. The most important types of cut flowers are roses, 
An earlier version of this section has been published by the author in collaboration with T. D. Magorh 
"Flowers and French Beans from Kenya. A Story of Export Success." in S. Ellis & Y. A. Faure (eds.) 
Entreprises et entrepreneurs africains. Karthala - Orstom, Paris, 1995, pp. 435-444. 
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spray and standard carnations, statice, alstroemeria, arabicum, solidaster, molucella, 
tuberose, ornithogalum, delphinium, ammi majus and orchids (see also Section 3.2). 
All horticultural commodities are exported fresh, with the exception of some of the 
harvested French beans and pineapples, which are tinned. Whereas tinned produce is 
transported by sea, fresh commodities are usually air-freighted. The only major exception 
are irregular shipments of avocados to the Middle East in refrigerated containers. 
The composition of fresh horticultural exports has changed over time: the relative 
importance of cut flowers increased at the expense of fruits and vegetables (Table 5.2). By 
1993, over half the value of horticultural exports derived from cut flowers. Their export 
volume increased by about three-quarters in four years' time, while the export volume of 
fresh mangoes, pineapples, French beans and Asian vegetables either remained stable or 
declined (Table 5.3). Only avocados showed a major increase, due to rising sea transports. 
The top seven countries that import fresh horticultural commodities from Kenya are 
all situated in Western Europe (Table 5.4). The most important export destination outside 
Europe is Saudi Arabia. Certain commodities have one main destination, such as Asian 
vegetables, of which over 90% are destined for the United Kingdom, where they wind up 
on the tables of British Asians in London and elsewhere. As for cut flowers, around 60% of 
the total exports are sent to the Netherlands to be auctioned near Schiphol Airport.21 
The horticultural export sector in Kenya is the preserve of a limited number of traders 
and producers. In 1992, around 60 traders were exporting fruits and vegetables, of whom 
more than one-fifth were producers at the same time. The high degree of market 
concentration and vertical integration have been part of the success of horticultural exports, 
as we will see. In the case of cut flowers there is even greater concentration. Of the 
approximately 40 cut flower exporters who were in business in 1992, one-third owned a 
flower farm. Moreover, the four largest flower-producing exporters accounted for more than 
three-quarters of the total cut flower exports. 
The involvement of foreign and multinational companies in the horticultural export 
sector is quite substantial indeed, especially in cut flowers. A quarter of the flower exporters 
are foreigners, while two of the four market leaders are multinationals, including Brooke 
Bond, a subsidiary of Unilever which is well-known throughout Africa. The other two 
leading flower exporting firms are Kenyan-owned. 
In the case of vegetables and fruits, the importance of multinational and foreign 
companies is limited. The share of Kenyans of Asian origin, who have been in Kenya for 
more than one generation and have Kenyan nationality, is high. One-third of the fruit and 
vegetable exporters belong to this group, and this is partly related to the export of Asian 
vegetables. Kenyans of Asian origin are less prominent in flower exports, where they 
account for only one-sixth of all exporters and are not among the four leading exporters. 
The secret of the Asian traders' success lies in their active promotion of small-scale 
production combined with detailed knowledge of the market. Market information is easier 
for Asians to acquire than other Kenyans because of their international family connections. 
Many Asian traders have family members in the United Kingdom who inform them about 
A large portion of the Kenyan flowers do not stay in the Netherlands but are bought by Dutch exporters. 
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Table 5.2. Export value of fresh fruit, vegetable and cut flower exports, 1984-1993 
(at current prices in KSh million) 
Year Fruits Vegetables Cutflowers Total 
KSh mln % KSh mln % KSh mln % KSh mln % 
1984 69.8 17 172.0 41 174.0 42 415.8 100 
1985 54.2 12 200.8 43 209.2 45 464.2 100 
1986 99.3 15 282.7 45 248.0 39 630.0 99 
1987 104.3 12 293.4 33 502.4 56 900.1 101 
1988 298.4 22 394.7 30 634.9 48 1328.0 100 
1989 204.9 14 509.7 35 728.5 51 1443.1 100 
1990 184.3 11 628.8 37 864.4 51 16783 99 
1991 201.9 10 775.8 39 1033.5 51 2011.2 100 
1992 359.0 14 909.7 36 1247.8 50 25163 100 
1993 521.8 11 1771.7 37 2482.8 52 47763 100 
Source: internal files HCDA 
Table 5.3. Export volume of fresh horticultural exports, 1989-1993 (metric tonnes) 
Commodity 1989 1990 1991 7992 1993 
Mangoes 2,971 2,613 1,745 2,349 2,850 
Avocados 3,438 3311 4,193 6,310 6,676 
Pineapples 3,255 767 580 568 757 
French beans 15,227 16,330 14,855 15,196 14,468 
Asian vegetables 8,614 9,276 9,244 9,445 9,095 
Cut flowers 13,245 14,423 16,405 19,807 23,636 
Other 2,753 2,427 2,826 3,688 4,646 
Total 49,503 49,147 49,848 57363 62,128 
Source: internal files HCDA 
Table 5.4. Destination of fresh Kenyan horticultural exports, 1989-1993 (%)* 
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
United Kingdom 33.5 34.8 33.9 293 28.9 
France 17.0 18.6 19.8 22.3 16.7 
Netherlands 16.7 19.2 21.8 28.3 25.3 
Germany 12.6 11.8 12.9 9.1 10.4 
Belgium 3.6 6.8 3.6 3.8 2.7 
Italy 6.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.1 
Switzerland 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.1 4.0 
Saudi Arabia 1.2 1.6 0.8 1.2 1.0 
Other countries 7.0 4.9 4.7 3.5 10.9 
nmö 10OÖ 1ÖÖÖ 1ÖÖÖ 1ÖÖÖ 
Source: internal files HCDA 
* percentage of export volume 
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market developments or deal with the actual importation and distribution of the commodities 
concerned.22 Other Kenyan traders normally lack contacts of this kind. 
All Kenyan vegetable and fruit exporters rely at least in part on contract farmers. \ 
These are smallholders who buy seeds and various other inputs from certain traders or their \ 
agents, while committing themselves to sell the produce to them. 2 3 A smallholder will ' 
typically produce some 30 to 90 kilograms of French beans a week, receiving about KSh 
1,000 to KSh 3,000 for this crop. These agreements, usually unwritten, are often the subject 
of disagreement A farmer may decide to sell the commodities to another exporter who offers 
a slightly higher price. That is all the more tempting if the farmer has received inputs on 
credit On the other hand, when the export market is depressed, a farmer may find that the 
trader fails to arrive to collect the crop. Export possibilities fluctuate weekly or even daily, 
notwithstanding the well-established contacts between most vegetable and fruit exporters and 
European importers. These fluctuations stem from the demand in Europe and competition 
from other countries.2 4 As one export trader put i t 'If Morocco sends a boadoad of French 
beans to France, I will not sell a single box of French beans the next day.' Exporters react to 
such market developments by staying at home, leaving their contract farmers with unsaleable I 
produce that does not even have a local market 
In the case of cut flowers, small-scale production is less significant A small-scale 
flower grower is one who harvests less than 10,000 stems a year, while large-scale farms 
produce anywhere between 5 and 250 million stems a year. Successful flower cultivation 
requires special skills, for which large-scale producers employ experts. Without such skills 
most smallholders cannot attain the standards of quality required in the European market and 
elsewhere, especially Japan, where quality regulations are even more stringent than in 
Europe. Consequently, smallholders normally sell to chance exporters who handle relatively 
small quantities. 
The involvement of the government in horticultural exports is rather limited. The 
Horticultural Crops Development Authority (a parastatal) used to carry out exports, but 
stopped doing so in 1986. Now it has only a regulating, advisory and monitoring function 
on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture (Appendix 5.7). 
Conditions for success 
In October and November 1992, four successful horticultural exporters were interviewed for 
a better understanding of the structure of the marketing channels in which this type of traders 
operate, and of the conditions for success in this part of the horticultural sector (Appendix 
5.8). 
Jaffee (1990; 1993; 1994) has shown that long-term and exclusive trading ties reduce the transaction 
costs faced by exporters, they do not have to identify the range of potential customers in different 
countries, negotiate individual sales terms with each, and enforce the ensuing agreements. Instead, they 
utilize a single contract and a single partner to make their sales, relying on this better informed and 
better positioned trader to coordinate sales and distribution operations. 
An exporter normally deals with contract farmers though agents or employed truck drivers. The drivers 
are supposed to buy directly from the farmers, but some of them engage local agents to bring the 
produce from the farms to the collection points. The agent then pays the farmers 5 to 10 per cent less 
than the predetermined price, which sparks many complaints from the farmers (Njoro, 1993). 
In 1992 the Kenyan export price for French beans, for instance, fluctuated between KSh 20 and KSh 60 
per carton (Nyoro, 1993). 
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The case studies show that concentration and vertical integration are two factors that 
determine the success of horticultural exports. Only a strictly limited number of exporters are 
able to enter this multimillion dollar trade, which requires participants to have a minimum 
scale of operations. There are two reasons for this. First, exporters have to be able to deliver 
whatever quantities customers may require, at whatever moment. If an exporter proves 
unreliable in this respect, he will loose his customers rapidly, especially since competition by 
horticultural exporters from other African countries is rising. To make matters more difficult, 
exporters cannot stick to one customer, because importers switch from one source to another 
every week, putting exporters in trouble if they have no alternative market outlet 
The second reason why a minimum scale of operations is necessary derives from the 
need to have agents in the field, trucks on the road and cold stores in town or at the airport 
These are essential to promote production, secure transportation to the airport, and maintain 
the quality of the commodities. Agents will only remain faithful if an exporter's turnover is 
large enough to guarantee them a reasonable commission. Heavy investments in transport 
and storage will only pay themselves back under the same conditions. 
Besides money to invest, export traders require financial resources because of 
temporary losses they can incur during the initial stage of marketing or during periods of 
oversupply in the international market The horticultural export assortment is to a large extent 
different from the assortment offered for sale in the domestic market. Therefore, rising 
exports of fruits, vegetables and cut flowers do not increase produce prices in the domestic 
market. 2 5 This in itself is positive, but it also has a negative side. The disparity between 
export assortments and domestic assortments makes the export trade even more risky than it 
already is. If traders fail to export their produce there is hardly any local market for it. In 
many cases it must be destroyed. 2 6 Solid financial backing is required to meet the losses 
involved. As a consequence, most successful exporters have been in business for a long 
time or have additional sources of income. 
In addition to concentration, successful horticultural exports require vertical 
integration. The key to this is quality control (one aspect of a marketing channel's 
effectiveness, see Section 4.5). Unless exporters can guarantee delivery of highest-grade 
products, they will lose their customers. Quality can be regulated most easily when the 
exporters produce their commodities themselves. This requires major investments, however. 
The alternative is to rely on smallholders who are supplied with the right inputs and closely 
supervised by agents in the field. The chances of failure are greatest in the case of cut 
flowers, which explains why more exporters have reverted to their own production in this 
sector. 
The phenomenon of diversification also exists in the Kenyan horticultural export 
trade. There are large exporters who act as transport operators, hiring out cargo space to 
smaller colleagues, and there are exporters who have diversified into the production of 
packing material. This is a sign of the flexibility of Kenyan export traders, who must be 
inventive in order to survive in an uncertain marketing environment Their success is 
determined by commercial skill and their willingness to take risks, although the latter are 
2 5 In other words, the equity in serving market segments is not affected (see Section 4.6). 
2 6 Porter (1990) has pointed out that a home market is important to an industry with high levels of 
uncertainty. The interviews with traders have shown that high levels of uncertainty are characteristic for 
the export of fresh horticultural commodities from Kenya. 
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sometimes passed on to smallholders, labourers and the physical environment. The 
involvement of foreigners, multinationals and Kenyans of Asian origin is notably high, but 
the heavy investments that are required to become and remain successful suggest that most 
of the value added is ploughed back into the Kenyan economy. Exports of horticultural 
commodities have developed without any substantial support from the Kenyan government, 
thus reflecting the abilities of private entrepreneurs to generate employment and foreign 
exchange. 
5.5. Horticultural processors 
The present book focuses primarily on Kenyan marketing channels for fresh horticultural 
produce. That is because the largest proportion by far of the Kenyan horticultural 
commodities are marketed fresh, and only relatively small quantities are processed before 
reaching the consumer in Kenya or elsewhere. Nonetheless, we will now have a quick look 
at horticultural processors. 
Kenya possesses canning, juice extraction and jam factories. Major products are 
tinned pineapples, tinned French beans, jams, ketchup, sauces, juices and juice concentrates 
(Table 5.5). The producers of jams and ketchup and the smaller producers of juices 
concentrate primarily on the domestic market. The producers of tinned beans and pineapples 
and the larger producers of fruit juices and fruit concentrates focus mainly on the export 
market The profits of factories that trade in the domestic market depend to a large extent on 
economic developments in the country, which determine the purchasing power of potential 
consumers. The profits of export processors are closely related to their production costs 
relative to competitors in other countries, as well as to demand developments in the world 
market. 
The domestic market is competitive, but competition does not reach the level 
experienced by producers for the world market Many export processors have had problems 
surviving in recent decades. Two case studies show this: one concerns a vegetable 
dehydration factory in Naivasha, and the other a juice factory near Mombasa (Appendix 
5.9). The examples illustrate how difficult it is to be a successful horticultural processor in 
Kenya. Quality standards in the international market are high, and competition can be lethal. 
Production costs are inflated by poor irrfrastructure in the production areas and by high costs 
of packing materials. 2 7 The raw materials offered for sale are often of poor quality, 
especially because farmers can sell their first-quality produce against higher prices in the 
local fresh market 
Sadly, the same problems that plague Kenya in the 1990s were already found in 
various developing countries three decades ago. Abbott (1988) cites a FAO study carried out 
in the second half of the 1960s which surveyed thirty-five vegetable and fruit processing 
enterprises that had not lived up to expectations. Two-thirds of them had problems with raw 
material supply, which were related to factors such as overestimation of potential supply and 
Porter (1990) cites infrastructure (including the transport and communication systems) as one of the 
factor conditions that determine an industry's competitiveness in the world market 
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Table 5.5. Horticulture processing factories in Kenya 
Industry Location (District) Manufactured products 
Kabazi Canners Ltd. 
Del Monte Ltd. 
Kenya Orchards Ltd. 
Kenya Fruit Processors Ltd. 
Trufoods Ltd. 
Kenya Sunshine Products Ltd. 
Frozen Foods (K) Ltd. 
Feingold J. H. 
Associated Packers Ltd. 
Pan African Vegetable 
Products Ltd. 
Limuru Canning Factory 
CremexLtd. 
Erskine & Price Manufacturing 
Njoro Canning Factory (K) Ltd. 
Agraphia Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 
Seven trees Farm Ltd. 
ML Kenya Agro-Industries Ltd 
Mashambani Industries Ltd. 
Bawazir Food Processors Ltd. 
Fri-O-Ken 
Highlands Canners Ltd. 
Subukia (Nakuru) 
Tbika (Kiambu) 
Machakos 
Souk (Kericho) 
Thika (Kiambu) 
Nairobi 
Ruaraka (Nairobi) 
Nairobi 
Bahati (Nakuru) 
Nairobi 
Naivasha (Nakuru) 
Limuru (Kiambu) 
Nairobi 
Nairobi 
Njoro (Nakuru) 
Nairobi 
Murang'a (Murang'a) 
Kiganjo (Nyeri) 
Kisii 
Mtwapa (Mombasa) 
Nairobi 
Nairobi 
canned vegetables, canned fruits, 
canned tomato juice, fruit salad 
canned fruits, pineapple juice, 
pineapple slices and segments, 
frozen and canned vegetables, 
tomato sauce 
jams, marmalades, fruit juices, 
canned fruits and vegetables, 
tomato sauce, tomato ketchup 
passion fruit juice 
jams, canned pineapple, tomato sauce, 
potato crisps, fruit squashes 
fruit squashes, passion fruit juice, 
black currant health drink, tomato sauce 
canned fruit and vegetables 
strawberry jams, juices 
fruit squashes, instant jellies 
dehydrated vegetables 
canned & fresh peas 
tomato sauce, spices, fruit squashes, 
tomato ketchup 
passion fruit juice 
canned French beans 
potato crisps, dried peas 
fruit juices, jams 
canned fruits and vegetables 
processed juices and vegetables 
fruit juice concentrates 
canned beans 
canned beans 
Sources: internal files HCDA, as consulted in 1990. The first five companies are also mentioned in Bhushan (1991, 
1996). 
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lack of sufficient varieties for processing. Little less than one-third had problems with 
market demand, caused by factors such as overestimation of prospective demand, 
misjudgement of consumer tastes, and underestimation of competition from other sources. 
These are the same supply and demand problems found here for PanAVeg and Bawazir. 
One final remark on horticultural processing in Kenya should be made. Processing is 
often mentioned by Kenyan policy makers as a means to get rid of seasonal oversupplies in 
the domestic market. It is important to stress that this is not by definition viable when the 
processed commodities are intended for export. Export processors require top-quality 
produce. Second-quality goods therefore remain unsold during periods of oversupply, either 
with or without the presence of export processors.28 
5.6. Some comments on the channels from a SCP point of view 
On the basis of the foregoing description of all the actors and institutions operating in the 
Kenyan horticultural marketing channels, a few observations can be made about the channels 
in terms of key words from structure-conduct-performance (SCP) analysis (Box 5.1). 
Buyer and seller concentrations, entry barriers 
In the domestic market, the structure of the horticultural marketing system is made up of 
large numbers of buyers and sellers operating at various marketing levels. Buyer and seller 
concentrations are generally low, especially in the rural and urban market places. Buyer 
concentrations are relatively high in less accessible production areas which have no assembly 
centres and where a limited number of collecting wholesalers deal with individual farmers at 
the farm gate. 
The exact number of collecting wholesalers operating in a production area is difficult 
to estimate. However, according to Baumol et al. (1980), potential rather than actual 
competition counts, and imperfect competition is not a problem when entry and exit barriers 
are absent (see Section 4.4). Various entry barriers play a role in African horticultural trade, 
including economies of scale, capital requirements, cumulated experience, access to 
distribution channels and the expectations of potential entrants. These feature at the collecting 
wholesale level in particular. 
In Kenya, one entry barrier seems to be most important: the lack of credit facilities 
which could provide potential collecting wholesalers with the working capital needed to get 
into business. Short-term credit is needed to pay a deposit to the truck owner for hiring a 
truck and to give farmers some down payment to ensure they do not sell their commodities 
Processing is often seen as a medicine for all evils in Kenya. In Taveta, district officers advocated the 
building of a banana wine factory to solve the problem of banana surpluses and low farm-gate prices in 
the area. The reason for the surpluses and low prices was the poor condition of the road from Taveta to 
Mombasa. It caused high transport losses, and limited the number of transporters in the area. Bananas 
that did reach Mombasa without spoiling on the way did sell well. Whether banana wine would sell in 
the same market was never researched (nor whether the production of banana wine was technically 
feasible). Whether the transport of bottles of banana wine over the same road would be less of a problem 
than transport of fresh bananas was not looked into either. Banana wine had become a panacea that 
would bring prosperity to all. 
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Box 5.1. Structure-conduct-performance analysis 
Stracture-conduct-performance (SCP) analysis was developed by Bain (1959, 1968), 
Clodius & Mueller (1961) and Slater (1968). Market structure and trader conduct 
determine market performance. In turn, market performance will influence market 
structure and traders' conduct in the long run. 
The key words used in relation to structure, conduct and performance differ greatly 
from one author to the other, depending on the sector and region being studied and the 
perceptions of the researcher. The key words used here are relevant to the agricultural 
sector in developing countries and are based on Clodius & Mueller (1961), Hill & 
Ingersent (1982), Van Tilburg (1981) and Van Tilburg et al. (1989). 
v M a r k e t structure refers to the organizational characteristics of the market, 
including seller and buyer concentration, conditions of entry, power distribution, and 
availability of market information. Market conduct refers to the set of competitive 
practices and tactics that traders deploy. It includes the methods employed by a trader or 
group of traders in determining prices and output; their attitudes towards grading, 
sorting, customer relations and adoption of innovations; the means by which price and 
product policies of competing traders are coordinated and adapted to each other; and 
the extent to which predatory and exclusionary tactics are directed against established 
rivals or potential entrants. Market performance refers to the economic result: product 
suitability in relation to product quality; rates of profit in relation to the margins at the 
different trading levels; level of output in relation to any deliberate restrictions to 
influence prices; and, finally, price integration between markets and the degree of 
unpredictable variation of prices in markets. 
The SCP method has been subject to criticism, among other reasons because of its 
emphasis on narrowly defined economic goals such as efficient resource allocation and 
equitable income distribution (Bateman, 1976), its monodisciplinary approach (Harriss, 
1982), and its inability to assess the contribution of agricultural markets to economic 
development. As for the last criticism, Janssen & Van Tilburg (1997) give three 
arguments for this inability: (1) SCP does not usually examine the costs and benefits of 
successful intervention, (2) SCP analysis normally does not include the process of 
change and instability through which most developing economies are passing, and (3) 
SCP criteria may be useful to review the existing agricultural marketing systems but are 
poor indicators of their potential for effecting change. 
Some SCP studies on agricultural marketing in developing countries are Jones 
(1972), Van Tilburg (1981,1988), Van Tilburg et al. (1989), Dijkstra & Magori (1992b, 
1994a, 1994b), Tollens (1992), Van Tilburg & Lutz (1992, 1995), Limbu (1993), Lutz 
(1994) and Goossens (1994). 
to other traders. Long-term loans are needed for traders who decide to buy trucks for 
themselves. 
Usually getting a loan from a commercial bank is impossible or very cosdy, because 
of the risky nature of the trade business and the requirement of collateral. The demand for 
collateral also affects transporters who want to buy a truck. In the past, tide deeds for land 
were demanded, although they were not available. Nowadays tide deeds are available in 
most areas, but many banks no longer accept them as collateral. Banks had meanwhile 
experienced problems in selling such tide deeds because some local communities became 
very hostile to potential buyers. The lack of credit facilities to buy trucks results in a scarcity 
of transporters in the production areas. As a consequence, traders have to rely on urban 
transporters, but they do not like to send their trucks to horticultural production areas that are 
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difficult to access. The vehicles get stuck easily and the wear and tear is high. Thus, 
financial and transport constraints impede the entry of new collecting wholesalers into the 
marketing channel, especially in less accessible production areas.2 9 
Transport and finance are no real entry barriers to horticultural retailers. They use 
public transport (matatus), and their turnover is much smaller than that of wholesalers, 
meaning that they require less capital. Moreover, groups of traders may solve their credit 
problems by organizing informal savings and credit groups that provide financial aid to 
members whenever needed (see Section 5.2). 
Finance is an important entry barrier when it comes to export trade. Capital 
requirements are high, because of the need for means of transport, cold storage facilities, 
and market information systems. Additional financial resources are required when traders 
focus on the export of processed horticultural commodities. Exporters of fresh and 
processed produce have better access to credit facilities from commercial banks than 
horticultural traders who concentrate on the domestic market. However, their capital 
requirements are also much higher (see Section 5.4). Often, potential exporters will only 
succeed in getting a substantial loan from a bank if they are part of one of the old-boys' 
networks in which bankers, captains of industry, bureaucrats and politicians participate. 
Lacking access to such a network, they will succeed only if they have substantial family 
resources. 
Level of competition, power distribution, restrictions on output 
The level of competition among traders in domestic market places is high, and prices are 
determined by supply and demand. A hierarchical power structure does not appear to exist 
Horticultural traders are small-scale entrepreneurs who do not make themselves dependent 
on larger traders. Price cartels and deliberate restrictions on traded quantities were not found 
in our trade survey, even among collecting wholesalers who are relatively small in number 
and potentially more powerful. 
Amongst horticultural retailers, price cartels would probably not limit competition 
even if they existed. Retail prices often refer to heaps and bundles which have no standard 
size. A heap of tomatoes can contain four to seven fruits, small or large, green or red, and 
any of five major varieties. All these distinguishable variables constitute means of 
competition among traders, without affecting the prices. A heap of tomatoes costs about the 
same from one retailer to the next, but the quantity and quality differ. Thus, any price 
agreements amongst traders do not hinder competition in the absence of standardized selling 
units. Moreover, even if such units existed, observance of the rules by all traders would be 
very difficult to control. 
The threat of buying cartels, which would influence farm-gate prices and hence the 
incomes of the farmers, is most immediate at the collection stage because of recurrent 
accessibility problems in the production areas. Roads that change into mudpools after every 
shower discourage potential collecting wholesalers, and this decreases competition at the 
buying stage. Buying units also look more standardized at the wholesale level than at the 
retail level: potatoes are purchased by the gunny bag, tomatoes by the box, bananas by the 
Exit barriers are absent Wholesalers, who want to quit can sell their truck second-hand at a fair price and 
use the money to repay loans; they have no other long-term financial obligations. 
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bunch and pineapples by the dozen. However, potato bags are extended, tomato boxes have 
different volumes, banana bunches vary in size and pineapples in weight As a result there is 
no real standardization on the basis of which a price cartel could operate. Moreover, not all 
farmers have to rely on collecting wholesalers who come to their farms. Some may be able 
to sell their produce to local assembling traders (who in turn sell on to collecting 
wholesalers);3 0 some farmers even sell to retailers who come to their farms. Others may be 
able to bring their produce to a rural assembly market where the number of potential buyers 
is larger, and price competition stronger. We will look in more detail at rural assembly 
markets in Sections 6.3 to 6.7, and at the rationale of collecting wholesalers in Sections 6.1 
and 6.2. 
Competition in the domestic market is not curtailed by law. The government tried to 
create a monopoly only once, in the second half of the 1960s when the Horticultural 
Cooperative Union was given a monopoly on onion marketing. The monopoly was never 
effective (Appendix 5.4). 
The level of competition in the horticultural export branch is high, even though the 
number of exports is limited. Exporters try to secure their business through long-term 
vertical relationships with European importers, auctions, retail chains or overseas family 
branches, rather than developing horizontal ties with other exporters. Competition in the 
world market is rising, sometimes to the cut-throat level, and traders act each for themselves. 
Customer relations, predatory and exclusionary trader tactics 
Customer relations are not very important in domestic retail markets, although retail traders 
often try to befriend consumers by means of an extra dash after a deal is settled. Customer 
relations are more important at the collection stage. Farmers normally sell to whoever wants 
to buy instead of waiting for specific traders. When supply is scarce, however, collecting 
wholesalers try to hold onto producers by means of advance payments, while at the same 
time developing customer relations with local purchasing agents to secure supply and 
improve the efficiency of collection (see Section 5.2). 
Customer relations are very important in the export trade. On the supply side, many 
exporters of fresh and processed produce use contract farmers who are supplied with inputs 
in return for their harvest (see Section 5.4). On the demand side, customer relations with 
importers, auctions and other institutions are nourished to secure markets. 
Predatory and exclusionary tactics are uncommon in domestic horticultural trade. The 
only place where such things are known to take place is Nairobi wholesale market The 
example of the Kinangop Horticultural Society, described in Appendix 5.4, shows that 
collecting wholesalers who supply this market may use all kinds of tactics to disrupt the 
activities of new competitors. 
Exclusionary tactics probably play some role in the export trade. Export traders need 
a licence before they can start business and that can sometimes present problems. It is often 
said that ministers and former ministers who are in the horticultural export trade themselves 
are behind such problems, but this cannot be proven. 
3 0 When collecting wholesalers are not around and farmers are in need of money, assembling traders may 
be a solution. However, these traders are only able to store produce for a limited time. They will 
therefore not buy when they expect collecting wholesalers to stay away for too long, as when access 
roads to the production area are blocked. 
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Price information 
Up-to-date information on prevailing prices in the domestic rural and urban markets is 
usually no problem for horticultural traders, because they go to these markets themselves or 
can ask other traders who have been there. The only constraint is that the prices apply to 
non-standardized selling units as explained above. Up-to-date price information is a bigger 
problem for horticultural farmers, especially those living in isolated production areas without 
assembly markets. They depend for their sales on collecting wholesalers who come to the 
farms, while they receive their price information from these same traders. This could in 
theory lead to price manipulation at the expense of the farmers. 
A potential source of independent price information to the farmers is the radio. 
Several times a week the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation, in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, broadcasts commodity prices, data collected in major urban 
wholesale markets like Nairobi and Mombasa. Although these prices give only a rough idea 
what farm-gate prices to expect, they are supposed to improve farmers' bargaining position 
in dealing with traders. Unfortunately, fewer than 5 per cent of the horticultural farmers 
listened to the broadcasts at the time of our survey. Many lacked a radio or money to buy 
batteries, and if they had a working radio they usually listened only to their regional station 
that broadcasts in the local language. The price reviews were given on the national network 
in Kiswahili. 3 1 
An horticultural exporter can get up-to-date price information (e.g. auction prices for 
flowers) from various European institutes and companies — that is as long as he is prepared 
to pay for i t Such information is not available to contract farmers who sell their produce to 
exporters. They have no other choice than to accept what an exporter tells them, while trying 
to find out what other exporters are paying their outgrowers.32 
Product suitability 
Product suitability is related to the price-quality ratio of the traded horticultural commodities, 
and to attitudes of the traders towards grading, sorting and adoption of innovations. 
Although domestic prices are determined largely by market forces, the price-quality ratio is 
not optimal due to a generally low quality level in the surveyed markets. This is largely the 
result of factors outside the sphere of influence of individual traders. One of them is the 
physical conditions in the marketplaces. Lack of sheds, concrete floors and proper drainage 
adversely affect the quality of the fruits and vegetables sold in the market The commodities, 
generally highly perishable, are displayed on the ground without protection against sun and 
rain. After a shower, the marketplace turns into a mudhole, and fruits and vegetables get as 
dirty as their surroundings. 
The state of the roads also reduces the quality of the commodities. The rough roads 
in the production areas cause losses of fruits and vegetables destined for urban centres 
This language barrier is not unique in Africa. A recent FAO study on market information services in 
developing countries came across the same problem in other countries, such as in Guinea Bissau, where 
prices are broadcast in Portuguese and the bulk of the farming community speaks Creole (Shepherd, 
1997). 
The exporter may pay the farmers a fixed price throughout the buying season or a price that fluctuates in 
relation to prices in the destination market In both cases the farmers do not know whether the price 
they receive is fair in relation to the marketing costs and selling price of the exporter. 
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outside the district. Losses are aggravated by improper sorting and packing. For example, 
collecting traders and farmers in Taveta division carry tomatoes in large gunny bags all the 
way from the farms to Taveta market By the time they get there the ripest tomatoes have 
turned to pulp. Collecting wholesalers usually repackage lots in boxes, but once again 
tomatoes of varying ripeness are often intermixed and most boxes are so big that tomatoes at 
the bottom get squashed. The use of gunny bags and large boxes does not arise from 
ignorance on the part of the farmers and traders. Wooden boxes are very expensive in 
Taveta as timber has to come from far away. 
Tomato traders do try to innovate packing methods, especially when transport 
distances are large and potential losses are substantial. In the past few years, some tomato 
wholesalers have begun using plastic crates which were formerly used solely to transport 
bread. The crates have a longer lifespan than wooden boxes and tend to be less costly and 
easier to come by in some parts of the country. 
An example of the rationale of poor packaging concerns cooking bananas. Collecting 
wholesalers in Kisii put bunches of cooking bananas on top of each other in the back of a 
truck without using boxes or cartons that would protect them against sun and rain. On arrival 
in Nairobi or Mombasa, the quality is often poor and consumers complain. Packing the 
cooking bananas would be expensive for two reasons. First, the trader needs to employ 
labourers to remove the hands from the stems and put them into cartons or boxes. Second, 
and more important, packing materials are scarce and costly. Packaging would therefore 
considerably increase the selling price of the fruits, raising the question of whether urban 
consumers would be able and willing to pay more in return for better quality. Of course, 
prices would not have to rise as much as the extra costs of packing, because of the 
anticipated lower losses during transport. Under the present circumstances, however, the 
smaller produce losses would probably not compensate the higher costs. 
These examples deal with highly perishable commodities. In the case of less fragile 
commodities like potatoes and cabbages from Nyandarua, the quality of the vegetables 
remains reasonably good, even when they are packed in extended gunny bags of over 100 
kilograms. However, the topping up of bags makes price formation in the production areas 
less transparent to farmers. Extensions differ from one bag to another, and farmers do not 
know the weight of their extended bags (especially because special labourers take care of the 
topping up). Farmers may get information on prices received by other farmers, but they do 
not know the sizes of the bags involved. Collecting wholesalers are not only their most 
important source of price information, but they also determine the size of the bag extensions. 
The practice of extending bags is the result of the market fee system in the Wakulima 
wholesale market Nairobi. Collecting wholesalers who enter this market are charged an 
amount per bag, regardless of size. They will not stop topping up bags until selling units in 
the Nairobi and other major wholesale markets have been forcefully standardized, or until 
market fees are based on the weight of each bag. 
In contrast with domestic trade, sorting, grading and standard packing units are 
common in export trade. Without sorting and grading, exportation would not be possible, 
because of the high quality demanded by European importers, and the large quality 
fluctuations in harvested produce. Substandard produce is usually destroyed or dumped onto 
the local market. Packaging innovations that have been developed elsewhere in the world are 
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introduced as quickly as possible to remain competitive. Importation of ready-made packing 
materials and inputs for the local manufacture of such packing materials used to be a 
bottleneck as a consequence of bureaucratic procedures and regulations with regard to 
foreign exchange. Nowadays the regime is not as strict The high costs of good-quality 
packing materials still remain a problem, especially when the Kenyan Shilling is weak. 
Profitrates 
The profit rates of horticultural traders who operate in the domestic market are not 
excessive, as reflected in trader incomes. The majority of the traders in the local markets 
earn small to moderate incomes, and only a minority of the traders in the larger markets are 
fairly well-off (see Section 5.2). The group with the highest incomes is without a doubt the 
collecting wholesalers. Their substantial profits are at least partly related to the risks they 
have to endure. 
As collecting wholesalers do not deliberately restrict output levels or operate buying 
cartels, the level of competition is determined by the number of traders who come to the 
production areas and the availability of transporters to carry the produce to the urban 
centres. Both factors depend on the accessibility of the areas. Improvement of the 
infrastructure will therefore not only permit smaller margins by reducing trade risks and 
transport costs, but it would also force wholesalers to decrease their margins because of 
rising competition. 
Profit rates are potentially high in export trade, but they are commonly subject to 
large fluctuations. Trade risks are high due to local and intercontinental transport difficulties 
and recurring oversupplies in the world market. Most export traders are accustomed to 
temporary losses, and part of their normal profit must be reserved for such setbacks. 
Price integration between markets and price fluctuations within markets 
Analysis of price integration between domestic market places and price fluctuations in 
domestic markets requires longitudinal price data. Such data were not collected during the 
trade survey. Some general observations can nevertheless be made. 
If commodities in a terminal market come from a rural assembly market the degree 
of price integration between the terminal market and the rural assembly market is generally 
high because there are good infrastructural connections (see Sections 6.3 to 6.7) and no 
storage activities at any level of the marketing chain. If roads in the destination area are bad, 
the produce generally passes also through a market with a distribution function. The degree 
of price integration between the distribution market and the terminal market is high, because 
retailers have to collect fresh produce the day before each market day, and this keeps them 
informed about prevailing prices. 
Horticultural commodities do not always pass through a rural assembly market on 
their way out of the production area. Under such circumstances prices at the farm gate and in 
the destination market have to be compared in order to analyse the level of integration. 
Interestingly, prices may fall at the farm level while remaining stable or rising at the 
destination market This is the result of two factors, poor infrastructure and interregional 
substitution. Some collecting wholesalers divert their buying operations to other production 
areas during periods when roads are muddy or impassable. The consequent lower demand in 
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the production area, in combination with higher transport costs, reduces farm-gate prices, 
while prices in the destination market remain stable when enough supplies from other parts 
of Kenya come in; otherwise they increase. 
Seasonal price variations in the domestic markets are usually predictable, as they are 
related to the same rainfall fluctuations that determine harvesting periods. The direct relation 
between harvesting on the farm and supply in the markets derives from the general absence 
of storage facilities for horticultural commodities at all levels of the marketing chain, 
including the farm. 
Price fluctuations in the international markets can be very volatile, especially when 
fresh produce is involved. Exporters can do little about that They can try to get long-term 
contracts against a fixed price, but very few customers are willing to take such a risk. If the 
price is fixed, the contract will normally not stipulate the quantity, which means that 
importers will not buy from an exporter when they can get the goods cheaper elsewhere. 
Price integration between local markets and international markets is normally not an 
issue. Most exported commodities do not pass a local market place, because production 
takes place at exporters' own farms or through contracted outgrowers. Only when 
commodities cannot be exported and are dumped on the local market does some price 
relationship exist 
Concluding remark 
It can be concluded that horticultural farmers and traders succeed in operating within a 
marketing environment characterized by a poor physical infrastructure, poorly developed 
market places, scarcity of transport means, lack of credit facilities, lack of appropriate and 
affordable packing materials, and, in the case of farmers, lack of independent market 
information. Better market performance will require an improved marketing environment 
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In the previous chapter various market intermediaries were reviewed. In this chapter we look 
in more detail at the collection stage of the horticultural trade, analysing two aspects: the 
rationale of collecting wholesalers (Sections 6.1 and 6.2), and the development of rural 
assembly markets (Sections 6.3 to 6.7). 
6.1. The efficiency rationale of collecting wholesalers: the distributing 
wholesalers' perspective 
Collecting wholesalers buy primarily from farmers in production areas to sell to distributing 
wholesalers in the wholesale markets of large towns. Their motive to go into business is 
clear: they want to make money and they have found a way to do so. Within a capitalistic 
system that is a legitimate reason. However, it raises the question of why distributing 
wholesalers and farmers do not go for the money themselves. Why do distributing 
wholesalers buy produce from collecting wholesalers instead of going to the production 
area, and why do farmers sell their produce to collecting wholesalers instead of taking it to 
the urban market? Both questions will be dealt with, starting with the first one. 
Distributing wholesalers may have various reasons to leave the collection stage to 
collecting wholesalers. These reasons will be discussed in qualitative terms. The trade 
survey did not include enough wholesale markets and distributing wholesalers to come to a 
reliable quantitative analysis. The qualitative findings are based on observations in the 
Nairobi, Nakuru and Mombasa wholesale markets. 
One important reason why wholesalers focus entirely on the distribution task — 
selling produce in the market place to retailers — is the daily character of market places in 
large urban centres. When the consumer population of an urban centre rises, periodic 
markets change into daily ones. Concentrating all trade on one or two market days is no 
longer necessary to attract enough customers per day. The change from a periodic into a 
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daily market affects the mobility of the wholesalers in the market place. When the market 
was still periodic, wholesalers had sufficient time to collect produce in the production areas 
themselves. Not all of them did so, since some waited for suppliers to come to them, but 
they preferred to collect the produce because of the additional profits involved. Without 
collection, wholesalers would be idle on non-market days.1 
Once a market has changed from a periodic into a daily one, the distributing 
wholesalers' time becomes scarcer. Various costs are involved if they continue buying 
produce from farmers in the production area rather than from collecting wholesalers in the 
market One such cost involves lost sales on the days the wholesaler is on the road. A 
second cost derives from lower sales on the days the trader is in the market. Many urban 
horticultural retailers come to buy produce from wholesalers every day of the week, early in 
the morning before starting their own trading. For each commodity or group of related 
commodities they prefer to deal with one wholesaler whom they can trust in terms of prices 
and quality. They therefore prefer a distributing wholesaler who is available throughout the 
week to a part-time wholesaler, unless the latter offers substantially lower prices. 
In some wholesale markets, being absent has an additional cost aspect. When a 
market changes from periodic to daily, the infrastructure of the market place tends to change 
as well. Permanent concrete stalls and halls replace temporary wooden stalls and selling on 
the ground.2 Distributing wholesalers are charged by the market authorities for the use of 
these upgraded facilities. The details of the arrangements differ from one market to the other. 
In the new, spacious Mombasa wholesale market distributing wholesalers sell either from 
an individual stall annex store or from a hall they share with other wholesalers. When they 
use a stall they pay a monthly rent, when they sell in a shared hall they do not pay anything.3 
In the Nakuru wholesale market, which is also relatively new but not as spacious as the 
Mombasa one, all distributing wholesalers sell from two halls and are charged on a daily 
basis. In the Nairobi wholesale market, which is old and small, all distributing wholesale 
traders have to rent a stall on a monthly basis. 
As long as wholesalers are charged on a daily basis or not charged at all, being 
absent from the wholesale market does not affect their selling costs. If they have to pay a 
monthly rent, however, it becomes costly to leave the stall idle. Costs continue while 
revenues are absent. The costs of stall rent have to be added to the lost sales mentioned 
earlier. The total has to be compared with the profit made by going to the production area 
instead of staying in the market Though figures are not available, the fact that collecting 
wholesalers are in business at all shows that buying from them can be more profitable for 
distributing wholesalers than going to the production area themselves. 
If a wholesaler were to sell in different markets on successive days, time would be more scarce, but 
according to the trade survey horticultural traders in Kenya usually stick to one market place to sell their 
produce (unlike clothes traders, for example). 
The market also gets properly fenced and guards look after stored produce at night 
At the time of the survey in 1991, wholesalers without stalls were only charged at the market gate 
when bringing produce into the market place. This meant that collecting wholesalers, who brought 
produce into the market to sell to distributing wholesalers, were charged while distributing wholesalers 
resident in the market were not In 1993 the market authorities were in the process of changing the 
rules, which were considered unfair towards collecting wholesalers. 
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The further away the production area is from the urban centre, the longer it takes for 
a distributing wholesaler to collect horticultural commodities, and the more selling time that 
is lost We might therefore expect collecting wholesalers to become more important as 
transport distances increase. This can indeed be observed. Collecting wholesalers are rare 
for commodities produced in divisions surrounding an urban centre, because wholesalers 
can easily combine collection and distribution activities in one day. Wholesale markets are 
operational in the morning, so traders can use the afternoon to collect produce.4 When 
commodities are produced elsewhere in the region or outside it, collecting wholesalers are 
quite common. It would then take a distributing wholesaler at least one full day to collect 
produce and come back, raising opportunity costs in terms of lost sales, as explained earlier. 
A wholesaler cannot buy commodities in the production area and sell them in the 
urban market at the same time. He could employ people to do the buying while himself 
focusing on the selling, or vice versa,5 but that is rather uncommon due to the risks 
involved. Farmers usually have to be paid cash on delivery. Therefore, a substantial amount 
of money has to be taken to the production area to buy sufficient produce to fill a truck. 
Wholesalers find it risky to entrust such large sums of money to employees. They recall 
stories of an employee who absconded with all the money, and another who paid farmers 
half the price and promised to pay the rest within a few weeks. When farmers started to 
complain the latter employee also disappeared. Whether the stories are entirely true is not 
important. They show wholesalers' perceptions of the financial risks incurred by sending an 
employee to the production area with money. Even when an employee is given the benefit of 
the doubt,, a wholesaler cannot verify everything the employee tells him. If the employee 
says he needs more money because farm-gate prices have suddenly gone up, the wholesaler 
either has to accept this or travel to the production area to check prices himself. To reduce all 
these financial risks wholesalers prefer to pay farmers personally.6 An employee (or an 
agent) may do the negotiations, but the wholesaler finalizes the transactions.7 
From the point of view of distributing wholesalers, then, the use of collecting 
wholesalers can be explained in efficiency terms: the benefits are thought to counterbalance 
the opportunity costs. Such costs would be lower if roads in the production areas were in 
better shape (less collection time), standardized selling grades existed (no visual inspection 
required), the banking system were better developed (no cash payment required), and 
farmers had telephones (smoother communication). In other words, the existence of 
collecting wholesalers is at least partly due to the poorly developed marketing environment 
Driving to the farms takes less than an hour, and buying produce and loading it into a truck can be 
finalized in half a day. 
Someone has to go to the production area in person to do the buying. Ordering by phone is not 
possible, because farmers do not have phones and commodities do not have standardized grades. 
The situation is different if, for instance, two brothers run a wholesale business. One of them can then 
focus on the collection stage and one on the distribution stage. According to the trade survey, however, 
shared family businesses are not very common in horticultural wholesale trade. 
Similarly, wholesalers also prefer to finalize transactions personally with customers in the wholesale 
market Employees (or brokers) may do the negotiations but the wholesaler will be around to supervise 
the transactions and collect the money. In retail trade the situation is different It is not uncommon for 
retail traders to look after each other's businesses. The amount of money involved, however, is much 
smaller than in wholesale trade. 
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6.2. The efficiency rationale of collecting wholesalers: the farmers' 
perspective 
Farmers could deliver their commodities to distributing wholesalers in the urban wholesale 
market, but they rarely do. According to the farm survey, very few horticultural farmers sell 
in large urban centres, even if such centres are within their district (as is the case for Kisii).8 
The reason is at least partly psychological. Farmers believe that urban wholesalers use 
unscrupulous bargaining methods and that urban markets are characterized by fierce 
competition. Such ideas are usually preconceived, which does not mean they are totally 
unfounded. To the extent that they are false, farmers are victims of a disturbed information 
flow and a psychological entry barrier based on mistaken expectations (see Section 4.4 on 
entry barriers). To the extent that the ideas are realistic, the trading practices in the urban 
market would increase farmers' marketing costs. The composition of these marketing costs 
is shown in the following example based on (1) information collected in Kinangop 
(Nyandarua District) in our farm survey, (2) observations in the Nairobi wholesale market, 
and (3) interviews with 24 potato-collecting wholesalers operating in the area. 
Kinangop is situated some 100 kilometres from Nairobi, and is one of the main 
suppliers of potatoes to the Kenyan capital (see Section 3.3). Over 90 per cent of the farmers 
in the area were cultivating potatoes for sale at the time of the farm survey. As few as two 
percent of these farmers took their produce to Nairobi to sell to distributing wholesalers.9 All 
others relied on collecting wholesalers who came to their farms. Calculations will show that 
the decision to sell to collecting wholesalers was a rational one: selling at the farm gate is 
more efficient than going to Nairobi. 
Opportunity costs and marketing costs: the farmer's breakeven point 
When a farmer sells his potatoes to collecting wholesalers at the farm gate he does not 
perform any marketing functions.1 0 He receives a lower price, however, than if he sold the 
potatoes to distributing wholesalers in Nairobi. The difference between the farm-gate price 
and the price he would have received in the wholesale market can be regarded as an 
opportunity cost In the analysis, this opportunity cost is compared with the marketing costs 
of selling potatoes in Nairobi. If the average marketing costs exceed the average opportunity 
costs, selling at the farm gate is more efficient 
During the main harvesting period of 1990, the farm-gate price in Kinangop was on 
average KSh 180 per bag, and the buying price of distributing wholesalers at the Nairobi 
In Nyandarua, 5 of the 234 interviewed horticultural farmers (2%) went to such a centre, namely Nairobi 
(4x) and Machakos (lx). In Kisii, only 1 of the 1016 listed horticultural farmers went to Kisii town and 
three went to Kisumu (together less than 1%). In Taita, 5 of the 351 listed horticultural farmers (1%) 
went to Mombasa, and 7 (2%) to Voi. (Although Voi is the largest urban centre in the district it is 
relatively small compared to Mombasa, Nairobi and Kisii.) In Taveta, none of the 182 listed 
horticultural farmers went to Mombasa or any other large urban centre. 
None of these farmers sold their produce to retailers or to consumers. Selling to retailers requires a stall 
in the wholesale market and/or extensive knowledge of retail networks in the city. This is outside the 
scope of the farmers. Selling to consumers is not an option because harvests are too big to sell in retail 
quantities. 
In Kinangop both men and women are involved in potato production and selling. References to male 
farmers in the present example also apply to female farmers. 
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wholesale market KSh 336. Both prices fluctuated, but the gross margin (KSh 156) appears 
to have stayed more or less constant during the observation period, because there was 
sufficient competition at the buying and selling stages and no speculative storage at any level 
of the marketing chain. 1 1 Hence, in the analysis the opportunity costs are set at KSh 156. 
When a farmer takes his potatoes to Nairobi, instead of selling them at the farm gate, 
the marketing functions that have to be performed are as follows: physical possession 
(transport and storage), financing, risk taking, information, negotiation and payment (see 
Section 4.2). All functions are essential. To derive the farmer's total average marketing 
costs, the average costs of all functions are therefore added up. 
The farmer has two alternative means of taking his potatoes to Nairobi: a hired truck 
and public transport.12 The total marketing costs per bag of potatoes depend on the type of 
transport; transport costs differ, and so do the average costs in relation to other marketing 
functions (negotiation, payment, etc.). In Table 6.1 the average costs for each function are 
shown for a hired 7-tonne vehicle, and in Table 6.2 for public transport. The composition of 
each function-related cost is discussed in Appendix 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 visualizes the total average cost curves in relation to the number of potato 
bags a farmer trades when hiring a 7-tonne truck and when using public transport. The 
figure also shows the farmer's average opportunity costs when he uses collecting 
wholesalers instead of going to Nairobi himself (KSh 156). Comparing the three 
alternatives, we see that selling to collecting wholesalers is more economical than going to 
Nairobi as long as the farmer has less than approximately 460 bags to sell (7.7 truckloads). 
In other words, his break-even point for hiring a truck is about 460 bags. We have to 
compare this with the actual sales per farmer. None of the interviewed farmers in Kinangop 
anticipated selling more than 300 bags of potatoes during the harvesting period under 
consideration. The average sales per potato farmer were expected to be 26 bags, and just 
seven per cent of all the potato farmers expected to sell over 60 bags. It can be concluded 
that collecting wholesalers were the best alternative for all potato farmers in Kinangop. 
According to the farm survey, 98 per cent of the potato farmers in Kinangop indeed 
sold their potatoes to collecting wholesalers. Three of the 138 respondents took their 
potatoes by truck to Nairobi, and none did so by public transport. Two of the farmers that 
went to Nairobi carried not only their own potatoes but also potatoes they had bought from 
other farmers, thus acting primarily as collecting wholesalers. The third farmer reported 
sharing a hired truck with other potato farmers. It was the only case of group marketing 
found during the survey. 
Speculative storage at the farm level was uncommon for several reasons. First, farmers wanted to sell 
their harvest as soon as possible because they needed money. Second, harvests were big and farmers did 
not have enough storage space. Third, storage losses could be quite high due to humidity. Farmers 
preferred to postpone harvesting rather than store produce. However, the climate allowed two to three 
harvests a year, and postponing the harvest delayed field preparations for the next crop. Speculative 
storage at the wholesale level in Nairobi was absent because the city received supplies from all over 
Kenya, and harvesting periods differed from one part of the country to another. Therefore, fresh supplies 
were available most times of the year and seasonal storage was not cost-effective. 
A truck with a carrying capacity of 7 to 9 tonnes is best suited for the job. Buying such a truck is not 
an option to a farmer unless he wants to become a professional trader or transporter (none of the farmers 
in Nyandarua district grow enough produce to make buying a truck economically feasible). 
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Table 6.1. Function-related average marketing costs per bag of potatoes to a farmer 
hiring a 7-tonne truck, 1990 (KSh/bag) 
no. of 
bags 
transport storage finance risk 
taking 
informa-
tion 
negotia-
tion 
payment total 
20 283 0 64 4 67 17 9 444 
40 166 0 38 4 67 8 5 284 
60 127 0 29 4 67 0 3 230 
80 164 0 22 4 59 4 5 258 
100 141 0 17 4 54 3 4 223 
120 125 0 14 4 51 0 3 200 
140 147 0 12 4 48 2 4 217 
160 134 0 11 4 46 2 3 200 
180 125 0 10 4 45 0 3 187 
200 140 0 9 4 44 2 4 203 
220 131 0 8 4 43 1 3 190 
240 125 0 7 4 42 0 3 181 
260 135 0 7 4 39 1 3 189 
280 128 0 6 4 36 1 3 178 
300 123 0 6 4 34 3 170 
320 131 0 5 4 32 1 3 176 
340 126 0 5 4 30 1 3 169 
360 122 0 5 4 28 3 162 
380 129 0 5 4 27 1 3 169 
400 125 0 4 4 25 1 3 162 
420 122 0 4 4 24 3 157 
440 128 0 4 4 23 1 3 163 
460 124 0 4 4 22 1 3 158 
480 121 0 4 4 21 0 3 153 
Table 6.2. Function-related average marketing costs per bag of potatoes to a farmer 
using public transport, 1990 (KSh/bag) 
no. of 
bags 
transport storage finance risk 
taking 
informa-
tion 
negotia-
tion 
payment total 
3 81 0 23 2 67 34 78 285 
9 81 1 8 2 45 34 78 249 
18 81 4 4 2 28 34 78 231 
30 81 8 3 2 17 34 78 223 
42 81 12 2 2 12 34 78 221 
54 81 13 2 2 9 34 78 219 
66 81 15 2 2 7 34 78 219 
78 81 17 2 2 7 34 78 221 
90 81 20 2 2 6 34 78 223 
102 81 23 2 2 5 34 78 225 
114 81 27 2 2 4 34 78 228 
Figure 6.1. Total average marketing costs to potato farmers in Kinangop, 1990 (KSh/bag) 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360 380 400 420 440 460 480 
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Group marketing would be the obvious way to accumulate more than 460 bags of 
potatoes. Unfortunately, it has a negative reputation in Kinangop as a result of past 
experiences. Cooperative marketing of potatoes was tried there in the 1980s, but the 
initiative failed (see Section 5.3). Ever since, horticultural farmers in Kinangop have been 
reluctant to participate in any group marketing initiative. 
The situation under an improved marketing environment 
Apart from group marketing, it may be expected that selling in Nairobi would become 
economical to a larger number of Kinangop farmers if improvements were made to the 
marketing environment For a farmer who hires a truck, the transport, information, and 
(initially) the finance function determine the bulk of the average costs (see Table 6.1 above). 
The high transport and information costs for the first few trips to Nairobi weigh heavily on 
the average transport and information costs for subsequent trips. If government policies 
were able to lower the costs in relation to these functions, the breakeven point would shift to 
the left 
Average transport and finance costs could be lowered through a credit scheme 
initiated by a parastatal or a private bank and backed up by the government The credit 
scheme would issue loans to potential transporters. An increase in the number of trucks for 
hire would strengthen the bargaining position of farmers who require such a truck, thus 
lowering the hiring fees. The credit scheme would also have to issue loans to farmers who 
require working capital to take their commodities to Nairobi, and who otherwise rely on 
informal money lenders with high interest rates. 
Average information costs could be lowered by developing a new kind of market 
information system. The radio has failed to be the appropriate medium for such a system in 
Kenya (see Section 5.6), and other methods should be tried, such as price information 
boards at strategic places in the production areas.1 3 
Let us assume a significantly improved marketing environment for 1990 (the 'ideal* 
situation). Would selling in Nairobi have been economical to the majority of the Kinangop 
potato farmers under these circumstances (given that they acted as individuals and not as a 
group)? The answer is negative. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the revised average costs per bag 
of potatoes. It is assumed that hiring a truck would cost 10 per cent less because a larger 
number of trucks are available for hire, and that farmers pay the same fee from the start as 
collecting wholesalers (lower costs for the transport function).1 4 In addition, farmers could 
get an official short-term loan to finance their business (lower costs for the finance 
function). 1 5 
See also Shepherd (1997). 
The fee for collecting wholesalers was KSh 3850. Farmers paid this amount after the fourth trip when 
the transporter knew the farmer better (see Appendix 6.1, 'marketing costs in relation to the transport 
function'). 
The nominal interest rate on short-term loans has been set at 16.5% per annum, and the real interest rate 
at 6.5% (see Appendix 6.1, 'marketing costs in relation to the finance function'). The farmer will need 
the loan for one week when selling up to 60 bags, for two weeks when selling up to 120 bags, etc. It is 
assumed that he can get a loan for such a short period, and that he pays no administration costs when 
applying for the loan. The real interest rate is then 0.125% per week. It can be calculated that the 
average interest costs per bag are negligible. 
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Table 6.3. Function-related average marketing costs per bag of potatoes to a farmer 
hiring a 7-tonne truck in an improved marketing environment, 1990 
(KSb/bag) 
no. of 
bags 
transport storage finance risk 
taking 
informa-
tion 
negotia-
tion 
payment total 
20 244 0 0 4 0 17 9 274 
40 147 0 0 4 0 8 5 164 
46 133 0 0 4 0 8 4 149 
60 114 0 0 4 0 0 3 121 
80 144 0 0 4 0 4 5 157 
100 125 0 0 4 0 3 4 136 
120 113 0 0 4 0 0 3 120 
140 130 0 0 4 0 2 4 140 
160 120 0 0 4 0 2 3 129 
180 112 0 0 4 0 0 3 119 
Table 6.4. Function-related average marketing costs per bag of potatoes to a farmer 
using public transport in an improved marketing environment, 1990 
(KSh/bag) 
no. of 
bags 
transport storage finance risk 
taking 
informa-
tion 
negotia-
tion 
payment total 
3 81 0 0 2 0 34 78 195 
9 81 1 0 2 0 34 78 196 
18 81 4 0 2 0 34 78 199 
30 81 8 0 2 0 34 78 203 
42 81 12 0 2 0 34 78 207 
54 81 13 0 2 0 34 78 208 
66 81 15 0 2 0 34 78 210 
78 81 17 0 2 0 34 78 212 
90 81 20 0 2 0 34 78 215 
102 81 23 0 2 0 34 78 218 
114 « 27 0 2 0 34 78 222 
Finally, they could sell against current market prices in the Nairobi market from their first 
visit onwards due to an effective market information system (lower costs for the information 
function). 1 6 
The improved marketing environment would significandy reduce the farmers' total 
average costs. Collecting wholesalers would, however, also benefit from the improvements, 
especially the reduction in truck hire fees . 1 7 The lower costs would allow them to pay 
farmers more, thus reducing the gross margin. A 10 per cent reduction on truck hire allows a 
He receives the same price as collecting wholesalers. Therefore, his information costs are considered to 
be zero (see Appendix 6.1, 'marketing costs in relation to the information function*). 
It is assumed that collecting wholesalers would not benefit form the credit scheme: it will only provide 
working capital to farmers who want to market their produce in Nairobi. The improved market 
information system would not be of much help to the collecting wholesalers either, since they are 
already well informed. 
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reduction of KSh 6 on the gross margin per bag. 1 8 The new gross margin would be KSh 
150. 
The assumed improvements in the marketing environment would lower the new 
break-even point substantially: from 460 to 46 bags. Even so, in 1990 this would still have 
made hiring a truck economical for only 12 per cent of the Kinangop potato farmers. Selling 
to collecting wholesalers thus remained the best alternative for 88 per cent of the farmers. 
Conclusion 
The Kinangop example shows that the rationale of collecting wholesalers can be explained 
from a farmers' perspective by analysing function-related marketing costs. Collecting 
wholesalers are able to perform transport, information and finance functions more efficiendy 
than individual farmers. By being in business throughout the year or at least throughout the 
season, these traders are able to develop customer relations with transporters, accumulate 
knowledge about price developments, and level out high start-up costs. 1 9 
Mediation by collecting wholesalers is economical to all potato farmers in Kinangop 
because of the conditions in the marketing environment, especially with regard to transport, 
finance and information. However, even if these conditions should improve substantially, 
collecting wholesalers would remain the best alternative to the majority of the farmers. The 
supplies of most farmers are too small to make hiring a 7-tonne truck more attractive than 
selling to collecting wholesalers at the farm gate. Travelling to Nairobi by public transport is 
no alternative either, because of the distance involved and the limited number of bags that 
can be carried. Only if they operated as a group could farmers attain the same economies of 
scale as collecting wholesalers. 
6.3. The development of rural assembly markets: introduction20 
The second part of this chapter deals with rural assembly markets that often develop at the 
collection stage of horticultural marketing channels. The Kinangop example in the previous 
section has shown that farmers did not carry their potatoes to Nairobi but sold them to 
collecting wholesalers at the farm gate. The latter might also imply selling by a road near the 
farm, because many farms were inaccessible to vehicles. It did not imply selling to collecting 
wholesalers in a rural assembly market, because rural assembly markets are rare in 
Kinangop and elsewhere in Nyandarua District. This contrasts with districts like Kisii, 
where they are quite common. The question here, therefore, is under what circumstances 
rural assembly markets develop and how this relates to economic theory. 
The price of the truck is reduced from KSh 3850 to KSh 3465, or KSh 6 per bag. 
A collecting wholesaler can make three trips a week without problems, and four to five with some 
effort. In the case of four or five trips a week, however, he has to use purchasing agents who also have 
their price (in the case of three trips or fewer he may also use them; see Section 5.2). On the basis of 
three trips a week, a wholesaler can trade over 30 truckloads of potatoes per harvesting period. An 
individual farmer could never produce so many potatoes, and could only reach such an intensity of 
trading if he turned himself into a full-time collecting wholesaler. 
An earlier version of sections 6.3 to 6.7 has been published by the author in the British Food Journal, 
Vol. 98, no. 9, 1996, pp. 26-34: 'Food Assembly Markets in Africa: lessons from the horticultural 
sector of Kenya.' 
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Rural assembly markets will develop under free market conditions when they 
increase the efficiency of a marketing system. A market place concentrates supply and 
demand, so that buyers need not travel all over the production area to meet suppliers. Nor do 
they have to travel around seeking potential sources of supply, because sellers come to the 
market place when their commodities are ready for exchange (Alderson, 1976). Thus, an 
assembly market potentially increases the efficiency of a marketing channel by decreasing 
transport costs to buyers. In addition, it increases channel efficiency by decreasing 
suppliers' and buyers' transaction costs. The concentration of supply and demand makes 
price developments more transparent Such transparency may be expected to lower the costs 
of information (a transaction cost). 2 1 In sum, assembly markets should theoretically come 
into being when they reduce transport and/or information costs at the assembling stage. 
Whether this is indeed the case will be checked in the subsequent sections by comparing 
assembling trade in Nyandarua, Kisii, Taita and Taveta. The analysis looks at infrastructural 
conditions and supply factors, and links these to transport and information costs. 
Market outlets in Nyandarua, Kisii, Taita and Taveta 
In the research areas, households that sold horticultural commodities were asked where they 
sold them: at the farm gate, in a local market or in a large urban market (see Section 1.3). 
The latter alternative proved to be rare, as discussed in Section 6.2. The farmers involved in 
it are not included in the present analysis.2 2 As for the other two alternatives, farm-gate sales 
were clearly more important among horticultural farmers in Nyandarua and Taita, and sales 
in a local rural market among those in Kisii and Taveta (Table 6.5). A combination of farm 
gate and market sales was also possible, but in all four research areas the majority of the 
farmers chose either the one or the other.2 3 
The difference in market outiets between the four research areas will be explained 
after a look at the farmers' customers. Farmers who sold at the farm always dealt with 
traders. They sold primarily to collecting wholesalers but could also sell to retailers from a 
local rural market place, or to local assembling traders who then took the produce to the local 
market place to sell to collecting wholesalers. Farmers who went to the local market place 
themselves sold either to traders or directly to consumers. The traders were primarily 
collecting wholesalers but could also be retailers from the same or other local market places. 
The farmers carried the produce to the market on their head, by donkey or in one of the local 
minibuses that irregularly traverse the production areas. The traders who bought the produce 
used trucks and all kinds of public transport to take the commodities to other markets. Both 
farmers who sold at the farm and those who sold in the local market depended on the traders 
for information on current prices in other markets (see Section 5.6). 
For a discussion of information problems as a source of transaction costs, see Nabli & Nugent (1989). 
In Taita a fourth alternative existed, selling to the Taita Horticultural Produce Cooperative Society (see 
Section 5.3). During the survey, 35 of the 351 interviewed horticultural farmers said they did so. They 
are not included in the present analysis either. 
In comparisons of 'selling at the farm' and 'selling in local market', differences between Nyandarua and 
Kisii, Nyandarua and Taveta, Taita and Kisii, and Taita and Taveta are statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. When 'selling both at farm and local market' is included in the analysis, differences remain 
significant at the same level. 
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Table 6.5. Chief market outlets of horticultural farmers in the research areas* 
Nyandarua 
n (%) 
Kisii 
n (%). 
Taita 
n (%) 
Taveta 
n (%) 
1. selling at the farm 227 (99) 140 (14) 209 (69) 46 (25) 
2. selling in local 
market 1 (0) 737 (73) 45 (15) 87 (48) 
3. selling at farm and 
in local market 1 (0) 135 (13) 50 (16) 49 f27) 
229 (99) 1012 (100) 304 (100) 182 (io6) 
* Horticultural farmers who sold in large urban markets or who were members of the Taita HPCS are not included in 
the table. 
In the farm survey, farmers who took their produce to the market were not asked 
whether they sold it to consumers or traders. However, during the trade survey, farmers 
who sold produce in the sampled market places were asked about their customers. 
In Nyandarua, which has few rural markets of any significance in horticultural 
trading, two rural markets were surveyed: Engineer in the middle of the horticultural 
production area, and Magumu on the edge of the production area and district Few farmers 
were encountered in Engineer market 2 4 and the ones that were found sold small quantities 
to consumers (Table 6.6). This confirms the results of the farm survey, which identified the 
farm gate as the major market outlet in Nyandarua. Magumu market presented a different 
picture: almost half the suppliers in the market were farmers.25 Most sold their commodities 
to traders, and any excess to consumers. Magumu market is somewhat atypical for 
Nyandarua because of its location near the Nairobi-Nakuru highway, which skirts the 
district in the extreme south. Local farmers come to the market because it is visited by 
collecting wholesalers who are looking for produce but do not want to enter the district 
In Kisii, where numerous rural horticultural markets can be found, four local market 
places were surveyed: Nyakoe, Daraja Mbili, Kebirigo and Riochanda. The farm survey 
findings for Kisii were confirmed: the majority of the suppliers in the markets were 
farmers.2 6 These farmers sold primarily to traders. In Nyakoe and Daraja Mbili, the focus 
on traders was heavier than in Kebirigo and Riochanda (Table 6.6). Nyakoe and Daraja 
Mbili attracted more traders from other rural markets and from urban centres because of their 
location along the Kisumu-Kisii-Kericho highway. 
Of the 25 horticultural traders in Engineer market 21 were interviewed. Two were fanners, the others 
professional traders. 
Of the 75 horticultural traders in Magumu market 30 were interviewed. Thirteen were fanners, the 
others professional traders. 
In Nyakoe market 27 of the 225 horticultural traders were interviewed; 19 of them (70%) were farmers. 
In Daraja Mbili, 41 of the 286 horticultural traders were interviewed; 23 (56%) were farmers. In 
Kebirigo 38 of the 74 horticultural farmers were interviewed; 26 (68%) were farmers. In Riochanda 37 
of the 307 horticultural traders were interviewed, 27 (73%) were farmers. Some of the interviewed 
farmers in the market places not only sold produce from their own farms but also commodities which 
they had purchased from neighbours. 
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Table 6.6. Farmers in the local market place, by customer 
District Marketplace selling to consumers 
n (%) 
selling to traders (and consumers) 
n (%) 
Nyandarua Engineer 2 (100) 0 (0) 
Magumu 1 (8) 12 (92) 
Kisii Nyakoe 2 (11) 17 (89) 
DarajaMbili 2 (9) 21 (91) 
Kebirigo 8 (31) 18 (69) 
Riochanda 9 (33) 18 (67) 
Taita Wundanyi 15 (45) 18 (55) 
Taveta Taveta town 5 (28) 13 (72) 
Both in Taita and Taveta only a few markets existed. Two of them were surveyed, 
Wundanyi in Taita and Taveta town in Taveta. In Wundanyi the proportion of farmers in the 
market place was higher (60%), and in Taveta lower (20%), than might be expected on the 
basis of the farm survey. Nearly half the farmers in Wundanyi market focused entirely on 
consumers, while almost three-quarters of the farmers in Taveta market sold to traders 
(Table 6.6). The situation in the Taita and Taveta research areas proved more complicated 
than in Nyandarua and Kisii. The analysis therefore focuses first of all on Nyandarua and 
Kisii (Section 6.4). Taita and Taveta are discussed separately (Sections 6.5 and 6.6). 
6.4. Nyandarua and Kisii: accessibility and supply concentration 
When looking for factors that explain the presence of rural assembly markets, Nyandarua 
and Kisii lend themselves well to comparison. In Nyandarua, farmers hardly go to local 
markets at all to sell horticultural commodities, except for the few that sell small quantities to 
local consumers. In Kisii, the majority do not wait for buyers at the farm but go to a local 
market place, and sell not primarily to consumers but to traders. In other words, the Kisii 
markets have an important assembling function which the Nyandarua ones do not have. 
The relative absence of assembly markets in Nyandarua is attributable to two factors: 
accessibility and supply concentration. In Kisii, various tarmac roads cut across the 
production areas, and market places such as Daraja Mbili and Nyakoe have developed along 
these major roads. The minor roads to the farms are in poor shape and are virtually 
impassable after a heavy shower. In contrast with Kisii, the horticultural production areas in 
Nyandarua are not served by tarmac roads, and the nearest all-weather road is the highway 
from Nairobi to Nakuru skirting the production area in the south. A major road to a local 
market centre such as Engineer is often as difficult to negotiate as the minor roads to the 
farms. Once a trader has entered the production area, going to the farms is as risky as going 
to the market centre. Thus, a risk-wary trader going to Kisii will prefer to buy in a market 
place, while the same trader in Nyandarua might go to the farms as well. The only alternative 
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The average holding of the horticultural farmers sampled was 3.4 acres in Kisii, compared to 11.0 acres 
in Nyandarua. 
Some differences existed between different parts of the district In Kinangop, 92 per cent of the farmers 
sold potatoes and the average sales per harvesting period were 26 bags. In 01 Kalou, 73 per cent sold 
potatoes and the average sales per farmer was 79 bags. The potatoes from 01 Kalou were not only 
carried to Nairobi, but also to Nakuru in the adjacent district In Geta, high up the slopes of the 
Aberdare range, spring onions were a more popular cash crop than potatoes. Nevertheless, 60 per cent of 
the farmers sold potatoes. The average sales per farmer per harvesting period was 9 bags. 
Bananas are harvested more or less throughout the year while potatoes are planted and harvested during 
specific periods. 
Twenty per cent of all Kisii farmers sold sweet bananas; the average number of bunches sold per month 
was 13. Thirty-two per cent of all farmers sold kale: the average number of bags sold per harvesting 
period was 5. The leaves were harvested almost continuously throughout the harvesting period. Nine per 
cent of the Kisii farmers sold tomatoes; they sold on average 406 kg per harvesting period (the 
equivalent of 9 crates). The tomatoes were harvested in two or more rounds. 
in Nyandaxua is Magumu market near the highway, but prices there are high because of its 
unique location, and traders not too averse to risks will try their luck in the interior. 
Population density is very high in Kisii, both in absolute terms and in comparison to 
Nyandarua (see Section 4.3). As a consequence, holdings in Kisii are far smaller than in 
Nyandarua.27 Besides horticultural commodities, Kisii farmers also grow maize, coffee and 
tea while Nyandarua farmers grow almost exclusively horticultural commodities. Both size 
of holding and cropping patterns affect the quantities of horticultural produce sold. The farm 
survey found that 83 per cent of the farmers in Nyandarua sold potatoes, and that the 
average number of bags sold per potato farmer per harvesting period was 36.2 s The potatoes 
were harvested in one or a few rounds. A collecting wholesaler normally had to visit fewer 
than 10 farmers to fill his 7-tonne truck. In Kisii, selling cooking bananas was almost as 
common as potato selling in Nyandarua: 69 per cent of all Kisii farmers sold cooking 
bananas. However, the average cooking banana farmer sold only 9 bunches a month, 2 9 and 
a collecting trader required 800 bunches to fill a 7-tonne truck. Even assuming that the 
banana farmers harvested just once a month (which is usually not the case), a collecting 
trader had to visit over 80 farmers. The comparison shows that supply concentration was 
much higher in Nyandarua than in Kisii, and that a cooking banana wholesaler would hence 
save much more time buying in a market place where farmers assembled than would a potato 
wholesaler. Theoretically, the banana wholesaler might also save time by buying other 
commodities from the banana farmers at the farms, thus filling his truck more quickly. 
However, collecting wholesalers who dealt in cooking bananas tended to specialize in that 
commodity alone, because other commodities such as sweet bananas, kale and tomatoes, 
also produced by the Kisii farmers, were intended for another market They remained within 
the region (western Kenya), while cooking bananas were transported to large urban centres 
elsewhere in the country such as Nairobi, Nakuru and Eldoret 
The regional wholesalers who bought sweet bananas, kale and tomatoes in Kisii 
handled smaller quantities, and they had to rely on public transport or shared hired transport 
Most of them did not go all the way to the farms because of transport constraints and 
because the supply concentration of these commodities was at least as low as that of cooking 
bananas.3 0 As a consequence, most Kisii farmers who wanted to sell sweet bananas, kale or 
tomatoes had no alternative but to take them to the market. And as long as they were going, 
they might just as well take along their cooking bananas. The farm survey showed that 
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almost all of them did so . 3 1 Thus, the importance of the market place as an assembly point 
for cooking bananas was determined not only by the supply concentration of cooking 
bananas but also by that of the other horticultural commodities grown for sale, and by the 
scale of operation of the wholesalers buying those commodities. This is confirmed by the 
findings for Nyandarua, where cabbages were grown as horticultural cash crop in addition 
to potatoes. Most cabbage wholesalers coming to the district used the same kind of 7-tonne 
truck as potato wholesalers did. Fewer horticultural farmers sold cabbages than sold 
potatoes, but the quantities offered for sale per farmer did not differ gready. 3 2 As a result, 
neither potatoes nor cabbages required an assembly market in Nyandarua. 
Concluding, in Kisii the relatively low accessibility of farms compared to market 
places, together with a low supply concentration, has caused assembly markets to develop. 
In Nyandarua equally poor accessibility of farms and local retail market places, combined 
with a high supply concentration, explains the general absence of such assembly markets. 
6.5. Taita: a dual marketing system 
As noted earlier, the situation in Taita and Taveta is more complicated than in Nyandarua and 
Kisii. An analysis of the collection system in the latter two regions makes it clear that, in 
addition to accessibility and supply concentration, other factors may play a role. In this 
section Taita will be discussed, and in the next section Taveta. 
Similarly to Nyandarua and in contrast with Kisii, the majority of the horticultural 
farmers in Taita sold their produce at or near the farm (see Section 6.3). Nevertheless, Taita 
resembles Kisii more than it does Nyandarua: the population density is high, holdings are 
small, and supply concentration is relatively low. 3 3 Assembly markets are less important 
than farm-gate sales because of the location of the farms and the presence of specialized 
transporters. The Taita Hills are a relatively small but inaccessible area. Apart from a couple 
of main dirt roads, few tracks in the hills are accessible by truck due to their steep gradient 
and poor condition. Most horticultural farmers live within walking distance of one of the 
accessible roads. On specified days, collecting wholesalers wait at specified spots along 
these roads and horticultural farmers carry their commodities to them on their heads. The 
wholesalers do not concentrate on one kind of vegetable or fruit, but buy all sorts of 
commodities which are in high demand in Mombasa. After buying produce from the 
farmers, the wholesalers wait for transporters, who look for them up and down the roads. 
The transporters carry produce from different wholesalers directly from the hills to 
98% of the farmers who sold other horticultural commodities than cooking bananas sold them in the 
market place. Over half of these fanners (53%) also cultivated cooking bananas for sale. 85% of the 
latter group sold these bananas in the market place. 
Thirty-five percent of all farmers sold cabbages. The average number of bags sold per cabbage farmer per 
harvesting period was 33. The crop was harvested in three rounds or less. A collecting cabbage 
wholesaler required 50 to 60 bags to fill a 7-tonne truck. 
The population density in the Taita Hills is 230 persons per square km (CBS, 1994b). According to the 
farm survey, the average holding size was 2.9 acres. Tomatoes, cabbages and kale, the most important 
horuciutural commodities in Taita, were sold by 14%, 20% and 21% respectively of the farmers. The 
average selling quantities per harvesting period were 4 bags of kale, 215 kg of cabbage (approx. 2 bags) 
and 278 kg of tomatoes (or 6 crates). 
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Mombasa. 3 4 Thus, the few market places existing in the hills are not used to assemble 
produce destined for Mombasa, but to assemble produce for Mwatate and Voi town, located 
on the dusty plains at the foot of the hills. Traders from Mwatate and Voi buy their 
commodities in these market places from farmers who live within walking distance and come 
to the market to sell to both traders and consumers. The Mwatate and Voi traders do not buy 
their produce along the roads in the hills like the Mombasa wholesalers do, because there are 
no specialized transporters who operate to Mwatate and Voi. The Mwatate and Voi traders 
have to rely on public transport (matatus) that serves the market places. 
In summary, a dual marketing system has developed in Taita, one focusing on the 
supraregional town Mombasa without using assembly markets, and one focusing on the 
regional towns Mwatate and Voi with the use of assembly markets. No system of this kind 
exists in Kisii, where both regional and interregional flows traverse assembly markets, nor 
in Nyandarua, where neither regional nor interregional flows do so. The reason for the 
development of the dual system is the location of the farms and the presence of specialized 
transporters. 
6.6. Taveta: first- and second-level assembly markets 
In Taveta the majority of the farmers in the farm survey reported selling their produce in a 
market place. The majority of sellers in Taveta market were professional traders (see Section 
6.3). The reason for this situation is the presence of two additional, much smaller, market 
places in the production area, namely Chumvini and Mukuyuni. These serve as assembly 
markets for produce to be brought to Taveta market, which in turn serves as an assembly 
market for produce destined for Mombasa, Nairobi or elsewhere. Thus, a hierarchy of 
assembly markets can be distinguished, comprised of two first-level ones (Chumvini, 
Mukuyuni) and one second-level one (Taveta). 
Taveta serves as a second-level assembly market because of its location at the head of 
the only interregional road to Mombasa. The production areas are located to the north and 
south of Taveta, and all traffic has to pass this centre on its way out Transporters who hire 
out freight space like to assemble in Taveta because of its strategic location and because of 
the poor state of local roads. The majority of collecting wholesalers rely on these 
transporters because they do not own trucks themselves. Usually they share a truck and pay 
a fixed fee per box of tomatoes or bunch of bananas. They buy their commodities either 
from farmers in the first-level assembly markets or from assembling traders in Taveta. They 
do not go all the way to the farms, because these are located in swampy, inaccessible areas. 
When buying in the first-level market, they transport their commodities in small trucks and 
pick-ups hired from local transporters. On arrival in Taveta, the commodities are loaded onto 
one of the bigger trucks. When the collecting wholesalers buy from assembling traders in 
Taveta market, they do not have to bother about local transport But they do buy at a higher 
price, because the assembling traders have bought the commodities at the first-level 
assembly market and transported them to Taveta, in either their own or hired vehicles. Like 
The collecting wholesalers pay transport costs per kilogram of produce. They travel by public transport 
to Mombasa while the truck is carrying the commodities. 
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the collecting wholesalers, the assembling traders are not able to go all the way to the farms 
because of the inaccessibility of the area.3 5 
Although the strategic role of Taveta as a second-level assembly market has to do 
primarily with its location at the beginning of the only interregional road to Mombasa, other 
factors are also at play. First, Taveta has a railway station, and every market day a few 
goods wagons of bananas leave for Nairobi. Second, Taveta is located on the border with 
Tanzania, and the market is therefore noted for its cheap imported goods such as radios, 
textiles, etc. Traders who come to buy these commodities may also carry some bananas or 
other horticultural commodities with them back home. This boosts demand, making the 
market more attractive to assembling traders. Third, in addition to means of transport, there 
are also sorting and packing facilities available to collecting wholesalers. Highly perishable 
commodities such as tomatoes are often delivered by the farmers in gunny bags. The fruits 
have to be sorted and repackaged in boxes before going on long-distance transport Without 
the removal of overripe ones and proper repackaging, the whole lot would be rotten or 
mashed on arrival in Mombasa. In Taveta carpenters are available to supply new boxes and 
mend old ones, while experienced sorting boys can be hired to do the sorting. Of course, the 
sorting boys are not so much a cause as a consequence of Taveta's assembling function, but 
now established, they further increase the attractiveness of the market to collecting 
wholesalers. 
In Kisii, where assembly markets are also important outlets to farmers, no 
differentiation into first- and second-level assembly markets was found. None of the 
assembly markets had a more strategic location than the others, because all were located 
along routes to urban centres elsewhere in Kenya. In general, the phenomenon of second-
level horticultural assembly markets is not very common in Kenya, because most 
horticultural production areas are less isolated than those in Taveta. However, at least two 
major second-level assembly markets do exist in addition to Taveta: the wholesale markets of 
Nairobi and Mombasa. The first serves as a second-level assembly market for commodities 
from the central highlands which are destined for the coast and the second one for 
commodities from the coast destined for the central highlands. However, in both cases their 
assembling function is related not to accessibility but to a higher degree of vertical 
differentiation in the marketing channel, owing to the great transport distances of over 500 
km. Rather than go all the way to Nyeri, Meru or Nyandarua, some coastal collecting 
wholesalers buy tomatoes, potatoes and cabbages from highland collecting wholesalers in 
Nairobi. By the same token, some highland collecting wholesalers buy mangoes and citrus 
fruits from coastal collecting wholesalers in Mombasa instead of searching for them in the 
coastal production areas. The further differentiation in the marketing channel is based not 
only on efficiency considerations but also on cultural and ethnic differences between the 
highland and the coastal people. Such differences make it harder for a collecting wholesaler 
from one region to deal directly with farmers and assembling traders from another. 
The only exception is Mboghoni sublocation, where small trucks can get reasonably near the farms. As 
a consequence, this sublocation does not have an assembly market and relatively many farmers sell their 
commodities at the farm. They constitute the major part of the 25% shown in Table 6.5, Section 6.3. 
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6.7. Explaining the development of rural assembly markets and assessing 
their future importance 
In Section 6.3 it was observed that assembly markets develop when they reduce transport 
and information costs in the marketing channel. The research findings have shown that 
assembly markets for horticultural commodities tend to be found in surplus areas where 
farms are poorly accessible compared to market places, and where supply concentration is 
low. Clearly both factors are related to transport costs. When farms are relatively 
inaccessible and supply per farmer is small, traders who assemble produce at the farms face 
high transport costs. The creation of an assembly market will reduce these costs. Moreover, 
it will increase the efficiency of the marketing channel, because farmers who take their 
produce to the market use low-cost means of transport in comparison to traders who go to 
the farms (carrying their wares on their head, by donkey or local minibus as opposed to 
pick-up trucks or lorries). 
To farmers who offer small quantities for sale, the assembly market ensures a price 
that more or less reflects current supply and demand conditions. The market thus reduces 
farmers' costs of imperfect information. When farmers sell their produce at the farm, such 
costs can ran quite high. The trader who comes to buy the produce is usually the only one 
with up-to-date information on price developments in the urban markets. This gives him a 
decisive edge in price negotiations, especially because competing buyers are seldom around 
(in contrast with assembly markets, where all buyers are present simultaneously because of 
the periodic nature of the market). 
For farmers who offer small quantities for sale in the more isolated parts of the 
production area, the assembly market may be the only selling outlet Traders are not willing 
to travel all the way to their farms, and without a market place these farmers could not 
dispose of their produce. In this way, the assembly market not only increases the efficiency 
of the marketing channel, but it may also improve its effectiveness by stimulating a higher 
output 
When farms are just as accessible as the local market place and the supply per farmer 
is large, buying in the market will not reduce traders' transport costs. Most traders will then 
bypass the market. Farmers will wait for them at their farms, even though this may increase 
their costs of imperfect information. Taking the produce to the local market place would be 
cosdy to them in terms of transport. A farmer could not carry the entire load on their head or 
by donkey or matatu, and would thus require more expensive means (such as a pick-up 
track hired from a local businessman). Failing to sell all the produce she took to the market 
she would have to return home with i t again paying for transport. The extra trip would not 
do the produce any good either, especially in the case of highly perishable commodities. 
It can be concluded that the development of rural assembly markets for horticultural 
commodities can be explained in terms of efficiency developments: they evolve in production 
areas with relatively poor farm accessibility and low supply concentration, because they 
reduce the transport and/or information costs of suppliers and buyers. 3 6 
These findings will be useful to policymakers who are working to improve the efficiency (and 
effectiveness) of food marketing channels through the development of rural assembly markets. In 
deciding on regions where such markets should be established, they will no longer have to research 
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This finding can be used to assess the future importance of horticultural assembly 
markets in the research areas. If, in Nyandarua, roads to market centres such as Engineer are 
upgraded to all-weather roads, the relative accessibility of the farms will decrease. Under 
these circumstances, Engineer may be expected to develop into an assembly market similar 
to Magumu, all the more because population pressure in the district is on the rise, leading to 
a lower supply concentration. 
In Kisii, minor market centres may develop into new assembly markets if roads to 
these centres are improved. As a consequence, existing assembly markets further up the road 
may lose importance. Only when the majority of the roads to the farms are improved will 
assembly markets be likely to lose ground. For the moment, however, this is rather 
hypothetical because of the high costs of such an operation. 
In Taita, improvement of local roads may stimulate farmers who live in the more 
isolated parts of the hills to increase their horticultural production. The supply concentration 
will be relatively low, especially in the beginning, and that will call for new assembly 
markets. An increase in supply concentration may be hampered by rising population 
pressure. 
In Taveta, some of the services now provided by Taveta town may be taken over by 
existing first-level assembly markets if roads to the latter are improved, and if production in 
the vicinity of these markets further increases through improved irrigation practices. 
Upgrading the tracks to the farms into all-weather roads seems out of the question in the 
swampy areas of Taveta, even more than elsewhere. The first-level assembly markets will 
therefore retain their significance. 
It can be concluded that assembly markets will gain in importance, or at least 
maintain their current importance, in all four of our research areas. This applies to the 
coming decade. In the longer term, a new factor may come into play alongside accessibility 
and supply concentration. It will be related not to the efficiency of marketing channels but to 
their service output (effectiveness). It concerns a possible rise in the demand for high-quality 
produce. This will require quality control and may thus necessitate vertical coordination or 
integration in the marketing channel. Some vertical coordination and integration can already 
be observed in Kenya. A case of forward integration concerns a group of farmers in Taita 
have organized themselves into the Taita Horticultural Produce Cooperative Society (Taita 
HPC) (see Section 5.3). They sell their produce direcdy to retailers and institutions through 
a stall in the Mombasa wholesale market. At the time of the survey, they were achieving 
success because they endeavoured to supply superior-quality produce which was in high 
demand from tourist hotels. Their commodities fetched higher than average prices. The 
cooperative did not use local assembly markets, having instead its own collecting points 
where farmer-members brought their produce. 
For the time being, the concept of the Taita HPC cannot easily be implemented in 
most other parts of Kenya because the demand for high-quality, higher-priced vegetables 
transport and information costs, but can instead use farm accessibility and supply concentration as 
indicators. Developing rural assembly markets is predicted to have the desired impact in areas with three 
characteristics: (1) surplus production, (2) low supply concentration, and (3) poorly accessible farms. 
Dual systems or first- and second-level markets may need to be considered. 
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and fruits is still very limited among Kenyans. However, if Kenya develops further, and 
larger parts of the population get wealthier in the coming decade, things may change. 
In addition to this forward integration, some backward coordination and integration 
can be observed in Kenya. It involves horticultural export traders who contract outgrowers 
or who go into production themselves. Their European customers, owners or suppliers of 
large retail chains, demand superior-quality French beans, avocados, mangoes, chillies, etc. 
Exporters will be sure of attaining the required standards only if they produce the 
connnodities themselves or closely supervise selected outgrowers who are supplied with all 
the needed inputs (see Section 5.4). Harvested produce then goes direcdy from the farms to 
the airport, without passing assembly markets or other market places. Again, the prices of 
these commodities are still far beyond the purchasing power of most Kenyans, but this too 
may change. 
In sum, forward and backward coordination and integration to attain higher quality 
standards are not yet widespread practices and are not expected to become so in the years to 
come. In the long run if quality gains importance in the domestic market, developments may 
turn in this direction, making assembly markets less important than at present and in the near 
future. 
Vert i ca l D i f ferent iat ion o f Hort icu ltura l 
M a r k e t i n g Channe l s i n K e n y a : M o d e l , 
Hypo the se s and D a t a Set 
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This chapter and the following one deal with the vertical differentiation of horticultural 
marketing channels in Kenya. A model is built which is intended for African emerging 
economies. The first section explains why Kenya is an emerging economy where 
horticulture is concerned. The model and the hypotheses are then set out, and in the last two 
sections the data set is introduced and the independent variables are specified. The actual 
testing of the hypotheses will be reported on in the next chapter. 
7.1. Horticulture in Kenya: an emerging economy 
According to Janssen & Van Tilburg (1997) five stages of agricultural market development 
can be described, notably primitive, emerging, intermediate, industrialized and advanced. On 
the basis of the criteria laid down by these authors, the horticultural sector in Kenya can be 
characterized as an emerging economy. Horticultural farmers have shifted from a subsistence 
orientation to a mix of production for home consumption and production for the market 
They have not yet reached the stage of pure commercial farming. The farmers have started to 
specialize (see Section 3.4), but the specialization is according to agro-ecological zone and 
not yet according to farm size or market contracts. Farm size is still unimportant because all 
horticultural farms are small-scale family enterprises (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3). Large 
horticultural estates are found only when commodities for export are involved (see Section 
5.4). Market coordination and integration is to a large extent restricted to this export market 
On the input side, many farmers are still replacing their seed stock only occasionally, 
although the demand for seed with specific commercial characteristics is rising. The 
application of fertilizers and pesticides is limited, and when used they are often applied 
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incorrectly, as explained in Section 3.4. The only exception are again export farms, where 
expertise from outside is brought in whenever necessary, and capital is not a constraint 
Marketing channels serving the domestic market are still in a process of vertical 
differentiation. The market access of small farms is poor, and supply organizations such as 
marketing cooperatives are rare (see Section 5.3). Traders are able to enter the marketing 
chain because they accumulate produce from various producers. Due to economies of scale, 
this accumulation enables them to perform marketing functions such as transport, 
information and negotiation more efficiendy than individual farmers (see Section 4.4). When 
traders aim for cost control, their activities ntinimize the number of transactions in the 
channel. Average transaction costs are reduced, though they may remain high. Contracts and 
futures markets are still distant prospects; credit may be used to secure verbal agreements 
(interlinked markets). 
The channel differentiation process is not affected by factors such as government 
interventions, subsidies or laws, because horticultural commodities are regarded both as 
non-strategic and as too risky for intervention due to their perishability (see Section 4.1). 
Only horticultural exports are considered strategic and are hence subject to certain rules and 
regulations (see Section 5.4). 
Backward integration in the marketing channel is practised for export crops, notably 
by exporters going into production. It is uncommon for commodities geared to the domestic 
market Wholesalers do not go into large-scale production, but rely on field purchases from 
small-scale producers. Such purchases are hampered by the absence of grading at the 
production and assembling stages. 
Supermarket chains are common only in the largest urban centres, where they sell 
limited quantities of horticultural produce.1 Consumers prefer to buy their vegetables and 
fruits in the market place, where the high turnover assures them that the perishables will be 
fresh. 
Product differentiation is still very low. The demand structure is defined by the urban 
or rural location of consumers rather than by income size. Kenya experienced rapid 
population growth and urbanization during previous decades (see Section 3.1), but its per 
capita income increased little. The per capita GNP was estimated at US $250 in the first half 
of the 1970s, and US $270 in the first half of the 1990s (current prices) (World Bank, 
1995). The annual growth rate of the per capita GNP was a reasonable 3.1 per cent during 
the 1970s, but sank to a mere 0.3 percent in the 1980s (constant prices) (UNDP, 1994). The 
annual growth rate of per capita private consumption declined from 2.5 per cent in the 1970s 
to 0.8 per cent in the 1980s (constant prices) (UNDP, 1992). The income distribution did 
not change much. The top 20 per cent of the households earned 60 per cent of the national 
In this respect the present situation in Kenya, and elsewhere in Africa, resembles the situation in Asia 
in the 1970s. Bucklin (1977) and Goldman (1974, 1981) studied supermarket chains in Asia at that 
time. The diffusion of modern supermarkets was low, because they served a much larger market than 
traditional shops, implying that customers had to travel a greater distance to get to them. This was only 
attractive if customers reduced their frequency of shopping, which they refused to do for various reasons. 
First a large proportion of the foods sold was highly perishable and had to be purchased daily because of 
a lack of refrigerators. Second, the low-income consumers lacked storage space to keep foods for several 
days, and also could not afford to purchase more than one day's supply at a time. Both authors concluded 
that Western-style supermarkets were not widespread in Asia in the 1970s because they are were poorly 
suited to the needs of the low-income food buyer. 
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income in the first half of the 1970s, and 62 per cent in the early 1990s. The bottom 20 per 
cent earned 3 per cent of the income in both periods (World Bank, 1995). Under such 
conditions, the large majority of the consumers of horticultural commodities look for low 
prises rather than supreme quality. The market segment of the relatively wealthy consumers 
is still too small to trigger large-scale product differentiation. Some location-specific 
exceptions do exist In Nairobi, the presence of many well-paid expatriates and reasonably 
paid government officials has led to a noticeable demand for first-class produce, especially in 
wealthier quarters, as well as to the introduction of new horticultural commodities such as 
strawberries and rhubarb into the domestic market The same can be observed along the 
Kenya coast where the international tourist industry is the source of innovation. Here we 
can also observe some fledgling attempts at seasonal control (see Section 5.3 on the Taita 
HPC). The value-added in processing and marketing remains limited, however. 
The foregoing arguments demonstrate that in the emerging horticultural economy of 
Kenya the development of horticultural marketing channels is primarily an efficiency-based 
vertical differentiation process. Changes in the location and concentration of consumers are 
important determinants. Income is unimportant, because per capita incomes and income 
distributions have hardly changed over the past few decades. In some parts of the market, 
consumer incomes did rise: in the wealthier quarters of Nairobi, the tourist industry along 
the Kenya Coast and the export market. Here effectiveness (quality) featured alongside 
efficiency. The marketing channels that serve these newer market segments are not included 
in the following analysis. 
7.2. Vertical differentiation of horticultural marketing channels in an 
African emerging economy: the model and the hypotheses 
Our model of vertical differentiation includes one dependent variable, the degree of vertical 
differentiation of a channel, and five independent variables, notably the number of 
inhabitants of the market centre where the channel is directed, the population density of the 
rural hinterland of this market centre, the transport time of the commodity concerned, the 
keeping quality of this commodity, and the turnover of the trader concerned. Figure 7.1 
summarizes the model. The dependent and independent variables will be introduced one by 
one, and the hypothesis relating to each independent variable will be presented. 
Degree of vertical differentiation of a channel 
Three steps are distinguished in the differentiation process. First, horticultural farmers sell 
directly to consumers (step 1). Then professional traders enter the marketing channel, 
mediating between farmers and consumers (step 2). Finally, these traders differentiate into 
wholesale traders and retail traders (step 3). In the latter situation, more than one wholesale 
level may evolve, e.g. collecting wholesalers and distributing wholesalers, but in our 
research model all channels with at least one wholesale level are defined as step-3 channels. 
Figure 7.2 shows the stepwise differentiation process. 
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Figure 7.1. Vertical differentiation of horticultural marketing channels in an emerging 
economy: a model 
Figure 7.2. Steps of vertical differentiation in the model 
Stepl Step 2 Step 3 
Farmer-
trader 
1 1 
Consumer 
Farmer 
Professional 
trader 
Consumer 
Farmer 
Wholesaler 
1 Retailer 
} 
Consumer 
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Number of inhabitants of the market centre 
The history of food trade in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 2) already showed a general 
relation between urbanization and urban growth on the one hand and the development of 
food marketing systems (including those for horticultural commodities) on the other. It did 
not, however, go into the exact relationship between urban demand and the structure of the 
channels. 
According to Bucklin (1972) and Mallen (1977), marketing channels of food in 
emerging economies differentiate vertically when the size of the market increases. Market 
size is then defined in terms of market output In Kenya, where incomes have not risen in 
the past few decades (see previous section), market output is direcdy related to the size of the 
consumer population. Consumers who buy horticultural commodities are found above all in 
urban centres. Most urban households lack food self-sufficiency, and earn their money 
through employment or self-employment in the formal and informal handicraft industrial 
and service sectors. Their earnings usually allow purchases of horticultural commodities in 
addition to staple foods such as maize flour. When the number of inhabitants of a market 
centre increases the consumer population also grows. As a consequence, the output of the 
marketing channels supplying the centre increases, and the channels may be expected to 
differentiate vertically.2 
The relationship between the population growth of a market centre and the vertical 
differentiation of horticultural marketing channels that supply the centre can be investigated 
by means of a longitudinal study, analysing marketing channels geared to one centre over a 
few decades' time. Within the time frame of the present study this was not possible. The 
second-best alternative is to carry out a cross-sectional survey comparing market centres of 
various population sizes, under the assumption that they develop along similar lines as to 
their population characteristics. 
The hypothesis that will be tested is: 
A horticultural marketing channel is more vertically differentiated when the 
centre served by the channel has more inhabitants. 
Population density of the rural hinterland 
As noted, the demand for horticultural commodities is primarily found in urban centres. 
Many rural households are either self-sufficient or they lack the purchasing power to buy the 
commodities. In rural areas with a high population growth, however, this situation is 
changing rapidly. Some rural households are losing their food self-sufficiency as a 
consequence of their shrinking holdings. Landless rural households are not yet a widespread 
problem in Kenya, but the cash revenues of rural households are derived to an increasing 
extent from off-farm employment (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4). 
Rural households which are no longer self-sufficient in horticultural produce and 
which generate cash through other activities become potential buyers of vegetables and 
fruits. They go to the nearest market place to buy their commodities.3 The total consumer 
population served by this market place includes both the inhabitants of the centre and part of 
2 Should the growth of the centre be restricted to the slums, the demand for horticultural commodities 
might not increase because of the lack of purchasing power of the new citizens. In Kenya urban growth 
is not restricted to the slums. 
3 They may also buy some from neighbours, but often these fanners are in the same position. 
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the rural population of 'the rural hinterland'. For the purpose of the present analysis, the 
rural hinterland is defined as the rural area that depends on this market place because there is 
no other market place (either rural or urban) nearer by. 4 
Which proportion of the population of the rural hinterland will actually go to the 
market place to buy horticultural commodities is difficult to say, but the population density 
gives an indication.5 The higher the population density, the larger the potential number of 
rural consumers. A higher number of consumers increases the throughput of the marketing 
channels directed to the market centre, which in turn leads to more differentiated channels (as 
argued by Bucklin and Mallen; see the previous subsection). 
So far we have been looking at the rural hinterland from the demand side. It also has 
a supply side. A higher population density in the rural hinterland implies the presence of 
more horticultural farmers, because horticulture has a higher value-added per unit of land 
than produce such as cereals or traditional cash crops such as coffee and tea. 6 Some 
horticultural farmers will take their produce to the market centre to which the rural hinterland 
belongs (by definition, no other markets are nearer).7 Thus, a higher population density of 
the rural hinterland may increase the number of farmers selling produce to consumers in the 
market centre. In that case, some of the marketing channels directed to this centre are less 
differentiated than they would be if the rural hinterland were less densely populated. 
In sum, the population density of the rural hinterland can have a two-way effect On 
the demand side, it increases the consumer population served by the market centre, and thus 
the throughput of the marketing channels. As we saw before, a larger throughput leads to 
more differentiated marketing channels. On the supply side, however, greater rural 
population density increases the number of horticultural farmers in the vicinity of the market 
centre. Some of them then come to the centre to sell produce to consumers in the market 
place, thus forming less differentiated channels. Whether the demand or the supply effect 
will prevail cannot be determined in advance. 
The hypothesis that will be tested is: 
The vertical differentiation of a horticultural marketing channel that serves a 
population centre is influenced by the population density of that centre's 
rural hinterland. 
Transport time 
The description of the history of food trade in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 2) has revealed 
the role of transport in the development of food marketing systems (including those for 
Any rural consumers that live closer to another rural or urban horticultural market place than the one in 
the surveyed market centre are assumed to go there to do their horticultural purchases. Consequently, 
they do not belong to the rural hinterland of the surveyed market centre. Thus, the radius of the rural 
hinterland depends here on the distribution of market places in the region, and not on the size of the 
market centre where the surveyed market place is located (as is often the case in geographical studies). 
An estimate of the total rural population that depends on the market place would require, to start with, a 
very detailed demarcation of the rural hinterland. This is not necessary when we use the population 
density of the rural hinterland. 
Only when agro-ecological circumstances do not allow horticulture do farmers have to look for other 
cash corps. However, under such circumstances most other kinds of commercial agriculture are not 
feasible either, and at least some of the farmers will migrate to other areas. As a consequence, the rural 
population density will be low. 
Other farmers will take their produce to other urban centres or sell it to traders at the farm gate. 
119 
horticultural cornmodities). It did, however, not show the precise effect that such transport 
has on the structure of the channels. 
When an urban centre grows and demand rises, transport distances from the 
production areas to the centre may be expected to increase. First the production in the 
vicinity will grow, but when local producers are no longer able to satisfy demand, produce 
will be brought in from further away. Prices will rise due to an increase in demand, which in 
turn makes larger transport distances economically feasible, as was already shown by Von 
Thunen in the 19th century.8 
Watts (1987) showed the relation between urban growth and increasing transport 
distances for Kano, Nigeria. He called it the regionalization of food trade. Braun et al. 
(1992) described the same development for another Nigerian town, Uyo (South East 
Nigeria). With the growth of the centre, supplies of basic foodstuffs like yams, cassava, gari 
and okra were brought in from further away.9 
In emerging economies an increase in transport distances tends to increase the 
number of marketing intermediaries (Alderson, 1967; Bucklin, 1972). The new 
intermediaries will be able to work more efficiently with regard to transport and 
communication. A larger distance increases the relative importance of these factors in the 
total marketing costs and therefore the importance of economies of scale. 
Alderson defines distance not in terms of miles but in terms of the time involved in 
communication and transportation.10 This approach is appropriate in the case of developing 
countries, where one mile may take five minutes or one hour, depending on the state of the 
roads. 
The hypothesis that will be tested is: 
Horticultural marketing channels are more vertically differentiated when the 
transport from the production area to the market centre served by the channel 
takes more time. 
Keeping qualities 
It has been assumed thus far that horticultural commodities are a homogeneous group. 
Although all of them are perishables, they do, however, differ in their keeping qualities. 
Potatoes take considerably longer to go bad than bananas, and bananas can be kept longer 
than spinach. The keeping quality of a commodity could influence the structure of its 
marketing channels. After all, each transaction between channel members takes time, and 
that time will be more precious in the case of spinach than potatoes. Therefore, horticultural 
commodities with poorer keeping qualities may support less differentiated channels than 
horticultural commodities with better keeping qualities. 
For the theory of Von Thunen see, for instance, Haggett (1983). 
In the 1980s the principle supply areas of Uyo were located at a distance of 200 to 300 kilometres. This 
was also related to the increasing population density in the rural area surrounding the centre. In the 
course of time, the rural hinterland of Uyo had developed into a food deficit area, and part of the rural 
population had to rely on the same supplies brought in from elsewhere as did the inhabitants of Uyo. In 
this respect, the Nigerian case shows similar demand-side developments as outlined in the discussion of 
the rural population density factor in this chapter. 
The use of travel time rather than travel distance can also be observed in certain gravity models used in 
regional marketing analysis (see Section 4.5). 
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Based on these considerations, the analysis should ideally be carried out for each 
individual commodity separately. This was not possible, however, given the presence of 
over 100 different horticultural commodities in the market places. The number of 
observations per commodity would be too small. Alternatively, commodities can be grouped 
according to their keeping qualities. 
The hypothesis that will be tested is: 
Hort icul tura l marke t ing channels a re more vertically differentiated when the 
commodities t r aded have bet ter keeping qualities. 
Turnover of the trader 
Horticultural traders who sell produce in the market place of a consumer centre can be 
grouped on the basis of their respective turnovers. 
Wholesalers are expected to have the largest turnover. If they sell produce from their 
own farm they are called farmer-wholesalers, otherwise they are professional wholesalers. 
Next in hierarchy are mobile retailers, retailers who carry produce from the 
production area to the market place to sell to consumers. If they sell produce from their own 
farm they are called farmer-retailers, otherwise they are mobile professional retailers. 
At the bottom of the hierarchy are immobile retailers, retailers who buy their produce 
from wholesalers in the same market where they sell their commodities. They are by 
definition professional retailers (farmer-retailers are always mobile). 
The last two groups in the hierarchy (mobile retailers and immobile retailers) indicate 
that there is a relation between mobility and turnover. The explanation for this is economies 
of scale during transport. A retailer with a smaller turnover has higher average transport 
costs per selling unit in carrying produce from the production area to the consumer market. It 
is therefore more economical for him to stay in the market and buy from wholesalers than it 
is for a retailer with a larger turnover.11 
Mobile and immobile retailers usually operate in channels of different lengths. Most 
of the immobile retailers operate in marketing channels with at least two intermediate levels 
(farmer -> wholesaler -> retailer -> consumer). Mobile retailers usually operate in channels 
with fewer levels: if they are farmer-retailers there is no intermediate level (farmer -> 
consumer), and if they are mobile professional retailers there is one intermediate level 
(farmer -> retailer -> consumer).12 The following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hort icul tura l marke t ing channels a r e more vertically differentiated when the 
retai lers involved have a smaller t u rnove r . 1 3 
This argumentation is valid as long as the assorting function of the retailers is limited (e.g. they do not 
sell produce from different production areas). In Section 5.2 it was shown that this is indeed the case for 
most horticultural retailers in Kenya. 
Mobile professional retailers operate in channels with one intermediate level if they buy from farmers 
within the production area. The transaction may take place either at the farm gate or in a rural assembly 
market Mobile professional retailers operate in channels with two intermediate levels if they buy in a 
rural assembly market from a rural assembling trader. That is less common, however (see Section 6.3). 
The hypothesis is only expected to be accepted when channels with two intermediate levels (step 3: 
farmer -> wholesaler -> retailer -> consumer) are compared to less differentiated channels. There is no 
reason to believe that it will be accepted when less differentiated channels are compared. Farmer-retailers 
(operating in a step-1 channel: farmer -> consumer) and mobile professional retailers (operating in a 
step-2 channel: farmer -> trader -> consumer) are not necessarily presumed to have different turnovers, 
since they are both mobile. 
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7.3. The data set 
Horticultural traders in seventeen Kenyan market places are included in the analysis. 1 4 The 
randomly sampled traders in each market place were asked what kind of horticultural 
commodities they sold, both on the day of the interview and on other market days and 
during other parts of the year. 
For each commodity traded, the traders were asked whether they or other family 
members had cultivated the commodity, or bought i t For each bought commodity, the 
traders were asked where and from whom they had bought i t If produce had been bought at 
farms, the place of purchase was to be specified up to the divisional level. If produce had 
been bought in a market place, the name of the market place was recorded. The people from 
whom the trader could buy the produce in such a market place were classified as either 
farmers or traders.15 
A commodity could originate from more then one source of supply. A trader might 
for instance, report having gone to farms to buy potatoes from farmers, and on to a local 
market place in the production area to buy additional potatoes from traders. A trader might 
also report buying potatoes from both farmers and traders who came to the sampled market 
Or a trader might report selling potatoes from her own farm and potatoes she had bought 
from other farmers or traders. In all cases, all the sources of supply mentioned were 
recorded in the survey and included as separate transactions in the analysis. 
In addition to sources of supply, respondents were also asked to whom they sold 
their commodities, either to consumers or other traders or both. They were asked about their 
customers only once, because horticultural traders in Kenyan market places do not have a 
commodity-specific selling strategy (selling one commodity exclusively to consumers and 
another exclusively to traders). 
From sources of supply and customers to development steps 
Five supply categories can be distinguished: 
1. the supply comes from the respondent's own farm (he/she is a farmer-trader) 
2. the supply is bought from farmers in the production area (either at the farm gate or in a 
rural market place) 
3. the supply is bought from farmers in the sampled market place 
4. the supply is bought from traders in the production area (selling in a market place) 
5. the supply is bought from traders in the sampled market place 
Two customer categories can be distinguished: traders and consumers. Ten different 
combinations can be made from the supply and customer categories. They are shown in 
Figure 7.3. Each combination represents one marketing channel. In most cases, only part of 
The trade survey covered 18 market places (see Section 1.3), but the Kongowea wholesale market in 
Mombasa is not included in the analysis. In that market only traders that dealt with commodities from 
Taita Taveta were interviewed, so the sample was not random. In the other market places the traders 
were sampled randomly. 
A trader distinguished a supplying farmer from a supplying trader on the basis of the language used 
during the bargaining. A trader would talk about the price paid in buying the commodity, while a farmer 
would talk about the money spent on inputs when cultivating it Many farmers could also be recognized 
because they were less experienced negotiators and lacked up-to-date market information on supply and 
demand conditions, due to their irregular trading. 
Figure 73. Types of buying-and-seUing combinations according to the trade survey 
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the marketing channel from producer to consumer is shown. If produce is bought from 
farmers and sold to traders we are dealing with the upper part; if it is bought from traders 
and sold to consumers we are dealing with the lower part; and if it is bought from traders 
and sold to other traders, the middle part of the marketing channel is covered. Nevertheless, 
the rough structure of the entire marketing channel can be distilled from these channel 
segments. 
Each combination in Figure 7.3 can be compared with the three differentiation steps 
oudined in Section 7.2 (Figure 7.2). All combinations but one are readily linkable to a 
specific development step. If the respondent is a farmer and her customers are consumers, 
we are dealing with a step-1 channel. If she is a trader, her source of supply are farmers and 
her customers are consumers, we are dealing with a step-2 channel. If she is a trader, and 
either her source of supply or her customers are traders, we are dealing with a step-3 
channel. 
If her source of supply is a trader, we do not know whether this is the only extra 
level between the farmer and the respondent. The trader from whom the respondent is 
buying could be buying her produce from another trader; for instance, she might be a 
distributing wholesaler buying from collecting wholesalers or a wholesaler buying from 
assembling traders. In the analysis, all these cases are defined as a step-3 marketing channel, 
that is, a channel in which vertical differentiation into wholesale and retail trade has 
occurred. 
One particular combination of source of supply and customers can relate to more than 
one development step: a farmer selling to a trader. If that trader sells in turn to consumers, it 
will be a step-2 channel, but if she sells on to other traders it will be a step-3 channel. The 
customers of respondents' customers are, however, not known. Which alternative will 
prevail depends on the type of market place where the farmer is selling. The step-2 
alternative is most likely to occur in market places without an assembling function. In those 
markets the buying trader is usually a retailer. The step-3 alternative is most probable in rural 
assembly markets. The buying trader there is usually a wholesaler who purchases produce 
from the farmers to sell on to distributing wholesalers and/or retailers in large population 
centres elsewhere in the region or the country. 
Some assembling trade occurs in almost all rural markets in the sample. However, 
market places with a major assembling function are Magumu (Nyandarua District), Taveta 
(Taita Taveta District), Kisii Daraja Mbili, Nyakoe, Riochanda and Kebirigo (all Kisii 
District) (see Section 6.3). For the purpose of the analysis, they are labelled assembly 
markets. 
Unit of analysis and sample size 
The transaction is the unit of analysis. A transaction includes a trader, a commodity handled 
by this trader, a buying-and-selling combination in relation to this commodity, and a 
transport time in relation to this buying-and-selling combination. Thus, the number of 
transactions per trader depends on the number of commodities traded, the number of buying-
and-selling combinations for each commodity, and the variation in transport time per buying-
and-selling combination. An example: A respondent buys tomatoes from farmers at the farm 
gate in two different production areas and from traders in market places located in these two 
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areas. If she sells to consumers only, she represents four channels: two step-2 channels 
(combination 3 in Figure 7.3) and two step-3 channels (combination 7). If she sells to 
traders as well as consumers, she represents four more channels, all of them step-3 channels 
(combinations 4 and 8). 
In total, 726 traders were interviewed in the 17 markets surveyed, representing 3776 
transactions. Table 7.1 shows the number of traders interviewed per market, and the 
distribution of the transactions over the various buying-and-selling combinations as 
distinguished in Figure 7.3 (each buying-and-selling combination in Table 7.1 is represented 
by a letter that corresponds with a letter in Figure 7.3). 
In Table 7.2, all buying-and-selling combinations have been translated into steps. 
Combination A in Table 7.1 represents a step-1 channel and combinations C and E represent 
step-2 channels. Combination B represents a step-3 channel in rural assembly markets and a 
step-2 channel otherwise. All other combinations are step-3 channels. 
Not all 3776 observed transactions are included in the sample that will be used to test 
the vertical differentiation model. The reason is that some observations involve outgoing 
produce flows. Outgoing produce flows are ones that are directed not to the local consumer 
population living in the surveyed market centre and its hinterland, but to consumer 
populations elsewhere. The traders responsible for those flows buy commodities from the 
interviewed traders and farmers in the market place to take them to large urban centres such 
as Nairobi and Mombasa. 
The outgoing produce flows cause a problem: we know how to characterize them 
according to the model (they are always step-3 channels), but we do not know the size of the 
consumer population they serve. In the trade survey respondents were not asked where 
traders who bought from them took their commodities. In many cases the respondents 
would not have known. As a consequence, we do not know to which consumer centres 
these flows are directed. This leaves two solutions: (1) to include only those flows which are 
definitely directed to local consumers (flows whose terminal market is known), or (2) to 
exclude market places where outgoing produce flows are known to be substantial. 
For the first solution, five of the buying-and-selling combinations shown in Figure 
7.3 are relevant, namely those ending at a consumer (combinations A, C, E, G and I). The 
consumer will be local, because consumers usually go to the nearest buying place to buy 
their horticultural commodities. Travelling to market places further away does not make 
sense, because the costs of transport are normally higher than possible benefits gained by 
lower prices in such markets. Thus, in the cases of these five combinations, the surveyed 
market place is without a doubt the terminal market and the consumer population is known. 
For the other combinations the surveyed market place may not be the terminal market and the 
consumer population is not known. Hence, these combinations are not included in the 
analysis. 
The focus on combinations A, C, E, G and I in Figure 7.3 brings the sample size 
down to 2474 transactions (Table 7.3). 1 6 The number of step-1 channels remains the same, 
and the number of step-2 channels decreases by 11 per cent The largest reduction is. among 
Seventy-three traders from the original sample (10%) were omitted because they sold only to other 
traders and not to consumers. 
Table 7.1. Number of buying-and-selling combinations by market place 
marketplace no. of traders type of buying-and-selling combination* 
interviewed a b c d e 
Dundori 19 28 5 8 0 7 
Magumu 30 29 49 30 32 4 
Engineer 21 4 0 25 5 0 
Riocnanda 37 24 19 19 17 12 
Kebirigo 38 28 20 9 8 12 
Nyakoe 27 13 18 9 6 6 
Keroka 35 9 10 15 12 16 
Wundanyi 56 89 51 119 72 10 
Njoro 31 13 13 17 17 45 
Taveta 95 20 20 45 40 158 
Voi 57 47 29 135 84 17 
Nyahururu 21 13 5 29 12 3 
Kisii Daraja Mbili 41 21 24 18 23 17 
Kisii Municipal 39 11 8 37 34 14 
Nakuru wholesale 96 2 3 66 85 30 
Nakuru retail 24 7 2 3 0 127 
Mombasa Majengo retail 59 0 0 0 0 3 
Total all markets 726 358 276 584 447 481 
* For an explanation of the characters a, b, c, etc. see Figure 7 3 . 
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Table 7.2. Number of recorded transactions by step and market place 
marketplace no. of traders recorded transactions 
in sample Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 all 
Dundori 19 28 20 6 54 
Magumu 30 29 34 94 157 
Engineer 21 4 25 38 67 
Riochanda 37 24 31 72 127 
Kebirigo 38 28 21 58 107 
Nyakoe 27 13 15 45 73 
Keroka 35 9 41 57 107 
Wnndanyi 56 89 180 116 385 
Njoro 31 13 75 170 258 
Taveta 95 20 203 243 466 
Voi 57 47 181 294 522 
Nyahururu 21 13 37 46 96 
Kisii Daraja Mbili 41 21 35 108 164 
Kisii Municipal 39 11 59 88 158 
Nakuru wholesale 96 2 99 359 460 
Nakuru retail 24 7 132 227 366 
Mombasa Majengo 59 0 3 206 209 
Total all markets 726 358 • 1191 2227 3776 
step-3 channels (53 per cent). This is consistent with expectations, because, as argued, 
outgoing produce flows are always step-3 channels.1 7 
Instead of removing some of the buying-and-selling combinations from the sample, 
we can alternatively remove market places where outgoing flows are prominent. This is the 
case in the market places with a major assembling function: Magumu, Taveta, Nyakoe, Kisii 
Daraja Mbili, Kebirigo and Riochanda. This reduces the sample size by about the same 
degree as the omission of some of the buying-and-selling combinations (Table 7.4). 
However, the number of traders in the sample is reduced more drastically, as is the number 
of step-1 and step-2 channels (in favour of step-3 channels). A further disadvantage is the 
loss of the bulk of the rural market places in the sample.18 
The present analysis will apply both the focus on buying-and-selling combinations 
with known terminal markets and the removal of rural assembly markets.19 The results of the 
two alternatives will be compared. 
It may be argued that removal of the combinations B, D, F, H and J is not only a solution to outgoing 
produce flows but is also necessary to avoid counting the same channel twice. In large subsamples 
within one market place, answers of traders may to some extent be interrelated. If a respondent reports 
selling tomatoes to traders in the market and another reports buying tomatoes from traders in the same 
market, the two may actually have been dealing with each other. They are thus part of the same channel, 
the first trader representing the upper part and the second trader the lower part of the channel 
Of the six market centres with less than 2,000 inhabitants in the sample, four have a major assembling 
function (see Section 5.2). 
Appendix 7.1 shows the overlap and the differences between the samples used in the two analytical 
alternatives. 
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Table 73. Number of recorded transactions by step and market place, for trade flows 
with known terminal markets* 
marketplace no. of traders recorded transactions 
in sample Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 all 
Dundori 19 28 15 6 49 
Magumu 20 29 34 9 72 
Engineer 21 4 25 33 62 
Riochanda 33 24 31 13 68 
Kebirigo 37 28 21 12 61 
Nyakoe 17 13 15 8 36 
Keroka 31 9 31 29 69 
Wundanyi 56 89 129 25 243 
Njoro 31 13 62 67 142 
Taveta 80 20 203 94 317 
Voi 57 47 152 138 337 
Nyahururu 21 13 32 19 64 
Kisii Daraja Mbili 30 21 35 26 82 
Kisii Municipal 33 11 51 27 89 
Nakuru wholesale 84 2 96 123 221 
Nakuru retail 24 7 130 219 356 
Mombasa Majengo 59 0 3 203 206 
Total all markets 653 358 1065 1051 2474 
* combinations A, C, E, G and I in Figure 7.3. 
Table 7.4. Number of recorded transactions by step and market place, rural assembly 
markets excluded 
marketplace no. of traders recorded transactions 
in sample Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 all 
Dundori 19 28 20 6 54 
Engineer 21 4 25 38 67 
Keroka 35 9 41 57 107 
Wundanyi 56 89 180 116 385 
Njoro 31 13 75 170 258 
Voi 57 47 181 294 522 
Nyahururu 21 13 37 46 96 
Kisii Municipal 39 11 59 88 158 
Nakuru wholesale 96 2 99 359 460 
Nakuru retail 24 7 132 227 366 
Mombasa Majengo 59 0 3 206 209 
Total all markets 458 223 852 1607 2682 
7.4. Specification of the independent variables 
Number of inhabitants of the market centres and population density of their rural hinterlands 
The latest Kenyan population census was used as the source of information to estimate the 
populations of the centres where the surveyed market places were located and the population 
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density of their rural hinterlands (CBS, 1994b, 1994c). Although the census was carried out 
in 1989 and the trade survey was carried out between 1990 and 1992, the figures are thought 
to have sufficient accuracy for the analysis. Table 7.5 shows the populations of the surveyed 
centres. 
The larger population centres have more than one market place. Nakuru has a 
wholesale market and a retail market which are both included in the analysis. Both the 
traders in the retail market and most of those in the wholesale market sell to consumers (see 
Section 5.2). Both types of traders serve the entire town. Therefore, for both markets the 
urban consumer population has been set at the total number of inhabitants of Nakuru. 
Mombasa has a wholesale market and several retail markets. The wholesale market 
supplies primarily a number of retail markets on Mombasa Island and in Kisauni (Mombasa 
North Coast where the wholesale market is located). One of the retail markets on Mombasa 
Island, Majengo market, is included in the analysis. The consumer population for this 
market has been set not at the number of inhabitants of the quarter where the market is 
located, but at the total number of inhabitants of Mombasa Island and Kisauni. This is 
because all produce sold in the Majengo retail market passes through the wholesale market 
The transport costs from the wholesale market to the retail market are small compared to 
those from the production areas to the wholesale market. Economies of scale during 
transport are one of the prime determinants of the vertical differentiation process (see Section 
Table 7.5. Consumer population by market place 
District market centre marketplace inhabitants of population density of 
(Province) market centre rural hinterland 
Nyandarua Nyahururu Nyahururu 14,829 92 
(Central) Engineer Engineer 446 111 
Magumu Magumu 400* 147 
Nakuru Nakuru wholesale market 163,928 124 
(Rift Valley) retail market 163,928 124 
Njoro Njoro 9,026 148 
Dundori Dundori 400* 182 
TaitaTaveta Voi Voi 13,202 68 
(Coast) Taveta Taveta 10,378 66 
Wundanyi Wundanyi 2,764 401 
Kisii Kisii Municipal market 44,149 572 
(Nyanza) Daraja Mbili 22,075 572 
Nyakoe Nyakoe 800* 589 
Riochanda Riochanda 600* 526 
Kebirigo Kebirigo 700* 546 
Keroka Keroka 2,321 560 
Mombasa Mombasa Majengo 281,044 171 
(Coast) 
Based on CBS, 1994b, 1994c. 
Note: Figures with an asterisk (*) represent our own estimates because specified information was lacking in the 
population census. The population for Majengo market equals the population of Mombasa Island and Kisauni. The 
population of Daraja Mbili has been set at half the population of Kisii town (see main text). 
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7.2). Therefore, the total number of consumers served by all retail markets that depend on 
the wholesale market is thought to determine the degree of vertical differentiation of the 
marketing channels directed to consumers in each of these retail markets. 
Kisii town does not have a wholesale market, but it has two retail markets which are 
both included in the analysis. The Municipal market in the middle of town is a daily market 
and the Daraja Mbili market at the edge of town is a periodic one. The daily Municipal 
market serves all inhabitants of Kisii during the five days of the week that the periodic 
market is not operational. The survey in the Municipal market was carried out on one of 
these days. On days when the Daraja Mbili market is operational, some consumers go to 
there and some to the Municipal market It is assumed that on such days each market serves 
half the population of Kisii. Therefore, the number of inhabitants served by Daraja Mbili 
market is set at half the number of inhabitants of Kisii town. The sensitivity of this 
assumption will be tested in the analysis. 
In addition to the number of inhabitants of the sampled consumer centres, the 
population density of their rural hinterlands had to be ascertained. Rural hinterland has been 
defined above as the rural area that depends on a surveyed market place because there are no 
other market places (either rural or urban) nearer by. Defined in this way, the boundaries of 
a centre's hinterland often coincide with the boundaries of the administrative unit (division or 
subdivision) in which the centre is located. The exact shape of the hinterland is not so 
important because population density is used rather than the absolute number of rural 
inhabitants, and population density changes only gradually. Table 7.5 shows the population 
densities used in the analysis. 
Transport time 
In the trade survey, farmer-traders (who sold produce from their own farm) were asked 
what their place of residence was. The transport time is estimated on the basis of this 
information and the location of the surveyed market Professional traders were asked where 
they bought their commodities. If they bought commodities in production areas, the 
transport time was estimated on the basis of the place of purchase and the location of the 
surveyed market If they bought commodities in the surveyed market, the transport time 
refers to traders who did go to the production area to buy these commodities in order to sell 
them to immobile traders in the surveyed market 
Keeping qualities 
Three categories of horticultural produce are distinguished for the purpose of the analysis: 
commodities with poor, medium and good keeping qualities. The first and the last group 
have been entered as dummy variables. Both coincide largely with certain types of 
horticultural produce. All so-called leafy vegetables are categorized as poor, and all tubers, 
roots and bulbs as good. The leafy vegetables found in the surveyed market places were 
kale, spider flower, black nightshade, Amaranthus, cow pea leaves, bitter leaves, spinach, 
pumpkin leaves and lettuce. Once harvested, their keeping qualities outside the refrigerator 
are extremely poor. If they are not sold within one or two days after being harvested the 
trader has to decrease the price because the leaves start to flag and shrivel up. 
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In sharp contrast, tubers, roots and bulbs stay good for weeks, provided they are 
stored in a well-ventilated place. The most important tubers, roots and bulbs found in the 
market places surveyed were Irish potatoes, sweet potatoes, arrowroot, and red and white 
onions. Less known root crops such as beetroot and turnip are also part of the group. 
Pumpkins and the fresh herbs garlic and ginger were added because they have the same 
keeping characteristics. The entire category is named tubers, roots and bulbs for short 
All commodities that have keeping qualities better than leafy vegetables but poorer 
than tubers, roots and bulbs were grouped together into the third category. It includes 
commodities such as bananas, cabbages, mangoes, sweet peppers, passion fruit tomatoes, 
carrots, eggplant oranges and pineapples. 
Turnover 
The turnover of the traders in the sample is valued in Kenyan shillings and refers to the 
selling prices and selling quantities on the day the traders were interviewed. For each 
commodity the traders were asked how much they expected to sell on that day and what the 
average selling price would be. The average selling price was used in place of the going 
price at the moment of the interview because prices tend to change in the course of the day. 2 0 
All sampled traders in a particular market place were interviewed on the same market 
day. All market places in a region were surveyed when the bulk of the horticultural 
commodities were in harvest During such periods the price fluctuations from one market 
day to another would be relatively small. 2 1 
If current prices had been used, the calculated turnover would have been biased by the time of the day the 
interview was held. Usually prices are lower towards the end of the market day because traders do not 
like to take their perishable commodities home with them. 
At the beginning and towards the end of harvesting periods, price fluctuations become more volatile 
because supply is less steady. 
Vert ica l D i f ferent iat ion o f Hort icu ltura l 
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In the previous chapter a vertical differentiation model was put forward, and hypotheses 
were formulated to support i t The model and the hypotheses will now be tested by means of 
logistic regression (logit) analysis. 
8.1. Logistic regression analysis 
Two types of logit analysis can be distinguished: binomial (also called binary) and 
multinomial. Both work on the same principles, but binomial logit requires a dichotomous 
dependent variable, while multinomial logit allows dependent variables with more than two 
alternatives. The principles of logit analysis will be explained on the basis of the binomial 
variant 
Logit analysis is used to estimate the probability of some certain event. From the 
dichotomous value of the dependent variable the procedure predicts its estimate of the 
probability that the event will or will not occur. If the predicted probability is greater than 
0.50 the prediction is 'yes', otherwise the prediction is 'no' (Hair et al., 1995). 
The coefficients of the independent variables (Bo ,Bi , B 2 , etc) estimated by the 
procedure refer to a comparison of the probability of the event occurring with the probability 
of its not occurring. The mathematical expression is called 'the logit' because the coefficients 
are expressed in (natural) logarithms: 
logit = log ( Prob (event) /Prob (no event) ) = Bo + BtXi + B 2 X 2 +... + BpXp 
On the basis of the logit, the probability that the event will occur can be calculated: 
Prob(event) = 1 / (1 + e _ z ) whereby Z = BQ + BjXi + B 2 X 2 + ... + BpX p 
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The signs of the coefficients Bo, Bj , etc are interpreted similarly to those in ordinary 
regression. A positive coefficient increases the probability that the event will occur, and a 
negative one decreases i t 
The goodness-of-fit of the model can be assessed by means of the model chi-square. 
It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all the terms in the model, except the 
constant, are zero (comparable to the overall F-test in ordinary regression analysis) 
(Norusis, 1990a). If the null hypothesis is rejected (p<0.05), the model is meaningful. 
In addition to the model chi-square, the percentage of correctly classified 
observations gives an indication of the goodness-of-fit of the model. A t-test can be carried 
out on the classification table that compares observed and predicted values. The t-value is 
calculated as follows: 
t(n-i) = ( Q - P ) / s p 
Q = (nn +n22) /n 
P = (ni.2 + n 2 . 2 ) / n 2 
Sp = square root ( (1 - P) * P / n) 
Predicted 
no event event 
Observed 
no event n i l ni2 
event n21 n22 
n 
The number of 'no-event' and 'event' observations entered in the analysis should not 
differ too much (m. « n2.). When the number of 'no-event' and 'event' observations in the 
sample (ni. and n2.) is approximately the same, and the model fits well, the number of 
correcdy classified observations will be larger than the number of wrongly classified ones 
for both groups (nn > n n and n 2 2 > n 2 i ) . This will not be the case if group sizes 
considerably differ. In the case of, for instance, 20 'no event' observations On. = 20) and 80 
'event' observations (ni= 80) the model will focus primarily on the 'event' observations. As 
a consequence, both the 'event' and 'no-event' observations will be classified as 'event' 
occasions (ni 2 and n 2 2). When large differences exist in the sample, a random subsample 
must be taken from the biggest group (Maddala, 1992). 
Once the model has been estimated, extreme cases have to be checked.1 Conflicting 
or unrealistic answers by respondents may have led to the presence of these oudiers. If this 
is the case they have to be removed from the sample. Correlations between the independent 
variables in the model have to be checked, too. When two independent variables show a 
strong correlation, the removal of one of them from the analysis must be considered. 
The model has to be checked for heteroskedasticity. Logit analysis assumes 
homoskedasticity, meaning that the errors in the regression equation have a common 
variance. If error terms do not have a common variance they are heteroskedastic. 
A case is called extreme in the analysis when the studentized residual is greater than two (such in 
accordance with Norusis, 1990a). 
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Heteroskedasticity can be detected by separate regression analyses of the squared residuals 
of the model on each of the explanatory variables ( X i , X p ) , and by a regression analysis 
of the squared residuals on the predicted values of the dependent variable (Prob(event)) 
(Maddala, 1992). Absolute residuals may be used instead of squared residuals. The results 
are not necessarily the same, and therefore squared and absolute residuals are both used to 
detect heteroskedasticity in the present analysis. If heteroskedasticity is found for one or 
more explanatory variables, it can usually be resolved or diminished by substituting the 
logarithm or the reciprocal of these variables into the model (Norusis, 1990b; Maddala, 
1992). 
So far we have been talking about binomial logit analysis. Multinomial logit works 
according to the same principles. The biggest difference is that we no longer speak of 'no 
event' and 'event', but of 'event 1', 'event 2', 'event 3', etc. In binomial logit 'no event' 
was taken as a reference, and a positive sign of a coefficient increased the probability that the 
event would occur. In multinomial logit , 'no event' is not an option, and the model 
estimates the probability that one event occurs relative to another. 
Whereas a binomial logit model consists of one logit function expressed as 
log (Prob (event) / Prob (no event)), a multinomial logit model consists of J-l functions, 
whereby J stands for the number of possible events (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985). One of 
the events is taken as the point of departure, and the model estimates the probability of the 
other events occurring relative to this one. If, for instance, we have three events and event 1 
is taken as the point of departure, the model will be: 
log ( Prob (event 2 ) / Prob (event 1) ) = Bio + Bi j X n + B 1 2 X 1 2 + ... + B i p X i p 
log ( Prob (event 3 ) / Prob (event 1 ) ) = B 2 1 + B 2 1 X 2 1 + B 2 2 X 2 2 + ... + B 2 P X 2 P 
8.2. Analytic procedure 
The analysis will be performed twice, with two different data sets. In Section 7.3 it was 
explained that these two sets originate from the need to solve the problem of outgoing flows. 
The first data set includes all surveyed markets, but in each market those flows are excluded 
whose terminal markets are unknown. The second data set excludes surveyed market places 
where outgoing flows are prominent (rural assembly markets), while including all recorded 
flows in the remaining markets. 
The analysis seeks to estimate the probability of encountering step-1, step-2 and 
step-3 marketing channels. A step-1 channel stands for farmer -> consumer, a step-2 
channel for farmer -> trader -> consumer, and a step-3 channel for farmer -> wholesaler -> 
retailer -> consumer (see Section 7.2). In logit terms, three events occur. In multinomial 
logit, all three events can be entered in one and the same analysis. For binomial logit, the 
analysis has to be split into three parts: step-1 channels are compared with step-2 channels, 
omitting step-3 channels; then step-2 channels with step-3 channels, omitting step-1 
channels; and finally step-1 channels with step 3-channels, omitting step-2 channels. 
Table 8.1 shows the distribution of the dependent variable for each data set. Not all 
the available observations will be used, however, because of the need for approximately 
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equal group sizes (see Section 8.1). Random samples will be taken from the larger groups 
(step 2 and step 3) before carrying out the analyses. 
Both binomial and multinomial logit will be used. The multinomial variant is the 
most straightforward alternative, but the binomial one has the advantage that a larger number 
of observations can be included in the analysis. In multinomial logit, where all three groups 
are entered into the same analysis, the numbers of step-2 and step-3 observations have to be 
brought back to 358 or 223, depending on the data set used (see Table 8.1). As a 
consequence, we lose the largest part of the step-2 and step-3 observations. In binomial 
logit, where steps are compared in pairs, the number of step-2 and step-3 observations has 
to be reduced in a similar fashion to compare each of them with step-1 observations, but that 
is not necessary for comparing step-2 with step-3 channels. From the first data set all step-2 
and step-3 observations can be used, and from the second data set all step-2 observations 
and half of the step-3 observations. The larger the size of the sample, the greater the power 
of the statistical analysis (Hair et al., 1995). 2 Therefore, the power of a step-2 and step-3 
analysis is expected to be greater in binomial logit than in multinomial logit This makes it 
worthwhile to apply both approaches. 
The binomial analysis will be performed first. After estimation of the model, the 
results will be checked for (1) extreme cases, (2) correlations between independent 
variables, (3) and heteroskedasticity (see Section 8.1). If heteroskedasticity is found, 
conversion of independent variables will be attempted. Once the right converted variables are 
found, they can be entered directiy into the multinomial logit 3 
The dependent and independent variables to be used in the analyses were already 
introduced in Section 7.2 and elaborated in Section 7.4. What remains is naming them In 
the binomial analysis, where steps are compared one by one, the name of the dependent 
variable is equal to the highest step. For example, in the comparison of step-1 and step-2 
channels, the dependent variable is called STEP2, which is equal to one in the case of a step-
2 channel and zero in the case of a step-1 channel. In the multinomial logit, where all three 
steps are entered into the same analysis, the independent variable is called STEP, having a 
value of 1,2 or 3. 
Table 8.1. Sample population by vertical differentiation step and data set 
step 1 * step 2 * step 3 * all 
1. data set of trade flows with 
known terminal market ** 358 1065 1051 2474 
2. data set of all trade flows, rural 
assembly markets excluded 223 852 1607 2682 
* step 1 = farmer -> consumer; step 2 = fanner -> trader -> consumer; step 3 = farmer -> wholesaler -> retailer -> 
consumer. 
** buying-and-selling combinations A, C, E, G and I in Figure 7.3. 
Note: the two data sets will both be analysed and the results compared. 
The power of the statistical analysis is the probability that statistical significance will be indicated if it 
is present (Hair et al., 1995). 
SPSS will be used for the binomial logit analyses, and LIMDEP for the multinomial logit analyses. 
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The names of the independent variables used in the analysis are: 
POPSIZE Number of inhabitants of the market centre where the surveyed market 
place is located 4 
POPDENSITY Population density of the rural hinterland of the market centre where the 
surveyed market place is located 5 
TRANSTIME Transportation time from the farm to the surveyed market place by vehicle 
LEAVES Dichotomous variable equalling one in the case of leafy vegetables 
TUBERS Dichotomous variable equalling one in the case of tubers, roots and bulbs 
TURNOVER Value of a trader's turnover on the day of the interview 6 
8.3. Testing the model using trade flows with known terminal markets 
First, we focus on the marketing flows with known terminal markets (to avoid outgoing 
flows, see previous section). The analysis starts with binomial logit analyses of step-1 and 
step-2 channels, step-2 and step-3 channels, and step-1 and step-3 channels. Thereafter, the 
results are checked through multinomial logit analysis of step-1, -2 and -3 channels. 
Binomial logit of step-1 and step-2 channels 
Box 8.1 shows the binomial logit analysis for step-1 and step-2 channels. All independent 
variables are entered into the analysis at once. The variables POPSIZE and TRANSTIME are 
found to be significant at the 0.001 level. The other variables are not significant The model 
chi-square is significant and high, and so is the t-value of the classification table. There is no 
reason to remove the extreme cases from the sample.7 Correlations between independent 
variables are not disturbingly high. Heteroskedasticity is a problem, however, as shown 
when the squared and absolute residuals are regressed on each significant independent 
variable and on the predicted value of the dependent variable. The heteroskedasticity can to a 
large extent be resolved by taking the inversions of POPSIZE and TRANSTIME. The 
predicted residuals then no longer show heteroskedasticity. When the procedure is rerun 
with INVPOPSIZE (inversion of POPSIZE) and INVTRANSTIME (inversion of 
TRANSTIME), these variables become highly significant (0.001 level). In addition, the 
variables POPDENSITY and LEAVES become significant, though at lower levels (the first 
at the 0.05 level, and the second at the 0.10 level). 
To check whether the results of the analysis are stable, the analysis is repeated with 
two different random samples from the step-2 cases. Each time the same variables are 
4 The population figures are divided by one thousand before entering them into the analysis to avoid very 
small coefficients. Such coefficients are less exact in SPSS. The analysis will be repeated twice for 
different values of the population of Daraja Mbili because this figure is based on an assumption (see 
Section 7.4). 
5 The population density figures are divided by one hundred before entering to avoid very small 
coefficients. 
6 The turnover figures are divided by one thousand before entering to avoid very small coefficients. 
7 The extreme cases involve commodities traded by three traders in Nakuru (one in the wholesale market 
and two in the retail market). They differed from the other sampled traders in the Nakuru markets because 
they not only bought the commodities they sold, but also grew them on their own farms. In the 
analysis, they are entered twice, once as professional traders and once as farmers. The extreme values 
occur for the fanner entries. 
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significant (Appendix 8.1). The analysis is also repeated for the two different assumptions 
about the size of the consumer population of Daraja Mbili. Again, the same variables remain 
significant (Appendix 8.1). 
As explained in Section 8.1, the results of the analysis can be written as: 
log ( Prob(step 2) /Prob (step 1) ) = 1.4567 - 0.5205 x INVPOPSIZE - 0.1115 x POPDENSITY - 0.6178 x 
INVTRANSTIME - 0.4365 x LEAVES 
The sign of INVPOPSIZE is negative, meaning that a larger value of this variable decreases 
Box 8.1. Analysis of step-1 versus step-2 channels 
725 
725 
STEP2 
153.9 (df=6,p=0.0000) 
69.3% (t=10.3, p=0.000) 
8 
A. Logistic regression analysis 
Total number of cases 
Number of selected cases 
Dependent variable (0,1) 
Model Chi-Square 
Correcdy classified observations 
Number of extreme cases 
Variables in the equation: B 
POPSIZE 0.0158 
POPDENSITY - 0.0627 
TRANSTIME 0.9044 
LEAVES - 0.2686 
TUBERS - 0.0922 
TURNOVER - 0.0085 
Constant - 0.9501 
S.E. Wald Sig. 
0.0025 39.93 0.0000 
0.0454 1.91 0.1668 
0.1526 35.11 0.0000 
0.2247 1.43 0.2320 
0.2262 0.17 0.6836 
0.0081 1.09 0.2956 
0.2532 14.08 0.0002 
Pearson correlation matrix 
STEP2 POPSIZE POPDENS. TRANST. LEAVES TUBERS 
STEP2 1.00 
POPSIZE 0.33 1.00 
POPDENSITY -0.23 -0.27 1.00 
TRANSTIME 0.31 0.29 -0.37 1.00 
LEAVES -0.10 -0.11 0.08 -0.11 1.00 
TUBERS 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.20 1.00 
TURNOVER 0.18 0.41 -0.31 0.38 -0.08 -0.03 
Separate bivariate regression analyses of the significant independent variables and 
predicted values with the squared residuals and the absolute residuals 
Squared residuals Absolute residuals 
t-value p-value t-value p-value 
POPSIZE -7.07 0.0000 -13.68 0.0000 
TRANSTIME -5.15 0.0000 - 8.96 0.0000 
Predicted values -5.95 0.0000 - 11.27 0.0000 
Continued on next page 
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Box 8.1 continued 
B. Logistic regression analysis with inversions of POPSIZE and TRANSTIME 
Total number of cases 725 
Number of selected cases 725 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP2 
Model On-Square 113.9 (df=6,p=0.000) 
Correctly classified observations 67.5% (t=9.4, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 0 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.5205 0.1103 22.29 0.0000 
POPDENSITY -0.1115 0.0457 5.96 0.0147 
INVTRANSTIME - 0.6178 0.1482 17.38 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.4365 0.2238 3.80 0.0512 
TUBERS 0.0388 0.2212 0.03 0.8609 
TURNOVER 0.0060 0.0067 0.81 0.3695 
Constant 1.4567 0.2371 37.73 0.0000 
Separate bivariate regression analyses of the significant independent variables and 
predicted values with the squared residuals and the absolute residuals 
Squared residuals Absolute residuals 
t-value p-value t-value p-value 
INVPOPSIZE - 2.59 0.0098 - 4.32 0.0000 
POPDENSITY 0.59 0.5564 1.23 0.2206 
INVTRANSTIME -0.82 0.4112 - 0.47 0.6399 
LEAVES 2.18 0.0295 1.90 0.0581 
Predicted values 1.07 0.2872 1.51 0.1315 
the probability of encountering a step-2 channel. Since INVPOPSIZE is the inversion of 
POPSIZE, a larger value of INVPOPSIZE coincides with a smaller value for POPSIZE and 
vice versa. Thus, the negative sign in the equation means that a smaller value of POPSIZE 
decreases the probability of encountering a step-2 channel, and a larger value for POPSIZE 
increases this probability. In other words, the analysis shows that the probability of coming 
across step-2 channels relative to step-1 channels increases as the centre where the market is 
located has a larger population. 
The same reasoning can be followed for INVTRANSTIME. It also has a negative 
sign, so that a smaller value of INVTRANSTIME (that is, a higher value of TRANSTIME) 
increases the probability of encountering a step-2 channel. In other words, the probability of 
encountering step-2 channels relative to step-1 channels increases as more time is required to 
transport the commodity from the production area to the consumer centre where the market is 
located. 
The signs of POPDENSITY and LEAVES in the equation are also negative. The 
analysis thus shows that the probability of encountering step-2 channels relative to step-1 
channels decreases as the population density in the rural hinterland of the market centre 
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becomes higher, and when the traded commodities are (highly perishable) leafy vegetables. 
An explanation of these findings will follow. 
On the basis of the logit, we can calculate the estimated probabilities of finding step-2 
channels in market centres with different sizes, different population densities of the rural 
hinterland, different transport times of the commodity, and different perishability of the 
commodity (leafy vegetable or not). Before this, the equation has to be converted (see 
Section 8.1): 
Prob (step 2) = 1 / (1 + e _ z ) 
Z = 1.4567 - 0.5205 / POPSIZE - 0.1115 x POPDENSITY - 0.6178 / TRANSTIME - 0.4365 x LEAVES 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show the results for different combinations of the independent variables. 
The probability of encountering step-2 channels increases in both tables as we move from 
top to bottom and from left to right. This again indicates that (1) an increase in the size of the 
consumer population, (2) an increase in transportation time, and (3) a less extreme 
perishability (non-leafy vegetables) all have a positive effect on the proportion of step-2 
channels. 
A comparison of the two tables shows that the direction of the changes is the same 
whether the hinterland is relatively scarcely or densely populated. However, the initial 
probability for step-2 channels is lower in the case of a densely populated hinterland. A high 
population density slows down the increase in step-2 channels (professional traders buying 
Table 8.2. Estimated probability of encountering step-2 relative to step-1 channels in 
the case of a relatively sparsely populated hinterland (n=725)* 
1 POPSIZE = 0.6 
LEAVES = 1 LEAVES = 0 
POPSIZE = 100 
LEAVES = 1 LEAVES =0 
TRANSTIME 
0.5 0.22 0.31 0.40 0.51 
2.0 0.42 0.53 0.63 0.73 
5.0 0.47 0.57 0.69 0.77 
* POPDENSITY = 1.5 
Table 8.3. Estimated probability of encountering step-2 relative to step-1 channels in 
the case of a relatively densely populated hinterland (n=725)* 
I POPSIZE = 0.6 
LEAVES =1 LEAVES = 0 
POPSIZE = 100 
LEAVES =1 LEAVES = 0 
TRANSTIME 
0.5 0.15 0.22 0.30 0.40 
2.0 0.31 0.42 0.52 0.63 
5.0 0.36 0.46 0.57 0.67 
•POPDENSITY = 5.5 
139 
from farmers and selling to consumers) in favour of step-1 channels (farmers selling to 
consumers). 
Binomial logit ofstep-2 and step-3 channels 
Box 8.2 shows the results when step-2 and step-3 channels are compared. All cases of both 
groups are included in the analysis. The variables POPSIZE, TRANSTIME and 
TURNOVER are significant at the 0.001 level, the variable POPDENSITY at the 0.05 level 
and the variable LEAVES at the 0.10 level. The model shows significant and high model 
chi-square and t-values. There is no case to remove the extreme values from the sample.8 
Correlations between independent variables do not disturb the analysis, but 
heteroskedasticity is again a problem. It is again resolved to a large extent by taking the 
inverse of POPSIZE and TRANSTIME. 9 The outcome of the logistic analysis is little 
affected by this change: the inverse of POPSIZE (INVPOPSIZE) and of TRANSTIME 
(INVTRANSTIME) become significant and the signs change as expected (see analysis of 
step-1 and step-2 channels). The variables TURNOVER, POPDENSITY and LEAVES 
remain significant (the latter two at higher levels). 1 0 
The results of the analysis can be written again as a logit: 
log ( Prob(step 3) / Prob (step 2) ) = 1.5067 - 0.2267 / POPSIZE + 0.1239 x POPDENSITY -
1.9411 / TRANSTIME - 0.5822 x LEAVES - 0.0155 x TURNOVER 
It can be interpreted as follows: 
- The probability of corning across step-3 channels relative to step-2 channels increases as 
the centre where the market is located has a larger consumer population. This is the same as 
found in analysing step-1 and step-2 channels. 
- The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-2 channels increases as the 
population density of the rural hinterland of the market centre is higher. In the previous 
section the probability of finding step-2 relative to step-1 channels was found to decrease as 
the population density became higher. In Section 7.2 it was explained that a high rural 
population density may have both a negative effect (a higher density increases the number of 
horticultural farmers in the market place) and a positive effect on the differentiation process 
(a higher population density increases the consumer population dependent on the market 
place). It can be concluded that the positive effect (the 'consumer effect*) is found in 
comparing step-2 and step-3 channels (removing the farmers from the sample), while the 
negative effect (the 'farmer effect') is found in comparing step-1 and step-2 channels. In 
other words, the analyses show that both effects exist. 
Some of the extreme cases are traders who bought directly from the farmers to sell to consumers (step 
2), although the production area was 4 to 5 hours away. According to the model, they were expected to 
buy their produce from wholesalers in the selling market (step 3). The other extreme cases were traders 
who bought from wholesalers in the selling market (step 3), while the production area was only half an 
hour to one hour away. According to the model they were expected to go to the production area to buy 
directly from the farmers (step 2). 
When the squared residuals are regressed on the predicted values heteroskedasticity is no longer a 
problem, but for the absolute residuals it still is. 
The outcome does not change when other values are entered for the consumer population of Daraja Mbili 
market (Appendix 8.2). 
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- The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-2 channels increases as 
transport from the production area to the consumer centre takes more time. This was also 
found in the analysis step-1 and step-2 channels. 
- The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-2 channels is lower when 
the commodities concerned are leafy vegetables (with relatively poor keeping qualities). This 
was also found for the step-1 and step-2 channels. 
Box 8.2. Analysis of step-2 versos step-3 channels • 
A. Logistic regression analysis 
Total number of cases 2116 
Number of selected cases 2116 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 885.8 (df=6,p=0.0000) 
Correcdy classified observations 76.5 % (fr=24.4, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 27 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. WaU Sig. 
POPSEE 0.0051 0.0008 40.39 0.0000 
POPDENSITY 0.0757 0.0312 5.88 0.0153 
TRANSTTME 0.8757 0.0490 319.57 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.3410 0.1888 3.26 0.0708 
TUBERS - 0.0424 0.1365 0.10 0.7562 
TURNOVER - 0.0354 0.0042 71.32 0.0000 
Constant - 2.0053 0.1431 196.34 0.0000 
Pearson correlation matrix 
STEP3 POPSIZE POPDENS. TRANST. LEAVES TUBERS 
STEP3 1.00 
POPSIZE 0.37 1.00 
POPDENSITY - 0.12 - 0.21 1.00 
TRANSTTME 0.53 0.52 - 0.25 1.00 
LEAVES - 0.15 - 0.12 0.14 -0.20 1.00 
TUBERS 0.05 0.06 - 0.04 0.07 -0.16 1.00 
TURNOVER 0.00 0.21 - 021 0.21 -0.12 -0.07 
Separate bivariate regression analyses of the significant independent variables and 
predicted values with the squared residuals and the absolute residuals 
Squared residuals Absolute residuals 
t-value p-value t-value p-value 
POPSIZE - 10.69 0.0000 17.76 0.0000 
POPDENSITY 3.21 0.0014 4.14 0.0000 
TRANSTTME - 11.52 0.0000 20.59 0.0000 
LEAVES 0.64 0.5217 1.23 0.2189 
TURNOVER - 1.89 0.0591 - 2.89 0.0039 
Predicted values - 9.33 0.0000 16.19 0.0000 
continued on next page 
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Box 8.2 continued 
B. Logistic regression analysis with inversions of POPSIZE and TRANSTIME 
Total number of cases 2116 
Number of selected cases 2116 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 545.6 (df=6,p=0.000) 
Correctly classified observations 73.4 % (t=21.6,p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 69 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.2267 0.0882 6.60 0.0102 
POPDENSITY 0.1239 0.0332 13.97 0.0002 
INVTRANSTIME - 1.9411 0.1083 320.97 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.5822 0.1951 8.90 0.0028 
TUBERS - 0.0598 0.1235 0.23 0.6285 
TURNOVER -0.0155 0.0032 23.11 0.0000 
Constant 1.5067 0.1133 176.71 0.0000 
Separate bivariate regression analyses of the significant independent variables and 
predicted values with the squared residuals and the absolute residuals 
Squared residuals Absolute residuals 
t-value p-value t-value p-value 
INVPOPSIZE -0.39 0.6984 -2.94 0.0033 
POPDENSITY 3.81 0.0001 0.54 0.5863 
INVTRANSTIME -1.79 0.0733 -7.25 0.0000 
LEAVES 0.70 0.4836 -1.92 0.0547 
TURNOVER -1.28 0.2015 0.47 0.6373 
Predicted values -1.88 0.0604 5.77 0.0000 
- The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-2 channels decreases as the 
trader (in the present analysis a retailer) has a larger turnover.11 This was not found in the 
step-1 to step-2 analysis. 
The model can be used to estimate the probability of encountering more step-3 
channels relative to step-2 channels for differing values of the significant independent 
variables. To do this we have to rewrite the equation again: 
Prob(step3)= 1/(1 + e-*) 
Z = 1.5067 - 0.2267 / POPSIZE + 0.1239 x POPDENSITY -1.9411 / TRANSTIME - 0.5822 x LEAVES 
- 0.0155 x TURNOVER 
On the basis of this equation we can analyse the impact of changes in the value of one 
significant independent variable while the value of all others remains constant (ceteris 
paribus conditions). 1 2 Tables 8.4 to 8.8 show the p-values for different values of the 
All traders are retailers since only the combinations A, C, E, G and I of Figure 7.3 are included. 
All continuous variables are set at their median, and the dummy variable LEAVES is set at zero. 
According to the equation, the estimated probability of coming across a step-3 channel is 0.64 under 
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Table 8.4. The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-2 channels 
for different values of POPSIZE, under ceteris paribus conditions (n=2116) 
minimum lower median upper maximum 
value auartile auartile value 
POPSIZE* 0.400 9.026 13.202 163.928 281.044 
p-value 0.51 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65 
* POPSIZE = population of the market centre (1000s) 
Table 8.5. The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-2 channels 
for different values of POPDENSITY, under ceteris paribus conditions 
(n=2116) 
minimum lower median upper maximum 
value auartile auartile value 
POPDENSITY* 0.660 0.680 1.240 1.710 5.890 
p-value 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.76 
* POPDENSITY = population densiry of the rural hinterland (100s) 
Table 8.6. The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-2 channels 
for different values of TRANSTIME, under ceteris paribus conditions 
(n=2116) 
minimum 
value 
lower 
auartile 
median upper 
auartile 
maximum 
value 
TRANSTIME* 0.5 1.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 
p-value 0.09 0.41 0.64 0.75 0.80 
* TRANSTIME = transport time in hours 
Table 8.7. The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-2 channels 
for different values of LEAVES, under ceteris paribus conditions (n=2116) 
minimum value maximum value 
LEAVES* 0 1 
p-value 0 .64 0.50 
* LEAVES = dummy variable: 1 in the case of leafy vegetables 
these circumstances. While all other variables remain constant, the value of one of the variables is 
successively changed to its minimum, lower quartile, upper quartile and maximum. The corresponding 
probability of finding step-3 channels are shown in Tables 8.4 to 8.8. 
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Table 8.8. The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-2 channels 
for different values of TURNOVER, under ceteris paribus conditions 
(n=2116) 
minimum lower median upper maximum 
value quorate quarâle value 
TURNOVER 0.100 2.783 5.400 13.50 100.0 
p-value 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.61 0.29 
* TURNOVER = turnover of a trader (x 1000 Kenyan Shillings) 
independent variables. The leftmost column in each table represents the minimum value, and 
the rightmost column the maximum value found in the sample presendy being analysed. In 
comparing the tables it becomes clear that changes in transportation time have the greatest 
impact: the difference in p-value between the minimum and maximum value of 
TRANSTIME is 0.71. Changes in turnover have the second strongest impact (0.37), while 
changes in all other variables have a relatively limited impact (POPSIZE: 0.14; 
POPDENSITY: 0.13; LEAVES: 0.14). 
The values in Table 8.4 show that changes in the value of POPSIZE are of particular 
influence when a market centre is small. Once it is "big' (over 10,000 inhabitants), any extra 
increase in size of the consumer population does not further increase the probability of our 
coming across step-3 channels. Similarly, the impact of changes in TRANSTIME is greater 
when the time required to transport the commodity from the production area to the consumer 
centre is short (Table 8.6). If it is 'long' (over 4 hours), any additional increase in time 
scarcely increases the probability of finding step-3 channels. This non-linear impact of the 
variables POPSIZE and TRANSTIME is the result of their inversion. 
The continuous variables POPDENSITY and TURNOVER do show linear effects (a 
positive effect for POPDENSITY and negative one for TURNOVER). In both cases the 
effect is especially strong for high values of the independent variables. Such high values are, 
however, not very common in the sample. This is shown by the upper quartiles presented in 
the fourth column of the tables. Only beyond these upper quartiles do changes become 
consequential. 
Binomial logit ofstep-1 and step-3 channels 
Box 8.3 shows the results for step-1 versus step-3 channels. All step-1 cases are included 
and a random sample is taken from the step-3 cases. The variables POPSIZE, TRANSTIME 
and TURNOVER are significant at the 0.001 level, and the variable LEAVES at the 0.05 
level. The model shows a significant and high model chi-square and t-value for correctly 
classified observations. There is no reason to remove the extreme cases. 1 3 The correlations 
between most of the independent variables are generally low. The correlation between 
POPSIZE and TRANSTIME is relatively high (0.66), but not high enough to remove one of 
All extreme cases involve step-3 channels found in relatively small market centres for commodities that 
had to be transported over relatively small distances. There is no need to remove such cases from the 
sample. 
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the two variables from analysis. Heteroskedasticity is again a problem, and can be tackled as 
before by taking the inversions of POPSIZE and TRANSTIME. When we enter the inverted 
variables into the analysis, they become significant, and the variables LEAVES and 
TURNOVER remain significant (the former becomes significant at a higher level). 1 4 
Bos 8.3. Analysis of step-1 versus step-3 channels 
A. Logistic regression analysis 
Total number of cases 748 
Number of selected cases 748 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 574.7 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 85.3 % (t=19.2, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 16 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. WaU Sig. 
POPSIZE 0.0195 0.0030 42.14 0.0000 
POPDENSITY 0.0832 0.0621 1.80 0.1800 
TRANSTIME 2.1851 0.2247 94.59 0.0000 
LEAVES -0.7616 0.3598 4.48 0.0343 
TUBERS - 0.0712 0.3033 0.06 0.8144 
TURNOVER - 0.0782 0.0147 28.24 0.0000 
Constant - 3.1710 0.3681 74.23 0.0000 
Pearson correlation matrix 
STEP3 POPSIZE POPDENS. TRANST. LEAVES TUBERS 
STEP3 1.00 
POPSIZE 0.55 1.00 
POPDENSITY - 0 3 4 - 0 3 3 1.00 
TRANSTIME 0.62 0.66 - 0 3 9 1.00 
LEAVES -0.24 -0.16 0.13 -0.22 1.00 
TUBERS 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.17 1.00 
TURNOVER 0.16 0.21 -0.31 0.28 -0.06 -0.06 
Separate bivariate regression analyses of the significant independent variables and 
predicted values with the squared residuals and the absolute residuals 
Squared residuals Absolute residuals 
t-value p-value t-value p-value 
POPSIZE -6.05 0.0000 - 10.07 0.0000 
TRANSTIME -8.23 0.0000 - 12.95 0.0000 
LEAVES 0.45 0.6493 0.54 0.5919 
TURNOVER -3.03 0.0025 -4.13 0.0000 
Predicted values -6.85 0.0000 -10.65 0.0000 
continued on next page 
Similar results are obtained for other random samples from the step-3 cases, and for the alternative 
figures for the consumer population of Daraja Mbili (Appendix 8.3). The results of the analysis are 
therefore stable. 
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Box 8.3 continued 
B. Logistic regression analysis with inversions of POPSIZE and TRANSTIME 
Total number of cases 
Number of selected cases 
Dependent variable (0,1) 
Model Chi-Square 
Correctly classified observations 
Number of extreme cases 
748 
748 
STEP3 
415.6 (df=6,p=0.0000) 
81.8%(t=17.3,p=0.000) 
35 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.4833 0.1442 11.22 0.0008 
POPDENSITY 0.0341 0.0614 0.31 0.5784 
INVTRANSTIME - 2.3960 0.1986 145.58 0.0000 
LEAVES - 1.0638 0.3371 9.96 0.0016 
TUBERS 0.0069 0.2648 0.00 0.9791 
TURNOVER - 0.0237 0.0078 9.11 0.0025 
Constant 2.9059 0.2525 132.46 0.0000 
Separate bivariate regression analyses of the significant independent variables and 
predicted values with the squared residuals and the absolute residuals 
Squared residuals Absolute residuals 
t-value p-value t-value p-value 
INVPOPSIZE -3.47 0.0006 - 4.78 0.0000 
INVTRANSTIME 2.74 0.0064 - 0.20 0.9841 
LEAVES 0.61 0.5436 - 0.22 0.8257 
TURNOVER 0.98 0.3279 2.69 0.0073 
Predicted values -2.06 0.0400 0.38 0.7009 
The results of the analysis can again be expressed in a logit: 
log ( Prob(step 3) / Prob (step 1) ) = 2.9059 - 0.4833 / POPSIZE - 2.3960 / TRANSTIME -
1.0638 x LEAVES - 0.0237 x TURNOVER 
The interpretation is as follows: 
- The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-1 channels increases as the 
consumer population of the market centre where the market place is located becomes larger. 
The same was found in the comparison of step-1 and step-2 channels, and step-2 and step-3 
channels. 
- The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-1 channels increases as the 
transport from the production area to the consumer centre requires more time. This was also 
found for the step-1 and step-2 channels and the step-2 and step-3 channels. 
- The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-1 channels is lower when 
the commodities concerned are leafy vegetables (with relatively poor keeping qualities). This 
was also found in the analysis of step-1 and step-2 channels, and step-2 and step-3 
channels. 
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Table 8.9. Significance and direction of independent variables per binomial analysis, 
for trade flows with known terminal markets 
step 2 versus step 1 
(n=725) 
step 3 versus step 2 
(n=2116) 
step 3 versus step 1 
(n=748) 
POPSIZE 
(INVPOPSIZE) 
+ 
( -) 
+ 
( - ) ( -) 
POPDENSITY - + not sign. 
TRANSTTME 
(INVTRANSTIME) 
+ 
( -) 
+ 
(-) 
+ 
( -) 
LEAVES _ — 
TUBERS not sign. not sign. not sign. 
TURNOVER not sign. - -
- The probability of encountering step-3 channels relative to step-1 channels decreases as a 
trader (in the present analysis a retailer) has a larger turnover. This was also found in the 
comparison of step-2 and step-3 channels, but not for the step-1 and step-2 channels. 
The variable POPDENSITY is not significant, in contrast with the analyses of step-1 versus 
step-2 channels, and step-2 versus step-3 channels. The variable TUBERS is not significant 
either, similar to the findings in the other subanalyses. Table 8.9 above summarizes the 
results of all the binomial analyses thus far. 
Multinomial logit of step-1, step-2 and step-3 channels 
Multinomial logit of all three types of marketing channels will now be performed in an 
attempt to confirm the results of the binomial logit analyses. Three groups are distinguished 
(step = 1,2 and 3), which means that the model consists of two logit functions (see Section 
8.1). Box 8.4 shows the results of the analysis. In part A, step=l is taken as the point of 
departure. It gives us the coefficients for the logit functions Prob (step=2) /Prob (step=l) and 
Prob (step=3) / Prob (step=l). In part B, step=2 is taken as the point of departure, showing the 
coefficients for the logit functions Prob (step=l) / Prob (step=2) and Prob (step=3) / Prob (step=2). 
The first function provides no additional information, as the coefficients are exactly the 
opposite of the coefficients for Prob (step=2) / Prob (step=l). The function Prob (step=3) / Prob 
(step=2) does provide information not found by taking step=l as the point of departure, 
namely, on the relationship between step-3 and step-2 channels. 
The results of the multinomial logit analysis largely confirm the results of the 
separate binomial analyses. Table 8.10 summarizes the significance and direction of the 
independent variables. The only difference vis-a-vis the binomial analyses (see Table 8.9) is 
that INVPOPSIZE loses its significance for step-2 versus step-3 channels. This is most 
probably due to the smaller sample sizes which had to be used in the multinomial analysis. 
In the binomial analysis, all step-2 and step-3 channels were included, whereas in the 
multinomial analysis subsamples were taken from the step-2 and step-3 channels (34 per 
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Box 8.4. Multinomial logit analysis of step-1, step-2 and step-3 channels 
Total number of cases 1115 
Number of selected cases 1115 
Dependent variable STEP 
Model Chi-Square 519.6 (df=12,p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 62.2 °, % Çf2=4483, p=0.000) 
A. Step=l as point of departure 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. t-ratio Sig. 
coefficients for step=2 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.5336 0.1085 -4.92 0.0000 
POPDENSITY - 0.1148 0.0467 -2.46 0.0139 
INVTRANSTIME -0.4940 0.1377 -3.59 0.0003 
LEAVES - 0.3785 0.2217 -1.71 0.0877 
TUBERS 0.0237 0.2164 0.11 0.9129 
TURNOVER 0.0056 0.0064 0.87 0.3851 
Constant 1.3054 0.2259 5.78 0.0000 
coefficients for step=3 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.5574 0.1366 -4.08 0.0001 
POPDENSITY 0.0303 0.0541 0.56 0.5763 
INVTRANSTIME -2.6710 0.1956 - 13.65 0.0000 
LEAVES -1.0297 0.3195 -3.22 0.0013 
TUBERS -0.0934 0.2414 -0.39 0.6989 
TURNOVER - 0.0160 0.0072 -2.21 0.0271 
Constant 3.1057 0.2399 12.95 0.0000 
B. Step=2 as point of departure 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. t-ratio Sig. 
coefficients for step=l 
INVPOPSIZE 0.5336 0.1085 4.92 0.0000 
POPDENSITY 0.1148 0.0467 2.46 0.0139 
INVTRANSTIME 0.4940 0.1377 3.59 0.0003 
LEAVES 0.3785 0.2217 1.71 0.0877 
TUBERS - 0.0237 0.2164 -0.11 0.9129 
TURNOVER - 0.0056 0.0064 -0.87 0.3851 
Constant - 1.3054 0.2259 -5.78 0.0000 
coefficients for step=3 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.0238 0.1442 - 0 . 17 0.8673 
POPDENSITY 0.1450 0.0516 2.81 0.0049 
INVTRANSTIME -2.1771 0.1840 -11.83 0.0000 
LEAVES -0.6511 0.3079 -2.12 0.0344 
TUBERS -0.1170 0.2104 -0.56 0.5781 
TURNOVER - 0.0216 0.0055 -3.89 0.0001 
Constant 1.8003 0.1910 9.42 0.0000 
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Table 8.10. Significance and direction of independent variables according to 
multinomial logit analysis, for trade flows with known terminal markets 
(n=1115) 
step=2 versus step=l step=3 versus step-2 step=3 versus step=l 
POPSIZE 
(INVPOPSIZE) 
+ 
(-) 
not sign. + 
(-) 
POPDENSITY - + not sign. 
TRANSTTME 
(TNVTRANSTIME) 
+ 
(-) 
+ 
(-) 
+ 
( - ) 
LEAVES _ _ _ 
TUBERS not sign. not sign. not sign. 
TURNOVER not sign. - -
cent of each). Sampling was necessary in the latter analysis because the number of step-1 
observations was far smaller than the number of step-2 and step-3 observations, and all three 
groups had to be approximately the same size (see Section 8.2). (Sampling was not 
necessary in the case of binomial analysis of step-2 and step-3 channels because step-1 
channels were not included.) The smaller number of observations decreased the power of the 
multinominal analysis, probably causing the lack of significance of POPSIZE for the step-2 
versus step-3 channels. 
The variables POPDENSITY, INVTRANS1TME, LEAVES and TURNOVER 
remain significant for step-2 versus step-3 channels, notwithstanding the smaller size of the 
sample. Although their level of significance is lower than those in the binary analyses, it 
remains sufficiendy high (see Boxes 8.2 and 8.4). 
Both the binomial and multinomial analyses reveal that INVTRANSTIME is by far 
the most significant variable in the comparison of both step-2 and step-3 channels and step-1 
and step-3 channels (see Wald statistics in Boxes 8.2 and 8.3, and t-ratios in Box 8.4). The 
result is different in the case of step-1 versus step-2 channels. INVPOPSIZE is the most 
significant variable there, in both the binomial and the multinomial analysis, with 
INVTRANSTIME second best (see Wald statistics in Box 8.1 and t-ratios in Box 8.4). 
8.4. Testing the model using all trade flows, rural assembly markets 
excluded 
The analyses so far have focused on trade flows which were known to be directed to local 
consumers. While this solved the problem of outgoing flows headed for unknown terminal 
markets, it could have biased the results of the analyses by excluding a proportion of the 
observed transactions in each market. Therefore, a second approach will now be added: 
analysing all trade flows, but excluding those markets where outgoing flows are known to 
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be especially important (the rural assembly markets). If the results of both approaches prove 
similar, we may conclude that no major biases are present 
The procedures are the same as those followed in the previous section. Therefore, 
the results of the binomial analyses are reported in the text in a summary table (Table 8.11), 
and the complete binomial analyses can be found in Appendix 8.4 . 1 5 The results of the 
binomial analyses of all trade flows, rural assembly markets excluded, coincide largely with 
the results of the binomial analyses of trade flows with known terminal markets as presented 
in Table 8.9 above. Two differences appear, and they can both be explained. The first 
concerns the variable POPDENSITY, which is no longer significant for step-1 and step-2 
channels nor for step-2 and step-3 channels (it was already nonsignificant for step-1 and 
step-3 channels). There is an explanation for this. When the rural assembly markets were 
omitted from the sample to solve the problem of outgoing flows, this cased the variable 
POPDENSITY to lose part of its variation. The four rural assembly markets in Kisii District 
have relatively densely populated hinterlands in comparison to other rural markets and most 
urban markets in the sample (see Section 7.4, Table 7.5). Removing those market places 
leaves only three markets with rural population densities over 400 (Wundanyi, Kisii 
Municipality and Keroka), while all others have densities below 200. Thus, the 
discriminating value of POPDENSITY declines and the variable loses its significance. 
The second difference between Tables 8.9 and 8.11 is the lack of significance of the 
variable TURNOVER for step-1 versus step-3 channels in the latter table. There is an 
explanation for this, too. In the analyses of trade flows with known terminal markets, 
professional wholesalers who sold only to other traders and not to consumers (pure 
Table 8.11. Significance and direction of independent variables per binomial analysis, 
for all trade flows with rural assembly markets excluded 
step 1 versus step 2 
(n=465) 
step 2 versus step 3 
(n=1689) 
step 1 versus step 3 
(n=448) 
POPSIZE + + + 
(TNVPOPSrZE) (-) (-) (-) 
POPDENSITY not sign. not sign. not sign. 
TRANSTIME + + + 
(INVTRANSTIME) (-) (-) 
LEAVES - - -
TUBERS not sign. not sign. not sign. 
TURNOVER not sign. - not sign. 
The results of the multinomial analysis do not differ much from the binomial analyses, and are therefore 
not reported. As far as differences exist they are again thought to be the result of reduced power of the 
multinomial analysis due to a smaller sample size (see Sections 8.2 and 8.3). The results of the binary 
analyses are generally stable. The only exception is the significance of the variable LEAVES. Its 
significance is not confirmed in all cases when new samples of the largest group are taken (see Appendix 
8.4, step-1 versus step-2 channels and step-1 versus step-3 channels). 
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wholesalers) were omitted. These traders operate in step-3 channels and have relatively large 
turnovers. 1 6 They are included in the analysis of all trade flows. As a consequence, the 
average turnover of step-1 channels is no longer significantly higher than the average 
turnover of step-3 channels. 1 7 It can be concluded that comparing the turnover of step-1 and 
step-3 traders only makes sense when the analysis focuses on the retail level. 
The presence of pure wholesalers in the sample does not disturb the analysis of step-
2 versus step-3 channels to any great extent. The turnovers of step-3 traders are still 
significantly smaller than those of step-2 traders, but the level of significance is lower. The 
variable TURNOVER is significant at the 0.05 level for all trade flows (Appendix 8.4) and 
at the 0.01 level for trade flows with a known terminal market (see Box 8.2). 
8.5. Conclusions with respect to the model 
Three levels of vertical differentiation have been compared in this chapter: farmer -> 
consumer (step 1), farmer -> retailer -> consumer (step 2) and farmer -> wholesaler -> 
retailer -> consumer (step 3). A model was tested which was based on five hypotheses (see 
Section 7.2). The first hypothesis was: 
A horticultural marketing channel is more vertically differentiated when the centre 
served by the channel has more inhabitants. 
It has been shown that the probabilities of encountering (1) a step-2 channel relative to a 
step-1 channel, (2) a step-3 channel relative to a step-2 channel, and (3) a step-3 channel 
relative to a step-1 channel are all higher when a centre has more inhabitants. It can therefore 
be concluded that this hypothesis is fully accepted. Two qualifications should be made, 
however. First, an increase in the number of inhabitants particularly is the most influential 
when centres are small. As they get bigger (over 10,000 inhabitants), further population 
increase has only a limited effect on the probability of finding more differentiated marketing 
channels there. Second, in the case of step-1 versus step-2 channels, population size is the 
most important variable of all endogenous variables in the model (it has the highest 
significance). Such is not the case otherwise: transport time is the most important 
endogenous variable when it comes to step-2 versus step-3 and step-1 versus step-3 
channels. 
The second hypothesis was: 
The vertical differentiation of a horticultural marketing channel that serves a 
population centre is influenced by the population density of that centre's rural 
hinterland. 
This hypothesis is also accepted. The findings show that a high population density of the 
rural hinterland has a negative effect on the probability of encountering a step-2 channel 
The average turnover of the pure wholesalers was KSh 918 (n=72), compared to KSh 175 for other 
traders who operated in step-3 channels (n=520). Analysis of variance shows that the averages differ 
significantly, at p<0.001 when turnover is used as a dependent variable, and at p<0.01 for log-
transformed turnovers (without this transformation the distributions are positively skewed). 
Besides pure professional wholesalers, pure farmer-wholesalers were also left out of the analysis of trade 
flows with known terminal markets. The latter respondents, however, were also excluded from the 
analysis of all trade flows, since they were found only in rural assembly markets. 
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relative to a step-1 channel. This can be explained in terms of the supply-side effect 
described in Section 7.2. A higher population density leads to the presence of more 
horticultural farmers in the hinterland. Some of them come to the market place to sell to 
consumers, thus increasing the importance of step-1 channels. 
A high population density of the rural hinterland has a positive effect on the 
probability of encountering a step-3 channel relative to a step-2 channel. This involves the 
demand-side effect: a high population density of the rural hinterland increases the consumer 
population served by the market centre because some of the rural households lack self-
sufficiency (and a larger consumer population increases the probability of finding more 
differentiated marketing channels). 
A high population density of the rural hinterland has no significant effect on the 
probability of finding a step-3 channel relative to a step-1 channel. This suggests that in this 
case opposing supply- and demand effects balance each other out. 
The third hypothesis was: 
Horticultural marketing channels are more vertically differentiated when the transport 
from the production area to the market centre served by the channel takes more time. 
The analyses have shown that the probability of encountering a step-2 channel relative to a 
step-1 channel, a step-3 channel relative to a step-2 channel, and a step-3 channel relative to 
a step-1 channel is greater when transport takes more time. The hypothesis is therefore 
accepted. It should be noted that an increase in transport time has the strongest impact on the 
probability of coming across more differentiated marketing channels in cases where 
production and consumption centres are relatively near to each other. If they are far apart 
(over 4 hours' drive), any further increase in transport time has a weaker effect 
The fourth hypothesis was: 
Horticultural marketing channels are more vertically differentiated when the 
commodities traded have better keeping qualities. 
The results of the analyses show that this hypothesis can only partly be accepted. Three 
types of horticultural produce were distinguished: commodities with poor keeping qualities 
(leafy vegetables), medium keeping qualities and good keeping qualities (tubers, roots and 
bulbs). It has been shown that a significant difference exists between commodities with poor 
keeping qualities and other horticultural commodities: the probability of finding a more 
differentiated marketing channel is smaller when dealing with leafy vegetables.1 8 Contrary to 
this, however, no significant difference was found between commodities with good keeping 
qualities (tubers, roots and bulbs) and other horticultural commodities. This is most likely 
due to the absence of storage at any level in the marketing chain, and transport distances that 
never go beyond a two-day journey. As a consequence, the time between harvesting and 
selling to consumers is almost always less than one week, even in the case of tubers, roots 
and bulbs. 
The fifth and final hypothesis was: 
Horticultural marketing channels are less vertically differentiated when the retailers 
involved have a larger turnover. 
This hypothesis was formulated only for step-2 versus step-3 channels and step-1 versus 
step-3 channels. The analysis has shown that for these two combinations, the hypothesis is 
It must be further noted that differences are only significant at the 0.10 level. 
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indeed accepted. The probability of encountering a more differentiated marketing channel 
becomes smaller (and the probability of finding a less differentiated marketing channel 
becomes greater) when the turnover of the retailer involved is larger. 
All in all, it can be concluded that the hypotheses on (1) the number of inhabitants of 
the market centre, (2) the population density of the rural hinterland, (3) the transport time of 
the commodities, and (4) the turnover of the traders have been fully accepted, whereas the 
hypothesis on the keeping qualities of the commodities was partially accepted. 
S u m m a r y and C o n c l u s i o n s 
9 
This book deals with horticultural marketing channels in Kenya. In particular, it studies the 
structure and development of such channels and the actors and institutions that operate 
within them. The rationale of collecting wholesalers and the development of rural assembly 
markets is analysed, and the vertical differentiation of the marketing channels is investigated 
in depth to identify factors that explain the process. The chapter to follow provides a 
summary of the research findings and general conclusions. 
9.1. Summary of the research findings 
Horticulture in Kenya 
Kenya belongs to the middle-income countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.1 It has a fast growing 
population, of which an increasing proportion lives in towns. The majority of the rural 
population lives in the fertile central and western highlands, and along the shores of Lake 
Victoria and the Indian Ocean. Pressure on land is mounting in these areas. Horticulture 
occupies over ten per cent of Kenya's total arable land. 
Almost all horticultural producers in Kenya are smallholders who cultivate 
vegetables, fruits and tubers for family consumption and for the domestic market 2 The 
hmited number of large-scale farms in the country concentrate mainly on production for 
export Most of them use irrigation. Smallholder production is generally rainfed. 
The production of horticultural commodities for the domestic market was studied 
here in detail in three districts, namely Nyandarua in the central highlands, Kisii in the 
highlands of western Kenya, and Taita Taveta halfway between the central highlands and the 
coast. 3 Nyandarua is one of the chief suppliers of potatoes and cabbages to the Nairobi 
market a 100 km to 140 km journey from the production area. Kisii is a key producer of 
bananas. The fruits find their way to urban centres in western Kenya, the Rift Valley and the 
1 Section 3.1. 
2 Section 3.2. 
3 Section 3.3. 
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central highlands 500 km further up the road. Taita Taveta has two centres of horticultural 
production, the wet Taita Hills and the farmland around the Taveta Springs in the otherwise 
dry lowlands. The Taita Hills are a major supplier of cabbages, tomatoes, capsicums and 
other vegetables to the Mombasa market, 170 km away. The Taveta area produces bananas, 
tomatoes, onions, mangoes and citrus fruits for the same market. That trip is some 80 km 
longer. 
In all four research areas (Taita and Taveta taken separately) commercial horticulture 
has evolved gradually among smallholders over the past decades. Favourable agro-
ecological circumstances and increasing land shortage in the production areas, in 
combination with growing urban demand and improvement of interregional road networks, 
have fostered the development process. 
Our farm survey found high participation in commercial horticulture, not only near 
all-weather roads but also in more isolated parts of the research areas.4 Among those 
involved, horticulture was on average the most important source of cash revenues on the 
farm. It was a core activity for low-, middle- and high-income households. 
It has been argued that commercial horticulture offers a more sustainable source of 
income to smallholders than do export crops (coffee, tea, cotton) or off-farm employment.5 
The sustainability of the horticultural enterprise is, however, threatened by its present 
success. The rise of commercial horticulture initially led to diversification in the agricultural 
sector. When it proved profitable, farmers began to ignore other agricultural crops. This is 
not necessarily a problem, since horticultural crops are extremely varied in nature. However, 
the research shows that farmers tend to limit themselves to a few horticultural commodities 
(such as potatoes in Nyandarua and bananas in Kisii and Taveta), making their farming as 
poorly diversified and as vulnerable as before.6 Specialization and lack of crop rotation lead 
to severe pest and disease problems. The problems are exacerbated by failing crop 
protection. 
Horticultural marketing channels in Kenya 
Once the commodities are produced they are brought into the marketing system This system 
consists of marketing channels which are part of the marketing structures that operate within 
a marketing environment. The Kenyan environment is in many aspects quite similar to the 
marketing environment of horticultural marketing structures in other Sub-Saharan African 
countries.7 The political and legal environment is weak. Government interventions, which 
until recently characterized the marketing of grains, are absent in the case of horticultural 
commodities. Vegetables, fruits and tubers are not regarded as strategic. Moreover, their 
perishability makes interventions risky, and requires cold storage facilities in the event of 
off-season storage. The demographic and economic environments have a greater impact on 
the horticultural marketing structures than the political and legal environment has. The size of 
the urban population, the degree of self-sufficiency of rural households, and the purchasing 
power of rural and urban households are all determinants of the size of the potential 
4 Section 3.4. 
5 
6 
7 
Section 3.4. 
Section 3.4. 
Section 4.1. 
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consumer population. The physical environment (infrastructure) determines whether these 
consumers can actually be reached. The socio, cultural and ethnic environment influences the 
diet of consumers, as well as the characteristics of market intermediaries. 
A wide variety of marketing intermediaries operate in the Kenyan horticultural 
marketing channels. Multiplicity of channels is quite common.8 Marketing structures may 
encompass a wide range of channels. 
Traders (merchants) are the most important marketing intermediaries because they 
take tide to the produce. Different types of traders operate at different levels in the marketing 
channels and in different types of market places.9 Farmer-traders and professional retailers 
serve local consumers in periodic retail markets in rural areas. Farmer-traders and 
assembling traders sell in rural assembly markets to wholesalers from elsewhere. 
Professional wholesalers in daily urban markets sell to professional retailers, who in turn 
sell in the same or in another daily urban market to consumers. The professional wholesalers 
may collect the produce themselves or act as distributing wholesalers, using collecting 
wholesalers as intermediaries. 
The distinction between wholesale traders and retail traders, and between wholesale 
markets and retail markets, is rather artificial. One and the same trader or market may serve 
both traders and consumers. Traders' assortments give no clue to the type of trade 
(wholesale or retail). This is because the assortment of wholesalers and retailers is usually 
limited. The assorting function is relatively unimportant to both of them. 
Our trade survey found that by far the majority of the horticultural traders are 
women. 1 0 Male traders appear only when remunerations are relatively high, as is the case in 
wholesale trade, or in retail trade carried out in daily retail markets of large urban centres. 
With regard to ethnic background, age and marital status, the composition of the trader 
population in a market place usually corresponds more or less to the composition of the 
general population in the region where the market is located. 
The trade survey suggests that the majority of the horticultural traders derive low to 
moderate daily and monthly incomes from their trading activities. Three small groups have 
high incomes. Two of them concentrate on the domestic market, namely the collecting 
wholesalers, and those distributing wholesalers who operate in large wholesale markets 
(such as the Kongowea wholesale market in Mombasa). Horticultural export traders 
constitute a third group of relatively wealthy traders. 
The horticultural export traders are a world apart.11 They ran multimillion companies 
which have various offices (e.g. in the production area, in the centre of Nairobi and at the 
airport), and which deal with transport, storage, sales, and promotion. They produce on 
large-scale farms, use smallholders as contract farmers, or combine both methods. 
The Kenyan export assortment differs extensively from the assortment in the 
domestic market This has the advantage that exports do not cause scarcity or inflate prices in 
the domestic market The disadvantage is that exporters cannot sell unexportable produce in 
the local market either. The traders need a solid financial basis to cope with financial losses. 
8 Section 42. 
9 Section 5.2. 
1 0 Section 5.2. 
1 1 Section 5.4. 
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In addition they try to reduce risks through vertical integration and coordination (also beyond 
the export stage), diversification and flexibility. 
In addition to traders, marketing intermediaries who do not take title to the produce 
operate in the horticultural marketing channels. 1 2 In the production areas, purchasing 
agents work on behalf of collecting wholesalers. They possess expert power because of 
their knowledge of the local situation. They reduce collection costs by identifying produce 
for sale, carrying out the negotiations and streamlining the process. In return they receive a 
commission. Brokers, who operate on the same basis, are less common. They are found, 
for instance, in the Nairobi wholesale market A special kind of broker that operates in the 
Mombasa wholesale market is the auctioneer. 
Porters and transporters are hired as facil i tat ing in te rmed ia r i e s to get the 
produce from the farm to the destination market The transporters use donkeys, tractors, 
handcarts, minibuses, coaches, and small and large trucks. In the export trade, cargo planes, 
airliners, and sometimes cargo vessels may be used (the latter only in combination with 
refrigerated containers). 
Important financial facilitators in domestic horticultural trade are savings and credit 
associations. Commercial banks are relatively unimportant because most payments are made 
in cash. The banks are reluctant to issue loans to horticultural traders because of their lack of 
collateral and their high trade risks. Other facilitating intermediaries such as warehouse 
firms, marketing research companies, insurance companies and advertising agencies are 
unimportant to horticultural traders (export traders being the exception to the rule for the first 
three). 
Horticultural marketing cooperatives, marketing institutions which might best be 
classified as selling agents, are rare in Kenya. 1 3 Reasons for this are a general reluctance on 
the part of farmers to participate in any kind of group marketing as a result of negative 
experiences with cooperative structures, as well as availability of alternative marketing 
channels. Case studies of the Horticultural Cooperative Union and the horticultural 
marketing activities of the Kinangop Agricultural Cooperative society have shown that 
farmers' reluctance to participate in new initiatives is understandable. Both organizations 
failed due to mismanagement and the lack of successful marketing strategies. The Union 
thought it could improve the efficiency and equity in domestic and export marketing channels 
to the benefit of farmers. It lost the battle with private traders due to its bureaucratic payment 
procedures and inflexible commission rates. The Kinangop society, which was entirely 
equity-based, just copied the activities of collecting wholesalers, but without the required 
knowledge of the marketing system. However, one further case study of the Taita 
Horticultural Produce Cooperate Society has shown that cooperative marketing does not 
always fail. The Taita HPC has succeeded by bringing something new: improved service 
output (effectiveness) of the marketing channel through supplying superior quality produce. 
Other core elements of its strategy are the market-oriented planning of harvests, and direct 
access to retailers. 
One more market intermediary needs be mentioned, the processor. Although by 
far the largest portion of the Kenyan horticultural commodities are marketed fresh, some are 
1 2 Section 5.2. 
1 3 Section 5.3. 
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processed before reaching consumers in Kenya or elsewhere. Kenya has canning, juice 
extraction and jam making factories. 1 4 Major products are tinned pineapples and tinned 
French beans for export, and jams, ketchup, sauces and tinned juices for the domestic 
market In addition to large commercial firms, small cottage industries are involved, 
producing fresh fruit juices among other commodities. Many factories have experienced 
difficulties in surviving, especially when they produce for export. Case studies of Pan 
African Vegetable Products Ltd and of Bawazir Fruit Processors Ltd have shown that the 
quality of the Kenyan raw materials is poor, that farmers prefer to sell in the fresh market 
where they receive higher prices, that production costs are inflated by poor infrastructure and 
high costs of packing materials, and that competition in the world market is lethal.1 5 
The collection stage of the marketing system deserves special attention because it is 
the most problematic and least understood part African politicians like to question the 
rationale of collecting wholesalers. The mediation of these traders can, however, be 
efficient for distributing wholesalers and farmers. They allow distributing wholesalers to 
focus entirely on their urban clienteles. This is especially important in large urban centres 
where wholesale and retail markets operate six days a week. For such distributing 
wholesalers, being absent has its costs in terms of lost revenues and customer relations.1 6 
Collecting wholesalers can also be efficient intermediaries for farmers, as shown by 
a case study of the collecting potato trade between Kinangop (Nyandarua) and Nairobi. 1 7 
Farmers who carry the potatoes to the Nairobi wholesale market by themselves face costs 
with regard to transport storage, finance, risk taking, information, negotiation and payment 
(the last three being transaction costs). Especially the high average costs in relation to 
transport, finance and information make reliance on collecting wholesalers more economical 
for farmers than going to Nairobi themselves. 1 8 The wholesale traders are able to perform 
these functions more efficiendy because they have higher turnovers. They are in business 
throughout the season or year, which allows them to develop customer relations with 
transporters, accumulate knowledge about price developments, and level out high start-up 
costs. 
Even if farmer's costs in relation to transport finance and information are reduced 
through a credit scheme and an improved market information system, the majority are still 
better off selling their produce to collecting wholesalers, because their supply is simply too 
small. Only by operating as a group could they potentially achieve the same economies of 
scale as the traders. 
Farmers and collecting wholesalers in Kinangop usually trade with each other at or 
near the farms, whereas in Kisii such transactions are concentrated in ru ra l assembly 
markets. The difference can be explained in terms of transport and information costs. 
According to the findings of the farm and trade surveys, assembly markets tend to be found 
in surplus areas where farms are poorly accessible compared to market places, and where 
supply concentration is low. 1 9 Under these circumstances traders who assemble produce at 
1 4 Section 5.5. 
1 5 Section 5.5. 
1 6 Section 6.1. 
1 7 Section 62. 
1 8 Section 62, Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1. 
1 9 Section 6.4. 
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farms face high transport costs, and the development of an assembly market will reduce their 
costs. 2 0 It will also increase the efficiency of the marketing channel, because farmers who 
take their produce to the market use low-cost means of transport in comparison to traders 
who go to the farms. To the farmers, the assembly market ensures a price that more or less 
reflects current supply and demand conditions, thus reducing their costs of imperfect 
information. 
Under certain circumstances, dual systems or first- and second-level assembly 
markets exist . 2 1 In Taita and Taveta these circumstances are specific infrastructural 
conditions and the presence of specialized transporters. 
It is expected that assembly markets will gain in importance (Nyandarua, Taita), or at 
least maintain their current importance (Kisii, Taveta) for the coming decade. 2 2 Only in the 
long run, if a search for improved quality control leads to vertical coordination and 
integration in domestic marketing channels, may assembly markets become less important, 
A few final comments on horticultural marketing channels in Kenya can be made, 
employing keywords from structure-conduct-performance analysis. 2 3 In the domestic 
market, buyer and seller concentrations are generally low, except in less accessible 
production areas without assembly markets where a limited number of collecting wholesalers 
deal with individual farmers at the farm gate. Financial constraints (lack of formal credit) and 
transport constraints (lack of trucks for hire in production areas) hamper the entry of new 
wholesalers, thus reducing competition at this stage. 
The level of competition among traders in the domestic market is high. Price cartels 
and deliberate restrictions on traded quantities were not found during the trade survey. Any 
price agreements among traders would hardly hamper competition anyway because of the 
absence of standardized selling units. 
In the export market, capital requirements are an important entry barrier, as is 
cumulated experience. The number of exporters is limited, but mutual competition is high. 
Competition in the world market is severe and still mounting. Customer relations are 
important both towards suppliers and buyers. Up-to-date price information is accessible to 
exporters, but not to contract farmers and independent smallholder producers. 
Lack of up-to-date price information is also a problem to horticultural farmers in the 
domestic market, especially when they live in isolated production areas without assembly 
markets. They depend for their sales on collecting wholesalers who come to the farms, while 
receiving their price information from these same traders. 
If farm-gate prices are low, this does not necessarily mean that profit margins of 
traders are high. Farm-gate prices are affected by high physical losses in the marketing 
process. The losses result from poorly developed rural market places and rural roads, and a 
lack of appropriate and affordable packing materials. Farm-gate prices are also affected by a 
strong seasonality of supply. 
2 0 Section 6.7. 
2 1 Sections 6.5 and 6.6. 
2 2 Section 6.7. 
2 3 Section 5.6. 
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Vertical differentiation of horticultural marketing channels 
The horticultural sector in Kenya can be characterized as an emerging economy. 2 4 One of 
the characteristics of such an economy is that marketing channels directed to the domestic 
market are still in a process of vertical differentiation. A model has been developed here to 
find out which factors determine this process. 2 5 It distinguishes three steps of 
differentiation: (1) farmer -> consumer, (2) farmer -> retailer -> consumer, and (3) farmer 
-> wholesaler -> retailer -> consumer. The third step also includes channels with more than 
one wholesale level. The first two explanatory factors entered into the model are the number 
of inhabitants of the market centre where the surveyed market place is located and the 
population density of the rural hinterland. They are indicators of the consumer population 
served by the marketing channel. Other factors are transport time of the commodity from 
producer to consumer, keeping qualities of the commodity, and turnover of the trader 
concerned. 
The unit of analysis is the transaction.26 It refers to a trader, a commodity handled by 
this trader, a buying-and-selling combination in relation to this commodity, and the transport 
time in relation to this buying-and-selling combination. Each transaction is related to one of 
the three differentiation steps in the model. 
The trade survey registered 3776 transactions. Not all of them are used in the present 
analysis. Some transactions represent channels that are not directed to the local consumer 
population but to unknown consumer populations elsewhere. These transactions have to be 
removed because the size of the consumer population is one of the explanatory variables in 
the model. Two approaches are applied. First, all surveyed market places are included in the 
analysis, but transactions with unknown terminal markets are removed from the sample, 
leaving 2474 transactions. Second, all transactions are included, but rural assembly markets, 
where outgoing flows are known to be important, are removed. This leaves 2682 
transactions. The results of both approaches should ideally be similar. The analyses show 
that this is indeed the case. 
Five hypotheses have been formulated here, which, on the basis of logit analyses, 
were all at least partly accepted. The first hypothesis proposes that a horticultural marketing 
channel is more differentiated when the centre served by the channel has more inhabitants. In 
general, the history of Sub-Saharan Africa shows a clear relation between urbanization and 
urban growth on the one hand and the development of food marketing channels on the 
other. 2 7 More specifically, the growth of the number of inhabitants of a centre increases the 
market output which in turn allows traders economies of scale when they differentiate.28 
According to the analysis, the relation between the number of inhabitants and the structure of 
the channels that serve them is non-linear an increase in population has the strongest impact 
on the probability of encountering more differentiated channels when the centre is relatively 
small. 2 9 
2 4 Section 7.1. 
2 5 Section 7.2. 
2 6 Section 7.3. 
2 7 Chapter 2. 
2 8 Section 7.2. 
2 9 Chapter 8. 
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The second hypothesis proposes that the differentiation of a horticultural marketing 
channel that serves a population centre is influenced by the population density of this 
centre's rural hinterland. The analysis shows that the effect is negative when step-2 and step-
1 channels are compared. A higher rural population density implies more horticultural 
farmers, some of whom come to sell to consumers in the centre's market (a supply-side 
effect). The effect is positive when step-3 and step-2 channels are compared. A higher rural 
population density implies more rural consumers who depend on the centre's market (a 
demand-side effect). 
The third hypothesis proposes that horticultural marketing channels are more 
differentiated when the transport from the production area to the market centre that is served 
by the channel requires more time. In general, the history of Sub-Saharan Africa shows a 
clear relation between transport conditions and food marketing structures. 3 0 More 
specifically, when commodities come from further away, and therefore require more 
transport time, this increases the opportunities of differentiating traders to gain from 
economies of scale in the process. 3 1 According to the analysis, the relation is again non-
linear: the impact of an increase in transport time on the probability of encountering more 
differentiated channels decreases when transport time is already substantial.32 
The fourth hypothesis proposes that horticultural marketing channels are more 
differentiated when the commodities traded have better keeping qualities. Every transaction 
takes time, but that time is less precious for commodities with good keeping qualities than 
for highly perishable ones. According to the analysis, the hypothesis is only accepted when 
leafy vegetables are compared with other horticultural commodities. The extremely poor 
keeping qualities of leafy vegetables imply less differentiated channels. 
The fifth and final hypothesis proposes that horticultural marketing channels are less 
differentiated when the retailers involved have larger turnovers. Farmers who retail their 
produce (step-1) and professional retailers who buy from farmers (step-2) are expected to, 
and found to, have larger turnovers than retailers who buy from wholesalers (step-3). The 
latter have to rely on wholesalers because their selling quantities are too small to make their 
own transport from the production area to the market centre profitable. 
Policy recommendations 
On the basis of the problems of the horticultural sector, 3 3 the performance of the 
horticultural market 3 4 and the differentiation model presented above, policy 
recommendations have been formulated. These are presented in Appendix 9.1. They are 
intended for both private marketing intermediaries and the Kenyan government. At the 
production stage they relate to extension, credit and inputs. At the marketing stage they 
concern the exchange functions (recommendations on market infrastructure, group 
marketing), physical functions (road infrastructure, transport, cold storage) and facilitating 
functions (credit, packing, standardization, information systems). 
3 0 Chapter 2. 
3 1 Section 7.2. 
3 2 Chapter 8. 
3 3 Section 3.4. 
3 4 Section 5.6. 
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9.2. General conclusions 
The marketing channel approach has been used here to study the trade of horticultural 
commodities in Kenya. This makes the study more holistic than a study of market places or 
traders as such. It is a kind of systems approach: all marketing steps from producer to 
consumer are taken as a system 
The marketing channel approach has allowed us to analyse efficiencies of the 
marketing process. We were able to calculate the costs of all marketing functions that have to 
be performed at different stages of the marketing channel. In this way, we could explain 
why collecting wholesalers are important, and indeed the best alternative, for potato farmers 
in Kinangop, Nyandarua District 
Through the channel approach we were also in a better position to understand the 
dynamics of the marketing process. It helped explain, for instance, the development of rural 
assembly markets for horticultural commodities. Consideration of the transport and 
information costs of farmers and wholesalers at the collection stage of the marketing channel 
showed when and where these markets are expected to emerge. 
In particular, the channel approach made it possible to explain the number of trade 
levels observed in the marketing system (the degree of vertical differentiation of the 
channels). According to the findings, two of the principle explanatory factors are population 
size of the consumer centre, and transport time from producer to consumer. Interestingly, 
these two factors also feature in gravity models used in regional marketing analysis. 3 5 Such 
models were developed to explain not the structure of marketing channels, but the 
attractiveness of a city's shopping area. The present findings suggest that gravity models 
may also contribute to a better understanding of the structure of marketing channels in 
developing countries. 
The vertical differentiation model proposed here helps to anticipate future 
developments in the marketing system in relation to expected trends in the demographic 
marketing environment (rural and urban population concentrations) and in the physical one 
(infrastructure). This is in contrast with approaches such as structure-conduct-performance 
analysis which usually do not go beyond the present state of affairs.36 
The model used here will most likely have relevance not only for Kenya but also for 
other emerging economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The horticultural marketing system in 
Kenya is further developed than those in many other African countries as a result of large 
urban demand, high pressure on arable land, and a relatively well developed road system. 
Many African countries are heading in the same direction, however. The model can be an aid 
to understanding how horticultural marketing channels in these countries are likely to 
develop. 
The present analysis has shown that marketing channel theory, which has been 
applied extensively in developed countries, is of great relevance to the developing world as 
well. The analysis has focused on horticultural commodities, but studies on the marketing of 
other food crops such as grains can benefit from the same approach. These studies are 
Section 4.5. 
One of the criticisms of SCP analysis put forward by Janssen & Van Tilburg (1997) concerns its 
limited predictive power (see Section 5.6, Box 5.1). 
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needed now that state-controlled marketing is no longer the issue, and policymakers have put 
their faith in the free market 
Appendices 
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Appendix 2.1: 
Causes of rural-urban migration in post-independence Africa 
Becker et al. (1986) and UN (1989) identify a wide range of economic and non-economic 
causes of rural-urban migration in post-independence Africa. Among the economic factors 
are prices deliberately skewed against the agricultural sector (the urban bias), and a gap 
between urban and rural expected wages. A factor with both economic and environmental 
aspects is the rising population pressure on natural resources, as shown by indicators such 
as accelerating soil erosion, soil degradation and outright destruction, often associated with 
overstocking and overgrazing, and the breakdown of indigenous farming systems and 
smallholdings. 
Geographical factors of rural-urban migration are the proximity of most urban 
centres to densely populated rural areas, and the short distances between villages and 
medium-size towns. The latter is said to stimulate stepwise migration (village - small town -
big town), although there is no consensus on this. 
Social factors are marital instability, short-term cash needs for dowries, and access to 
education and consumer goods and services in urban centres. In addition, the ease of 
adjusting to the urban milieu due to a support system provided by relatives is said to facilitate 
rural-urban migration. 
Psychological factors are a desire for freedom from control of the older generation, 
the importance of prestige and the image of the city, and finally, distorted perceptions of the 
likelihood of success in the city. The ultimate goal of the rural youth, schooled in the formal 
education system, is the acquisition of a 'white collar' job in the city (Rempel & Todaro, 
1973). 
Political factors in some countries are rural insecurity and the expelling of nationals, 
mosdy petty traders, of one country from another. Rural insecurity was experienced in 
countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Sudan, Liberia and Burundi. A mass 
exodus followed Ghana's Aliens Compliance Order in 1969 and Nigeria's Aliens Quit Order 
of 1983. 
Additional factors in the rural-urban migration of women are the weak social position 
of childless women in traditional cultures, the desire to escape responsibilities for 
cultivation, the stifling social position imposed on women by men in villages, and better 
chances of finding a suitable partner in cities. 
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Appendix 3.1: 
Commercial horticultural crops in Kenya1 
Common Name Botanical Name Utilization 
Apple 
Artichoke (Globe) 
Artichoke 
(Jerusalem) 
Asparagus 
Aubergine 
Avocado 
Banana (Sweet) 
Banana (Cooking) 
Bean (Broad) 
Bean (Common or 
Kidney) 
Beetroot 
Breadfruit 
Brinjal 
Broccoli 
Brussels sprout 
Cabbage 
Carrot 
Cape gooseberry 
Cassava 
Cauliflower 
Celery 
Cherimoya 
Chora 
Pyrus malus (Rosaceae) Fruit 
Cynara scolymus (Compositae) Vegetable 
Helianthus tuberosus 
(Compositae) Vegetable 
Asparagus officininalis 
(Liliaceae) Vegetable 
Solanum melongena 
(Solanaceae) Vegetable 
Persea americana (Lauraceae) Fruit 
Musa sapientum (Musaceae) Fruit 
Musa paradisiaca (Musaceae) Vegetable 
Vicia faba (Leguminosae) Vegetable 
Phaseolus vulgaris 
(Leguminosae) Vegetable 
Beta vulgaris 
(Chenopodiaceae) Vegetable 
Artocarpus altilis (Moraceae) Fruit 
Solanum melongena 
(Solanaceae) Vegetable 
Brassica oleracea var. botrytJs 
(Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Brassica oleracea var. 
gemrnifera (Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Brassica oleracea var. capitata 
(Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Daucus carota (Umbelliferae) Vegetable 
Physalis peruviana (Solanaceae) Fruit 
Manihot esculenta (Euphorbiaceae) Vegetable 
Brassica oleracea var. botrytis 
(Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Apium graveolens var. dulce 
(Umbelliferae) Vegetable 
Annona cherimola 
(Annonaceae) Fruit 
Vigna unguiculata 
(Leguminosae) Vegetable 
Based on Kokwaro (1979). Cut flowers are not included in the list 
Common Name Botanical Name Utilization 
Choyote Seehium edule 
(Cucurbitaceae) Vegetable 
Cluster bean Cyamopsis tetragonoloba 
Vegetable (Leguminosae) 
Coconut Cocos nucifera (Palmae) Edible nut 
Coco yam (new) Xanthosoma sagittifolium 
Vegetable (Araceae) 
Coco yam (old) Colocasia esculenta (Araceae) Vegetable 
Cress (Water) Nasturtium officinale 
(Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Cucumber Cucumis sativus 
(Cucurbitaceae) Vegetable 
Dhania Coriandrum sativum 
(Umbelliferae) Pot herb 
Dudi Lagenaria siceraria 
(Cucurbitaceae) Vegetable 
Eggplant Solanum melongena 
Vegetable (Solanaceae) 
Endive Qchorium endivia 
(Compositae) Vegetable 
Fennel Foeniculum vulgare 
(Umbelliferae) Pot herb 
Fig Reus carica (Moraceae) Fruit 
Galka Luffa cylindrica 
Vegetable (Cucurbitaceae) 
Garlic Allium sativum 
(Amaryllidaceae) Pot herb 
Gherkin Cucumis sativus 
(Cucurbitaceae) Vegetable 
Golden grenadilla Passiflora ligularis 
Fruit (Passifloraceae) 
Grape Vitis vinifera (Vitaceae) Fruit 
Grapefruit Citrus paradisi (Rutuceae) Fruit 
Guar Cyamopsis tetragonoloba 
Vegetable (Leguminosae) 
Guava Psidium guajava (Myrtaceae) Fruit 
Horseradish tree Moringa oleifera 
(Moringaceae) Vegetable 
Jackfruit Artocarpus heterophyllus 
Fruit (Moraceae) 
Jambolan Eugenia cuminii (Myrtaceae) Fruit 
Kale Brassica oleracea var. acephala 
(Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Karela Momordica charantia 
(Cucurbitaceae) Vegetable 
Kohlrabi Brassica oleracea var. 
(Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Leek Allium ampeloprasum var. 
Vegetable porrum (Amaryllidaceae) 
Lemon Citrus limon (Rutaceae) Fruit 
Lettuce Lactuca sativa (Compositae) Vegetable 
Lime Citrus aurantifolia 
(Rutaceae) Fruit 
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Common Name . 
Loquat 
Macadarnia 
Mandarin 
Mango 
Marrow 
Methi 
Melon (Canteloupe) 
Melon (Water) 
Mint (Round-leaved) 
Mulberry 
Mushroom 
Mzambarau 
Okra 
Onion 
Orange 
Papaya or Pawpaw 
Parsley 
Parsnip 
Passion fruit 
Pea 
Pea (Pigeon) 
Peach 
Pear 
Pepper (Red) 
Pepper (Sweet) 
Pineapple 
Plantain 
Plum 
Pomegranate 
Pomelo 
Potato 
Pumpkin 
Radish 
Radish (Moolee) 
Rape 
Botanical Name Utilization 
Eriobotrya japonica 
(Rosaceae) Fruit 
Macadamia ternifolia 
(Proteaceae) Edible Nut 
Citrus reticulata (Rutaceae) Fruit 
Mangifera indica 
(Anacardiaceae) Fruit 
Cucurbita pepo 
(Cucurbitaceae) Vegetable 
Trigonella foenum-graecum 
(leguminosae) Pot herb 
Cucumis melo 
(Cucurbitaceae) Fruit 
Citrillus lanatus 
(Cucurbitaceae) Fruit 
Mentha rotundifolia (Labiatae) Pot herb 
Morus spp. (Moraceae) Fruit 
Psalliota campestris 
(Basidiomycetes) Vegetable 
Eugenia cuminii (Myrtaceae) Fruit 
Hibiscus esculentus 
(Malvaceae) Vegetable 
Allium cepa var. cepa. 
(Arnaryllidaceae) Vegetable 
Citrus sinensis (Rutaceae) Fruit 
Carica papaya (Caricaceae) Fruit 
Petroselinum crispum 
(Umbelliferae) Vegetable 
Pastinaca sativa (Umbelliferae) Vegetable 
Passiflora edulis 
(Passifloraceae) Fruit 
Pisum sativum (Leguminosae) Vegetable 
Cajanus cajan (Leguminosae) Vegetable 
Prunus persica (Rosaceae) Fruit 
Pyrus communis (Rosaceae) Fruit 
Capsicum frutescens 
(Solanaceae) Spice 
Capsicum annum (Solanaceae) Vegetable 
Ananas comosus 
(Bromeliaceae) Fruit 
Musa paradisiaca (Musaceae) Vegetable 
Prunus salicina (Rosacceae) Fruit 
Punica granatum (Punicaceae) Fruit 
Citrus grandis (Rutaceae) Fruit 
Solanum tuberosum (Solanaceae) Vegetable 
Cucurbita maxima 
(Cucurbitaceae) Vegetable 
Raphanus sativus (Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Raphanus sativus var. 
hortensis (Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Brassica napus (Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Common Name Botanical Name Utilization 
Rhubarb Rheum rhaponticum Dessert, 
Savoy 
(Polygonaceae) Vegetable 
Brassica oleracea var. capitata 
(Cruciferae) Vegetable 
Shallot Allium cepa var. 
aggregatum (Amaryuidaceae) Pot herb 
Snake Gourd Trichosanthes cucumerina 
(Cucurbitaceae) Vegetable 
Spinach Spinacia oleracea 
Vegetable (Chenopodiaceae) 
Spinach (Amaranthus) Amaranthus spp. 
(Amaranthaceae) Vegetable 
Spinach (Beet) Beta vulgaris (Chenopodiaceae) Vegetable 
Spring Onion Allium cepa var. 
aggregatum (Amaryllidaceae) Pot herb 
Strawberry Fragaria vesca (Rosaceae) Fruit 
Sweet corn Zea mays var. saccharata 
(Gramineae) Vegetable 
Sweet potato Ipomoea batatas (Convolvulaceae) Vegetable 
Saragwo Moringa oleifera 
(Moringaceae) Vegetable 
Suran Amorphophallus campanulatus 
Vegetable (Araceae) 
Tangerine a m i s reticulata (Rutaceae) Fruit 
Tindora Cocciniagrandis 
(Cucurbitaceae) Vegetable 
Tomato Lycopersicon esculentum Fruit, 
(Solanaceae) Vegetable 
Tomato (Cherry) Lycopersicon esculentum Fruit, 
var. cerasiformae Vegetable 
Tomato Tree Cyphomandra betacea Fruit, 
(Solanaceae) Vegetable 
Turia Luffa acutangula 
(Cucurbitaceae) Vegetable 
Turnip Brassica rapa (Crucifereae) Vegetable 
Val Lablab purpureus 
Vegetable (Leguminosae) 
Valor Lablab purpureus vat. 
Vegetable benghalensis 
Yam Dioscorea spp. (Dioscoreaceae) Vegetable 
Youngberry Rubus strigosus (Rosaceae) Fruit 
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Appendix 3.2: 
Production of cut flowers and cut foliage in Kenya, 1987-1992 (Hectares) 
Type offlower 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Spray Carnations 120.0 145.0 157.0 182.0 220.0 275.0 
Standard Carnations 35.5 50.0 18.5 53.0 27.0 42.0 
Roses 16.0 25.0 21.0 27.0 47.0 80.0 
Statice (Limonium spp) 128.0 197.0 209.0 100.5 118.5 112.0 
Alstroemeria 48.0 55.0 68.0 82.0 50.0 86.0 
Tuberose 10.0 4.5 6.0 2.0 10.0 15.0 
Arabicum (0. Saundersiae) 35.0 25.0 14.0 14.8 10.0 30.0 
Molucclla 1Z0 7.0 5.3 1.5 7.5 15.0 
Orchids (Cymbidium) 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2 5 4.0 
Ornithogalum (0. thysoides) 35.0 15.0 173 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Gypsophila 5.5 2.0 1.0 1.1 5.0 6.0 
Liatris 7.0 1.7 1.8 75 * 
Lilies (Lilium spp) 3.0 3.5 3.6 25 7.0 
Arum Lilies 5.5 5.0 1.3 2.5 25 4.0 
Delphinium 86.0 38.0 55.0 12.0 * 20.0 
Euphorbia Marginata 25.0 25.0 6.0 * * 
Dill 12.0 5.0 _ * * 
Ammi Majus 20.0 3.5 7.0 NR 35.0 33.0 
Solidaster - 15.0 19.0 12.0 2.8 26.0 
Chrysanthemum 25.0 20.0 21.0 8.7 8.7 9.0 
Cut foliage - 15.0 5.0 5.8 16.0 30.0 
Bulphleurum 10.0 - 40.0 
Others - - 37.7 10.7 50.0 55.0 
Total 630.5 664.0 676.8 5383 638.3 860.0 
Source: Nyamiaka, 1995. 
•Included in Others 
NR = Not Recorded 
Nyandarua Kisii Taita Taveta 
Area suitable for horticulture (sq km) 2,435 1,649 230 510 
Altitude (m) 2400-3000 1500-2200 1400-1700 600-1000 
Rainfall (mm) 850-1600 1400-2100 900-1200 480-700 
Long rains March - June Feb. - June March-May March-May 
Short rains July - Dec. July - Jan. Oct-Dec. Nov. - Dec. 
Soil type deep, imperfecdy deep to very deep. moderately deep, very deep. 
to well-drained, well-drained clay weU-drained well-drained 
clay loam / clay + thick humic clay loam + clay loam/clay 
+ humic topsoil topsoil humic topsoil 
Population density (persons/sq km) 
- Lowest density 51 330 83 29 
- Average density 158 554 226 66 
- Highest density 383 1068 705 393 
Source: CBS, 1994b; Jaetzold and Schmidt, 1983. 
Notes: All figures refer to the areas suitable for horticulture. The figures on population density refer to 1989, the year of the latest census. 
Nyandarua(n=229) 
KSh % 
Kisu(n=144) 
KSh % 
Tata(n=87) 
KSh % 
farm activities: 
- vegetables, fruits, tubers 
- livestock, livestock products 
- coffee, tea, pyretbrum, cotton 
total net farm cash income 
net off-farm cash income 
net household cash income 
0 
10,200 
7,900 
600 
18,700 
5,800 
0 
42 
32 
2 
76 
24 
600 
3,000 
1,100 
2,000 
6,700 
1,900 
7 
35 
13 
23 
78 
22 
0 
3,600 
2,100 
0 
5,700 
5,000 
0 
34 
20 
0 
53 
47 
24500 100 8,600 100 10,700 100 
Taveta (n=38) 
KSh % 
100 
5300 
200 
400 
6,000 
3,800 
9,800 
1 
54 
2 
4 
61 
39 
Note: The net farm cash income consists of the value of cash received for the sale of agricultural commodities, animals and livestock products minus 
the costs of the goods and services purchased for farm use (FAO, 1980; MOA, 1989). The value of farm produce consumed within the household is not 
included. The off-farm cash income consists of the wages (when employed) and profits (when self-employed) of resident household members, plus the 
remittances and cash contributions of any part-time residents with jobs elsewhere. For more details see Appendix 3 5 . 
CD 
to 
X 
u> 
tw 
8" 
I 
173 
Appendix 3.5: 
Calculation method for the household cash income 
Net household cash income = net farm cash income + net off-farm cash income + 
net land cash income. 
In the surveyed areas, the net land cash income (annual rent received for plots rented out) 
was on average negligible. 
Remittances by household members with jobs away from home were included in the net off-
farm cash income. 
Gross farm cash incomes were calculated by multiplying selling quantities and average 
selling prices for the year under consideration. 
Selling quantities of crops were recorded per plot: 
- For annual crops (cereals, beans, vegetables, tubers, cotton) sales were recorded per 
season. Three seasons were distinguished: long-rains, short-rains and the intermediate 
period. 
- For perennial crops with more or less continuous harvesting (tea, bananas) average sales 
were recorded per three months. The total annual sales were calculated by multiplying 
these figures by four. 
- For perennial crops with harvesting periods in one part of the year (coffee, pyrethrum) 
average sales were recorded per three-month harvesting period. The total annual sales were 
calculated by multiplying these figures by 5/3 for coffee, and 7/3 for pyrethrum 
Fruit trees, other than bananas, were usually not grown on separate plots but scattered 
throughout the farm. Annual selling quantities were recorded per tree type. 
Livestock sold was recorded per animal type. Livestock products sold were primarily milk. 
Average milk sales per day were recorded. 
Average selling prices were estimated: 
- For cereals and beans, estimated prices were based on average selling prices in local market 
places during harvesting periods. The (lower) official prices offered by the NCPB were 
not used, as small-scale farmers in the survey areas preferred to sell their limited surplus in 
the market place. 
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- For vegetables, fruits and tubers, average selling prices resulted from the weighted average 
of the recorded lowest and highest annual selling price and the price at the time of the 
interview. 
- For livestock and livestock products, the selling prices were recorded. 
- For coffee, tea, cotton and pyre thrum, local buying prices of the cooperatives and boards 
were used. 
Net farm cash incomes were calculated by deducting the estimated costs of purchased 
inputs and services from the gross cash incomes. 
For crops, the total costs per crop were estimated as a percentage of the gross income: 
- for cereals, beans, coffee, tea, pyrethrum and cotton on the basis of interviews with 
extension officers; 
- for vegetables, fruits and tubers on the basis of recorded costs. 
The costs included: 
- Purchased inputs: hybrid seeds, fertilizer, insecticides and fungicides. 
- Purchased farm tools: e.g. spraying pump, hoe. Depreciation costs were calculated, based 
on a lifetime of five years. In most cases, the calculated depreciation costs were negligible. 
- Services: hired casual labour for ploughing, planting, weeding and harvesting. Sometimes, 
hired tractor and ox services for ploughing and harrowing were used. In addition to casual 
labour, one or more permanent labourers might be in service. 
For livestock and livestock products, costs of purchased services included veterinary 
services and hired permanent labour to look after the catde. The total costs were estimated as 
a percentage of the gross income on the basis of interviews with extension officers. 
The net off-farm income was estimated on the basis of the monthly income and number 
of months employed of each member of the household engaged in off-farm employment 
A distinction was made between full-time and part-time household members, and between 
local employment (in the compound or neighbourhood) and employment elsewhere: 
- In the cases of full-time residents and local employment the entire wage (when employed) 
or estimated income (when self-employed) was accounted to the household budget 
- In the cases of full-time residents and employment elsewhere, the wage or estimated 
income was accounted to the household budget except for estimated travelling costs. 
- In the case of part-time residents, the incomes were accounted to the household budget in 
relation to the frequency of visits to the household by the people concerned. It was 
assumed that less frequent visits resulted in lower cash contributions and remittances to the 
household (as a percentage of the income earned). 
Nyandarm (n=229) 
% of net hh. 
KSh cash income 
Kisii (n=144) 
% of net hh. 
KSh cash income 
Taita(n=87) 
% of net hh. 
KSh cash income 
Taveta(n=38) 
% of net hh. J© » *di 
KSh cash income 
* 3 >
O C5 
Low-income hh's 2,000 42 800 57 1,200 73 1,100 87 
Middle-income hh's 8,100 40 2,000 34 2,400 34 4,600 65 
High-income hh's 27,100 47 7,100 33 8,900 34 10,900 46 
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Abbreviations: hh = household 
Note: The low-income households are the lowest 25% of the household cash income distribution Cower quartile), the middle-income households belong to 
the middle 50% (interquartile), and the high-income households are those in the highest 25% of the household cash income distribution (upper quartile). 
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Appendix 5.1: 
Characteristics of horticultural traders in the domestic market 
Our hypothesis is that horticultural traders in the domestic market are a cross-section of the 
local population. Trader characteristics such as gender, ethnic group, age, marital status and 
income will be analysed. Unless otherwise indicated, the information is based on the trade 
survey (see Section 1.3 in the main text). 
Gender 
As far as the gender of the traders is concerned, the hypothesis that horticultural traders are a 
cross-section of the local population has to be rejected. Over 95 per cent of the traders who 
sell horticultural commodities in rural market places and in market places in small urban 
centres have at least one thing in common: they are women. Only in daily markets in large 
urban centres do male traders become somewhat more numerous. In Kisii Municipal market, 
for instance, about 30 per cent of the traders were men at the time of the survey, and in the 
Majengo retail market in Mombasa about 40 per cent The difference between markets in 
rural areas and small urban centres on the one hand and large urban centres on the other is 
most probably related to the incomes earned. In the former most female traders are so-called 
'petty traders' who sell the surplus of a farm household or small quantities of bought 
produce, trying to earn a little money. For them trade is one of the rare opportunities to 
obtain cash. The remuneration per hour is low, but attractive when no other opportunities 
exist Farm revenues from export crops such as coffee and tea are often controlled by the 
husbands, while trade revenues may provide a personal income to the women and give them 
some autonomy. 
Husbands may be cultivating export crops, be absent because of jobs elsewhere, or 
have died or abandoned their wives. Those that are around and idle are often too proud (or, 
as some women say, too lazy) to work all day for such a small amount of money. According 
to men, cultural standards do not allow them to trade commodities while sitting on the 
ground (which is necessary due to absence of stalls). Selling clothing and cooking utensils 
in a similar way is, however, not a problem. Trading these commodities is usually more 
rewarding than retailing vegetables and fruits. The same is true for the wholesaling of 
horticultural commodities, and doing so without a stall is not a problem to men, either.2 
2 It can be observed that men are more prominent in the distributing and collecting wholesale trade than in 
the retail trade of horticultural commodities. The gender ratio in neither of these types of wholesale trade 
is known. 
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In the Kisii Municipal market and in the Majengo retail market (Mombasa) a major 
part of the trade takes place in stalls. More important is that these are daily markets. Even if 
the income generated per market day is not higher than that in rural markets, the monthly 
income will be much higher because of the greater number of selling days. Apparendy the 
monthly income is there high enough to attract both women and men (see also 'trader 
incomes'). 
Ethnic background 
The hypothesis that horticultural traders are a cross-section of the local population is 
accepted in terms of the ethnic background of the traders. In most cases the ethnic 
composition of the trader population more or less conforms to that of the general population 
in the region where the traders operate. Almost all horticultural traders in the Nyandarua 
markets are Kikuyu, and in the Taita markets Taita. In all market places in Kisii District, 
except for Riochanda market, horticultural commodities are traded almost exclusively by 
Kisii. Riochanda market is located on the border of Kisii and Homa Bay Districts where 
Kisii and Luo territories meet. As a consequence, the market place is used as a trading 
ground by both ethnic groups. 
In Nakuru District 60 per cent of the population belong to the Kikuyu, while about 
three-quarters of the horticultural traders in the Nakuru and Njoro markets belong to this 
ethnic group. In Taveta Division of Taita Taveta District, the Kamba outnumber the local 
Taveta, both among the general population and as horticultural traders in the market place. 
The only place where the ethnic composition of the traders in the market places differs from 
that of the general population is Mombasa. Over half the horticultural traders in the surveyed 
market places in Mombasa are Kamba or Kikuyu, while only one fifth of the general 
population belongs to those two groups. Mijikenda are hardly found selling horticultural 
commodities, although they are the biggest group, constituting one quarter of the general 
population. The Kamba are also major actors in the collecting wholesale trade between 
Taveta and Mombasa. This is to be expected, given the presence of supplying Kamba 
farmers and Kamba traders in Taveta and demanding Kamba traders in Mombasa. 
Age 
The hypothesis that horticultural traders are a cross-section of the local population is also 
accepted for age. In a small survey in three market places in Taita Taveta horticultural traders 
were asked their age. The markets were located in Voi, the largest urban centre in the district 
(13,000 inhabitants), Wundanyi, a smaller urban centre (3,000 inhabitants); and 
Mgambonyi, a rural centre (less than 500 inhabitants). In Voi and Wundanyi, traders were 
randomly sampled, and in Mgambonyi all traders were interviewed. 
The age distribution of the traders did not differ significantly from one market place 
to another (Table A5.1). In all three markets none of the traders was younger than 18 or 
older than 55, while the majority were between 25 and 45 years of age. It can be concluded 
that the size of the market centres did not affect the age composition of the traders operating 
in the markets. 
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Table A5.1. Age distribution of horticultural traders by population size of the market 
centre in Taita Taveta* 
age category large urban centre small urban centre rural centre all centres 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
18-24 years 5 (17) 7 (23) 5 (23) 17 (21) 
25-34 years 12 (40) 12 (40) 5 (23) 29 (35) 
35-44 years 7 (23) 6 (20) 7 (32) 20 (24) 
45-55 years 6 (20) 5 (17) 5 (23) 16 (20) 
all traders 30 (100) 30 (100) 22 (101) 82 (100) 
*X2 =2.73 (not significant). 
Table A5.2. Age distribution of horticultural traders and the general population in 
Taita Taveta* 
age category traders general population 
n (%) n (%) 
18-24 years 17 (21) 25,013 (32) 
25-34 years 29 (35) 25,005 (32) 
35-44 years 20 (24) 16,632 (21) 
45-55 years 16 (20) 12,230 (15) 
all traders 82 (100) 78,880 (100) 
Source for general population: CBS, 1994b. 
.68 (not significant). 
The age distribution of the trader population did not differ significandy from that of 
the entire district population between 18 and 55 years old (Table A5.2). 3 The absence of 
young and elderly people was to be expected, as this is common in most types of 
employment. It can therefore be concluded that the horticultural traders in the sampled 
markets show ordinary age characteristics. 
Marital status 
In the Taita Taveta study, the marital status of the traders was also investigated. The 
relatively small group of male traders in the market places (n=7) were all married except for 
one who was a widower. In contrast, about forty percent of the female traders were single 
The age distribution of the general population in Taita Taveta is based primarily on the rural situation 
because less than 15 per cent of the district population live in urban centres (CBS, 1994b, 1994c). The 
Voi and Wundanyi market places are situated in urban centres. None of the traders interviewed in the 
Wundanyi market lived in the centre itself, however. They lived in one of the surrounding locations and 
either possessed land themselves or lived on their parents' land. They were therefore part of the rural 
population. Twenty-three of the interviewed traders in the Voi market (77%) lived in Voi town; the 
others resided in rural areas. A comparison of the age distribution of the traders who lived in Voi with 
that of all inhabitants of Voi town reveals a similar picture to the one found in Table A5.2. 
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women. Approximately half of these were single mothers (Table A5.3). 4 All three market 
places showed the same picture. 
Approximately half the female traders in all three markets were married. However, 
some had a husband who lived elsewhere due to employment The percentage of absentee 
husbands was the lowest in the large urban centre (18%), followed by the small urban centre 
(25%) and the rural centre (37%). This hierarchy is probably related to the greater 
availability of local jobs in large centres. 
The Kenya CBS regards women with husbands who reside elsewhere for work to be 
heads of their household, similarly to single mothers who live on their own. 5 A third group 
of female households consists of divorced women who have not gone back to their parents, 
and a fourth group is comprised of widowed women. A survey by the Kenyan CBS in the 
first half of the 1980s showed that 46 per cent of all rural households in Taita Taveta were 
female-headed (CBS, 1988). Our Taita Taveta survey shows that in Mgambonyi market 9 
out of the 22 traders (41%) potentially represented female-headed households, and in 
Wundanyi 12 out of 30 traders (40%). A comparison of the two surveys therefore suggests 
that female-headed households were at least as common among the general rural population 
as amongst horticultural traders living in the rural areas.6 In other words, going into 
horticultural trade was not specific to female heads of households. Our hypothesis that the 
trader population is a cross-section of the general population is therefore not rejected with 
respect to the gender of the head of household. 
Table A5.3. Marital status of female horticultural traders by population size of the 
market centre in Taita Taveta 
status large urban centre small urban centre rural centre all centres 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
single: 
- without children 5 (21) 6 (20) 4 (19) 15 (20) 
- with children 5 (21) 7 (23) 4 (19) 16 (21) 
married: 
- husband around 11 (46) 12 (40) 8 (38) 31 (41) 
- husband elsewhere 2 (8) 3 (10) 3 (14) 8 (11) 
divorced, widowed 1 (4) 2 00 2 (10) 5 (7) 
all traders 24 (100) 30 (100) 21 (100) 75 (100) 
Most single women without children are relatively young and still members of their parents' household. 
Single mothers have children from unknown fathers or fathers that do not recognize their children. In 
rural areas most such women live with their parents and a smaller number live on their own, while in 
urban areas the situation is the reverse. Those who live on their own are heads of their household. 
Female-headed households are believed to be poorer in most cases than male headed households. 
In the scholarly literature, households with husbands who reside elsewhere for work are referred to as 
female-managed households rather than female-headed households, because the absentee men still feel 
responsible for their wife and children and support the household with regular or irregular remittances. 
Wundanyi is a small urban centre, but all traders lived in the surrounding rural areas. Voi is not included 
in the analysis because most traders lived in town and the CBS did not cover urban areas in its survey. 
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Trader incomes 
The hypothesis is also not rejected when it comes to the incomes earned, though we have to 
be a bit cautious here. According to our trade survey, only a small minority of the 
horticultural traders earn high incomes, as is similarly the case in other parts of the economy. 
In Wundanyi and Taveta, markets in relatively small population centres, one third to one half 
of the traders earned less than KSh 1,000 in November 1991 (Table A5.4). 7 By 
comparison, casual farm labour, which was regarded a poor man's job, yielded about KSh 
900 per month at that time. In the same market places, slightly under half of the traders 
earned between KSh 1,000 and KSh 5,000, the incomes of drivers, office clerks and 
primary school teachers at the time. Only a small minority earned between KSh 5,000 and 
KSh 10,000, also earned by technicians, doctors and managers, while almost no one earned 
top incomes of over KSh 10,000. 
We must be careful in drawing conclusions because most traders in Wundanyi and 
Taveta were part-time traders, selling produce two days a week (Table A5.5). 8 They were 
able to pursue other income-earning activities during the rest of the week. The most likely 
other activity would have been farming, because teaching, office work and the like are full-
time jobs. Farming, however, only generates additional income when it concerns crops other 
than the ones brought to the market We also have to use caution because incomes from 
horticultural trade may fluctuate from one month to another, in contrast with revenues from 
permanent jobs such as teaching. 
In retail markets in larger urban centres, such as Voi and Majengo (Mombasa), 
almost all traders were involved full-time (Tables A5.5 and A5.6). 9 The majority earned 
again less than KSh 5,000 a month (Table A5.4). Monthly incomes of over KSh 5,000 were 
slightly more common than in Wundanyi and Taveta. This was, however, not the result of a 
Table A5.4. Distribution of estimated monthly incomes of horticultural traders in 
selected market places, November 1991 (%) 
monthly Wundanyi Taveta Voi • Mombasa 
income Majengo Kongowea collecting 
retail wholesale wholesalers 
(KSh) (n=56) (n=95) (n=57) (n=59) (n=40) (n=15) 
<1,000 48 37 17 16 5 0 
1,000-4,999 48 46 44 48 22 7 
5,000-9,999 4 12 28 26 18 14 
>=10,000 0 6 11 10 56 80 
l o o 101 100 100 101 101 
Appendix 5.2 shows the method used to calculate daily and monthly incomes of the sampled traders. 
These were the two official market days. Only a minority of traders were in business six or seven days a 
week. Most of them rented stalls (Table A5.5). They tried to be in business continuously because they 
paid rent on a monthly basis, in contrast with traders who displayed their commodities on the ground 
and paid on a daily basis. 
In Voi market the majority of traders rent a stall and are in business throughout the week (Table A5.5). 
Only those without a stall stick to the official market days. In Majengo market in Mombasa every one 
rents a stall and in is business more or less the whole week (Table A5.6). 
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Table AS.5. Number of days per week traders are in business in Wundanyi, Taveta and 
Voi markets, by stall use (%) 
days per —Wundanyi market — — Taveta market — — Voi market 
week no stall stall all no stall stall all no stall stall all 
(n=50) (n=6) (n=67) (n=28) (n=17) (n=40) 
l o r 2 84 17 77 70 11 52 94 5 31 
3 t o 5 0 0 0 9 4 7 0 3 2 
6 or 7 16 83 24 20 86 40 6 93 67 
100 100 ÏÔT 99 101 ~99 100 101 Too 
Table A5.6. Number of days per week traders are in business in the Mombasa markets 
(%) 
days per week Majengo retail Kongowea wholesale collecting wholesalers 
(n=59) (n=39) (n=15) 
once every fortnight 0 0 7 
l o r 2 0 0 93 
3 t o 5 2 13 73 
6 o r 7 98 88 0 
ÏÔÔ TÔT ÏÔT5 
Table A5.7. Distribution of daily incomes of horticultural traders in selected market 
places, November 1991 (%) 
daily Wundanyi Taveta Voi •Mombasa 
income Majengo Kongowea collecting 
retail wholesale wholesalers 
(KSh) (n=56) (n=95) (n=57) (n=59) (n=40) (n=15) 
<100 46 40 23 41 18 0 
100-499 52 39 54 53 26 0 
500-999 2 15 12 2 26 0 
>= 1,000 0 6 11 5 31 100 
~m ÏÔÔ TÔT) ÏÔÏ ÏÔT Too 
higher income per selling day: the daily income distributions for Voi and Majengo retail 
markets were not very different from those for Wundanyi and Taveta (Table A5.7). The 
difference in monthly income was primarily the result of a larger number of selling days per 
week. 
Two groups of horticultural traders in the sample had higher monthly incomes than 
the traders discussed so far, namely the distributing wholesalers based in the Mombasa 
wholesale market, and the collecting wholesalers who sold from the back of their truck to 
them and to visiting retailers (Tables A5.4, last two columns). Most collecting wholesalers 
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came to the Mombasa wholesale market twice a week, and were busy collecting produce in 
the production areas during the rest of the week. Most distributing wholesalers sold produce 
throughout the week (Table A5.6). Not only the monthly incomes but also the daily incomes 
of both types of wholesalers were higher than those of the traders in the other markets (Table 
A5.7). The incomes of the wholesalers were in no way representative of all horticultural 
traders in the country, as the wholesalers were relatively few in number. Hence, our 
hypothesis is accepted, because only a small minority of the horticultural traders earn high 
incomes, as is the case in the Kenyan economy in general. 
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Appendix 5.2: 
Calculation method for trader incomes 
Daily income 
In each surveyed market place, horticultural traders were interviewed on an official market 
day during the main harvesting period in the region (see also Section 1.3 in the main text). 
Through observation it was verified that the market day was not different from other market 
days in that period. The net daily income or daily profit of the interviewed traders was 
calculated by deducting the various costs from the gross daily income or gross daily margin. 
The gross daily margin equalled the selling price minus the buying price times the turnover 
on the day of the survey per traded commodity. Cost categories might include packing 
material, transport costs, produce losses during transport, market fees, costs of unsold 
produce and capital costs. 
Traders used packing material such as boxes, bags, baskets, nets and crates during 
transport. Wholesaling traders also sold produce in such units. They either charged the 
buyer separately for the packing material, or included the costs of the packing material in the 
deal. Thus, their packing material costs were usually nil. Smaller traders usually sold their 
produce loose. They might wrap vegetables or fruits in a piece of old newspaper, which they 
had been able to get hold of at no cost. Some traders supplied plastic bags to their 
customers, but only if they paid for them. The packing material that was required during 
transport could be used until it had worn out. The depreciation costs were too small to be of 
significance. 
Transport costs were the most important cost category to the traders (except for 
immobile traders, who bought produce in the same market place). Various types of transport 
costs were distinguished in the survey, including: 
- hired labour for carrying to road 
- hired transport to road 
- hired labour for loading 
- rent of hired vehicle 
- running costs of own vehicle (including fuel and oil, salaries and allowances to driver and 
turnboys, repair and maintenance of truck, tyres, insurance, interest and depreciation, 
trade licence, administration) 
- hus/matatu fees (one way, for the produce) 
- bas/matatu ticket (to and fro, for the trader) 
- hired labour for unloading/carrying 
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- hired handcart 
- other transport costs (specified by the trader) 
Produce losses during transport were generally low, except for collecting wholesalers who 
dealt with truckloads of highly perishable commodities such as bananas. 
Besides transport costs, the main other marketing costs were market fees. Less 
frequent costs in relation to the market place were the rent of a store and the wages paid to a 
watchman. Watchmen were usually shared with other traders, thus reducing the costs 
involved. 
Traders without stores usually sold (almost) all produce they brought to the market 
Unsold produce was carried home, to be sold on the next market day or consumed in the 
household. The costs of unsold produce were usually negligible. Traders with stores also 
planned to sell all produce within one or two days, to avoid quality deterioration. Only 
tubers, onions, and bananas that required ripening might stay in the store a few days longer. 
The traders' costs of capital were usually low due to absence of or limited storage, 
limited use of borrowed money, and low opportunity costs of their own capital. In 
comparison to other traders, collecting wholesalers might have relatively high costs of 
capital. 
Monthly income 
The monthly income was calculated by multiplying the net daily income by the number of 
days a week the trader was selling at the time of the survey, and multiplying that by 4.3, the 
number of weeks per month. 
If traders in periodic markets sold commodities outside the official market days, it 
was presumed that the income during those days was one-third of the income on official 
market days. 
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Appendix 5.3: 
Farmer Cooperatives in Kenya: a troubled history 
The first farmer cooperatives in Kenya were established by white settlers in the 1920s. The 
formation of cooperatives by Africans was not permitted until 1945, when a new cooperative 
act was passed with the explicit aim of fostering marketing cooperatives among the African 
population. Initially African farmers focused on the cooperative marketing of cereals, eggs, 
poultry, vegetables and dairy produce. In the 1950s, when the administration started to 
promote smallholder production of export crops, coffee cooperatives, pyrethrum 
cooperatives and multipurpose cooperatives became more important At independence, in 
1963, approximately 460 societies were registered (Gyllstrbm, 1991). 
The newly independent Kenyan government continued the export-oriented 
agricultural policy. Coffee, pyrethrum and dairy societies east of the Rift Valley, and cotton 
and sugar societies west of the Rift valley, rated high in terms of registrations. The number 
of registered societies increased rapidly: in four years' time 645 societies were formed 
(Gyllstrbm, 1991). 
After 1966 the growth of the cooperative movement slowed down as the government 
imposed stringent regulatory controls on the movement 'partly in response to perceived 
problems of cooperative mismanagement and rampant corruption, and partly as a result of 
the state's own imperatives to regulate the economy in pursuit of "development" ' (Zeleza, 
1990, 74). Through the Cooperative Societies Act (1966) and the Cooperative Societies 
Rules (1969), the Department of Cooperative Development was given exclusive rights of 
registration, dissolution and compulsory amalgamation of societies. It was also given the 
power to supervise budgets and accounts, and to dictate a society's mode of organization 
and activity orientation by prescribing the contents of the bylaws (Gyllstrom, 1991). 
In the 1970s, the role of the cooperatives was redefined and widened in response to 
declining economic growth. The Department of Cooperative Development was upgraded into 
a Ministry in 1974, and increased since then both in size and complexity (Gyllstrbm, 1988). 
Growing emphasis was placed on production credit and input supply with the intention of 
disseminating more productive, input-intensive technologies. This strategy was continued in 
the first half of the 1980s, although it had proved ineffective. According to Gyllstrbm (1991) 
the policy may actually have slowed down the integration of smallholders into the market 
for two reasons. First loan defaulters tried to avoid dealing with their societies, which in 
practice meant that they ceased to produce the crops monopolized by the cooperatives. 
Second, as a consequence of the poor performance of societies, unions, and the Ministry of 
Cooperative Development in administering the loans — which resulted in widespread 
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irregularities — farmers' confidence in the ability of cooperatives to serve their interests 
became seriously damaged, and their ideology questioned. 
In the 1980s the number of agricultural societies increased from approximately 1,000 
to over 2,000 (Zeleza, 1989; GOK, 1997). At the same time, the problems of the 
cooperative movement further escalated due to two factors. First, falling world market 
prices, of coffee in particular, exposed the inefficiencies in the cooperative marketing 
system Second, corruption and clientalism became a threat to the very existence of the 
cooperative movement As long as prices had been good, cooperatives had to some extent 
been able to deal with these conditions. When world market prices fell, the cooperatives 
continued as if nothing had happened, and the soft state, as Myrdall has called i t became 
rather destructive. Farmers might have been used to getting paid less than they were entided 
to, but they never got used to not being paid at all or only after several years. 
With the liberalization of agricultural trade in the 1990s, the societies faced a new 
challenge: competition with private collecting traders (e.g. for coffee and milk). Open 
competition did not do the cooperative movement any good. According to the Kenyan 
government, the proportion of agricultural produce marketed by the cooperatives declined 
from 59 per cent in 1991 to 21 per cent in 1995 (most probably in value terms, although this 
is not specified as such) (GOK, 1997). 
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Appendix 5.4: 
Case studies of horticultural marketing cooperatives 
Case 1. The Hort icul tural Cooperative Union 
History, aims and activities 
The Horticultural Cooperative Union (HCU) was established in 1951 by European settler-
farmers, primarily to market members' produce. 1 0 In 1967 its mandate was enlarged. The 
HCU was given a monopoly over the marketing of onions in the country. The aim was to 
stabilize onion prices and ensure fair returns to small-scale growers. By selling the onions 
on behalf of the farmers, it claimed to get a better price for them, thus improving the equity 
in the channel.1 1 In addition to onions, the HCU marketed other horticultural commodities 
of both members and non-members but without monopolizing the trade. Non-members paid 
a higher commission than members (15% versus 10% of the price realized by the HCU). 
Table A5.8 shows the relative importance of the commodities handled by the HCU in 
1975. As shown, onions were the core of the business. They were grown by both small-
scale and large-scale farmers to be sold by the HCU in the domestic market Of the other 
commodities, capsicums, French beans and asparagus were mainly grown by large scale 
farmers for export. The HCU also exported mangoes delivered by the Malindi Farmers Co-
operative Society. Potatoes, strawberries, oranges, pineapples and eggs were meant for the 
domestic market The potatoes and pineapples were grown by small-scale farmers, the 
strawberries and eggs by a small number of large growers, and the pineapples by the 
Delmonte plantation in Thika. Other fruits traded by the HCU included peaches, plums, 
apples and pears. Unlike the other commodities, these fruits were produced by the HCU 
itself on a 25.5 acre farm bought by the union in 1971. 1 2 
The HCU collected produce from suppliers by lorry at assembly points and 
sometimes at farms. All commodities were delivered to the HCU headquarters in the Nairobi 
industrial area, where the administration was located as well as the central depot with 
packing and cold storage facilities. Transport distances to the central depot could extend 
beyond 500 kms, for instance for onions from Bungoma and mangoes from Lamu and 
The story of the Horticultural Cooperative Union as presented here is based on Buaruhanga (1977). 
The Union would be able to offer larger volumes for sale than individual farmers, and have more market 
information, two aspects that determine the power of a marketing channel member (see Section 4.6 in 
the main text). 
The farm, which was called Pentlands Orchards, was located 18 miles northwest of Nairobi. 
188 
Table A5.8. Relative importance and main supply areas of commodities handled by the 
HCU in 1975 
commodity % of total volume main supply areas 
Vegetables 
Onions 60.1 Pckcrra, Naivasha, Athi River, Bungoma 
Capsicums 5.7 Naivasha, Athi River 
Potatoes 3.0 Nakuru, Kinangop 
French beans 6.5 Athi River, Limuru, Ngong 
Asparagus 0.8 Naivasha, Athi River 
Other vegetables 6.1 
Fruits 
Mangoes 4.0 Mombasa, Lamu, Malindi 
Strawberries 0.7 Nakuru, Limuru 
Oranges 2.1 Mombasa, Kitale, Machakos 
Pineapples 5.5 Thika 
Other fruits 4.4 
Eggs 1.1 Athi River, Muguga 
iöoö 
Based on Buaruhanga, 1977, p. 10, Table 1.2. 
Malindi. (Table A5.8 shows the main areas of supply per commodity.) Producers were 
supplied with crates, cartons, sacks, boxes or nets to minimize deterioration during 
transport. The costs of the packing materials were deducted from the payments, which took 
place after the consignment was sold. The grower received a return form that showed the 
quantity received and sold, the price obtained, the commission and costs deducted, and the 
net returns. Payments usually took four weeks from the moment the produce had left the 
farm. 
As for its sales outlets, the HCU sold to Nairobi greengrocers from the Nairobi 
depot, and to consumers from a stall in the Nairobi City market and a supermarket it owned. 
The latter was opened in the Nairobi city centre in 1972. The HCU also had a branch office 
in Mombasa that was used mainly to sell onions and potatoes supplied by the Nairobi 
branch. The total domestic sales of the union were valued at approximately 5 million Kenyan 
Shillings in 1975. 
The commodities that the HCU exported were sold mainly through wholesale 
markets in London, using two British agents. 1 3 Relatively small quantities were exported to 
Switzerland, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Denmark. In 1975, the HCU handled 
approximately 3 per cent of Kenya's horticultural exports by volume. 
Problems 
By 1975 the HCU was in trouble. Suppliers and customers were deserting the union and 
financial losses were accumulating. Suppliers preferred private traders to the HCU for two 
In 1974/75,84 per cent of the HCLTs exports by volume went to the UK. The British agents worked on 
a commission, charging 7.5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. 
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reasons. The first was the long interval between delivery of the produce to the union and 
receiving the payment Private traders usually paid cash on delivery. The second reason was 
the flat commission rate that was applied regardless of product quality, quantity, location, 
seasons and loyalty of the supplier. Private traders did take account of such characteristics 
when dealing with individual farmers. Even in the case of onions, for which the HCU was 
supposed to have a monopoly and for which unregistered production and selling was illegal, 
the union faced severe competition from private traders.14 
As for exports, the HCU was unable to compete with private exporters and handled 
only a tiny part of the total horticultural export volume. Even in the case of mangoes, for 
which the HCU was the sole agent of the Malindi Farmers' Cooperative Society, exports 
were very limited because the society sold most of its mango supplies in the more 
remunerative domestic markets along the Kenya coast. The HCU only received the society's 
surpluses, that is, when such surpluses were present. 
The HCU was rapidly losing customers to private traders. In the past it had had a 
large number of professional and institutional buyers, but all of them had deserted it by 1975 
except for some thirty Nairobi greengrocers. The HCU supermarket, that was supposed to 
sell to high-income groups, hotels, restaurants and other institutions, had been incurring 
considerable losses from the moment it opened its doors, and eventually it folded in April 
1975. Reasons for the deMcle were its unsuitable location and poor management 
The declining turnover of the HCU and the inability of the management to identify 
the botdenecks led to rising financial losses. In 1976 the government decided to close down 
the business. The Horticdtural Crops Development Authority (HCDA) took over some of its 
activities, including the sales of onions and the export of horticultural commodities (see 
Appendix 5.7). The other activities were left to the private sector. 
Case 2. Horticultural marketing by the Kinangop Agricultural Cooperative 
Society 
The Kinangop Agricultural Cooperative Society was a multipurpose society 1 5 that for a 
relatively short period in its history performed horticultural marketing activities. The 
initiative must have been taken sometime in the early 1980s. The society aimed to sell its 
members' horticultural commodities in the Nairobi market Potatoes were the most important 
horticultural crop in the area, and the society focused to a large extent on this crop. Bags of 
potatoes were collected near the farms to be sold to wholesalers and retailers in the 
Wakulima wholesale market. In this it copied the activities of collecting wholesalers that 
were present in the area. The society probably started its new enterprise because farmers or 
local leaders felt exploited by these traders, who offered prices that were thought to be too 
The problems the HCU had in maintaining its monopoly in the onion trade were not unique: the 
National Cereals Produce Marketing Board had similar problems in the maize trade (see Section 2.3 in 
the main text). 
Core activities of the society were the collection of milk and pyrethrum from members. The milk was 
delivered to the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) (see also Section 2.3 in the main text) and the 
pyrethrum to the Pyrethrum Board of Kenya. Besides produce collection, the society irregularly dealt 
with input supply. 
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low as compared to prices in Nairobi. In other words, they wished to improve the equity in 
the marketing channel to the benefit of the farmers. 
The society had purchased a truck to transport the produce to the market The truck 
would collect members' produce near the farms and carry it to the Wakulima wholesale 
market in Nairobi. Whether all the money to buy the truck was brought together by members 
or an additional loan was received is not clear. What is clear, however, is that larger farmers 
donated more money, and therefore expected to have more rights. This was problem number 
one. During supply peaks, the larger farmers, who were also the leaders of the society, laid 
claim to the truck and smaller farmers had to await their turn. Local politicians and other 
leaders also thought they had privileges and demanded the truck for the transport of their 
crops and for other important activities such as moving furniture. In the end, many smaller 
members still had to sell their produce to collecting wholesalers. 
A second problem concerned payment to members. In this the Kinangop society was 
no different from many other agricultural societies. Farmers were not paid immediately but 
only after weeks or even months, and the overhead charged by the society was high, at least 
according to the members. Quantitative information about the charges is not available, but in 
many Kenyan agricultural societies overhead costs have been inflated by the inefficient use 
of resources and by outright corruption on the part of staff members. In the case of 
Kinangop, part of the overhead on the horticultural marketing activities may have also been 
used to cover losses on other society activities such as input supply. 
The horticultural marketing activities of the Kinangop society were further troubled 
by a lack of knowledge about the marketing system. The society just copied the activities of 
collecting wholesalers, following them to the Wakulima wholesale market in Nairobi. The 
collecting wholesalers, who did not appreciate this, began obstructing the society's activities 
in all kinds of ways. First, the Nairobi wholesale market is very small and trucks have to 
queue before entering the market place. Collecting wholesalers used their knowledge and 
connections to jump the queue. Second, the society representative who finally entered the 
actual market place might sell his load to a market intermediary whom he presumed to be a 
distributing wholesaler but who in reality worked for a collecting wholesaler — the same 
collecting wholesaler the society was trying to escape. Third, distributing wholesalers might 
refuse to buy the produce on the grounds of existing buying agreements with collecting 
wholesalers. The latter thus used their customer relations as part of their exclusionary tactics. 
Finally, distributing wholesalers might keep away customers by offering a lower price, 
temporarily accepting small margins. As a consequence, the society needed more than two 
days before they had sold out, and had to pay double or triple market fees for each bag as a 
result of the daily charges. 1 6 
The society had an especially hard time selling its produce during regional harvesting 
peaks. The number of collecting wholesalers supplying produce to the Wakulima market 
multiplied and competition reached a cut-throat level. The society had to realize peak sales 
because most of its members followed the traditional agronomic calendar, all planting and 
harvesting at the same time. The society did not monitor market prices, nor did it teach its 
Traders are charged at the market gate for each bag or other unit of produce they bring into the market 
place. The only traders who are allowed to leave their produce in the market overnight are resident 
wholesalers. 
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members to practise the production planning required to harvest when prices were high. 
After a few harvesting seasons most of the members had lost faith in the horticultural 
marketing activities of the society and turned back to the private traders. 
Case 3. The Taita Horticultural Produce Cooperative Society 
In contrast with the Horticultural Cooperative Union and the horticultural marketing activities 
by the Kinangop Agricultural Cooperative Society, the Taita Horticultural Produce 
Cooperative Society has been a success, that is at least until 1995. 
History, aims and strategy 
The Taita Horticultural Produce Cooperative Society, usually called Taita HPC for short, 
was established as part of a Kenyan Government programme to stimulate the productivity 
and efficiency of the horticultural sector. 1 7 It started operations in 1990 with the help of 
German technical assistance (GTZ) and a Nairobi-based consultancy firm called 
Technoserve.1 8 Its head office was built near Wundanyi in the middle of the Taita Hills, an 
area with a long history of vegetable production for the Mombasa market (see Section 3.3 in 
the main text). Initially, it was part of the Taita Farmers Cooperative Society (TFCS), which 
concentrated primarily on coffee. 1 9 In 1992 the Taita HPC was registered as a separate 
cooperative society, the Taita Horticultural Produce Cooperative Society Ltd. 2 0 
The aims of the Taita HPC were twofold: to increase yields by providing technical 
know-how and inputs such as seed, fertilizers and pesticides through a seasonal credit 
scheme; and to streamline the marketing of farmers' produce by supplying transport to 
Mombasa, by producing at the right time for the market, by providing continuity in 
production, and by standardizing, grading and packing the produce before it went on 
transport. 
The Taita HPC recruited 600 farmers, and instructed them when to sow. Various 
subgroups had differing sowing dates. Through this method, the cooperative applied a 
staggered production strategy. Farmers were allowed to select two types of vegetables per 
season from a limited crop package. From 1991 to 1993 the package was composed of 
The programme was already formulated in the 1970s (MOA, 1979), but was not launched until ten years 
later. HPCs were to be formed in various high potential horticultural production areas, and new 
wholesale markets established in Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu. Taita was the first to receive a HPC 
and Mombasa the first to open a new market O^ongowea wholesale market opened its gates in 1989). 
As of 1995 the other wholesale markets had not yet followed and no other HPCs had been established. 
The reasons were lack of donor funding and, in the case of the wholesale markets, ongoing discussions 
regarding the location of these markets. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the information on the Taita HPC presented here is based on Technoserve 
(1989,1991, 1993). 
The newly established Taita HPC took over the limited horticultural marketing function of the TFCS 
(the TFCS had only about 20 regular horticultural suppliers who between them supplied 300 to 400 
kilograms per delivery). The TFCS had taken over the horticultural marketing activities of the Ngangao 
Cooperative Society, liquidated in 1982. The Ngangao Cooperative Society had replaced the defunct 
Taita Vegetable Growers Cooperative Society in 1962. The later had been formed by colonial officers in 
1941 (see Section 3.3 in the main text). 
When the Taita HPC had got off to a good start, it became clear to the management that it would have 
to become independent to avoid being used as a cash cow by the heavily indebted TFCS. 
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white cabbage, tomatoes, spinach, lettuce, capsicums, French beans, baby marrow, 
cucumber, cauliflower, leeks, garden peas, carrots, red cabbage, and Chinese cabbage. In 
the course of time tomatoes, cauliflower, capsicums, lettuce and spinach became more 
important, at the expense of carrots, baby marrow, French beans and garden peas. 
Tomatoes, white cabbage and spinach have remained the core of the business, not only 
because they are part of the traditional package of the member-farmers, but also because they 
are in high demand in the Mombasa market In 1994, the Taita HPC began including maize 
and beans as rotational crops for three reasons: to battle seasonal shortages of food, to fix 
nitrogen in the soil, and to fight soil-borne diseases and pests like nematodes. 
The Taita HPC set up collecting centres at Wundanyi, Mugange, and Werugha, and 
rented a wholesale stall at Kongowea wholesale market Mombasa. The vegetables were 
collected from the farmers and transported by cooperative truck to Mombasa every day of 
the week except Friday. 2 1 This activity was continuous all the year round, with slack 
periods during the dry season and the early first rains, and a peak period towards the end of 
the first rains. A second peak occurred towards the end of the second rains but it was less 
extreme because the planting of maize has first priority for the farmers during this period. 
Farmers were provided with farm inputs to make sure they used the correct ones. 
The aim was to sustain high yields and deliver good-quality produce. The emphasis on 
quality gave the cooperative a head start when competing in Mombasa with other suppliers 
from Taita and the central highlands of Kenya. A more or less continual supply of high-
quality produce was something many customers favoured but few traders provided. The 
Taita HPC increased the effectiveness of the marketing channel.2 2 
Produce of the cooperative sold well, and to wide cross-section of customers 
including retailers, institutional buyers (tourist hotels, ship chandlers) and consumers. In 
1991 the cooperative handled 528 tonnes of produce worth KSh 3.1 million, and in 1992, 
559 tonnes worth KSh 4.2 million. The commodities fetched higher than average prices in 
the Mombasa market because of their superior quality. The average payout ratio to the 
farmers was also high, namely 94 percent in 1991 and 86 per cent in 1992. 
Characteristics of Taita HPC members 
The concept of the Taita HPC allowed participation of relatively small as well as large 
horticultural farmers. Any farmer that had a quarter of an acre of land suitable for 
horticulture could join the cooperative. However, initially wealthier farmers with more land 
and higher incomes were in the majority. According to the HPC management this had two 
reasons. First, none of the farmers in the Taita Hills were very eager to join a new project 
under the umbrella of the Taita Farmers Cooperative Society because of their poor 
experiences with the latter institution. After some persuasion, farmers were found, but many 
of them were relatively wealthy. Apparently they were willing to take the risk because their 
resource base allowed them to do so. 
A second reason for the prevalence of large farmers was the screening of the credit 
record of potential members. HPC members were supposed to receive inputs on credit To 
If the truck was not completely full, cargo space was offered to traders and farmers for rent That 
provided an additional income flow to the cooperative. 
See Section 4.5 in the main text on channel effectiveness. 
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minimize future problems of bad debts, only farmers with a good record of previous loan 
repayments were qualified for loans. Many small farmers were still indebted to the Taita 
Farmers Cooperative Society. 2 3 
Between 1991 and 1993 the membership of the society rose from six hundred in 
1991 to slightly over a thousand. The influx of smaller horticultural farmers increased. There 
were two reasons for this. First, these farmers saw that the society was doing well, that 
members were receiving high prices and that the risks were limited. Second, the role of 
credit in the project diminished, and farmers with a poor loan record were also allowed to 
participate. 
No success without problems 
With its high payout ratios, increasing membership and rising turnover, the TaitaHPC had 
developed into a prosperous horticultural marketing cooperative by 1993. At the same time, 
its progress had been slowed by various factors. The first factor was, according to 
Technoserve, a sociocultural one. In 1993, the Taita HPC was still producing only 25 per 
cent of its targeted annual output of 2,000 tonnes. Especially the older HPC members, who 
constituted the majority of the Taita HPC membership, were not fully utilizing their available 
land. According to Technoserve (1993,30) 'some African traditions discourage industry and 
the older generation (over 40 years) is still bound by the tradition that instils fear and 
discourages financial success.' The report adds, however, that the older generation also has 
a lower demand for cash because it has no school bills to pay and does not have the same 
appetite for luxury items as the younger generation. The report also mentions the reason 
cited by the members themselves, which was labour shortage. Although Technoserve does 
not accept this, it could well be true since off-farm employment away from home is quite 
common in the Taita Hills (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4 in the main text). 
A second factor that affected the performance the Taita HPC was weather conditions. 
Rainfall had become quite unreliable in the early 1990s, reducing yields. This in turn 
affected loan repayments by the farmers, a third factor of concern. As said, the role of credit 
in the project had diminished over time. The reason was a high default rate. Initially, 
participating farmers were supplied with inputs on credit Loan repayments were poor for 
three reasons. The first was the erratic weather that affected farmers' yields and income. The 
second reason was the general misconception amongst farmers that the inputs on credit 
represented 'free money', which was based on their earlier experience with other credit 
schemes. Farmers did not feel obliged to deliver their produce to the Taita HPC in order to 
repay their loan. Some sold all or part of their produce to collecting wholesalers instead, and 
others did not use the inputs themselves, but sold them to other farmers. The project lacked 
tangible security that could be used to force the farmers to pay their debts. The third reason 
Probably their loans had not been repaid after coffee prices had plunged and farmers had stopped 
harvesting the crop. Farmers neglected the coffee trees and interplanted them with bananas, maize and 
other crops. There is no reason to believe that large farmers did not have loans at the TFCS when coffee 
prices started to drop, but they probably continued to harvest the crop longer because of the money 
invested and because their larger holdings meant they had a less urgent need to use the land for other 
crops. They may also have been able to come to some agreement with the TFCS about the writing-off 
of their debts, whereas smaller fanners did not have the connections to do so. 
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for the high default rate was insufficient knowledge about proper use of the inputs among 
some farmers that were sincere in their efforts to produce and deliver to the cooperative. 
To solve its loan default problems, the Taita HPC turned to commercial sales of 
inputs to its members (so-called self-sponsored supply) and to providing loans that were one 
hundred percent secured. The new policy did not affect the demand for inputs by established 
HPC members. It did, however, inhibit young, promising farmers from joining the project, 
because many of them had insufficient capital to finance their first crop produced for the 
cooperative. 
In addition to sociocultural factors, the weather and loan defaulting, three further 
factors hampered the performance of the Taita HPC. The first was a lack of irrigated 
production. During the dry season, many vegetables fetch high prices in the Mombasa 
market The Taita HPC therefore tried to maximize its turnover during these periods, but this 
required irrigated production by its farmers. Although parts of the Taita Hills have had 
experience with irrigated production for decades, it is still not a very common practice. As a 
consequence, the bulk of the vegetables were not supplied to the cooperative until towards 
the end of the rains when prices in the Mombasa market were low. 
Another problem was the availability and rising costs of fertilizers. Fertilizer prices 
were liberalized as part of Structural Adjustment Policies in the early 1990s. The result was 
a sharp increase in wholesale and retail prices, that reduced HPC members' ability to buy 
them. To make matters worse, fertilizers were sometimes unavailable due to an unstable 
Kenyan Shilling which was hampering imports. All in all, fertilizer application by HPC 
members declined, which adversely affected the quality standards of the produce. 
A last problem that impeded the performance of the Taita HPC was the fact that some 
HPC produce was sold by members to collecting wholesalers near the farms and to 
consumers and retailers in the local market As noted above, some HPC members tended to 
sell their produce to traders to avoid repaying their loan. Others sold to traders because they 
required cash on a daily basis for current household needs. Most of the collecting 
wholesalers paid cash on delivery, while the cooperative paid at fixed intervals through bank 
accounts. Some collecting wholesalers were also said to advance substantial cash deposits 
for growing crops. 
HPC produce was sold not only to collecting wholesalers but also to retailers and 
consumers in the Wundanyi market place. The reason for this was that prices in Wundanyi 
were sometimes higher than in Mombasa. Although Wundanyi market is located in the 
production area, prices of commodities such as tomatoes and cabbages can be higher than in 
Mombasa, because additional supplies from the central highlands of Kenya reach Mombasa 
and not Wundanyi. The Mombasa market is the main destination for all produce from up-
country because of its large consumer population. The consumer population of Wundanyi is 
relatively small, and none of the collecting wholesalers from Nairobi dare to go to the 
Wundanyi market to sell an entire truckload of tomatoes or cabbages. Thus, prices in 
Wundanyi market can be high if supplies from the Taita Hills are limited. The Taita HPC did 
not benefit from high prices in the Wundanyi market because it was focused entirely on the 
Mombasa market 
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Explaining the Taita HPC's success 
At first glance it seems likely that the success of the Taita HPC is related to the availability of 
Mombasa as a market oudet The demand for high-value vegetables like cauliflower, lettuce, 
baby marrow and sweet pepper is greater in Mombasa than in other large cities because of 
the coastal tourist industry. The vegetables mentioned were indeed assigned a key place 
within the crop package when the Taita HPC started its activities in 1990. However, the 
HPC management soon found out that the demand for such high-value commodities was 
limited even in Mombasa, and that the market easily became flooded. Moreover, crops with 
a medium value like tomatoes, cabbage and spinach proved to sell very well in Mombasa as 
long as top quality was offered. With increasing transport costs due to rising fuel prices in 
subsequent years, the demand for tomatoes and cabbages from Taita Taveta further increased 
in Mombasa, because of the high prices asked for tomatoes and cabbages from Central 
Province. As a consequence, the Taita HPC began to concentrate even more on those 
medium value crops. 
It can be concluded that the presence of the coastal tourist industry does not 
completely explain the success of the Taita HPC. At least as important are the superior-
quality supply, a market-oriented planning of production, and access to retailers. This 
strategy can also be applied by groups of farmers in other parts of Kenya. Superior quality 
requires the use of proper inputs, improved grading and packing, and organization of 
transport. Market-oriented planning of production requires day-to-day scanning of the major 
urban markets, and the planning of planting and harvesting periods. Irrigation facilities may 
be needed for harvesting outside the main supply peaks. Finally, access to retailers must be 
gained by renting a stall in the wholesale market of the target city, thus bypassing 
distributing wholesalers who might otherwise boycott the farmers' initiative at the instigation 
of collecting wholesalers. 
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Appendix 5.5: 
Some remarks on export diversification in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sustainable economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa requires a steady increase of foreign 
exchange revenues, and for some time to come this will have to be derived from agriculture 
(Delgado, 1995). Unfortunately, world commodity prices for traditional export crops such 
as coffee and cocoa have been declining, and the prospects for price increases in real terms 
are poor (Duncan, 1993). Substantial agreement therefore exists that diversification of the 
agricultural export base should be central to long-term growth strategies in Africa (Boafo-
Arthur, 1992; Delgado, 1995; Duncan, 1993). Diversification into non-traditional export 
crops is advocated, with fruits, vegetables and flowers being the prime candidates. The 
major macroeconomic and agricultural policy reforms realized in Africa during the last 
decade have created many of the right conditions. African exporters are now less subject to 
the heavy implicit taxation on non-traditional (and traditional) agricultural exports that comes 
with industrial protection and overvalued exchange rates (Delgado, 1995). 
Having said that, we have to carefully weigh the idea of diversification into non-
traditional exports and the role of this process in the development of Africa. Non-traditional 
exports may be helpful for income and may generate employment, but it will be some time 
before they can displace traditional agricultural exports as the chief providers of employment 
and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (Delgado, 1995). Moreover, whilst export diversification 
has been an objective in a number of countries, it has proved a difficult and protracted 
process (UNCTAD, 1996). For one thing, success in promoting non-traditional exports may 
depend on specific policies to overcome obstacles at the early stages of breaking into new 
markets (so-called proactive policies) (Delgado, 1995). Researchers do not agree, however, 
on the extent to which governments should intervene in the production and marketing of 
non-traditional export crops. They are only agreed on the risks of any such intervention. 
There are many things governments can do to help develop new export activities, but there 
are also many things they are already doing with counterproductive results (Duncan, 1993). 
In addition to the policy aspect, world market developments also have to be 
considered. Many scholars fear that Sub-Saharan Africa will be marginalized by the 
increasing economic and spatial integration of the European Union (Sommers & Mehretu, 
1992). Some believe that diversification of exports can succeed only in combination with 
serious negotiations for realistic and binding trade and other concessions from the EU 
(Boafo-Arthur, 1992). Fact is that the EU is developing all sorts of rules that impede the 
import of vegetables, fruits and flowers from Africa. One such rule concerns the so-called 
maximum chemical residuals levels. Residues of pesticides in excess of set maximum 
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residue limits (MRLs) or residues of banned pesticides, if detected, will result in the total 
rejection and return or destruction of a shipment at the expense of the exporter (Nyamiaka, 
1995). The MRLs have a serious side-effect: they tend to reduce the involvement of small-
scale producers. The rising minimum standards entail high production costs, resulting from 
the use of professional managers and cosdy inputs (Brown & Tiffen, 1992). In effect this 
means production on large-scale farms, and that implies the involvement of European and 
multinational companies. 
Not only European integration, but also the globalization of trade systems forms a 
threat to Africa's non-traditional exports. According to the UNCTAD (1996), the yet 
unfinished Uruguay Round agenda on 'non-trade' issues, such as the relationship of trade to 
environmental and labour standards, could jeopardize the projected benefits of the Uruguay 
Round for Africa and other developing regions. 
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Appendix 5.6: 
Horticultural exports from Africa 
European consumers find all kinds of fruits in their baskets, vegetables on their plates and 
flowers in their vases which have been imported from Africa. French beans grown in 
Burkina Faso, pineapples from plantations in Ivory Coast, mangoes picked in Mali, 
avocados from orchards in Mozambique, grapefruits from Swaziland, bananas from 
Cameroon, strawberries packed in Kenya, grapes from South Africa, and roses cut in 
Zimbabwe are all exported from Africa to Europe. Per commodity, African countries can be 
listed in the order of importance based on the quantities exported fresh to Europe. In 1991, 
the situation was as follows: 
A. Fruits 
Pineapples 
Avocados 
Bananas 
Ivory Coast, Ghana, South Africa 
South Africa, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia 
Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Somalia 
South Africa, Mali, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Gambia, 
Mozambique, Guinée, Namibia 
South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique 
Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia, Zimbabwe 
Morocco, South Africa 
South Africa 
South Africa 
Morocco, Kenya 
South Africa, Namibia 
South Africa, Namibia 
South Africa 
South Africa, Morocco, Senegal 
Somalia 
Madagascar, South Africa, Mauritius, Réunion, Namibia 
Mangoes, Guavas 
Grapefruits 
Oranges 
Tangerines 
Lemons 
Apples 
Strawberries 
Grapes 
Plums 
Pears, Apricots 
Melons 
Watermelons 
Litchis 
B. Vegetables 
French beans 
Aubergines 
Peas 
Sweet corn 
Onions 
Artichokes, Garlic 
Courgettes, Leeks 
Asparagus, Tomatoes 
Kenya, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Senegal, Ethiopia, Egypt 
Kenya, Gambia 
Morocco, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nigeria, Morocco 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia 
Egypt, South Africa 
Egypt 
Morocco 
Morocco 
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C. Cut flowers 
Carnations Kenya 
Alstroemeria Kenya, Zimbabwe 
Asters Kenya, Zimbabwe 
Chrysanthemum Zimbabwe, Nigeria 
Roses Zimbabwe, Kenya, Morocco, Zambia 
Delphinium Kenya, Zimbabwe 
Gypsophila Kenya 
Gladioli Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast 
Liatris Kenya, Zimbabwe 
Solidaster Kenya, Zimbabwe 
Orchids South Africa, Kenya 
Ammi majus Kenya 
Trachelium Kenya, Zimbabwe 
Stance Kenya 
Veronica Zimbabwe 
unspecified Ethiopia, Tanzania, Namibia 
(Sources: data from CBS, the Netherlands; DNSCE, France; HMSO, the United Kingdom; ISTAT, Italy; 
Mimsterio de Econonua y Hacienda, Spain; NIS, Belgium/Luxembourg; Stat Bundesamt, Germany; and the 
association of Dutch flower auctions (VBN), the Netherlands) 
Almost all fresh horticultural commodities exported from Africa to Europe are 
transported by air. Major exceptions are produce from northern Africa and bananas and 
pineapples from West Africa, which are transported in refrigerated ships (Van der Laan, 
1997). For other horticultural produce, transport by sea was, at least until recently, non 
existent, either because it was not feasible due to the perishability of the commodities, or 
because it required sophisticated refrigeration techniques not yet available at African 
harbours. Hence, the growth of the horticultural export trade from Africa closely 
corresponds to the growth of air traffic over the past two decades. Cargo space has become 
more readily available at lower cost, due to the increasing number of diplomats, business 
people, development workers, tourists and others travelling to Africa. 
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Appendix 5.7: 
The Horticultural Crops Development Authority 
The Horticultural Crop Development Authority (HCDA) was established in 1967. Its initial 
objectives included fixing prices of horticultural commodities, marketing, and operating 
horticultural processing factories (Nyoro, 1993). As for the marketing and price fixing, the 
HCDA appointed the Horticultural Cooperative Union (HCU) as the monopolist buyer of 
onions and exporter of horticultural commodities (Appendix 5.4). The union failed and the 
HCDA reassumed the activities in 1976. The HCDA later lost its monopoly on onions, 
however, and became a buyer of last resort instead. 
The HCDA remained actively involved in the export of commodities until 1986, 
when the government decided to leave all export trade to the private sector. The HCDA had 
become too much a competitor to private exporters rather than a provider. From then on, the 
HCDA was empowered to undertake the following key activities (HCDA, 1990): 
1. the regulation of the horticultural industry through the licensing of exporters and 
application of rules as promulgated by the Ministry of Agriculture; 
2. the provision of advisory services to the government and industry; 
3. the provision of information about the market (market intelligence) to the industry; 
4. the monitoring of prices and foreign exchange remittances to Kenya; 
5. the supply of vital inputs to farmers, and assistance in grading, storage, collection, 
transportation and warehousing of produce (such only if approved and gazetted by the 
Minister of Agriculture). 
The HCDA receives no subsidies from the Kenyan government, but finances its 
operating costs with export levies on fresh and processed produce and fees for export 
licensing. In 1993 the export levy was KSh 0.12 per kg for fresh produce, and was variable 
for processed produce. The HCDA also collects a levy on behalf of the Fresh Produce 
Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK), to which all exporters of fresh produce belong 
by virtue of paying the levy. In 1993, this levy was KSh 0.01 per kg of fresh produce. The 
FPEAK, whose purpose is to resolve problems affecting fresh produce exports by creating a 
unified voice, is a member of the HCDA board. The chairman of that board is appointed by 
the President of Kenya. Other members represent the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, and 
Cooperative Development, as well as the industry (including growers, exporters and 
processors). 
The HCDA is often criticized by producers and exporters for imposing export levies 
in return for too little action. According to Nyoro (1993), the HCDA has been unable to 
effectively disseminate market information to producers, although it receives information 
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from the International Trade Centre (ITC) in Geneva. Producers and exporters have to rely 
on their own sources for the latest price developments in the various selling markets. 
Nyoro characterizes the supply of inputs to farmers by the HCDA as erratic. He 
gives the example of a campaign in Coast Province against pests and diseases such as the 
mango weevil. The HCDA was to coordinate the spraying of nurseries and orchards. In 
1990, however, it stopped supplying the inputs for the programme, and told farmers and 
export companies to look for the chemicals themselves. The campaign suffered badly from 
this change in policy. 
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Appendix 5.8: 
Case studies of horticultural export traders 
Case 1. An experienced flower producer-exporter 
The first interviewed trader is a flower producer and exporter who emigrated from Germany 
around 1977. He worked for five years at Sulmac, Kenya's biggest flower exporter, and 
then started his own business. Today he has a 40-acre farm where he employs 210 people, 
producing about 20 million stems a year from irrigated land. The growing season lasts from 
October to March or April, which avoids the European summer during which European 
flower growers dominate the market 
The grower's main flowers are Alstroemeria and Solidaster, the latter of which is 
highly prized for use in bouquets because of its bright yellow colours. The future for 
Solidaster cultivation looks bright since bouquets are enjoying growing popularity in 
Europe. The only problem is that it needs about 16 hours of light a day, while the Kenyan 
day lasts no more than 12 hours. So extra illumination is required, and each plant has its 
own light bulb (and the farm a large generator). As well as flowers from his own farm, this 
trader exports other species which he buys from four other farms of 6 to 10 acres each, and 
from a farmers' cooperative of 300 small-scale producers, the only flower cooperative of its 
kind in Kenya. 
The trader has a pre-cooling unit at his farm, in which cut flowers are chilled before 
being transported to the airport Once they have arrived at the airport, they are stored in a 
cold store belonging to Oserean, another leading flower exporter, until being loaded into an 
aircraft chartered by Oserean. That firm charters more air cargo space than it needs and hires 
out part of it to smaller flower exporters. 
Once exported, the flowers are sold either at an auction in Holland or on contract to 
importers in Switzerland and Germany. These two sales methods are complementary. 
Contracts specify price but not quantities, leaving the trader with unsold flowers in the event 
of low prices in the European market; the auction system allows the sale of variable 
quantities but at fluctuating prices. 
When asked the main problem he was facing, this trader mentioned the high taxation 
on aeroplane fuel imposed by the Kenyan government This inflates the Kenyan freight rates 
in comparison to other African countries competing in the international flower market such 
as neighbouring Tanzania. 
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Case 2. An inexperienced flower producer-exporter with hired expertise 
The second interviewed exporter is primarily an importer of agrochemicals, who went into 
rose farming and exporting some years ago. He has litde expert knowledge of roses, but 
brings in a consultant from Israel twice a month. His rose farm consists of two hectares of 
greenhouses, producing five million stems per season. As roses are rather new in Kenya and 
established rose farmers were not willing to share their expertise, the selection of suitable 
varieties required a considerable investment of time and money. Post-harvest handling and 
transport also had to be developed by trial and error, as roses are delicate flowers that need to 
be kept at around three degrees centigrade during the entire length of transport. 
The trader uses planes chartered by Oserean but, he says, there are problems in 
depending on others for cargo space, especially close to demand peaks in Europe (e.g. 
Christmas and Mother's Day). For those two high points in the market year, he has to be 
sure of getting his flowers to Europe in time, but he knows that Oserean will give priority to 
filling the aircraft with its own flowers. There is little point in approaching another large 
exporter to hire cargo space, since all are competing at such a prime market time. If he is 
unsuccessful in finding cargo space, the trader may have to send his flowers to auction two 
days after Christmas instead of two days before. 
A future problem foreseen by the rose exporter involves complaints by European 
flower growers about increasing competition from countries like Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
Colombia and Israel. European growers are trying to stop the flower auction organizations, 
in which they are shareholders, from accepting flowers from those countries. At the same 
time they are urging the European Union (EU) to impose import restrictions. The EU has 
already developed rules requiring the destruction of imported flowers that originate from 
illegally multiplied planting material, the origin of which can be checked through the 
multiplication farms which sell such material. 
The EU rule will affect the smallholders who work with illegally multiplied material 
because the royalties are too expensive for them The multiplication farmers are also reluctant 
to deal with smallholders, because until 1995 Kenya had not signed the UPOV convention, 
an international treaty protecting their rights. Strict EU controls on planting material do not 
affect the large-scale producers, but they may be a sign of things to come (see also Appendix 
5.5). 
A factor that may contribute to further actions by the EU is the negative image of the 
Kenyan flower producers in certain European countries. One German organization, for 
example, has threatened to organize a boycott of Kenyan flowers because the labourers on 
Kenyan farms are thought to be not properly protected during the spraying of the flowers. 
Labour unions have raised questions about the wages paid to Kenyan labourers, and 
environmental organizations are criticizing the excessive use of agrochemicals, which pollute 
lakes near Kenyan flower farms. Such developments are of interest to European flower 
growers who want to keep African flowers outside the EU market 
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Case 3. A producer-exporter of French beans 
The third trader is a Kenyan exporter who has been in business for many years, chiefly 
exporting French beans. In addition, he exports some mangoes, avocados, passion fruit, and 
apple bananas (a small, sweet variety of banana), and he is trying his luck with snow peas. 
He has two irrigated farms of 100 and 50 acres respectively, on which he employs some 150 
people all told. He buys French beans from about 100 smallholders and buys mangoes from 
agents in the coastal area of Kenya, but otherwise all his commodities originate from his own 
farms. During the off-season in the export market (June-September) he grows tomatoes on 
his farms, which he sells to a local supermarket chain (Uchumi). 
The trader exports 3 to 10 tonnes of French beans per week, depending on demand. 
The commodities are flown to Europe the night after they are picked. Only if a flight is 
delayed are they stored in a cold store belonging to the airport This is rather risky, because 
the cold store breaks down regularly. The trader uses an Air France cargo plane which flies 
to Nairobi twice a week, and he reserves space through a local cargo agent His exports 
(between October and May) are destined for the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and 
Switzerland. Importers place their orders on a weekly basis, which makes long-term 
planning virtually impossible. 
Lack of cargo space has been a problem in the past, but that is now no longer the 
case due to an overall business decline. The slump may be attributed, first to the economic 
recession in Europe that has affected the demand for the commodities handled by the 
exporter, and second, to increasing competition from other African countries in the case of 
French beans, and Israel in the case of avocados. Since the trader is aware that cut flower 
exports are very profitable, he is thinking of converting his vegetable and fruit farms into 
flower estates. 
Case 4. A vegetable and fruit exporter with no production of his own 
The fourth interviewed trader has been in business for over 20 years, and deals with 15 
different commodities, including French beans, courgettes, capsicums and all kinds of Asian 
vegetables. He relies on about a thousand contract farmers in various parts of Kenya, who 
supply him with about a hundred tonnes of produce a day. These smallholders receive seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides and an advance payment in turn for selling the commodities to him 
The trader sells to importers, wholesalers and retailers whom he contacts at trade 
fairs in various European countries. He exports French beans seasonally and Asian 
vegetables throughout the year. For the latter he is given special treatment by airlines, which 
are willing to offer space in the high season in accordance with the trader's performance 
during the low season, when there is an over-supply of cargo space. 
The exporter has a cooling device close to the airport which he uses only when 
flights are delayed, but he expects pre-cooling to become a standard procedure in the near 
future to enhance quality. Although this requires substantial investment, it is necessary to 
keep ahead of competitors from other African countries. 
205 
According to the trader, flexibility is a must at all stages of the export process. The 
destination of a commodity may change at any moment, even when it is already waiting at 
Nairobi airport. If a cargo of okra has to go to France instead of Britain, the vegetables have 
to be repacked on the spot, because French importers demand smaller boxes than British. 
French beans sold to large retailers such as supermarket chains are even packed in retail 
quantities (so-called pre-packing). The trader complains that the availability of cheap, good-
quality packing material is a problem. To rectify this, several large exporters are planning to 
collaborate in budding a packing material plant 
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Appendix 5.9: 
Case studies of horticultural export processors 
Case 1. Pan African Vegetable Products Ltd. 2 4 
The history of Pan African Vegetable Products Ltd. in Naivasha goes back as far as 1964, 
when the Biddle and Sawer Company, a British firm that had been prominent in the 
marketing of Kenyan pyrethrum, started a vegetable dehydration factory on the edge of 
Naivasha town. The plant's aims were to earn Kenya foreign exchange by selling 
dehydrated vegetables overseas, to prolong shelf life of vegetable produce, to reduce its 
bulkiness in order to save cargo space and reduce transport costs, and last but not least to 
alleviate marketing problems of farmers in and around Naivasha. Those farmers resided 
predominandy in Kinangop Division, Nyandarua District 
From the moment the factory began operations, it showed erratic performance. Its 
capacity was small, but its turnover even smaller, its export markets were ad hoc, and it 
fetched low prices for its dehydrated vegetables and thus incurred financial losses. The 
company went into receivership for the first time in 1968. The Kenyan Government bought 
the factory and renamed it Pan African Foods. 
The performance of the company improved somewhat over the following years, but 
the Kenyan produce was still sold at lower prices in the world market than that of other 
major suppliers, due to its poorer quality. In the early 1970s, the Bruckner Werke company, 
the largest producer of dehydrated vegetables in West Germany, was asked to come in, to 
provide finance, technical know-how and established distribution outlets. The new joint 
venture was called Pan African Vegetable Products Ltd., and it began operating in 1975. 
The factory expanded and the government made land available to serve as nucleus 
estates for the company, where crops could be grown to supplement the produce supplied by 
farmers. Nevertheless, the performance of the company did not improve. The relations 
between 'PanAVeg' and Bruckner were troublesome from the start. The factory accused 
Bruckner of paying insufficient prices, providing insufficient market information, and 
curtailing the possibilities to develop promising distribution outlets. Bruckner in turn became 
annoyed by the factory's inability to maintain high quality standards and produce according 
to plan. Relations were further undermined by exogenous developments: oil prices increased 
dramatically, thus increasing production costs, and the demand for dehydrated vegetables in 
the world market stagnated due to an economic recession in Western Europe. 
The history of the vegetable dehydration plant until 1982 is based on Jaffee (1987), and the more recent 
history on interviews by the present author with the factory management in 1990. 
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In 1982 the company went into receivership for the second time, only to be revived 
in 1986 under the auspices of the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation 
(ICDC), a government parastatal. In order to secure supplies, the management restarted a 
promotion campaign for carrot cultivation in Kinangop division. The company supplied 
carrot seed on credit to the farmers through their cooperative societies. 2 5 Moreover, the 
farmers were promised a guaranteed market outlet and the company was to take care of 
transport to the factory. So far so good, until the factory trucks did not turn up when the 
carrots had been harvested. Those farmers who organized transport to Naivasha themselves 
had to cope with further difficulties. The carrots had to meet all sorts of requirements. They 
were supposed to be of a certain size, colour, moisture content, variety, and to have been 
topped off in a particular way. Finally, the prices the farmers were offered were low 
compared to prices in the market for fresh carrots, and farmers did not receive cash on 
delivery as when they sold to collecting wholesalers. As a consequence, farmers ceased 
carrot cultivation or sold the crop in the fresh market 
After the outgrowers debacle, the factory came to focus almost entirely on production 
on its own estates, which were too small to keep the factory running at anything near full 
capacity. Lack of buyers became a new bottleneck, however. There was no domestic market 
for dehydrated vegetables in Kenya, and the factory was unable to compete in the 
international market The latter fact became especially clear when the German partner left the 
company in 1982, taking with it all its German contacts that had bought most of the produce 
up to then. The factory found no substantial long-term alternative market oudets due to 
severe competition in the international market and the higher quality standards of Asian 
competitors. 
After half a decade of further financial losses and government subsidies to keep the 
factory running, the plant was put up for sale by the ICDC in 1991, as part of the national 
structural adjustment policy of the Government It would take four years to find a buyer that 
would offer more than scrap value for the company's assets. 
Case 2. Bawazir Fruits Processors Ltd. 2 6 
This factory was built in 1988 by an international company called Tropical Food Processors 
Ltd. In 1992 the company closed the factory due to increasing financial losses and sold it to 
a Kenyan business family in 1993. The factory restarted operations in April 1993 under the 
name Bawazir Fruits Processors Ltd. 
The plant is able to produce mango, pineapple, grape, orange, passion fruit and 
tomato concentrates, as well as tinned juices, tomato paste, banana puree and various jams. 
The fruit concentrates and banana puree are intended for the export market and the tinned 
juices, tomato paste and jams for the domestic market. The core of the business is 
production of the fruit concentrates. 
2 5 Many people, including farmers and government officers, thought and still think that the seeds were 
supplied free of charge. 
2 6 The story on Bawazir is based on interviews with the management in December 1993. 
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Less than a year after the restart of its engines, the factory was experiencing serious 
problems. They must have existed at least in part under the previous ownership. On the 
input side, Bawazir had problems acquiring sufficient fruit for its juice concentrates. The 
factory had an annual capacity of 30,000 tonnes of fresh fruit, but was running at one third 
of this. This was due to the low prices offered to farmers for their oranges, mangoes and 
pineapples. Farmers preferred to sell their fruit in the local markets to wholesalers and 
consumers. The factory was not able to pay as much as the local market because of the low 
prices for concentrates in the international market, the high transport costs to the factory, the 
high costs of the steel drums used for packaging, and the quality of the supplies offered. The 
high transport costs were due to the factory's location outside the main production areas of 
oranges, mangoes and pineapples, and the poor condition of many access roads to such 
areas.2 7 The high costs of the drums were related to the depreciation of the Kenyan Shilling, 
which made the imported steel, used by a factory in Thika to make the drums, expensive. 
The quality of the produce was a problem in the case of mangoes and citrus. To get good-
quality concentrate, the factory preferred large fruits produced by trees of a high-yielding 
variety. Most farmers, however, had indigenous trees that produced small fruits. The factory 
used the indigenous fruits for juice production, and to a Umited extent for concentrate 
production. 
In addition to its supply problems the factory had to deal with a lack of customers. 
Competition in the international market was strong, and when the factory closed in 1992, 
customers shifted to other suppliers. Almost a year after reopening, the management had not 
been able to get back any of them, nor had they been able to find new buyers. 
The demand for juice concentrate in the domestic market was negligible. The demand 
for tinned fruit juices was much higher, but the factory was too big to produce only for the 
domestic market (it would only use a small part of its capacity, resulting in high fixed costs 
per selling unit). Moreover, competition was strong once again. The factory had to compete 
with a number of fruit juice tinning factories from up-country, and the demand for tinned 
juice from the tourist hotels at the coast had fallen during recent years because of competition 
by cottage industries.28 
The juice of the cottage industries is cheaper, and it is fresh. The former owner of the 
present Bawazir factory had begun supplying fresh juices to tourist hotels in five-litre plastic 
containers, but after the cottage industries had taken over the idea, the factory was pushed 
out of the market. It was not able to compete with the small-scale entrepreneurs because of 
its capital-intensive method compared to the cheaper labour-intensive one used by the cottage 
industries. The latter use a squeezer and an electric blender of the kitchen type as their only 
mechanical tools. More advanced producers have a deep freeze in which they store the juice 
until it is ordered by their customers. Beginning producers only process the fruits after 
receiving an order. Both buy the fruit at the local market—the Kongowea wholesale market 
in the case of Mombasa and the Municipal market in the case of Malindi. The cottage 
businesses are located near those markets, so their transport costs are low. 
The produce was usually bought from farmers near their farms. Some farmers organized transport to the 
factory themselves. Sometimes a farmers' cooperative society was also used as intermediary at the 
collection stage. 
A cottage industry is a small-scale enterprise located in or around the house of the proprietor. 
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Appendix 6.1: 
Specification of the marketing costs of a Kinangop farmer trading potatoes 
Nairobi wholesale market in the 
Marketing costs in relation to the transport junction 
Seven- tonne trucks are for hire in Nairobi. To get hold of one of such a vehicle, the farmer 
has to take public transport to Nairobi to meet transporters. During his stay in Nairobi he has 
to pay for food and lodging. The first time he goes to Nairobi he needs at least two and a 
half <kys to travel to the city, find a willing transporter, and come back with the truck (and 
driver]!. Subsequent trips can be made in one and a half days because the farmer knows 
where to g o . 2 9 During his absence his part of the work on the farm either has to be 
postponed or casual labour has to be hired. This has its (opportunity) costs. 3 0 
The transporter who agrees to hire out his truck for a trip to the production area and 
back charges the farmer a lump sum that includes petrol, a driver, and two turn boys. The 
first tine the farmer deals with the transporter, he has to pay more than regular customers 
(such its professional collecting wholesalers). Only when the transporter gets to know the 
farmer better will he lower the price to the regular-customer level. 3 1 
The farmer has to bear other transport-related costs as well. He has to purchase 
gunny bags to pack the potatoes. He has to hire young men to extend (top up) filled bags 
with tvined sisal. 3 2 The sisal has to be bought, too. The extended bags have to be loaded 
onto die truck by other hired young men. On arrival in Nairobi, market fees have to be paid 
2 9 Tl e first trip will include half a day of travelling from the farm to Nairobi, one and a half days finding a 
truck for hire, and half a day returning to the farm with the truck. Subsequent trips will take the same 
travelling time, but only half a day to find a truck. Once the farmer knows the transporter well he might 
try to order a truck by phone, using a phone at the local post office. Transporters will be reluctant to 
honour such a request, however, because it means that they do not get an advance payment (see 
msurketing costs in relation to the finance function). 
3 0 Labour has a price in Nyandarua because of the commercial cultivation of vegetables. The opportunity 
costs of the farmer's labour are set at the cost of hired casual farm labour in the area (thus assuming that 
a casual labourer will do the farm work as well as the farmer would do). Labour and travelling costs 
would not have to be included in the calculations if the farmer had to go to Nairobi anyway, for instance 
to visit a doctor or buy inputs. This will normally not be the case, however, because nearby Limuru and 
Niiivasha offer the same services as Nairobi, and a farmer would prefer to stick to doctors and input 
suppliers he knows. 
3 1 Alter the farmer has hired a truck four times in subsequent weeks, the price will be lowered. The 
surcharge for the first four trips is estimated at 10 per cent 
3 2 The topping-up of potato bags is standard procedure (see Section 5.6 in the main text product 
suitability). 
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Box A6.1. Marketing costs in relation to the transport function, 1990 
A. Hiring a 7-tonne truck 
1. Costs of getting hold of the truck: 
- one-way trip to Nairobi: KSh 15 for the local matatu, KSh 40 for the connecting matatu to Nairobi; 
- food and lodging costs during stay in Nairobi: KSh 300 for first trip (2 nights out), KSh 150 for 
subsequent trips (1 night out); 
- opportunity costs of farmer's own labour: KSh 83 (2.5 days) for first trip, KSh 50 (1.5 days) for 
subsequent trips. 
2. Transport costs: 
- Hiring fee for the truck: KSh 4235 per trip for first four trips, KSh 3850 for each additional trip. 
3. Other transport-related costs: 
- gunny bags: KSh 10 per bag; 
- sisal for twining: KSh 10 per bag; 
- hired labour for topping-up and twining bags: KSh 20 per bag; 
- hired labour for loading truck: KSh 2 per bag; 
- entry fee Nairobi market: KSh 6 per bag; 
- hired labour for unloading truck: KSh 2 per bag. 
B. Using public transport 
1. Transport costs: 
- transport fees: KSh 10 per bag for the local matatu, KSh 20 per bag for the connecting matatu to 
Nairobi. 
2. Other transport-related costs: 
- gunny bags: KSh 10 per bag; 
- sisal for twining: KSh 10 per bag; 
- hired labour for topping-up and twining bags: KSh 20 per bag; 
- hired labour for carrying to the market: KSh 5 per bag; 
- entry fee Nairobi market: KSh 6 per bag. 
at the entrance to the Nairobi wholesale market. Once in the market men have to be hired 
once more to unload the truck. All these costs would have been met by the collecting 
wholesaler if the farmer had sold the potatoes at the farm-gate. 
Section A of Box A6.1 above quantifies all transport-related costs to the farmer in 
hiring a 7-tonne truck. The second column of Table 6.1 in the main text shows the average 
transport costs in relation to the total number of potato bags the farmer wants to sell in 
Nairobi, based on a maximum of 60 bags per trip. 3 3 
Rather than hiring a truck, the farmer can use public transport (matatu). This has the 
advantage that the farmer does not have to make a separate trip to Nairobi to organize 
transport, and does not incur the costs involved. He has to bear the costs of empty gunny 
bags, sisal and twine, hired labour for topping-up and twining, transport fees for the local 
matatu and the connecting matatu to Nairobi,3 4 hired labour for carrying the produce to the 
An extended potato bag weighs on average 125 kilograms. A 7-tonne truck should therefore officially 
carry no more than 56 bags per trip. Truck drivers do allow 60 bags without much fuss. Collecting 
wholesalers who own a 7-tonne truck load as many as 70 bags, which is technically possible but leads 
to higher costs from excessive wear and tear on the truck and the need to bribe policemen who check on 
overloading on the way to Nairobi. 
For each matatu the fanner pays a fixed transport fee per bag of potatoes. In addition he has to buy a 
ticket for himself. This rickets is, however, not included in the transport costs, because it is part of the 
payment function as will be explained later on. 
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wholesale market 3 5, and entry fees to the market (see Section B of Box A6.1). The total 
averagu marketing costs in relation to transport are constant, regardless the number of trips 
made (see second column of Table 6.2 in the main text). 
Marketing costs in relation to the storage junction 
A farmer who travels to the market by matatu faces storage costs. The latter may consist of 
interesi: and depreciation on investments in a store, and costs arising from storage losses. To 
start with the first: most farmers in Nyandarua do not have a sophisticated vegetable store, 
and use their house or a low-budget general farm store instead. Therefore, their investments 
with regard to storage are nil, and so are their interest and depreciation. 
This leaves costs in relation to storage losses. If a farmer hires a 7-tonne truck with a 
carrying capacity of 60 bags, all bags from one plot can easily fit into the truck and none of 
the potatoes have to be stored.3 6 If a farmer travels to Nairobi by matatu, he can only carry 3 
bags a! a time (matatu drivers do not allow more bags to avoid excessive overloading). The 
other potatoes harvested from the same plot have to be stored, to be depleted gradually.3 7 
The storage period depends on the number of bags harvested and the number of trips the 
farmer is able to make per week. The farmer has to combine his travels with his farm work, 
and is herefore able to travel to Nairobi twice a week at the most (a trip requiring one and a 
half days). 
The third column of Table 6.2 in the main text shows the average costs in relation to 
storage losses. 3 8 The table goes not further than 114 bags. To get 114 bags to Nairobi 
market would take 38 trips, or almost 5 months travelling twice every week. It is unlikely 
that any farmer could sustain such an effort Moreover, the second potato crop of the year in 
Kinangop is usually harvested five to six months after the first one. 
Marketing costs in relation to the finance function 
A farmer who does not sell his potatoes at the farm gate to a collecting wholesaler will not 
get his money until he has reached the urban market and sold the produce to a distributing 
wholesaler. He has to finance the transport costs from his own resources or with a loan, 
which 
hiring 
in both cases implies interest costs. 3 9 The money requirements are especially high for 
a truck. He will need money to travel by matatu to Nairobi and for food and lodging 
3 5 The matatu station is a few hundred metres away from the wholesale market and casual labourers 
normally carry the bags to the wholesale market 
3 6 According to the farm survey a maximum of 42 bags were sold per plot in 1990. Farmers who sold 
more than 42 bags per harvesting period had planted more than one plot of potatoes (more than 42 bags 
per plot were sold in less than 4 per cent of all potato plots in the sample, N=299). If they sold less, 
they had planted all potatoes on one plot Potatoes from one plot were all harvested at the same time, 
while potatoes from different plots could be harvested simultaneously or in phases. Phase wise 
harvesting required phasewise planting. The length of the rainy season allowed a maximum period of 
one month between the first and last planting. 
3 7 According to field experiments by Durr & Lorenzl (1980) storage losses of potatoes in Kinangop 
av aage 2.3 per cent per week. 
3 8 The value per bag has been set at KSh 180, the average farm-gate price in Nyandarua in 1990. This 
figure is taken instead of the cultivation cost because the farmer has the alternative to sell the potatoes 
to a collecting wholesaler immediately after the harvest Thus, the storage losses, when calculated on 
the basis of opportunity costs, have to be valued against the farm-gate price of the produce. 
3 9 If tie finances the trade from his own resources, the interest costs are opportunity costs. 
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while there. The transporter who hires out the truck will, in the beginning, ask for advance 
payment of the entire rent because he does not know the farmer and does not yet trust him. 
Finally, the farmer will need money to buy gunny bags and sisal twine and to pay casual 
labourers for the topping-up, loading and unloading. 
The period the money is needed is rather short, since hiring a truck to sell one 
truckload of potatoes only takes a few days, and offloading the entire harvest will take two 
months at most. Nevertheless, getting a loan may be cosdy. It has already been noted in 
Section 5.2 that commercial banks do not like to deal with horticultural farmers who want to 
go into trade. Such farmers therefore have to rely on informal money lenders, who charge 
higher interest rates, but do not require collaterals.4 0 The fourth column of Table 6.1 in the 
main text shows the average interest costs per bag in truck transport 
If the farmer takes public transport instead of hiring a truck, the capital requirements 
are much lower, including only the transport-related costs (see Section B of Box A6.1) and 
the costs of a ticket to Nairobi.4 1 In addition to this, the farmer faces a minor financial cost 
because he has to store the potatoes. If he sells the potatoes to a collecting wholesaler he can 
earn interest on the money received. If he bypasses the collecting wholesaler and uses a 
matatu, the potatoes have to be stored, and the lost interest must be treated as an opportunity 
cost. The average interest per bag is quite low, however. 4 2 The fourth column of Table 6.2 
in the main text shows the total average costs in relation to the finance function (including 
interest on the loan and opportunity costs of stored produce) to a farmer using public 
transport 
Marketing costs in relation to the risk-taking function 
Two types of risks are normally mentioned in textbooks on marketing, namely physical and 
market risks. The first concern the destruction or deterioration of the product itself, while the 
second relate to changes in the value of a product as it is marketed. The latter changes can be 
caused by unfavourable price movements, as when changes in consumer taste make the 
product less desirable (Kohls & Uhl, 1990). 
In the case of the potato trade in Kenya, the market risks are small compared to the 
physical risks. Although potato prices in Nairobi fluctuate considerably, that is due mainly to 
seasonal cycles (Durr & Lorenzl, 1980). Such cycles do not cause large market risks 
In 1990, the interest rate at commercial banks on so-called short-term loans was 16.5 per cent per 
annum. Informal money lenders charged approximately 25 per cent interest on all seasonal loans, 
regardless of the precise term. To get the real interest rate, the nominal rate has to be corrected for 
inflation, which was approximately 1 per cent per month in 1990. Thus, the real interest rate on an 
informal loan for two months was 23 per cent 
The fanner needs to buy a one-way matatu ticket to accompany the produce (KSh 55). He can pay his 
return ticket from the money earned from the sales. A farmer who hires a truck incurs no extra costs in 
this respect because he accompanies his produce in the truck. The costs of accompanying produce will 
be explained further under the payment function. 
The fanner can bring his money to the local branch of a commercial bank to be put in a savings 
account He receives 14 per cent interest on an annual basis, of which 4 per cent is left after correction 
for inflation. It can be calculated that the average interest per bag is nil up to 54 bags, and KSh 1 
between 54 bags and 114 bags. The interest would be much higher according to the short-term real 
interest rate in the informal market (23 per cent). However, it is unlikely that an ordinary farmer could 
turn into a successful money lender from one day to the next 
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Box A6.2. Marketing costs in relation to physical risks, 1990 
To calculate the average costs per bag in relation to physical risks, one must know the frequency that 
vehicles get into trouble. It is difficult to generalize these chances because they not only depend on the 
weather but they also differ from one vehicle to the other, depending on the age of the vehicle and the 
experience of the driver. Our general impression in the 1990 harvesting season in Kinangop was that 
one out of every 9 journeys (11%), both by truck and by matatu, was delayed because a vehicle broke 
down or got stuck in the mud. 
In order to quantify the value losses involved, a few assumptions must be made. First, 5 per cent 
of the trips are delayed because of a breakdown and 6 per cent because the vehicle gets stuck. Second, 
quality deterioration of potatoes is highest in the event of a broken-down truck (30% loss in value), 
followed by a stuck truck (20%), a broken-down matatu (15%), and a stuck matatu (10%). Pulling a 
vehicle out of the mud takes less time than repairing a vehicle, and both take less time for a matatu 
than a truck. Moreover, changing to another passing matatu is easier than organizing another hired 
truck. 
Before calculating the average loss per bag of potatoes in relation to type of transport, we have 
to define what value we mean. For the storage losses discussed above, the average farm-gate price of 
KSh 180 was used for the alternative of selling to collecting wholesalers. The same average applies to 
losses in relation to vehicle breakdown, because this is assumed to occur throughout the year 
independent of the weather conditions. Getting stuck in the mud, however, is clearly related to the 
weather, and so are the farm-gate prices that collecting wholesalers are willing to offer. During heavy 
rains with their high risks of getting stuck, traders offer lower prices. These prices must also be 
applied to farmers who would organize transport at that time. Consequendy, possible losses due to a 
stuck vehicle are valued here at KSh 80, the farm-gate price in 1990 during periods of low 
accessibility. 
Based on the above assumptions, it can be calculated that the total average loss per bag of 
potatoes is: 
(5% x 30% x KSh 180) + (6% x 20% x KSh 80) = KSh 3.7 in transport by hired truck, and (5% x 
15% x KSh 180) + (6% x 10% x KSh 80) = KSh 1.9 by matatu. 
because there is no seasonal potato storage between harvesting and selling in the urban 
market 4 3 
That physical risks are much larger than the market risks is mainly due to weather 
and road conditions. Tarmac roads are nonexistent in the production areas of Kinangop, and 
vehicles break down regularly due to the rough roads. Moreover, the high precipitation of 
over 800 mm per annum causes regular floods that block roads and leave vehicles stuck in 
the mud for days. Whenever such things happen, the quality of a perishable good like 
potatoes deteriorates rather quickly, especially because the load is unprotected against 
sunshine and rain. If a farmer sells his produce at the farm-gate to a collecting wholesaler, 
the latter has to bear the costs of such quality losses. The farmer who transports his own 
potatoes to Nairobi bears the risk himself. Box A6.2 above explains the calculations of the 
average loss per bag in transporting the potatoes by hired truck and by matatu. 
Marketing costs in relation to the information function (a transaction cost) 
A farmer who bypasses collecting wholesalers to sell his potatoes to distributing wholesalers 
in Nairobi has to develop a knowledge of the Nairobi market. He has to know who the 
The short-term risks are slightly greater in transport by matatu than by truck because depletion of a 
farmer's stock may then take several months. However, it is difficult to make accurate estimates of price 
fluctuations during such a period, because short-term price movements depend on unpredictable factors 
such as the weather. 
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distributing wholesalers are in the market, and who their brokers are, and how such traders 
should be approached. In addition he needs to know what price he can expect on the day he 
brings his potatoes to the market The problem is that such knowledge can only be gained 
through experience. Traders in the market do not have a signboard, and prices are neither 
fixed nor announced in the market 4 4 Only when the farmer brings potatoes to the market 
regularly will he gain a sense of the trading practices, trader strategies and price 
developments. 
Due to his lack of information on his first trips to Nairobi, the farmer receives a 
lower price than collecting wholesalers. These lost revenues can be defined as the farmer's 
information costs. 4 5 On subsequent trips the farmer's knowledge increases and he will make 
a better price. 4 6 The sixth column of Table 6.1 in the main text shows the average 
information costs (revenue losses) per bag of potatoes when he hires a truck. The costs are 
constant up to 60 bags, the maximum number carried in one trip. 4 7 Thereafter the average 
costs decrease as a result of the lower information costs on subsequent trips and the levelling 
out of the high information costs of the first trip. The sixth column of Table 6.2 in the main 
text shows the average information costs when he uses public transport 
Marketing costs in relation to the negotiation function (a transaction cost) 
Prices in the Nairobi wholesale market are determined through negotiation. The results of the 
negotiations depend on two factors. The first is knowledge of the market system and price 
developments. The costs of the negotiation function coincide here with those of the 
information function. The second factor is the number of bags of potatoes offered for sale. 
Collecting wholesalers always arrive in Nairobi with a fully loaded truck, both to reduce 
their average transport costs and to have a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis distributing 
wholesalers. The more bags the latter traders can buy at one go, the shorter their average 
negotiating time per bag, and hence the greater their willingness to offer a higher price per 
bag. 4 8 This is a matter of concern to a farmer who hires a truck but is not able to fill it 
completely, and even more so for one that brings three bags of potatoes by matatu to the 
market The latter will never be able to get the same price as a collecting wholesaler, even if 
Prices in the Nairobi wholesale market are announced on the radio, but these are selling prices, not 
buying prices. Moreover, many people have their doubts about the accuracy of the broadcasted prices 
(see Section S.6 in the main text price information). 
It is estimated that during his first trip, the farmer receives some 20 per cent less than the average price 
made by collecting wholesalers. The latter traders report that a fanner may even end up selling his 
produce to one of these collecting wholesalers while assuming he is dealing with a distributing 
wholesaler. That is because the market place is too small to bring all produce in, and part of the produce 
changes hands without entering the market 
It is estimated that he receives 10 per cent less during his second, third and fourth trip. On subsequent 
trips he receives the same price as collecting wholesalers. For the purpose of our calculations, his 
information costs for such subsequent trips are considered to be zero, because by then he is familiar with 
trading practices and strategies in the wholesale market and he acquires the latest information on price 
developments by accompanying his produce there. The costs of accompanying produce will be dealt 
with under the payment function (see 'marketing costs in relation to the payment function' below). 
It may be expected that in quantities up to 60 bags the farmer will carry all produce by hired truck to 
Nairobi in one go. Hiring a truck three times to carry 20 bags a trip would be very cosdy indeed. 
The negotiating time per bag is lower when more bags are bought at once because a trader will negotiate 
approximately as long about the price for 60 bags of potatoes as about the price of 40 bags. 
Negotiations for 30 bags will probably take longer than for 3 bags, but not ten times as long. 
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he frequents the market as much as the wholesaler.4 9 The average negotiation costs per bag 
of potatoes are shown for a hired truck in the seventh column of Table 6.1 in the main text 
and for a matatu in the seventh column of Table 6.2. 5 0 
Marketing costs in relation to the payment function (a transaction cost) 
To bypass the collecting wholesalers, the farmer carries the potatoes to Nairobi himself. In 
theory the farmer might also ask somebody he knows who is going to Nairobi anyway to 
accompany the produce and do the selling. However, he will prefer to travel to Nairobi 
himself, for two reasons. First, knowledge about the market system and price developments 
will only accumulate when the same person does the selling all the time. Second, the 
distributing wholesalers pay cash on delivery and the farmer will only trust himself (or his 
close relatives) when it comes to bringing the money back home. He will therefore 
accompany the produce as part of the payment function.51 
The costs of accompanying the produce are related to the type of transport used. 
When using a hired truck, the farmer can sit in the truck on the journey out He has to travel 
back home by matatu.52 The entire trip takes one and a half days, including half a day to 
load the truck and travel to Nairobi, and one day to sell the produce and return home. The 
farmer does not spend the night in a hotel but in the truck to make sure the potatoes are not 
stolen. The truck is parked in the queue with other produce trucks in front of the wholesale 
market Since he has no lodging costs, only food costs remain. 5 3 On top of the travel and 
food costs, the opportunity costs of the farmer's labour have to be counted. 5 4 The eighth 
column of Table 6.1 in the main text shows the average payment costs (costs of 
accompanying the produce) per bag when using a hired truck. 
When using public transport instead of a hired truck, the farmer must buy tickets to 
and from Nairobi. The entire trip will again take one and a half days. The farmer will travel 
during the afternoon and night and return the next day after selling the potatoes. Based on 
three bags per trip, the average payment costs when the farmer uses public transport are 
shown in the eighth column of Table 6.2 in the main text 
The difference in price in relation to lot size is estimated to be 10 per cent for those offering fewer than 
10 bags for sale, 5 per cent for less than 30 bags (half a truckload), and 25 per cent for less than 60 
bags (1 truckload). For the purpose of our calculations, the negotiation costs are considered to be zero 
for a full truck (60 bags). In reality the negotiation costs are then equal to the costs of the time spent by 
the farmer in the negotiation process. However, that is part of the total time required to accompany the 
produce to the wholesale market The latter costs are dealt with under the payment function (see 
"marketing costs in relation to the payment function' below). 
A farmer who takes a matatu will always get 10 per cent less (KSh 34) because he offers 3 bags for sale 
at a rime (it is assumed he will try to minimize transport costs by carrying the maximum number of 
bags allowed by the matatu driver). 
If he does not collect the money himself but entrusts it to someone else, he could face high enforcement 
costs to get the money later. Accompanying the produce and collecting the money saves the farmer 
these enforcement costs (see also Section 6.1 in the main text on perceptions of distributing wholesalers 
with regard to the risks involved). 
A one-way trip by matatu costs KSh 55 (see costs in relation to the transport function). 
The food costs are KSh 50 per day out Stricdy speaking, the food costs until the bags are sold (half a 
day: KSh 25) should also to be included in the loan mentioned under the finance function. The related 
interest costs per bag of potatoes are, however, very small or negligible and therefore ignored. 
The opportunity costs of the farmers own labour are KSh 33 per day (see 'marketing costs in relation to 
the transport function' above). 
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Appendix 7.1: 
Sample overlap and difference between the two analytic alternatives 
analysis of all trade flows, rural assembl y markets excluded 
no. of cases 
included in 
sample 
no. of cases 
excluded from 
sample 
all 
cases 
analysis of 
no. of cases 
included in 
sample 
1838 636 2474 
trade flows 
with known 
terminal 
markets 
no. of cases 
excluded from 
sample 
844 458 1302 
all cases 2682 1094 3776 
Appendix 8.1: 
Additional analyses of step-1 versus step-2 channels for trade flows with 
known terminal markets 
A. Alternative values of the variable POPSIZE for Daraja Mbili market 
Al. Results for first alternative (POPSIZE = 11.037) 
Total number of cases 725 
Number of selected cases 725 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP2 
Model Chi-Square 114.1 (df=6, p=0.000) 
Correcdy classified observations 67.5% (t=9.4, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 0 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.5237 0.1106 22.43 0.0000 
POPDENSITY -0.1104 0.0457 5.85 0.0156 
INVTRANSTIME - 0.6182 0.1482 17.41 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.4361 0.2238 3.80 0.0513 
TUBERS 0.0413 0.2213 0.03 0.8518 
TURNOVER 0.0059 0.0067 0.79 0.3728 
Constant 1.4571 0.2372 37.74 0.0000 
A2. Results for second alternative (POPSIZE = 33.112) 
Total number of cases 725 
Number of selected cases 725 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP2 
Model Chi-Square 113.9 (df=6,p=0.000) 
Correcdy classified observations 67.5%(t=9.4,p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 0 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.5194 0.1102 2224 0.0000 
POPDENSITY -0.1118 0.0457 5.99 0.0144 
INVTRANSTIME - 0.6177 0.1482 17.37 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.4366 0.2238 3.80 0.0511 
TUBERS 0.0379 0.2212 0.03 0.8640 
TURNOVER 0.0060 0.0067 0.81 0.3684 
Constant 1.4565 0.2371 37.72 0.0000 
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B. Other random samples of step-2 channels 
Bl. Results for first alternative 
Total number of cases 754 
Number of selected cases 754 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP2 
Model Chi-Square 1313 (df=6,p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 69.0% (t=10.4, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 0 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE -0.5886 0.1120 27.64 0.0000 
POPDENS1TY - 0.0976 0.0461 4.49 0.0342 
INVTRANSTIME - 0.5781 0.1471 15.45 0.0001 
LEAVES -0.6094 0.2270 7.21 0.0073 
TUBERS 0.1652 0.2144 0.59 0.4411 
TURNOVER 0.0080 0.0067 1.43 0.2322 
Constant 1.4404 0.2371 36.92 0.0000 
B2. Results for second alternative 
Total number of cases 698 
Number of selected cases 698 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP2 
Model Chi-Square 117.8(df=6,p=0.000) 
Correctly classified observations 66.8% (t= =8.9,p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 0 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.4514 0.1073 17.69 0.0000 
POPDENSITV -0.1452 0.0477 9.26 0.0023 
INVTRANSTIME - 0.7323 0.1536 22.73 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.4489 0.2305 3.79 0.0519 
TUBERS 0.0540 0.2217 0.06 0.8075 
TURNOVER -0.0002 0.0071 0.00 0.9749 
Constant 1.6272 0.2465 43.58 0.0000 
Appendix 8.2: 
Additional analyses of step-2 versus step-3 channels for trade flows with 
known terminal markets 
A. Alternative values of the variable POPSIZE for Daraja Mbili market 
AL Results for first alternative (POPSIZE = 11.037) 
Total number of cases 2116 
Number of selected cases 2116 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 545.5 (df=6, p=0.000) 
Correcfly classified observations 73.4 % (t=21.6, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 69 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.2258 0.0884 6.53 0.0106 
POPDENSITY 0.1243 0.0332 14.03 0.0002 
INVTRANSTIME - 1.9411 0.1083 321.00 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.5815 0.1951 8.88 0.0029 
TUBERS 0.0593 0.1235 0.23 0.6315 
TURNOVER - 0.0155 0.0032 23.09 0.0000 
Constant 1.5059 0.1133 176.65 0.0000 
A2. Results for second alternative (POPSIZE = 33.112) 
Total number of cases 2116 
Number of selected cases 2116 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 545.6 (df=6, p=0.000) 
Correcfly classified observations 73.4 % (t=21.6, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 69 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.2270 0.0882 6.63 0.0100 
POPDENSITY 0.1238 0.0331 13.94 0.0002 
INVTRANSTIME - 1.9411 0.1084 320.96 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.5824 0.1951 8.91 0.0028 
TUBERS - 0.0599 0.1235 0.24 0.6275 
TURNOVER - 0.0155 0.0032 23.11 0.0000 
Constant 1.5070 0.1134 176.73 0.0000 
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Appendix 8.3: 
Additional analyses for step-1 versus step-3 channels for trade flows with 
known terminal markets 
A. Alternative values of the variable POPSIZE for Daraja Mbili market 
Al. Results for first alternative (POPSIZE = 11.037) 
Total number of cases 748 
Number of selected cases 748 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 415.8 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 81.8 % (t=173, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 35 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wakl Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.4888 0.1446 11.42 0.0007 
POPDENSITY 0.0353 0.0614 0.33 0.5645 
INVTRANSTIME - 2.3959 0.1985 145.68 0.0000 
LEAVES -1.0635 0.3371 9.95 0.0016 
TUBERS 0.0092 0.2648 0.00 0.9722 
TURNOVER - 0.0237 0.0078 9.16 0.0025 
Constant 2.9066 0.2525 132.49 0.0000 
A2. Results for second alternative (POPSIZE = 33.112) 
Total number of cases 748 
Number of selected cases 748 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 415.5 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 81.8 % (t=173, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 35 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.4814 0.1441 11.16 0.0008 
POPDENSITY 0.0337 0.0614 0.30 0.5830 
INVTRANSTIME - 2.3960 0.1986 145.55 0.0000 
LEAVES - 1.0638 0.3371 9.96 0.0016 
TUBERS 0.0062 0.2648 0.00 0.9813 
TURNOVER - 0.0237 0.0078 9.10 0.0026 
Constant 2.9056 0.2525 132.45 0.0000 
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B. Other random samples of step-3 channels 
Bl. Results for first alternative 
Total number of cases 720 
Number of selected cases 720 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 413.4 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 82.1 % (t=17.2, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 30 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPS1ZE - 0.4498 0.1509 8.88 0.0029 
POPDENSITY 0.0245 0.0628 0.15 0.6970 
1NVTRANSTIME -2.4968 0.2114 139.44 0.0000 
LEAVES -1.1157 0.3476 10.30 0.0013 
TUBERS 0.0042 0.2684 0.00 0.9875 
TURNOVER - 0.0225 0.0079 8.11 0.0044 
Constant 2.9068 0.2624 122.69 0.0000 
B2. Results for second alternative 
Total number of cases 719 
Number of selected cases 719 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 416.5 (df=6, p=0.000) 
Correcdy classified observations 81.5 % (t=16.9, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 35 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.5192 0.1501 11.97 0.0005 
POPDENSITY 0.0250 0.0640 0.15 0.6958 
INVTRANSTIME -2.4648 0.2101 137.68 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.9772 0.3515 7.73 0.0054 
TUBERS 0.0436 0.2705 0.03 0.8718 
TURNOVER - 0.0200 0.0082 5.91 0.0151 
Constant 2.8283 0.2613 117.19 0.0000 
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Appendix 8.4: 
Binary analyses using all trade flows, rural assembly markets excluded5 5 
A. ANALYSIS STEP-1 VERSUS STEP-2 CHANNELS 
Al. Results of analysis 
Total number of cases 465 
Number of selected cases 465 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP2 
Model Chi-Square 66.7 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 63.9% (t=5.9, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 1 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZK -0.6265 0.1958 10.24 0.0014 
POPDENSITY - 0.0122 0.0682 0.03 0.8585 
INVTRANSTIME - 0.6703 0.1812 13.69 0.0002 
LEAVES - 0.4658 0.2763 2.84 0.0918 
TUBERS 0.4321 0.2863 2.28 0.1312 
TURNOVER 0.0046 0.0083 0.31 0.5749 
Constant 1.1263 0.3025 13.86 0.0002 
A2. Results of analysis with other random samples of step-2 channels 
All. Results for first alternative 
Total number of cases 442 
Number of selected cases 442 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP2 
Model Chi-Square 43.0 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 62.0% (t=5.0, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 0 
Heteroskedasticity occurred in all the analyses, similar to that found in the analysis of trade flows with 
known terminal markets. It could be solved as before by taking the inversions of POPSIZE and 
TRANSTIME. Daraja Mbili market is not included in the present analyses because it is a rural 
assembly market (in the analysis of trade flows with known terminal markets, the analysis had to be 
repeated for different POPSIZE values of this market). 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.6467 0.2047 9.98 
POPDENSITY - 0.0165 0.0671 0.06 
INVTRANSTIME - 0.4651 0.1756 7.01 
LEAVES - 0.4152 0.2623 2.51 
TUBERS 0.0124 0.3013 0.00 
TURNOVER 0.0087 0.0094 0.85 
Constant 0.7577 0.3240 5.47 
A22. Results for second alternative 
Total number of cases 446 
Number of selected cases 446 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP2 
Model Chi-Square 47.5 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correcfly classified observations 62.1% (t=5.1, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 2 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.6750 0.2070 10.63 
POPDENSITY 0.0204 0.0677 0.09 
INVTRANSTIME - 0.4674 0.1830 6.53 
LEAVES - 0.2205 0.2583 0.73 
TUBERS 0.3641 0.2950 1.52 
TURNOVER 0.0108 0.0089 1.48 
Constant 0.6575 0.3193 4.24 
B. ANALYSIS STEP-2 VERSUS STEP-3 CHANNELS 
Bl. Results of analysis 
Total number of cases 1689 
Number of selected cases 1689 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 332.5 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correcdy classified observations 68.9% (t=15.5, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 24 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.3704 0.1288 8.27 
POPDENSITY 0.0574 0.0370 2.41 
INVTRANSTIME -1.4451 0.1027 197.96 
LEAVES -0.4060 0.1829 4.93 
TUBERS - 0.0937 0.1419 0.44 
TURNOVER - 0.0075 0.0030 6.38 
Constant 1.2482 0.1245 100.46 
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B2. Results of analysis with other random samples of step-3 channels 
B21. Results for first alternative 
Total number of cases 1727 
Number of selected cases 1727 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 3355 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 70.0% (ts=16.6, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 22 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE -0.3240 0.1228 6.96 0.0083 
POPDENSITY 0.0501 0.0373 1.81 0.1789 
INVTRANSTIME - 1.4139 0.1003 198.60 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.4390 0.1829 5.76 0.0164 
TUBERS -0.0454 0.1393 0.11 0.7446 
TURNOVER -0.0072 0.0029 6.07 0.0137 
Constant 1.2669 0.1239 104.51 0.0000 
B22. Results for second alternative 
Total number of cases 1705 
Number of selected cases 1705 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 307.8 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 68.6% (t=15.4, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 24 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.3295 0.1235 7.12 0.0076 
POPDENSITY 0.0575 0.0367 2.46 0.1167 
INVTRANSTIME -1.3629 0.0988 190.31 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.3832 0.1779 4.64 0.0312 
TUBERS - 0.1907 0.1430 1.78 0.1824 
TURNOVER - 0.0071 0.0030 5.54 0.0186 
Constant 1.2230 0.1239 97.37 0.0000 
C. ANALYSIS STEP-1 VERSUS STEP-3 CHANNELS 
CI. Results of analysis 
Total number of cases 448 
Number of selected cases 448 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 194.9 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 76.3% (tpl 1.2, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 18 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.7375 0.3160 5.45 0.0196 
POPDENSITY 0.1350 0.0824 2.69 0.1013 
INVTRANSTIME - 2.0379 0.2313 77.60 0.0000 
LEAVES -0.6092 0.3602 2.86 0.0908 
TUBERS 0.3123 0.3440 0.82 0.3640 
TURNOVER -0.0097 0.0089 1.19 0.2745 
Constant 2.0352 0.3028 45.17 0.0000 
C2. Results of analysis with other random samples of step-3 channels 
C21. Results for first alternative 
Total number of cases 443 
Number of selected cases 443 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 190.0 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correcay classified observations 74.3% (t=10.2, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 5 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.5989 0.2766 4.69 0.0304 
POPDENSITY 0.0234 0.0864 0.07 0.7867 
INVTRANSTIME - 1.8576 0.2239 68.82 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.8049 0.3685 4.77 0.0289 
TUBERS 0.0673 0.3301 0.04 0.8384 
TURNOVER - 0.0031 0.0085 0.13 0.7209 
Constant 2.0461 0.3084 44.00 0.0000 
C22. Results for second alternative 
Total number of cases 464 
Number of selected cases 464 
Dependent variable (0,1) STEP3 
Model Chi-Square 192.5 (df=6, p=0.0000) 
Correctly classified observations 75.4% (t=10.9, p=0.000) 
Number of extreme cases 12 
Variables in the equation: B S.E. Wald Sig. 
INVPOPSIZE - 0.4634 0.2327 3.97 0.0464 
POPDENSITY 0.0175 0.0822 0.05 0.8312 
INVTRANSTIME - 1.9076 0.2185 7621 0.0000 
LEAVES - 0.4104 0.3456 1.41 0.2350 
TUBERS 0.1901 0.3333 0.33 0.5683 
TURNOVER - 0.0107 0.0082 1.70 0.1919 
Constant 2.2018 0.2935 5627 0.0000 
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Appendix 9.1: 
Policy recommendations 
In this appendix some ideas are developed for short-term improvements in the horticultural 
sector (first part) and for long-term policies (second part). Recommendations are made 
which may be of use to actors and institutions operating in the sector as well as to the 
Kenyan government. Private market intermediaries must carry out the job, but some state 
regulation is advocated, for instance when it comes to the standardization of wholesale units. 
In addition, state investments in facilities such as roads, market places and improved 
information systems are seen as important. Finally, it is argued that extension services and 
training are needed to improve the sector's capacity to solve its own problems. 
Short-term improvements in market performance 
Various problems and constraints hamper the present performance of the sector. Some 
recommendations will be made that may apply not only to Kenya but also to other African 
countries with similar horticultural production and marketing systems. 
The domestic market and the export market are dealt with separately. Their producers 
and market intermediaries differ, and their marketing problems and constraints are not 
necessarily the same. 
The domestic market 
The first constraint that demands attention in the domestic market is the quality of produce 
entering the market Marketing channels may be very efficient and effective but that is to no 
avail if the quality of the produce is poor to start with. The quality is poor for various 
reasons. 5 6 Farmers use uncertified seeds and planting material, because certified ones are 
either not available or too expensive. The crop is attacked by pests and diseases, which 
prosper due to a lack of crop rotation, scarcity of affordable agro-chemicals, and untimely 
and indiscriminate use of them. Fertilizer applications are low because farmers lack 
knowledge about the use of fertilizers or do not have the money to buy them. Agro-
chemicals are sprayed right until the last moment and sometimes even after harvesting, 
leaving high chemical residues in the food of consumers. In sum, poor quality is the result 
of lack of financial means, failing supply and inadequate knowledge. It is recommended that 
Section 3.4 (in the main text). 
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the lack of financial means be tackled through some kind of credit system, as will be 
discussed more in general later on. In addition, farmers need to be educated by extension 
officers about proper input use. Finally, local seed companies, and government and private 
nurseries require support in their efforts to supply farmers with certified and affordable 
seeds and planting material. 
Once the produce is harvested, marketing problems arise. Poor infrastructure in the 
production areas causes accessibility problems. 5 7 The obvious solution is to improve the 
physical infrastructure. Roads, however, are expensive, especially in horticultural 
production areas located in hilly or mountainous areas with a high precipitation. In some 
parts of Kenya a system has been introduced whereby groups of people are responsible for 
the maintenance of certain stretches of rural roads. They receive a small reward in return. 
The same is being done in other parts of Africa as part of food-for-work programmes. The 
system is recommendable for horticultural production areas. 
As well as by poor roads, the collecting stage of the marketing process is affected by 
the state of rural market places. 5 8 Most of them lack essential facilities such as stalls, toilets, 
fences, and proper drainage systems. They are usually too small, so that many traders sell 
their produce outside the official trading area. The areas themselves change into mudpools 
after every shower. The poor conditions affect the quality of the commodities traded. One 
does not expect every rural market place to have concrete stalls, but it is recommended that 
they at least have a concrete floor, toilets, and a proper drainage system. If the fenced area 
were big enough to harbour all traders, the latter could be required to trade only in the 
official market place. This will make collection of market fees easier. Such fees are only fair, 
however, if the local authorities use at least part of the revenues to improve and maintain the 
marketplace. 
Transport is also a major constraint Trucks for hire are scarce in the production 
areas, and this restricts the possibilities for farmers and collecting wholesalers to get the 
commodities from production areas to large urban centres.5 9 Improved availability of trucks 
would increase competition among collecting wholesalers, which may lead to better prices to 
farmers. It would also give groups of farmers the opportunity to go into trade. Again, some 
kind of credit system is needed that enables issuing loans to farmer groups and traders to 
purchase trucks, even if they lack collateral. 
Produce losses during transport are usually high due to perishability of the 
horticultural commodities and lack of adequate sorting, grading and packing. The Taita HPC 
has shown that such activities repay their costs. 6 0 Improper packing usually does not arise 
from ignorance of farmers and traders, but from a scarcity of timber and the high costs of 
ready-made crates and boxes. The practice of packing vegetables and fruits in very large 
units like extended bags of over 120 kgs and wooden boxes of 80 kgs also stems from the 
present market fee system in the urban wholesale markets, which is based on transport units 
regardless of their size. It is recommended that extension services sensitize farmers and 
traders to the advantages of proper sorting, grading and packing. In advice on appropriate 
5 7 Section 5.6 (in the main text). 
5 8 Section 5.2. 
5 9 Sections 5.6 and 62. 
6 0 Section 5.3. 
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packaging means, both technical and financial aspects have to be taken into account 
Standardization of selling units in the urban wholesale markets has to be realized, for 
example by allowing only non-extended bags and wooden boxes of less than 40 kg to enter 
the market place. 6 1 
Capital is a constraint both in horticultural production and in marketing. Financial 
institutions are reluctant to supply credit for smallholder horticulture.02 Collateral is often a 
problem In some parts of Kenya (e.g. Taita Taveta), farmers have not yet received their tide 
deeds. In other parts, financial institutions have experienced problems in selling land 
mortgaged as collateral because local communities became very hostile to potential buyers 
(e.g. in Kisii). Financial institutions ought to develop a positive attitude towards horticultural 
smallholders. Loans need to be made available both for buying inputs and financing trade. 
Group lending may be recommendable when title deeds are absent or cannot be used as 
collateral.63 
Collecting wholesalers play a crucial role when it comes to marketing horticultural 
commodities, and most farmers cannot do without them. 6 4 However, if farmers organized 
themselves into farmer groups and went into trade themselves, they would receive the trade 
profits that are now being made by the traders. Group marketing by farmers is feasible, as is 
shown by the example of the Taita HPC. 6 5 It requires an elaborate concept that may need to 
include not only organized transport, but also production planning based on the monitoring 
of market prices; input supply; improved sorting, grading and packing; direct selling to 
retailers; and last but not least, independent business-oriented management Whether all 
aspects of the concept are required depends on the type of horticultural commodities handled 
and the market targeted. It is recommended that group marketing only be supported when it 
is based on a well thought-out marketing strategy. 
The bargaining power of horticultural farmers towards traders depends not only on 
supply and demand conditions, as reflected in average farm-gate and market prices, but also 
on knowledge among the farmers about these conditions. The Kenyan government has tried 
to improve the farmers' knowledge by regularly broadcasting the prices prevailing in 
selected urban markets.6 6 The effect has been minimal, since very few horticultural farmers 
listen to the broadcasts. Most of them either do not have a wireless set or batteries, or they 
do not know about the broadcasts, or they listen only to programmes in their tribal language 
which do not include this kind of information. It is therefore recommended that price 
information be broadcasted on regional stations that use local languages. Extension workers 
should sensitize the farmers to the price broadcasts on the radio. They can also listen to the 
6 1 The alternative to standardization is to weigh all produce when it enters, but this does not seem a 
practical option. Standardization must be introduced simultaneously in the largest wholesale markets 
(Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu). The other markets will then follow suit without problems. 
6 2 Section 5.2. 
6 3 Farmers or traders could organize themselves into associations to open savings accounts. Fixed weekly 
or monthly contributions could be used to generate enough capital for them to eventually apply for 
loans, for instance to develop irrigation channels or buy a truck. Meanwhile, the money could be used 
to issue short-term credit to members who want to start or expand their horticultural farm or trade 
business. 
6 4 Section 6.2. 
6 5 Section 5.3. 
6 6 Section 5.6. 
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broadcasts themselves and pass on the information to farmers who have no radios or 
batteries. They could, for instance, write the prices on blackboards in local marketplaces and 
at the Chiefs office. 6 7 
Similarities exist between the constraints in horticultural marketing and those in the 
marketing of grains. To improve the performance of liberalized grain marketing in Africa, 
projects and programmes focus on the development of marketplaces, storage structures and 
rural financial markets; on long-term infrasmictural policies to reduce transport costs; and on 
investment in market-support systems, marketing research, and quality grades and 
standards.68 It is recommended that such initiatives not confine themselves to grains, but be 
expanded to horticultural commodities. As has been shown, they require the same measures. 
Horticulture deserves not to be forgotten. 
The export market 
Although producers and market intermediaries that deal with export commodities are 
generally performing well, they also have problems to cope with. In the production sphere, 
the problems of small-scale producers especially need attention. A major part of the 
production is concentrated on large farms run by export traders. However, small-scale 
farmers are also involved, either as contract farmers or as independent producers who sell to 
export traders.69 The latter group is small but important from a development point of view. 
They act as forerunners of a much larger groups of smallholder producers who are 
considering switching to horticultural export crops. A major problem for them is scarcity of 
appropriate planting material. Local nurseries do not produce the right materials, and 
international breeders are reluctant to deal with small-scale farmers because of risks of illegal 
multiplication. Moreover, certified material that has to be imported is expensive, and small-
scale farmers cannot afford to buy it without receiving some kind of credit Additional credit 
is required to buy agro-chemicals. Therefore, the recommendations formulated above with 
regard to planting material and credit also apply for smallholders focusing on the export 
market 
The farmers also need to be advised, above all on chemical residues. The European 
Union is implementing very stringent rules on maximum residue levels, and smallholders 
stand an increasing chance that their crop will be rejected by exporters, or destroyed on 
arrival in Europe. 7 0 Information is also required on post-harvest handling: proper treatment 
and packing are essential to guard quality. Scarcity of affordable packing materials is a 
problem which is not easy to solve because local low-cost alternatives do not meet the 
required international standards. 
To produce the right varieties, smallholders need to have access to market 
information about demand developments in the international market. At present they are not 
6 7 At present the prices are broadcasted only a few times a week. A daily routine would be better, as prices 
of vegetables and fruits fluctuate substantially from one day to another. The most appropriate time 
would be immediately after the news because farmers who want to save batteries switch off the radio 
after the news. At present broadcasted prices apply only to urban markets. It would be better if prices at 
the major rural assembly markets were included in the broadcasts, as they are nearer to the farm-gate 
price that most farmers have to negotiate for. See also Shepherd (1997). 
6 8 Section 2.3. 
6 9 Section 5.4. 
7 0 Appendices 5.5 and 5.8. 
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abreast of things. Local extension officers cannot help them because they know as little as 
the farmers. It is recommended that a group of extension workers be trained to deal 
specifically with horticultural export crops. 
Large-scale producer-exporters are well capable of solving their own production 
problems. Like exporters who have not gone into production, they do face persistent 
international transport constraints due to scarcity of cargo space. 7 1 The availability of cargo 
space is partly related the number of the number of scheduled passenger flights to Kenya, 
partly to the stopover of cargo planes on their way North, and partly to the willingness of 
charter companies to bring in their planes. One of the decisive factors with regard to the 
latter two categories is the local taxation of jet fuel The tax used to be much higher in Kenya 
than in neighbouring counties. Although it has been reduced now, a further reduction may 
have to be considered. 
A second problem the exporters face is the negative image of Kenyan horticultural 
produce in Europe. 7 2 Efforts have been put into reducing the use of agro-chemicals and 
improving labour conditions on large-scale farms, but the results have not yet been 
communicated to European consumers. It is recommended that this issue be taken up, for 
instance by the Horticultural Crops Development Authority. 
Long-term horticultural policies 
The domestic market 
On the basis of our vertical differentiation model, some recommendations can be made for 
the longer term. Two premises underlie them First, horticultural production for the domestic 
• market is expected to remain a smallholder business. Second, the commodities are to be 
traded in a free-market system Given these conditions, the model that has been proposed in 
this book predicts that changes in urban population, transport time, and rural population 
density have the strongest impact on the marketing system 7 3 
Based on present trends, further urban growth may be expected in Kenya. 7 4 
According to the model, it will increase the importance of more differentiated marketing 
channels, especially if smaller towns are the centres of urban growth. Farmer-traders will 
become scarcer and wholesale traders will arise, partly because some of the produce will be 
brought in from further away (increasing transport time). The growth in wholesale trade 
demands improved market places. The Kenyan government has focused so far on building 
separate wholesale markets, but once established these markets have been found to also 
develop as centres of retail trade.75 The distinction between wholesale and retail horticultural 
trade is rather artificial, and it is therefore recommended that markets be built where both 
types of trade have a place. To ensure that farmers retain direct access to consumers, the new 
7 1 Section 5.4. 
7 2 Section 5.4. 
7 3 Section 8.5. 
7 4 Section 3.1. 
7 5 Section 5.2. 
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market places should have both stalls that are rented out on a monthly basis and a section 
where part-time (farmer-)traders can sell commodities by paying a daily fee. 
At some moment in time, large urban market places will require cold storage 
facilities. Local market authorities may take the initiative to build and manage the facilities. It 
is recommended that they do so only after a thorough feasibility study. Once they are built, 
accountable management and transparent procedures are a prerequisite for running the cold 
stores to the benefit of all market participants. The initiative could also be left to large 
traders. They would probably run the facilities more efficiently and effectively, but at the 
expense of accessibility to smaller traders. Whether private traders or the local market 
authorities take the lead is partly a political choice. 
The presence of cold stores will increase the shelf life of highly perishable 
commodities such as leafy vegetables. According to the model, this will lead to more 
differentiated marketing channels. Farmer-traders will become less important and 
wholesalers more important in the trade of these commodities. This has its bearing on the 
desired infrastructure of the market places where such cold stores would be located. 
In addition to urban growth, rising pressure on rural land may be foreseen. More 
rural households will embark on the horticultural enterprise, which requires relatively little 
land, but the output per farmer will decline. 7 6 According to the research findings, the 
consequent lower supply concentration will increase the need for rural assembly markets.7 7 
The location of such a market within a region has to be based on its relative accessibility: it 
should be better accessible by road or rail than its hinterland. Most assembly markets that 
already exist in Kenya had been small local markets before they evolved their assembling 
function. This suggests that it is better to upgrade a well-situated local market place than to 
establish a new one. Upgrading means improving its accessibility, preferably by means of 
all-weather roads. Investments will pay themselves back, as rural assembly markets are 
expected to maintain their importance at least for the coming decade. 
Beyond the coming decade it is difficult to predict what will happen. For one thing, it 
is hoped that per capita incomes will have increased in the intervening period. This would 
probably lead to a more substantial demand for high-quality produce. As a consequence, 
vertical coordination and integration may become more common in the domestic market 
Farmer groups could take the lead, using a similar strategy to that presently applied by the 
Taita HPC. To become successful, the groups will require technical and managerial support 
For the rest, they should be able to develop without being shackled by political forces. 
Export market 
Long-term developments in the horticultural export market depend on the future structures of 
world supply and demand, and on Kenya's competitiveness. In addition, the production of 
export crops will depend on local developments such as an increasing demand for food, 
accumulating pressure on land, and the rise of a rural proletariat that needs jobs. 
It is difficult to say what the role of Kenyan policymakers could be. One thing may 
be important At present the horticultural export assortment is largely different from the 
assortment offered for sale in the domestic market. To remain a successful exporter in the 
7 6 Section 3.4. 
7 7 Section 6.7. 
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long term, it may be important to have a solid home market 7 8 The Kenyan government 
could play a role in promoting the local consumption of commodities that have hitherto only 
been exported. 
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Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift heeft als onderwerp de structuur en ontwikkeling van afzetkanalen voor 
tuinbouwgewassen in Kenia. Het is gebaseerd op veldonderzoek onder zo'n 500 
tuinbouwboeren in 4 productiegebieden en 750 handelaren in 18 markten. De analyses zijn 
met name gericht op de collecterende fase (van boer naar groothandelaar in de stad) en op 
verticale differentiatieprocessen binnen afzetkanalen voor groente en fruit Er wordt hierbij 
gebruik gemaakt van efficiencytheorieen over de structuur en ontwikkeling van afzetkanalen. 
Tuinbouwgewassen worden in Kenia voornamelijk geproduceerd door kleinschalige 
familiebedrijven. De groenten en het fruit zijn zowel bestemd voor eigen consumptie als voor 
de binnenlandse markt Een beperkt aantal grootschalige ondememingen rieht zieh op de 
produetie van groenten, fruit en bloemen voor de export 
De kleinschalige produetie is bestudeerd in Nyandarua, Kisii, Taita en Taveta, vier 
gebieden die bekend staan om hun commerciele tuinbouw. Uit het veldonderzoek blijkt dat 
de meerderheid van de rurale huishoudens aldaar tuinbouwproducten verkoopt en dat de 
internsten van groot belang zijn voor zowel arme als rijke Segmenten van de bevolking. 
Boeren in €6n gebied richten zieh maar op een beperkt aantal tuinbouwgewassen, 
b.v. aardappelen en kool in Nyandarua, en bananen in Kisii. De regionale specialisatie leidt 
tot problemen. Plantenziekten en plagen grijpen om zieh heen door gebrek aan wisselbouw 
en door het niet of verkeerd gebruiken van bestrijdingsmiddelen. 
De boeren verkopen hun produeten op de boerderij aan handelaren, of op een lokale 
markt aan handelaren en consumenten. De handelaren opereren in een vrijemarkteconomie 
zonder veel overheidsbemoeienis. De Keniaanse overheid heeft groenten en fruit nooit van 
groot strategisch belang geacht (in tegenstelling tot granen, waarvan ze de handel lange tijd 
heeft gemonopoliseerd). De kans dat interventies siecht zouden aflopen is ook groot omdat 
veel tuinbouwproducten zeer bederfelijk zijn en er gebrek is aan koelfaciliteiten. 
Er kunnen verschillende soorten handelaren worden onderscheiden. Op markten in 
rurale gebieden verkopen boeren en detailhandelaren groenten en fruit aan lokale 
consumenten. De waar wordt uitgestald op de grond en in houten kraampjes. De markten 
zijn in bedrijf gedurende twee dagen per week. Sommige rurale markten hebben een 
collecterende funetie. Collecterende groothandelaren kopen er produeten die ze per 
vrachtwagen of bus naar een groothandelsmarkt in de stad vervoeren. Deze urbane markt is 
open gedurende zes dagen per week en heeft meer voorzieningen (b.v. een dak, stenen 
vloer). In de markt verkoopt de collecterende groothandelaar aan distribuerende 
groothandelaren of rechtstreeks aan detailhandelaren die de produeten meenemen naar 
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markten en kiosken elders in de stad. Overigens vindt ook in groothandelsmarkten 
detailhandel plaats, en is het vaak niet goed mogelijk een onderscheid te maken nassen 
groothandelaren en detailhandelaren aangezien 6€n en dezelfde persoon zowel aan 
consumenten als handelaren kan verkopen. 
Uit het veldonderzoek blijkt dat het merendeel van de groenten- en fruithandelaren 
vrouw is. Mannen krijgen alleen telangstelling wanneer de inkomsten relatief hoog zijn. In 
het algemeen zijn de winsten bescheiden. Uitschieters naar boven zijn de collecterende 
groothandel, de distribuerende groothandel in grote Steden en de export. Exporteurs vormen 
een wereld op zieh met hun kantoren, Wagenparken, koelcellen en verkoopafdelingen. Een 
deel van hen verbouwt alle produeten zelf, op grootschalige bedrijven, een ander deel 
gebruikt kleinschalige contracttelers. 
Keniaanse handelaren kunnen voor de inkoop in produedegebieden ondersteuning 
krijgen van agenten. Het transport kan worden uitbesteed aan eigenaren van ezels, 
handkarren, tractoren, busjes en vrachtwagens. In geval van export kunnen vliegtuigen 
worden gecharterd of wordt gebruik gemaakt van lijnvluchten. Banken speien wel een rol in 
de export maar niet in de binnenlandse handel. Betalingen geschieden contant en de meeste 
handelaren komen niet in aanmerking voor een lening. Ze hebben geen onderpand en de 
handelsrisico's worden te hoog geacht 
Er zijn weinig handelscoöperaties in Kenia die zieh met tuinbouwgewassen 
bezighouden. Boeren hebben siechte ervaringen met landbouwcoöperaties, en wanneer ze 
kunnen kiezen tussen een coöperatie en een handelaar kiezen ze voor de laatste. De 
tuinbouwcoöperatie in Taita is een uitzondering. De basis voor haar succes vormen een 
marktgerichte productieplanning, kwaliteitsbeheersing en directe toegang tot detailhandelaren 
via een verkooppunt in de groothandelsmarkt van Mombasa. 
Een klein deel van de Keniaanse groenten en fruit wordt verwerkt. Ketchup, 
tomatenpuree, vruchtensappen en jam zijn bestemd voor lokale consumenten, ingeblikte 
ananas en boontjes voor de export. De export wordt bemoeilijkt door gebrek aan kwalitatief 
goede grondstoffen, siechte infrastruetuur, dure verpakkingsmaterialen en hevige 
coneurrentie op de wereldmarkt. 
Wanneer het gaat om verse groenten en fruit voor de binnenlandse markt is met name 
de collecterende fase van de handel een probleem. Er is ook het minste over bekend. Dit 
proefschrift toont aan dat collecterende groothandelaren een belangrijke rol speien doordat zij 
de efficiency in het afzetkanaal vergroten. Voor een beer uit Kinangop is het voordeliger om 
aan een collecterende groothandelaar te verkopen dan de produeten zelf naar Nairobi te 
brengen (100 km verder). Dit vanwege zijn hoge transport-, financierings- en 
informatiekosten. Voor een distribuerende groothandelaar uit Nairobi is het voordeliger om 
van de collecterende groothandelaar te kopen dan zelf naar de boer te gaan. Hij mist geen 
omzet en is altijd bereikbaar voor zijn klanten. 
Collecterende groothandelaren kopen hun produeten van boeren op de boerderij of in 
een rurale markt met collecterende funetie. In sommige produedegebieden komen veel 
collecterende markten voor (Kisii), in andere bijna geen (Nyandarua). Het verschil wordt in 
dit proefschrift verklaard in termen van transport- en informatiekosten. Collecterende 
markten komen met name voor in gebieden waar boerderijen slechter bereikbaar zijn dan 
lokale markten en waar de produetie per boer klein is. Collecterende groothandelaren die in 
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zulke gebieden geen individuele boeren langsgaan maar hun producten kopen op de lokale 
markt verminderen hun transportkosten. Boeren die naar de markt komen om hun producten 
te verkopen krijgen objectievere prijsinformatie. Wanneer ze hun producten op de boerderij 
verkopen zijn ze voor hun informaüe afhankelijk van de collecterende groothandelaar die de 
producten komt kopen. In de markt kunnen ze informaüe inwinnen bij alle aanwezige 
vragers en aanbieders. 
Niet in elk afzetkanaal komen collecterende groothandelaren voor. Een boer kan ook 
direct aan consumenten verkopen of aan een detailhandelaar. In dit proefschrift is een 
verticaal differentiatiemodel ontwikkeld dat voorspelt wanneer we een bepaald kanaal 
kunnen verwachten. Drie soorten worden onderscheiden: boer -> consument, boer -> 
handelaar -> consument, en boer -> groothandelaar -> detailhandelaar -> consument De 
laatste mogelijkheid kan ook meer dan één groothandelsniveau omvatten (collecterende 
groothandelaar, distribuerende groothandelaar). 
De eerste twee verklärende variabelen in het model zijn het aantal inwoners van de 
plaats waarop het afzetkanaal betrekking heeft en de bevolkingsdichtheid in de omgeving van 
deze plaats. Beide variabelen zijn indicatoren voor de grootte van de consumentenpopulatie 
die door het afzetkanaal wordt bediend. Andere variabelen in het model zijn de duur van het 
transport van boerderij naar consument de houdbaarheid van het product en de omzet van 
de handelaar. Voor elke verklärende variabele is een hypothèse geformuleerd. 
Het model is getest door het uitvoeren van binomiale en multinomiale logistische 
regressieanalyses op deelverzamelingen van zo'n 3800 geregistreerde transacties. Alle vijf de 
hypothesen zijn op z'n minst gedeeltelijk aanvaard. 
De eerste hypothèse is: afzetkanalen voor groenten en fruit zijn meer gedifferentieerd 
naarmate de plaats die door het kanaal wordt bediend meer inwoners heeft Meer inwoners 
vergroot de vraag en daarmee de stroom producten. Dit biedt schaalvoordelen voor 
handelaren die zieh richten op één fase van het handelsproces. De analyses laten zien dat het 
verband tussen bevolkingsgrootte en mate van verticale differentiatie binnen het kanaal niet 
lineair is: een toename van de bevolking vergroot met name de kans op verdere differentiatie 
zolang de plaats nog minder dan 10.000 inwoners heeft. 
De tweede hypothèse luidt: de mate van differentiatie van afze±analen wordt 
beïnvlœd door de bevolkingsdichtheid in de omgeving van de betrokken plaats. Het effect 
kan in théorie zowel positief als negatief zijn. De analyses laten zien dat het effect negatief is 
wanneer de eerste twee kanalen uit het model vergeleken worden (boer -> consument en 
boer -> handelaar -> consument). Er is dan sprake van een aanbodeffect: een hogere 
bevolkingsdichtheid leidt tot meer tuinbouwers van wie een deel naar de markt komt om 
producten aan consumenten te verkopen. Het effect is positief wanneer de laatste twee 
kanalen uit het model vergeleken worden (boer -> handelaar -> consument, en boer -> 
groothandelaar -> detailhandelaar -> consument). Er is dan sprake van een vraageffect: een 
hogere bevolkingsdichtheid leidt tot meer rurale consumenten die van de markt afhankelijk 
zijn. 
De derde hypothèse is dat afzetkanalen meer gedifferentieerd zijn naarmate het 
transport van de boerderij naar de consument meer tijd kost Wanneer het vervoer meer tijd 
in beslag neemt maakt het een belangrijker deel van de totale handelskosten uit en wordt 
daarmee het profiteren van schaalvoordelen belangrijker. De analyses laten zien dat ook het 
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verband tussen vervoerstijd en mate van differentiatie niet lineair is: een toename in tijd 
vergroot met name de kans op verdere differentiatie zolang de totale vervoerstijd nog onder 
de vier mir blijft 
De Vierde hypothèse luidt dat afzetkanalen meer gedifferentieerd zijn wanneer het 
product beter houdbaar is. Om deze hypothèse te testen zijn twee dummyvariabelen in het 
model opgenomen: één voor bladgroenten (relatief siecht houdbaar), en één voor 
knolgewassen (relatief goed houdbaar). Uit de analyses blijkt dat er alleen een significant 
verschil is tussen bladgroenten en andere tuinbouwproducten. De extreme bederfelijkheid 
van bladgroenten vergroot de kans op een minder gedifferentieerd kanaal. Elke transactie in 
het kanaal kost tijd, en deze tijd is relatief Schaars wanneer een product binnen twee dagen 
bederft. 
De vijfde en laatste hypothèse stelt dat afzetkanalen minder gedifferentieerd zijn 
wanneer de handelaren die aan de consument verkopen een grotere omzet hebben. De 
analyses laten zien dat boeren die aan consumenten verkopen (kanaal 1 in het model), en 
handelaren die van boeren kopen om aan consumenten te verkopen (kanaal 2) een grotere 
omzet hebben dan detailhandelaren die van groothandelaren kopen (kanaal 3). De eerste twee 
transporteren zelf nun producten van het productiegebied naar de markt, terwijl de laatste het 
transport overlaten aan groothandelaren. Zelf transporteren wordt economisch 
aantrekkelijker als de hoeveelheden groter zijn (lagere gemiddelde kosten). 
Het model zoals hierboven uiteengezet kan beleidsmakers helpen om tijdig te 
anticiperen op veranderingen in handelsstructuren voor groenten en fruit die het gevolg zijn 
van demografische en infrastructurele ontwikkelingen. Dit geldt niet alleen voor Kenia maar 
ook voor vele andere Afrikaanse landen. Het model kon ontwikkeld worden door de handel 
in groenten en fruit te benaderen met behulp van theorieën over het afzetkanaal. Deze 
theorieën, die in de ontwikkelde landen op grote schaal worden toegepast, blijken hiermee 
ook bijzonder relevant te zijn voor ontwikkelingslanden. Uit de analyses blijkt tevens dat 
ook gravitatietheorieën uit de regionale marketingschool bij kunnen dragen tot een beter 
begrip van marktstructuren in deze landen. 
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